Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

英文中文

Preconvex games Preconvex游戏

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.001

Eric Bahel , Christian Trudeau , Haoyu Wang

We introduce the notion of preconvexity, which extends the familiar concept of convexity found in cooperative games with transferable utility. In a convex game, the larger the group joined by an agent, the larger the marginal value brought to the group by that agent. By contrast, in strictly preconvex games, an agent’s marginal contribution is initially decreasing (when joining small groups), and it eventually becomes increasing at (and above) some critical group size. As a consequence, the core of a preconvex game may be empty. Defining the property of semicohesiveness (related to marginal contributions at this critical group size), we prove that it is sufficient to guarantee a nonempty core. We also propose a new solution for the set of preconvex games; and we characterize this solution by combining three axioms which are natural in our framework. A stronger cohesiveness property (guaranteeing that our solution falls in the core) is also studied. Some additional results are provided for the special case of anticonvex games, for which marginal contributions are always non-increasing.

我们引入了前凸性的概念，它扩展了在具有可转移效用的合作博弈中发现的熟悉的凸性概念。在凸博弈中，一个主体加入的群体越大，该主体给群体带来的边际价值就越大。相比之下，在严格的前凸博弈中，代理的边际贡献最初是减少的（当加入小群体时），并最终在某个临界群体规模上增加。因此，前凸游戏的核心可能是空的。定义了半内聚性（与临界群大小下的边际贡献有关）的性质，证明了它足以保证非空核。我们还提出了一种关于预凸对策集的新解；我们通过结合三个在我们的框架中很自然的公理来描述这个解。还研究了更强的内聚性（保证我们的解落在核心）。对于边际贡献总是不增加的反凸对策的特殊情况，给出了一些额外的结果。

引用次数: 0

Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned 当所有权被分割时，离散资源的群体激励相容分配

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003

Wataru Ishida , Changwoo Park

We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called “within-group endowments lower bounds”, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the “standard core” and the “exclusion core” (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.

当社会被划分为多个主体群体时，我们引入了分配对象的问题，每个主体集体拥有与其大小相等的一些对象。我们提出了一个新的公理，称为“群内禀赋下界”，它要求每个agent在他所属的群体中发现他的分配至少与他最不喜欢的对象一样理想。除了效率、群体策略证明性和群体明智中立性之外，我们还确定并描述了满足这一公理的一系列规则。我们还考虑了两个核心概念，“标准核心”和“排除核心”（Balbuzanov和Kotowski， 2019）。我们的发现是，它们是独立的概念，不像传统的所有权结构（例如，集体、私人和混合所有权），并且我们提出的规则总是建议在它们的交叉点分配。

引用次数: 0

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result 金融系统的合并-分裂抗扰性：一个表征结果

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011

Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena

In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.

本文通过考虑两种弱免疫形式：合并抗扰性和分裂抗扰性，探讨了金融系统环境下的可操纵性问题。不出所料，抗分裂性与债务优先于股权和股权有限责任等基本要求相冲突。值得注意的是，我们提供了一类破产规则的综合特征，这些规则产生了满足合并证明性的财务规则。

引用次数: 0

Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms 愤慨与合作规范的演变

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009

Xueheng Li

Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fixed local interaction structure. Second, mobility allows individuals to sort into cooperative communities, causing these communities to grow in size and persist under a wider range of conditions. Therefore, mobility fosters stable norms of cooperation and punishment in large human societies. This study is the first to apply stochastic stability to address multiple equilibria in psychological games.

社会学家和心理学家长期以来一直认为，情绪对于维持社会规范至关重要。本研究考察了义愤在维护社会合作规范中的作用。我模拟了群体心理博弈中的愤怒，并描述了嘈杂的最佳回答动态中的随机稳定均衡。分析得出了两个结论。首先，从长远来看，愤慨可以维持合作，无论互动是全球性的，还是发生在固定的局部互动结构中。其次，流动性允许个人分类成合作社区，使这些社区规模扩大，并在更广泛的条件下持续存在。因此，流动性在大型人类社会中促进了稳定的合作和惩罚规范。本研究首次将随机稳定性应用于解决心理博弈中的多重均衡问题。

引用次数: 0

Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment 基于排名的偏好：一个真实的商品匹配实验

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008

Andrew Kloosterman , Peter Troyan

We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they report as higher ranked may increase market welfare. We test these hypotheses with a matching experiment in a strategyproof mechanism, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD), and a non-strategyproof mechanism, the Boston mechanism. A novel feature of our experimental design is that the objects allocated in the matching markets are real goods, which allows us to directly measure rankings-dependence by eliciting values for goods both inside and outside of the mechanism. The experimental results are mixed, with stronger evidence for rankings-dependence in the RSD treatment than the Boston treatment. We find no differences between the two mechanisms for the rates of truth-telling and the final welfare.

