Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Understanding dynamic interactions 了解动态互动

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010

Konrad Grabiszewski , Alex Horenstein

Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects deal with are finite dynamic games with complete and perfect information. Understanding involves comprehending the relationships between choices and their consequences. The same backward-induction problem is presented using two distinct representations: tree and non-tree. The crucial difference between them is that the relevant connections between choices and consequences are directly provided in a tree but must be identified in a non-tree. Our study comprises 27 pairs of tree/non-tree interactions with a varying depth. We measure and analyze understanding by looking at success in understanding and the effort it involves. Our subjects struggle with understanding, even more so than solving. Greater depth increases the cognitive effort of understanding and, simultaneously, lowers the success rate in understanding.

处理问题包括理解和解决问题。虽然有大量文献分析了问题的解决，但本文的重点在于理解。研究对象处理的问题是具有完整和完美信息的有限动态博弈。理解包括理解选择及其后果之间的关系。同样的后向归纳问题有两种不同的表现形式：树型和非树型。它们之间的关键区别在于，树型表示法直接提供了选择与后果之间的相关联系，而非树型表示法则必须确定选择与后果之间的相关联系。我们的研究包括 27 对不同深度的树/非树互动。我们通过观察理解的成功率及其所付出的努力来衡量和分析理解。我们的研究对象在理解方面非常吃力，甚至比解决问题还要吃力。深度越大，理解的认知努力就越大，同时，理解的成功率就越低。

引用次数: 0

Local public good equilibrium 地方公益均衡

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.007

Nathan W. Chan , Anne van den Nouweland

We extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies by defining Local Public Good Equilibrium (LPGE). We employ “share functions” for individual agents that allow easy comparisons of consumption utility, both across consumption bundles and across jurisdiction memberships. Share functions furthermore aggregate for parsimonious calculation of equilibrium public good provision within each potential jurisdiction, allowing us to establish a link with hedonic games and deploy results from that literature. We demonstrate in examples how this enables us to show LPGE existence for a far wider class of economies than prior work seeking to extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies. In particular, we demonstrate LPGE existence with heterogeneous agents, a finite number of agents and jurisdictions, endogenous jurisdictional revenues and expenditures, and robustness against coalitional deviations. LPGE admits wide-ranging jurisdiction structures, and we demonstrate how it can generate results on sorting that have attracted interest in the extant literature.

我们通过定义地方公益均衡（LPGE），将比率均衡扩展到地方公益经济。我们采用了个人代理的 "份额函数"，便于比较不同消费组合和不同管辖区成员的消费效用。份额函数还能进一步汇总计算每个潜在管辖区内的公共物品均衡供给，使我们能够与享乐博弈建立联系，并运用该文献中的结果。我们将举例说明，与之前试图将比率均衡扩展到地方公益经济的研究相比，这如何使我们能够为更广泛的经济类型展示 LPGE 的存在。特别是，我们证明了 LPGE 存在于异质代理、有限数量的代理和管辖区、内生的管辖区收入和支出，以及对联盟偏差的稳健性。LPGE 允许广泛的管辖权结构，我们证明了它如何产生排序结果，这些结果在现有文献中备受关注。

引用次数: 0

The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests 借口经济学就业市场上的 "职前测试 "廉价言论

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006

Ran Weksler , Boaz Zik

In the job market, managers typically use pre-employment tests to evaluate a candidate's value. Candidates often respond by claiming, in a non-verifiable way, that circumstances not related to their value impair their ability to perform well in the test and, thus, render the test an unreliable source of information. We term such cheap-talk claims excuses. We show that if the candidate's expected performance in the test sufficiently depends on skills orthogonal to the candidate's value, the candidate may credibly use excuses despite the candidate's transparent motives. In equilibrium, excuses lead to a low prior belief about the candidate's value that is later accompanied by a lenient update process of the test's outcomes.

在就业市场上，管理者通常使用就业前测试来评估应聘者的价值。应聘者通常会以一种无法证实的方式来回应，声称与自身价值无关的情况损害了他们在测试中取得好成绩的能力，从而使测试成为一种不可靠的信息来源。我们把这种低俗的说法称为借口。我们的研究表明，如果候选人在测试中的预期表现充分依赖于与候选人价值正交的技能，那么尽管候选人的动机是透明的，但他仍可以可信地使用借口。在均衡状态下，借口会导致对候选人价值的低先验信念，随后伴随着对测试结果的宽松更新过程。

引用次数: 0

Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games 有限博弈中的正规化贝叶斯最佳响应学习

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.005

Sayan Mukherjee , Souvik Roy

We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian population games with finitely many strategies. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of rest points of the RBBR learning dynamic, and hence the existence of regularized Bayesian equilibrium in Bayesian population games. These equilibria are shown to approximate the Bayesian equilibria of the game for vanishingly small regularizations. We also explore the fundamental properties of the RBBR learning dynamic, which includes the existence of unique solutions from arbitrary initial conditions, as well as the continuity of the solution trajectories thus obtained with respect to the initial conditions. Finally, as applications to the above theory, we introduce the notions of Bayesian potential and Bayesian negative semidefinite games and provide convergence results for such games.

