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Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction 充分提取盈余的防串通机制
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.016
Huiyi Guo

The paper examines information structures that can guarantee full surplus extraction via collusion-proof mechanisms. Our collusion-proofness notion requires that there does not exist any coalition whose manipulation can affect the mechanism designer's payoff. When the mechanism designer is restricted to using standard Bayesian mechanisms, we show that under almost every prior distribution of agents' types, there exist payoff structures under which there is no collusion-proof full surplus extracting mechanism. However, when ambiguous mechanisms are allowed, we provide a weak necessary and sufficient condition on the prior such that collusion-proof full surplus extraction can be guaranteed. Thus, the paper sheds light on how the collusion-proofness requirement resolves the full surplus extraction paradox of Crémer and McLean, 1985, Crémer and McLean, 1988 and how engineering ambiguity in mechanism rules restores the paradox.

本文研究了能够通过防串通机制保证充分提取盈余的信息结构。我们的防串通概念要求不存在任何联盟,其操纵可以影响机制设计者的收益。当机制设计者仅限于使用标准贝叶斯机制时,我们证明在几乎所有代理类型的先验分布下,都存在不存在防串通全盈余提取机制的报酬结构。然而,当允许使用模棱两可的机制时,我们提供了一个关于先验的弱必要条件和充分条件,从而保证了防串通的完全盈余提取机制。因此,本文揭示了防串通要求如何解决了 Crémer 和 McLean,1985 年;Crémer 和 McLean,1988 年的完全盈余提取悖论,以及机制规则中的工程模糊性如何恢复了这一悖论。
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引用次数: 0
Myopic oligopoly pricing 近视寡头定价
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.014
Iwan Bos , Marco A. Marini , Riccardo D. Saulle

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for different pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hyper-competition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.

本文研究了卖方寻求近视改进的产能受限寡头垄断定价问题。我们采用了近视稳定集求解概念,并为任何给定的产能水平确定了唯一的纯策略价格求解。结果表明,当产能较大或较小时,该方案与纯策略纳什均衡点的集合相吻合。对于中间范围的产能,它预测了一个包含混合策略支持的价格区间。因此,这一稳定性概念包含了所有纳什均衡,并在没有纳什均衡时提供了纯策略解决方案。它尤其为不同的定价模式提供了行为理论依据,包括埃奇沃思价格周期和供应短缺的超竞争状态。我们还分析了企业规模分布变化的影响。最大企业之间的合并可能会导致更多的价格离散,因为它增加了最大近视稳定价格,减少了最小近视稳定价格。
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引用次数: 0
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains 词典偏好域下多伙伴匹配问题的强核心和帕累托最优性
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.010
Péter Biró , Gergely Csáji

We study strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains from a computational point of view. The restriction to the two-sided case is called stable many-to-many matching problem and the general one-sided case is called stable fixtures problem. We provide an example to show that the strong core can be empty even for many-to-many problems, and that deciding the non-emptiness of the strong core is NP-hard. On the positive side, we give efficient algorithms for finding a near feasible strong core solution and for finding a fractional matching in the strong core of fractional matchings. In contrast with the NP-hardness result for the stable fixtures problem, we show that finding a maximum size matching that is Pareto-optimal can be done efficiently for many-to-many problems. Finally, we show that for reverse-lexicographic preferences the strong core is always non-empty in the many-to-many case.

我们从计算的角度研究了词典偏好域下多伙伴匹配问题的强核心和帕累托最优解。对双面情况的限制称为稳定的多对多匹配问题,一般的单面情况称为稳定的固定问题。我们举例说明,即使对于多对多问题,强核心也可能是空的,而判定强核心的非空性是 NP 难的。从积极的方面看,我们给出了寻找接近可行的强核心解以及在强核心中寻找分数匹配的高效算法。与稳定固定问题的 NP-困难性结果相反,我们证明,对于多对多问题,找到帕累托最优的最大匹配大小是可以高效完成的。最后,我们证明,对于反向词法偏好,在多对多的情况下,强核心总是非空的。
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引用次数: 0
Information avoidance in school choice 择校中的信息回避
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.012
Paola Moscariello

I explain puzzles in the school assignment literature using a many-to-one matching model in which participants on one side of the market, the students, are endowed with ego-utilities à la Köszegi (2006). Ego concerns generate a form of information avoidance that results in non-truthful participation in DA matching mechanisms. In particular, students' best replies may be non-monotonic in school ranks. I show that truthful reporting can be restored by imposing a limit on the measure of students that a school can deem acceptable. Furthermore, students may be sensitive to signal garbling, in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In terms of policy, the results imply that admission committees' reliance on application dimensions that are seemingly weak proxies of academic performance may be beneficial. Other implications suggest that affirmative action policies might be beneficial. However, when students' best replies exhibit non-monotonicity in schools' selectivity, such policies might backfire.

