Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned 当所有权被分割时，离散资源的群体激励相容分配

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003

Wataru Ishida , Changwoo Park

We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called “within-group endowments lower bounds”, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the “standard core” and the “exclusion core” (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.

当社会被划分为多个主体群体时，我们引入了分配对象的问题，每个主体集体拥有与其大小相等的一些对象。我们提出了一个新的公理，称为“群内禀赋下界”，它要求每个agent在他所属的群体中发现他的分配至少与他最不喜欢的对象一样理想。除了效率、群体策略证明性和群体明智中立性之外，我们还确定并描述了满足这一公理的一系列规则。我们还考虑了两个核心概念，“标准核心”和“排除核心”（Balbuzanov和Kotowski， 2019）。我们的发现是，它们是独立的概念，不像传统的所有权结构（例如，集体、私人和混合所有权），并且我们提出的规则总是建议在它们的交叉点分配。

引用次数: 0

The topology of poker 扑克的拓扑学

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.013

Laurent Bartholdi , Roman Mikhailov

We introduce a topological invariant of games, based on homotopy theory, that measures their complexity. We examine it in the context of the “Texas Hold'em” variant of poker, and show that the invariant's value is at least 4. We deduce that evaluating the strength of a pair of cards in Texas Hold'em is an intricate problem, and that even the notion of who is bluffing against whom is ill-defined in some situations. The use of higher topological methods to study intransitivity of multi-player games seems new.

基于同伦理论，我们引入了一个拓扑不变量来度量博弈的复杂度。我们在扑克的“德州扑克”变体的背景下检查它，并表明不变量的值至少为4。我们推断，在德州扑克中评估一对牌的强度是一个复杂的问题，甚至在某些情况下，谁在吓唬谁的概念都是不明确的。用高级拓扑方法研究多人博弈的不可传递性似乎是一种新方法。

引用次数: 0

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result 金融系统的合并-分裂抗扰性：一个表征结果

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011

Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena

In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.

本文通过考虑两种弱免疫形式：合并抗扰性和分裂抗扰性，探讨了金融系统环境下的可操纵性问题。不出所料，抗分裂性与债务优先于股权和股权有限责任等基本要求相冲突。值得注意的是，我们提供了一类破产规则的综合特征，这些规则产生了满足合并证明性的财务规则。

引用次数: 0

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice 单交显性：偏好格

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004

Gregorio Curello , Ludvig Sinander

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general ‘maxmin’ class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.

大多数偏好比较都是单交优势的例子。我们研究了单交优势的晶格结构，证明了任意偏好集的最小上界的表征、存在性和唯一性结果。我们应用这些定理来推导新的比较静力学定理，用于集体选择和分析不确定性下的比较静力学定理，并描述相对于野蛮行为的不确定性厌恶偏好的一般“最大”类。

引用次数: 0

Information design in the principal-agent problem 委托代理问题中的信息设计

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.003

Yakov Babichenko , Inbal Talgam-Cohen , Haifeng Xu , Konstantin Zabarnyi

We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a regulator. We consider both the case of a risk-neutral and of a risk-averse agent, focusing mainly on a setting with a limited liability assumption. We provide a clean characterization for implementability of actions and utility profiles by any information structure, which turns out to be simple thresholds on the utilities. We further study naturally-constrained information structures in which the signal emitted from any action is either the action itself or some actions nearby. We show that the worst implementable welfare deteriorates gracefully as the information structure becomes noisier. In a more general class of signaling constraints, we prove that deciding whether a certain action is implementable is NP-complete.