我们引入了异质群体博弈中的正则化贝叶斯最佳响应（RBBR）学习动态概念。我们通过在具有有限多个策略的贝叶斯人口博弈中使用任意下半连续强凸正则扰动来获得这种动态。我们为 RBBR 学习动态的休止点的存在提供了充分条件，因此也为贝叶斯人口博弈中正则化贝叶斯均衡的存在提供了充分条件。这些均衡被证明近似于贝叶斯博弈中的贝叶斯均衡，其正则化程度非常小。我们还探讨了 RBBR 学习动态的基本特性，包括从任意初始条件出发的唯一解的存在性，以及由此获得的解的轨迹相对于初始条件的连续性。最后，作为上述理论的应用，我们引入了贝叶斯势博弈和贝叶斯负半有限博弈的概念，并提供了这类博弈的收敛结果。

引用次数: 0

Seemingly baseless discrimination 看似毫无根据的歧视

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.003

Maciej Dudek

We show that rational profit maximizing firms can find it optimal to wage discriminate against females even though females and males are identical in all respects. Specifically, we argue that a pay gap can emerge naturally as discrimination against females, in the first place, can endogenously affect the elasticity of labor supply and can make the supply of labor of males less elastic and the supply of labor of females more elastic. Furthermore, we note that once this endogenous change in elasticity emerges it in fact makes discrimination optimal and allows discrimination to materialize in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that discrimination against females is detrimental to the overall welfare and in addition it negatively affects wages of males. Consequently, we argue that an equal pay mandate would benefit both genders as in our model there is no tension between females and males, but there is an endogenous extraction of surplus from workers by employers. The key mechanism described in the paper extends naturally to the product markets and can serve as rationalization of the prevalent pink-tax.

我们的研究表明，即使女性和男性在所有方面都完全相同，理性的利润最大化企业也会发现对女性进行工资歧视是最优选择。具体来说，我们认为，薪酬差距可以自然产生，因为对女性的歧视首先会内生地影响劳动力供给的弹性，使男性劳动力供给的弹性降低，女性劳动力供给的弹性提高。此外，我们还注意到，一旦这种弹性的内生性变化出现，事实上就会使歧视成为最优选择，并使歧视在均衡中得以实现。此外，我们还表明，对女性的歧视不利于整体福利，而且还会对男性的工资产生负面影响。因此，我们认为，同工同酬的规定对两性都有利，因为在我们的模型中，女性和男性之间并不存在紧张关系，但存在雇主从工人身上榨取剩余的内生现象。本文所描述的关键机制自然而然地延伸到了产品市场，可以作为流行的粉红税的合理化。

引用次数: 0

Strategic ambiguity in global games 全球博弈中的战略模糊性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.004

Takashi Ui

In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs. We study the impacts of strategic ambiguity in global games and demonstrate the distinct effects of ambiguous-quality and low-quality information. Ambiguous-quality information makes more players choose an action yielding a constant payoff, whereas (unambiguous) low-quality information makes more players choose an ex-ante best response to the uniform belief over the opponents' actions. If the ex-ante best-response action yields a constant payoff, sufficiently ambiguous-quality information induces a unique equilibrium, whereas sufficiently low-quality information generates multiple equilibria. In applications to financial crises, we show that news of more ambiguous quality triggers a debt rollover crisis, whereas news of less ambiguous quality triggers a currency crisis.