我用一个多对一匹配模型来解释学校分配文献中的困惑,在这个模型中,市场一方的参与者,即学生,被赋予了类似于 Köszegi(2006 年)的自我效用。对自我的关注会产生一种信息回避,从而导致不真实地参与 DA 匹配机制。特别是,学生的最佳回答在学校排名中可能是非单调的。我的研究表明,通过对学校认为可以接受的学生人数进行限制,可以恢复真实的报告。此外,按照布莱克韦尔(Blackwell,1953 年)的观点,学生可能对信号干扰很敏感。在政策方面,研究结果表明,招生委员会依赖于那些看似学业成绩弱代理变量的申请维度可能是有益的。其他影响还表明,平权行动政策可能是有益的。然而,当学生的最佳答案在学校的选择性中表现出非单调性时,这种政策可能会适得其反。
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引用次数: 0
Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks 溢出网络中的相对性能评估
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.009
Yang Sun , Wei Zhao

In a multi-agent contracting problem, agents are linked in performance through two channels, effort spillover, governed by spillover network, and risk correlation, governed by risk structure. Assigning compensation weights on peers' performances can not only filter out common risks but also alter agent's incentives. We study how the network and risk structure jointly determine the optimal linear contract. First, the relative compensation sensitivity is determined by ratio of the dot product, between spillover vector and pure hedge portfolio, to unhedgeable risk. We then propose an index named informativeness along the spillover direction and argue that this index measures how precisely the principal can infer the agent's effort. By showing that both the implemented effort and induced welfare are increasing in the informativeness index, we argue that this index captures how central each agent is in this economy. Finally, results regarding relative sensitivities still hold under optimal contract with bounded compensation.

在多代理契约问题中,代理的绩效通过两个渠道联系在一起,一个是由溢出网络支配的努力溢出,另一个是由风险结构支配的风险关联。根据同行的表现分配报酬权重不仅能过滤掉共同风险,还能改变代理人的激励机制。我们将研究网络和风险结构如何共同决定最优线性合约。首先,相对补偿敏感度由溢出向量和纯对冲组合与不可对冲风险之间的点积之比决定。然后,我们提出了一个名为 "溢出方向信息度 "的指数,并认为该指数可以衡量委托人如何精确地推断代理人的努力。通过证明实施的努力和诱导的福利都会随信息指数的增加而增加,我们认为该指数可以反映出每个代理人在该经济中的核心地位。最后,关于相对敏感性的结果在有约束报酬的最优合约下仍然成立。
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引用次数: 0
Efficient matching under general constraints 一般约束条件下的高效匹配
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.013
Kenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase

We study indivisible goods allocation problems under constraints and provide algorithms to check whether a given matching is Pareto efficient. We first show that the serial dictatorship algorithm can be used to check Pareto efficiency if the constraints are matroid. To prove this, we develop a generalized top trading cycles algorithm. Moreover, we show that the matroid structure is necessary for obtaining all Pareto efficient matchings by the serial dictatorship algorithm. Second, we provide an extension of the serial dictatorship algorithm to check Pareto efficiency under general constraints. As an application of our results to prioritized allocations, we discuss Pareto improving the deferred acceptance algorithm.

我们研究了约束条件下的不可分割物品分配问题,并提供了检查给定匹配是否具有帕累托效率的算法。我们首先证明,如果约束条件是矩阵,串行独裁算法可以用来检查帕累托效率。为了证明这一点,我们开发了一种广义的顶级交易循环算法。此外,我们还证明了矩阵结构是序列独裁算法获得所有帕累托效率匹配的必要条件。其次,我们对序列独裁算法进行了扩展,以检查一般约束条件下的帕累托效率。作为我们的结果在优先分配中的应用,我们讨论了帕累托改进延迟接受算法。
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引用次数: 0
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs 具有相关回报的二人随机博弈中的最佳响应动力学
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.011
Hlafo Alfie Mimun , Matteo Quattropani , Marco Scarsini

We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p[0,1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p and is i.i.d. from the same uniform distribution with probability 1p. This model interpolates the model of i.i.d. random payoff used in most of the literature and the model of random potential games. First we study the number of pure Nash equilibria in the above class of games. Then we show that, for any positive p, asymptotically in the number of available actions, best response dynamics reaches a pure Nash equilibrium with high probability.

