Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

英文中文

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.012

King King Li , Toru Suzuki

This paper investigates the role of uninformed agents in information aggregation. A group of agents, who may or may not have private information about the state, communicate through a specific communication format and vote to make the correct decision—one that matches an unobservable state—based on majority rule. We analyzed efficient equilibria under simultaneous and sequential communication formats and tested these predictions in the laboratory. When all agents were informed, information was aggregated efficiently regardless of the format. However, when some agents were uninformed, the communication format significantly affected information aggregation. Specifically, although the probability of correct group decisions closely aligned with the rational benchmark under sequential communication, it was significantly lower under simultaneous communication, as unfounded opinions undermined information aggregation. We argue that the positive effect of sequential communication can be attributed to the social facilitation effect.

本文研究了不知情主体在信息聚合中的作用。一组代理（可能有也可能没有关于状态的私有信息）通过特定的通信格式进行通信，并根据多数决定原则投票做出正确的决策——与不可观察的状态相匹配。我们分析了同步和顺序通信格式下的有效平衡，并在实验室中对这些预测进行了测试。当所有代理都得到通知时，无论格式如何，信息都可以有效地聚合。然而，当某些代理不知情时，通信格式显著影响信息聚合。具体来说，虽然在顺序沟通下，正确群体决策的概率与理性基准密切相关，但在同步沟通下，由于没有根据的意见破坏了信息聚集，正确群体决策的概率明显较低。我们认为顺序沟通的积极作用可以归因于社会促进效应。

引用次数: 0

Robust price discrimination 强烈的价格歧视

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.006

Itai Arieli , Yakov Babichenko , Omer Madmon , Moshe Tennenholtz

We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a

\frac{1}{e}

-fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the drawn valuation. We show that this bound is tight in the case of binary buyer valuation.

我们考虑一个三度价格歧视模型，其中卖方的产品估值对市场设计者来说是未知的，市场设计者的目标是通过披露买方估值信息来最大化买方剩余。我们的主要结果表明，当卖方对产品的估值为零时，后悔被最优买方剩余的1e分数所限制。这个界限是通过随机绘制卖家估值并应用Bergemann等人（2015）对绘制的估值进行分割来实现的。我们证明，在二元买方估值的情况下，这个界限是紧的。

引用次数: 0

Interest group information in elections 选举中的利益集团信息

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012

Thea How Choon

Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group “plays favorites” by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causing policy divergence. Informative equilibria exist only if the interest group has sufficiently broad information. With opposing interest groups, this requirement is relaxed. I describe equilibria where each candidate is more sensitive to voter shocks in one tail, leading to policy convergence in the center and divergence in the tails. The presence of interest groups reframes the policy space, demarcating the consensus “moderate” regions from the “extremes”.

利益集团提供信息的方式是否系统性地使候选人产生偏见和两极分化？我考虑的是一个唐斯模型，在这个模型中，候选人不确定中间选民的偏好。多达两个利益集团，完全有偏见，观察选民的极端偏好，并向候选人发送无成本的信息。从一个利益集团开始，我展示了所有的信息均衡都是不对称的：利益集团通过向一个候选人透露粗糙的信息来“偏袒”，从而导致政策分歧。只有当利益集团拥有足够广泛的信息时，信息均衡才存在。对于对立的利益集团，这一要求是宽松的。我描述了这样一种均衡，即每个候选人对一条尾巴上的选民冲击更敏感，导致中间的政策趋同和尾巴上的分歧。利益集团的存在重新构建了政策空间，将共识的“温和”地区与“极端”地区区分开来。

引用次数: 0

Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness 团队组成：效率和近似公平

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002

Anna Bogomolnaia , Artem Baklanov , Elizaveta Victorova

A set of kn indivisible items is to be allocated to n agents; each agent has to get exactly k items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the “traditional” ones based on disregarding one object.

Our model and new fairness properties are insensitive to positive affine transformations of utilities, hence, there is no need for a separate treatment of “goods”, “bads”, and “mixed objects”. A famous Round Robin rule fares very well on all fairness accounts, but fails efficiency, while rules based on collective welfare maximization (like Nash or Leximin) cannot guarantee fairness, except on several special sub-domains (two agents, identical valuations, or binary utilities). EFx and PROPx still appear too strong. Traditional notions of approximate fairness do not allow for more positive results either.