在信息不完全且模糊的博弈中，理性行为不仅取决于基本模糊性（对状态的模糊性），还取决于策略模糊性（对他人行动的模糊性），这进一步诱发了模糊信念的等级。我们研究了全球博弈中战略模糊性的影响，并证明了模糊质量信息和低质量信息的不同影响。模棱两可的信息会让更多棋手选择收益不变的行动，而（不模棱两可的）低质量信息则会让更多棋手选择对对手行动的统一信念的事前最佳回应。如果事前最佳反应行动会产生恒定的收益，那么足够模糊的高质量信息会诱发唯一的均衡，而足够低质量的信息则会产生多重均衡。在金融危机的应用中，我们表明，质量较模糊的消息会引发债务展期危机，而质量较不模糊的消息则会引发货币危机。

引用次数: 0

Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.004

Ying Chen , Tom Lane , Stuart McDonald

We experimentally explore public good production levels and the endogenous formation of network structures to facilitate output sharing among agents with heterogeneous production costs and consumption valuations. Results corroborate the key theoretical insights of Kinateder and Merlino (2017) characterizing how agents form core-periphery networks. However, subjects often produce more and form denser networks than predicted, which sometimes reduces efficiency. There is some tendency for behaviour to converge towards the theoretical equilibrium over repeated play. Our results help us understand the emergence of the law of the few in real-world networks, and suggest it is driven by endogenous sorting of heterogeneous agents.

引用次数: 0

Inference from biased polls 从有偏见的民意调查中得出推论

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.007

Andy Brownback , Nathaniel Burke , Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch

People often attempt to present a positive image by overstating virtuous behaviors when responding to unincentivized “polls.” We examine whether others account for this “socially desirable responding” (SDR) when drawing inferences from such unincentivized responses. In an experiment, we incentivize “predictors” to guess others' choice behaviors across actions with varying social desirability. Predictors observe random subsamples of either (i) incentivized choices or (ii) hypothetical claims. The hypothetical claims exhibit systematic SDR and predictors are reasonably skeptical of them. However, their skepticism is not tailored to the direction or magnitude of SDR. This under-correction occurs even though subjects' stated sentiment toward the actions can predict SDR.

人们在回答无激励的 "民意测验 "时，往往试图通过夸大美德行为来展示自己的正面形象。我们研究了其他人在从这种无激励的回答中得出推论时，是否会考虑到这种 "社会期望的回答"（SDR）。在一项实验中，我们激励 "预测者 "猜测他人在不同社会可取性行动中的选择行为。预测者观察随机子样本（i）受激励的选择或（ii）假设性主张。假设性主张表现出系统性的社会可取性，预测者对其持合理怀疑态度。然而，他们的怀疑态度并不是根据特别提款权的方向或大小而调整的。即使受试者对行为的陈述情绪可以预测 SDR，这种修正不足的情况还是会发生。

引用次数: 0

Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment 个性化定价和隐私需求的战略对策：一项实验

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.008

Inácio Bó , Li Chen , Rustamdjan Hakimov

We consider situations in which consumers are aware that a statistical model determines the price of a product based on their observed behavior. Using a novel experiment varying the context similarity between participant data and a product, we find that participants manipulate their responses to a survey regarding personal characteristics, and manipulation is more successful when the contexts are similar. Moreover, participants demand less privacy, and make less optimal privacy choices when the contexts are less similar. Our findings highlight the importance of data privacy policies in the age of big data, in which behavior in apparently unrelated contexts might affect prices.

我们考虑的情况是，消费者知道一个统计模型会根据他们的观察行为决定产品的价格。我们通过一个新颖的实验，改变参与者数据和产品之间的情境相似性，发现参与者会操纵他们对个人特征调查的回答，而情境相似时，操纵会更成功。此外，当情境相似度较低时，参与者对隐私的要求较低，做出的最佳隐私选择也较少。我们的研究结果凸显了大数据时代数据隐私政策的重要性，在大数据时代，表面上无关的行为可能会影响价格。

引用次数: 0

Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options 无外部选择的一对一匹配市场中的战略行为

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.005

Camilo J. Sirguiado, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (Alcalde and Barberà, 1994). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal deferred acceptance mechanism. In general, Alcalde and Barberà's uniqueness result holds for one side of the market if and only if either at most one of its members may not declare inadmissibilities or there are fewer agents on that side than individuals without outside options on the other side of the market.

在双面一对一配对市场中，市场的每一方都有一个稳定的机制，对其成员来说都是策略安全的（Alcalde 和 Barberà，1994 年）。当代理人不能宣布潜在的合作伙伴不可接受时，这一唯一性结果只适用于空方（如果有的话）。此外，在对多头市场具有策略保护作用的稳定机制中，有一种机制比多头市场最优延迟接受机制更不易被其成员联盟操纵。一般来说，阿尔卡德和巴伯拉的唯一性结果对市场的一边成立，前提是且仅当市场的一边成员中最多有一个人不能宣布不允许，或者市场的一边的代理人少于市场另一边没有外部选择权的个人。

引用次数: 0

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