Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-08DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014
Robert M. Anderson , Haosui Duanmu
Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.
{"title":"Equilibrium and social norms","authors":"Robert M. Anderson , Haosui Duanmu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>Richter and Rubinstein (2020)</span></span> developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 119-128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009
Elif B. Osun, Erkut Y. Ozbay
The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretical equivalence, our results indicate that outcomes diverge and that commitment changes the outcomes. Our experimental results are in line with the predictions of a model that accounts for lying-averse agents.
{"title":"Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment","authors":"Elif B. Osun, Erkut Y. Ozbay","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretical equivalence, our results indicate that outcomes diverge and that commitment changes the outcomes. Our experimental results are in line with the predictions of a model that accounts for lying-averse agents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 329-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-12DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015
Elwyn Davies , Marcel Fafchamps
We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic motivation. Subjects from India and Africa follow intrinsic motivation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest and reach a less efficient outcome on average, but workers earn slightly more. We find no evidence of stereotypes across countries. Individual characteristics and stated attitudes toward worker incentives do not predict the behavioral differences observed between countries, consistent with cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.
{"title":"Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries","authors":"Elwyn Davies , Marcel Fafchamps","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic motivation. Subjects from India and Africa follow intrinsic motivation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest and reach a less efficient outcome on average, but workers earn slightly more. We find no evidence of stereotypes across countries. Individual characteristics and stated attitudes toward worker incentives do not predict the behavioral differences observed between countries, consistent with cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 175-199"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-03DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Lars Peter Østerdal
A partnership can yield a return—a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by a more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.
{"title":"Rationalizing sharing rules","authors":"Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Lars Peter Østerdal","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A partnership can yield a return—a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by a more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 97-118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we introduce a variant where decision-making is essentially sequential. Second, we vary the cost of disclosure, resulting in a 2×2 treatment design. Both sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs are suitable for reducing the demands on subjects' level-k reasoning. The data confirm that sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs lead to more disclosure, and there is virtually full disclosure in the treatment that combines both. A calibrated level-k model makes quantitative predictions, including precise treatment level and player-specific revelation rates, and these predictions organize the data well. The timing of decisions provides further insights into the treatment-specific unraveling process.
{"title":"Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning","authors":"Volker Benndorf , Dorothea Kübler , Hans-Theo Normann","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we introduce a variant where decision-making is essentially sequential. Second, we vary the cost of disclosure, resulting in a 2×2 treatment design. Both sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs are suitable for reducing the demands on subjects' level-<em>k</em> reasoning. The data confirm that sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs lead to more disclosure, and there is virtually full disclosure in the treatment that combines both. A calibrated level-<em>k</em> model makes quantitative predictions, including precise treatment level and player-specific revelation rates, and these predictions organize the data well. The timing of decisions provides further insights into the treatment-specific unraveling process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 267-284"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-06DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014
Ehud Lehrer , Dimitry Shaiderman
This paper examines information transmission games where the sender knows the realizations of states from a Markov process, but his informational advantage is counteracted by outside, random revelations to the receiver. For very patient players, we characterize the sender's value of the game with outside revelations in terms of the value without outside revelations. Through our characterization, we identify that, in contrast with the sender-receiver games with fixed states, the sender may benefit from being patient: his discounted value of the game may increase as the discount factor grows.
{"title":"Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations","authors":"Ehud Lehrer , Dimitry Shaiderman","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines information transmission games where the sender knows the realizations of states from a Markov process, but his informational advantage is counteracted by outside, random revelations to the receiver. For very patient players, we characterize the sender's value of the game with outside revelations in terms of the value without outside revelations. Through our characterization, we identify that, in contrast with the sender-receiver games with fixed states, the sender may benefit from being patient: his discounted value of the game may increase as the discount factor grows.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 411-439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011
Naoki Funai
We investigate the convergence properties of an adaptive learning model that overlaps those of stochastic fictitious play learning and experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In particular, we consider the case in which adaptive players play a game against not only other adaptive players but also committed players, who do not revise their behaviour but follow a fixed (strict Nash equilibrium or corresponding logit quantal response equilibrium) action. We then provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process, the choice probability profile of adaptive players, almost surely converges to the logit quantal response equilibrium that committed players follow. We also provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process of a more general adaptive learning model which overlaps those of payoff assessment learning and delta learning converges to a logit quantal response equilibrium different from the equilibrium that committed players follow with positive probability.
{"title":"Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria","authors":"Naoki Funai","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the convergence properties of an adaptive learning model that overlaps those of stochastic fictitious play learning and experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In particular, we consider the case in which adaptive players play a game against not only other adaptive players but also committed players, who do not revise their behaviour but follow a fixed (strict Nash equilibrium or corresponding logit quantal response equilibrium) action. We then provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process, the choice probability profile of adaptive players, almost surely converges to the logit quantal response equilibrium that committed players follow. We also provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process of a more general adaptive learning model which overlaps those of payoff assessment learning and delta learning converges to a logit quantal response equilibrium different from the equilibrium that committed players follow with positive probability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 351-376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003
Mark Whitmeyer
A natural way of quantifying the “amount of information” in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.
{"title":"A concavity in the value of information","authors":"Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A natural way of quantifying the “amount of information” in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 200-207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145119424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-10DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017
Xiaoyu Cheng
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is not robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.
{"title":"Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation","authors":"Xiaoyu Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is <em>not</em> robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 149-158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145061045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-11DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016
Paul H.Y. Cheung , Keaton Ellis
Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through lottery integration. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic concerns. In a series of three simple and parsimonious experiments and three tests, we examine the occurrence of the two kinds of non-isolation and reversal behaviors. We find significant evidence for positive reversal behavior, where subjects are more likely to make a fair choice if there is an alternative possible realization of an unfair outcome (which they chose themselves). In addition, the lower bounds for the prevalence of non-isolation in terms of lottery integration and dynamic non-consequential concern are estimated to be approximately 10% and 20%, respectively.
{"title":"Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference","authors":"Paul H.Y. Cheung , Keaton Ellis","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through <em>lottery integration</em>. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic concerns. In a series of three simple and parsimonious experiments and three tests, we examine the occurrence of the two kinds of non-isolation and reversal behaviors. We find significant evidence for <em>positive reversal</em> behavior, where subjects are more likely to make a fair choice if there is an alternative possible realization of an unfair outcome (which they chose themselves). In addition, the lower bounds for the prevalence of non-isolation in terms of lottery integration and dynamic non-consequential concern are estimated to be approximately 10% and 20%, respectively.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 159-174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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