我们研究了委托代理问题的一个变体，其中委托人不直接观察代理人的努力结果；相反，她会根据监管者设计的可变信息结构获得一个关于代理行为的信号。我们考虑了风险中性和风险厌恶代理人的情况，主要关注有限责任假设的设置。我们通过任何信息结构为操作和实用程序配置文件的可实现性提供了一个清晰的特征，这是实用程序的简单阈值。我们进一步研究了自然约束的信息结构，其中任何动作发出的信号要么是动作本身，要么是附近的一些动作。我们表明，当信息结构变得嘈杂时，最差的可实现福利会优雅地恶化。在更一般的一类信令约束中，我们证明了决定某个动作是否可实现是np完全的。

引用次数: 0

The art of concession in General Lotto games 一般乐透游戏中的让步艺术

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006

Rahul Chandan , Keith Paarporn , Dan Kovenock , Mahnoosh Alizadeh , Jason R. Marden

Can intentionally decreasing one’s own competitive abilities provide strategic benefits in adversarial environments? We investigate whether a competitor can gain an advantage by conceding valuable assets to an opponent under a well studied framework known as General Lotto games. While intuition suggests this cannot be done, we demonstrate that concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. We explore concessions in two settings: 1) General Lotto games, which depict 1-vs.-1 adversarial interactions, and 2) coalitional Lotto games, which depict two independent players competing against a common adversary (2-vs.-1) on non-overlapping contests. Our first result shows that conceding budgetary resources cannot be advantageous in either setting. However, we demonstrate that conceding valuable contests can be beneficial in the coalitional setting, characterizing optimal concessions when they exist. When both independent players in the coalitional setting have the option to concede, we characterize the Nash equilibria that emerge in this strategic scenario.

在敌对的环境中，有意降低自己的竞争能力能提供战略利益吗？我们研究了竞争对手是否可以通过将有价值的资产让与对手而获得优势，这一研究框架被称为通用乐透游戏。虽然直觉告诉我们这是不可能做到的，但我们证明，如果做出正确的让步，确实会带来战略上的好处。我们在两种情况下探讨让步：1)一般的乐透游戏，描绘1对1。2)联合乐透游戏，描述两个独立的玩家在不重叠的比赛中与一个共同的对手竞争（2比1）。我们的第一个结果表明，在任何一种情况下，让出预算资源都不会有利。然而，我们证明，在联盟环境中，承认有价值的竞争是有益的，当它们存在时，表现为最优让步。当联盟中的两个独立参与方都可以选择让步时，我们描述了这种战略情景中出现的纳什均衡。

引用次数: 0

BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design BAR纳什均衡及其在区块链设计中的应用

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.008

Olga Gorelkina , Rida Laraki , Maxime Reynouard

This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and applies it to the Verifier's Dilemma, a fundamental problem in the design of blockchain consensus. BARNE extends the Nash Equilibrium (NE) to accommodate interactions among Byzantine, altruistic, and rational agents, known as the BAR setting in the distributed computing literature. We prove the existence of BARNE in a broad class of games and introduce two refinements: global stability and local stability. We demonstrate that in the classical quorum-based blockchain protocol, honestly following the prescribed strategy is not a locally stable BARNE, whereas free-riding is a globally stable BARNE. To address this, we designed a more robust protocol with the same classical guarantees, by incorporating fines and forced errors. Under this new protocol, honesty becomes the unique globally stable BARNE, and free-riding is never a BARNE.

本文提出了一个新的解决方案概念，称为BAR纳什均衡（BARNE），并将其应用于验证者困境，这是区块链共识设计中的一个基本问题。BARNE扩展了纳什均衡（NE），以适应拜占庭、利他和理性代理之间的交互，在分布式计算文献中被称为BAR设置。我们证明了BARNE在一类广泛的对策中的存在性，并引入了全局稳定性和局部稳定性两种改进。我们证明了在经典的基于群体的区块链协议中，诚实地遵循规定的策略不是局部稳定的BARNE，而搭便车是全局稳定的BARNE。为了解决这个问题，我们通过合并罚款和强制错误，设计了一个具有相同经典保证的更健壮的协议。在这个新协议下，诚实成为全球唯一稳定的巴恩，而搭便车永远不是巴恩。

引用次数: 0

Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience 政治突出性、内生从众和政权弹性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011

Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch , Steffen Huck , Macartan Humphreys

We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by “bandwagoning” with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose the greatest threat to seemingly safe regimes: ever smaller shocks become sufficient to drastically escalate into full-blown attacks, i.e., the regime becomes less resilient. Stronger regime safeguards not only directly reduce incentives to attack but can overturn these effects, such that increases in salience boost regime resilience. Our results speak to charged debates about democratic resilience, by identifying how safeguards determine when a rise in citizen interest in political action can lead to a threat to democracy.