将一组kn个不可分割的项目分配给n个代理；每个智能体必须得到k个物品，并且智能体在捆绑包上有附加效用。能否找到一种有效且近似公平的分配方式？在这种情况下，我们引入了基于两个单一对象交换的近似公平的新概念，并将其与基于忽略一个对象的“传统”公平进行比较。我们的模型和新的公平性属性对效用的正仿射变换不敏感，因此，不需要单独处理“好”、“坏”和“混合对象”。著名的轮询规则在所有公平方面都表现得很好，但却没有效率，而基于集体福利最大化的规则（如纳什或列克明）不能保证公平，除非在几个特殊的子领域（两个代理、相同的估值或二元效用）。EFx和proprox似乎还是太强了。传统的近似公平概念也不允许出现更积极的结果。

引用次数: 0

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences 具有朋友导向偏好的享乐联盟形成问题的核心稳定性和策略抗扰性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.007

Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn , Seçkin Özbilen

We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into “friends” and “enemies” such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends.

We show that the partition associated with the strongly connected components (SCC) of the friendship graph is in the strict core. We then prove that the SCC mechanism, which assigns the SCC partition to each hedonic coalition formation problem with friend-oriented preferences, satisfies a strong group incentive compatibility property: group strategy-proofness. Our main result is that on any “rich” subdomain of friend-oriented preferences, the SCC mechanism is the only mechanism that satisfies core stability and strategy-proofness.

我们研究了朋友导向偏好下的享乐联盟形成问题；也就是说，每个主体对自己的联盟都有偏好，这是基于除了自己之外的主体划分为“朋友”和“敌人”，这样(E)增加一个敌人会使他的情况严格恶化，(F)增加一个朋友和一组敌人会使他的情况严格好转。面向朋友的偏好产生了一个所谓的友谊图，其中顶点是代理，有向边指向朋友。我们证明了与友谊图的强连通分量（SCC）相关联的划分是在严格核中。在此基础上，我们证明了SCC机制满足一个强群体激励相容性质：群体策略证明性。SCC机制将SCC分区分配给每个具有朋友导向偏好的享乐联盟形成问题。我们的主要结果是，在任何面向朋友的偏好的“丰富”子域上，SCC机制是唯一满足核心稳定性和策略抗性的机制。

引用次数: 0

Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes 通过简单的支付方案大致公平和人口一致的预算划分

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.001

Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen

In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to some candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introduce the maximum payment rule (

MP

). Under this rule, each voter controls a part of the budget and, in each step, the corresponding voters allocate their entire budget to the candidate approved by the largest number of voters with non-zero budget. We show that

MP

meets our criteria as it satisfies monotonicity and a demanding population consistency condition and gives a 2-approximation to a fairness notion called average fair share (AFS). Moreover, we generalize

MP

to the class of sequential payment rules and prove that it is the most desirable rule within this class: nearly all other sequential payment rules fail monotonicity while offering only small improvements in the approximation ratio to AFS.

在预算批准制中，需要根据选民对候选人的赞成投票，将预算分配给这些候选人。为了追求一个简单、一致和近似公平的规则，我们引入了最大支付规则（MP）。在这个规则下，每个选民控制一部分预算，在每一步中，相应的选民将他们的全部预算分配给得到最多非零预算选民认可的候选人。我们证明了MP满足我们的标准，因为它满足单调性和苛刻的总体一致性条件，并给出了公平概念的2近似，称为平均公平份额（AFS）。此外，我们将MP推广到顺序支付规则类，并证明了它是该类中最理想的规则：几乎所有其他顺序支付规则都失败单调性，而对AFS的近似比只提供了很小的改进。

引用次数: 0

Reasoning about your own future mistakes 对自己未来的错误进行推理

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.010

Martin Meier , Andrés Perea

We propose a model of reasoning in dynamic games in which a player, at each information set, holds a conditional belief about his own future choices and the opponents' future choices. These conditional beliefs are assumed to be cautious, that is, the player never completely rules out any feasible future choice by himself or the opponents. We impose the following key conditions: (a) a player always believes that he will choose rationally in the future, (b) a player always believes that his opponents will choose rationally in the future, and (c) a player deems his own mistakes infinitely less likely than the opponents' mistakes. These conditions, together with iterating property (b), lead to the new concept of perfect backwards rationalizability. We show that perfect backwards rationalizable strategies exist in every finite dynamic game. We prove, moreover, that perfect backwards rationalizability constitutes a refinement of both perfect rationalizability (a rationalizability analogue to Selten's (1975) perfect equilibrium) and procedural quasi-perfect rationalizability (a rationalizability analogue to van Damme's (1984) quasi-perfect equilibrium) – two concepts that are introduced in this paper. As a consequence, our concept avoids both weakly dominated strategies in the normal form and strategies containing weakly dominated actions in the agent normal form. For one-shot games, the concept coincides with permissibility (Brandenburger (1992), Börgers (1994)).