我们考虑的是具有随机回报的有限双人正则表达式博弈。玩家 A 的收益是均匀分布的 i.i.d.。给定 p∈[0,1],对于任何行动轮廓,棋手 B 的收益与棋手 A 的收益重合的概率为 p,并且是来自同一均匀分布的 i.i.d.,概率为 1-p。这个模型插值了大多数文献中使用的 i.i.d. 随机报酬模型和随机潜在博弈模型。首先,我们研究上述博弈中纯纳什均衡的数量。然后,我们证明,对于任意正 p,在可用行动的数量上,渐近地,最佳响应动力学以很高的概率达到纯纳什均衡。
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引用次数: 0
Voting to persuade 投票说服
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.007
Tsz-Ning Wong , Lily Ling Yang , Xin Zhao

We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous-signal model produces results different from discrete-signal models.

我们考虑了一个集体说服模型,在该模型中,一个具有私人连续信号的咨询委员会的成员就一项政策变化进行投票。然后,决策者在观察每次投票后决定是否采纳这一变化。当且仅当存在一种信息均衡时,委员会和决策者之间才有可能进行信息传递,在这种均衡中,决策者只有在全票通过后才会采纳政策变化。同样,当且仅当委员会规模足够大时存在这样一个均衡时,完全信息汇总才有可能实现。我们将进一步讨论为什么我们的连续信号模型会产生不同于离散信号模型的结果。
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引用次数: 0
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks 隐藏在众目睽睽之下同构任务中的报酬、概率、空间和时间
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.005
Sean M. Collins, Duncan James

Highest stoppage games in economics—first price sealed bid auction and Dutch auction, among others—have produced striking puzzles, including violation of revenue equivalence between auctions and adjustment of behavior across interfaces. The latter is also observed in risk elicitation. Here, we use existing puzzles to shed light on each other, by nesting auction and risk tasks in a common environment. We find behavior consistent with a spatial interface imparting the same relevant auction-theoretic surplus and probability information as does an interactive numerical calculation tool. Empirical revenue equivalence (respectively, risky choice) can thus be altered by design.

经济学中的最高停顿博弈--第一价格密封投标拍卖和荷兰式拍卖等--产生了惊人的难题,包括违反拍卖之间的收益等价性和跨界面的行为调整。后者在风险激发中也能观察到。在这里,我们通过将拍卖和风险任务嵌套在一个共同的环境中,利用现有的谜题来揭示彼此。我们发现,空间界面与交互式数字计算工具所传递的相关拍卖理论盈余和概率信息是一致的。因此,经验收益等价(分别是风险选择)可以通过设计来改变。
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引用次数: 0
Bayesian stable states 贝叶斯稳定状态
IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.008
Yi-Chun Chen , Gaoji Hu

This paper extends the Bayesian stability notion of Liu (2020) to define the Bayesian stability of a market state, which consists of a matching outcome and an information structure. The information structure can be arbitrarily heterogeneous and can accommodate learning among agents. We first establish that a Bayesian stable matching function of Liu (2020) can be recast as Bayesian stable market states with homogeneous information. We then illustrate the usefulness of such an extension by (i) refining Liu's Bayesian efficiency notion to define the Bayesian efficiency of a market state and (ii) generalizing his result—that Bayesian stable matching functions are Bayesian efficient—to an analogous one for market states. More importantly, we show that (iii) a decentralized matching process converges to a Bayesian stable market state and thereby offer a decentralized foundation for Liu's Bayesian stable matching function.

本文扩展了 Liu(2020)的贝叶斯稳定性概念,定义了由匹配结果和信息结构组成的市场状态的贝叶斯稳定性。信息结构可以是任意异质的,并且可以容纳代理人之间的学习。我们首先确定,刘(2020)的贝叶斯稳定匹配函数可以重构为具有同质信息的贝叶斯稳定市场状态。然后,我们通过(i)改进刘的贝叶斯效率概念来定义市场状态的贝叶斯效率,以及(ii)将他的结果--贝叶斯稳定匹配函数是贝叶斯有效的--概括为市场状态的类似结果,来说明这种扩展的有用性。更重要的是,我们证明了(iii)分散匹配过程收敛于贝叶斯稳定市场状态,从而为刘的贝叶斯稳定匹配函数提供了一个分散基础。
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引用次数: 0
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Games and Economic Behavior
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