我们将政治显著性引入针对政治政权的攻击的规范模型，作为缩放代理从偏袒中获得的表达性回报。均衡平衡了异质表达动机与避免制裁的动机，即与获胜方“随大流”。我们研究了政治显著性的比较静态，我们在平衡稳定性和攻击规模方面进行了表征。一个主要观点是，当对政权的制裁力度较弱时，制裁力度的加大可能对看似安全的政权构成最大威胁：较小的冲击足以急剧升级为全面攻击，也就是说，该政权变得不那么有弹性。更强有力的政权保障措施不仅可以直接减少攻击动机，还可以扭转这些影响，从而增强政权的抵御能力。我们的研究结果通过确定保障措施如何确定公民对政治行动的兴趣上升何时可能导致对民主的威胁，说明了关于民主弹性的激烈辩论。

引用次数: 0

Strategic mobilization of voters 策略性动员选民

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004

Guy Holburn , Davin Raiha

Organized public demonstrations of voter support for policy issues through rallies and petitions are mechanisms by which interest groups sometimes seek to influence political decision-making. We develop a voter-participation model of an interest group's strategic decision to publicly mobilize supportive voters through either a petition with zero participation cost or through a public rally with positive participation cost. Our model shows that voter mobilization can be influential when elected politicians are sufficiently uncertain about two dimensions of voters' preferences, the breadth of support for the issue and the saliency of the issue. The distribution of voter preferences – defined by the numbers of policy supporters and opposers and election vote-switchers and non-switchers – determines whether low or high participation-cost forms of mobilization are optimal. The model's predictions are consistent with recent mobilization campaigns organized by a range of interest groups, such as firms, environmental activists, and racial justice advocates.

通过集会和请愿有组织地公开展示选民对政策问题的支持，是利益集团有时试图影响政治决策的机制。我们建立了利益集团通过零参与成本的请愿或积极参与成本的公众集会公开动员支持性选民的战略决策的选民参与模型。我们的模型表明，当当选的政治家对选民的偏好、对问题的支持广度和问题的显著性这两个维度有足够的不确定性时，选民动员可能会产生影响。选民偏好的分布- -由政策支持者和反对者以及选举投票转换者和非转换者的人数- -决定了低或高参与成本的动员形式是最佳的。该模型的预测与最近一系列利益集团组织的动员运动是一致的，这些利益集团包括公司、环保活动人士和种族正义倡导者。

引用次数: 0

Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams 谁得到了荣誉？团队中的信用归因、溢出效应和低效率

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005

Saltuk Ozerturk , Huseyin Yildirim

We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, organizations may optimally limit spillovers by restricting peer communication or reducing transparency in teamwork. Moreover, concerns about credit-sharing can deter agents from inviting collaborators or selecting the most capable partners when leading projects.

我们研究了具有正溢出效应的环境中的团队激励，以及基于集体成功的事后公共信用的奖励。与事前有效的信用分配（使团队的总体收益最大化）相比，事后信用扭曲了个人激励：当溢出效应较低时，能力较高或成本较低的代理人获得了过多的信用，并付出了过度的努力，但当溢出效应较高时，他们的信用不足，动机不足。为了解决这些低效率问题，组织可以通过限制同伴沟通或降低团队合作的透明度来最佳地限制溢出效应。此外，对信用共享的担忧可能会阻止代理在领导项目时邀请合作者或选择最有能力的合作伙伴。

引用次数: 0

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