我们提出了一个动态博弈的推理模型，在这个模型中，在每个信息集中，参与者对自己的未来选择和对手的未来选择持有一个有条件的信念。这些条件信念被认为是谨慎的，也就是说，玩家永远不会完全排除自己或对手的任何可行的未来选择。我们施加以下关键条件：(a)参与者总是相信他在未来会做出理性选择，(b)参与者总是相信他的对手在未来会做出理性选择，(c)参与者认为自己犯错的可能性比对手犯错的可能性小得多。这些条件与迭代性质(b)一起，导致了完全向后合理化的新概念。我们证明了在每一个有限动态对策中都存在完美的向后合理化策略。此外，我们证明了完全向后合理化构成了完全合理化（类似于Selten（1975）的完全均衡的合理化）和程序准完美合理化（类似于van Damme（1984）的准完美均衡的合理化）的细化-这是本文介绍的两个概念。因此，我们的概念既避免了正常形式下的弱劣势策略，也避免了智能体正常形式下包含弱劣势行为的策略。对于一次性游戏，这一概念与可容许性是一致的（《Brandenburger》（1992），《Börgers》（1994））。

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引用次数: 0

A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets 随机匹配市场中空头优势的直接证明

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.013

Simon Mauras , Paweł Prałat , Adrian Vetta

We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with n doctors and n hospitals, the doctor-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm gives doctors an expected rank of order

\log n

for their partners and hospitals an expected rank of order

\frac{n}{\log n}

for their partners (Pittel, 1989; Wilson, 1972). This situation is reversed in an unbalanced market with

n + 1

doctors and n hospitals (Ashlagi et al., 2017), a phenomenon known as the short-side advantage. The current proofs (Ashlagi et al., 2017; Cai and Thomas, 2022) of this fact are indirect, counter-intuitively being based upon analyzing the hospital-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm. In this paper we provide a direct proof of the short-side advantage, explicitly analyzing the doctor-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm. Our proof sheds light on how and why the phenomenon arises.

研究了随机匹配模型下的稳定匹配问题，其中医生和医院的偏好是均匀独立随机抽样的。在一个有n名医生和n家医院的均衡市场中，医生提出的延迟接受算法为医生的合作伙伴提供了阶log (n)的期望秩，为医院的合作伙伴提供了阶nlog (n)的期望秩（Pittel, 1989; Wilson, 1972）。在拥有n+1名医生和n家医院的不平衡市场中，这种情况正好相反（Ashlagi et al., 2017），这种现象被称为短面优势。目前对这一事实的证明（Ashlagi et al., 2017; Cai and Thomas, 2022）是间接的，与直觉相反，是基于对医院提议延迟接受算法的分析。在本文中，我们提供了短边优势的直接证明，明确地分析了医生建议延迟接受算法。我们的证据揭示了这种现象是如何以及为什么产生的。

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引用次数: 0

Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics 朴素分析：算法启发式的战略优势

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.009

Ron Berman , Yuval Heller

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price elasticities and set prices too high. In games with strategic complements (substitutes), profits induced by such “naive analytics” equilibria Pareto dominate (are dominated by) those induced by the Nash equilibrium.

我们研究了通过分析算法估计的需求敏感性的不确定性的相互作用。在我们的解决方案概念中(1)企业根据可能存在偏差的分析算法的估计选择看似最优的策略，(2)偏差水平形成彼此的最佳答复。根据经验观察，在均衡状态下，公司的算法高估了广告效果，这导致广告商超支。在价格竞争中，企业也低估了价格弹性，将价格定得过高。在具有战略互补（替代）的博弈中，由这种“朴素分析”均衡引起的利润会支配由纳什均衡引起的利润。

引用次数: 0

Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance 在无知的面纱背后衡量公平和总财富的品味

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.005

Jan Heufer , Jason Shachat , Yan Xu

We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealth distribution choice exhibits equity or efficiency preferring tastes. Our experiments show clusters of social preference types, which are unexpectedly independent of risk preferences.

我们提出了一种工具来衡量个人在无知之幕背后对公平和效率的社会偏好，同时控制特殊的风险偏好。我们构造了一组投资组合和财富分配选择问题，这些问题共享一个公共预算集。在这两个问题中，一个给定的捆绑会导致对个人财富的相同分配。投资组合选择仅仅反映了个人的风险态度，提供了一个基准来评估他们的财富分配选择是表现出公平偏好还是效率偏好。我们的实验显示了社会偏好类型的集群，它们出乎意料地独立于风险偏好。

引用次数: 0

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Games and Economic Behavior

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