我们研究了通过匹配机制接收对象的偏好是否受到代理在其报告的排名顺序列表中排名的高度的影响。我们假设在其他条件相同的情况下，当代理对同一物品的排名越高时，他们获得的效用就越大。排名依赖效用的增加意味着，向策略证明机制提交真实的偏好可能不是一个主导策略，而非策略证明机制给予更多的代理他们报告的更高排名的对象可能会增加市场福利。我们在无策略机制，随机序列独裁（RSD）和非无策略机制，波士顿机制中进行匹配实验来检验这些假设。我们实验设计的一个新特点是，在匹配市场中分配的对象是真实的商品，这使我们能够通过在机制内部和外部引出商品的价值来直接衡量排名依赖。实验结果是混合的，与波士顿治疗相比，RSD治疗有更强的证据表明排名依赖。我们发现这两种机制在讲真话的比率和最终福利方面没有差异。

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引用次数: 0

Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence 具有对等机制和证据的健壮实现

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.007

Leonie Baumann

A principal must allocate a prize without monetary transfers. She wants to give it to the highest value agent. Agents know their own and their neighbors’ values, as determined by a network. Competing for the prize, agents send messages about themselves (applications) and their neighbors (references). They face a limit to lying, so information is partially verifiable. No incentive-compatible mechanism achieves robust implementation. Assigning the prize as a function of best applications and worst references achieves dominant strategy implementation for all networks and full implementation for the complete network and a class of networks if agents are partially honest.

委托人必须在没有货币转移的情况下分配奖金。她想把它交给最有价值的经纪人。代理知道自己和邻居的价值，这是由网络决定的。为了争夺奖项，代理发送关于自己（应用程序）和邻居（引用）的消息。他们说谎的能力有限，所以信息只能部分得到证实。没有激励兼容的机制能够实现稳健的执行。将奖励分配为最佳应用程序和最差参考的函数，可以实现对所有网络的主导策略实施，如果代理部分诚实，则可以实现对整个网络和一类网络的完全实施。

引用次数: 0

Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets 多资产实验市场中扭曲资产的定价

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.005

Shuchen Zhao

Using a series of laboratory experiments, this paper examines whether preferences for positively skewed assets, commonly observed in individual decision-making, persist in market settings where assets with both positive and negative skewness coexist. Results from a traditional BDM [Becker et al., 1964] task confirm a strong preference for positively skewed assets. However, this preference does not carry over to continuous double auction (CDA) markets with balanced endowments: market prices equalize, consistent with predictions from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). More surprisingly, in CDA markets with unbalanced initial endowments, a price inversion arises in which the negatively skewed asset becomes more expensive. Robustness checks across trading formats, group sizes, and asset scopes confirm these patterns. The findings underscore how institutional features and initial endowments moderate the translation of behavioral preferences into market prices, challenging the external validity of individual-level skewness preferences in financial markets.

通过一系列实验室实验，本文检验了在个人决策中普遍观察到的对正偏性资产的偏好，是否在正偏性和负偏性并存的资产市场环境中持续存在。传统BDM [Becker et al.， 1964]任务的结果证实了对正向倾斜资产的强烈偏好。然而，这种偏好不会延续到具有平衡禀赋的连续双拍卖（CDA）市场：市场价格均衡，与资本资产定价模型（CAPM）的预测一致。更令人惊讶的是，在初始禀赋不平衡的CDA市场中，出现了价格反转，负倾斜的资产变得更加昂贵。跨交易格式、集团规模和资产范围的稳健性检查证实了这些模式。研究结果强调了制度特征和初始禀赋如何调节行为偏好向市场价格的转化，挑战了金融市场中个人水平偏度偏好的外部有效性。

引用次数: 0

The art of concession in General Lotto games 一般乐透游戏中的让步艺术

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006

Rahul Chandan , Keith Paarporn , Dan Kovenock , Mahnoosh Alizadeh , Jason R. Marden

Can intentionally decreasing one’s own competitive abilities provide strategic benefits in adversarial environments? We investigate whether a competitor can gain an advantage by conceding valuable assets to an opponent under a well studied framework known as General Lotto games. While intuition suggests this cannot be done, we demonstrate that concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. We explore concessions in two settings: 1) General Lotto games, which depict 1-vs.-1 adversarial interactions, and 2) coalitional Lotto games, which depict two independent players competing against a common adversary (2-vs.-1) on non-overlapping contests. Our first result shows that conceding budgetary resources cannot be advantageous in either setting. However, we demonstrate that conceding valuable contests can be beneficial in the coalitional setting, characterizing optimal concessions when they exist. When both independent players in the coalitional setting have the option to concede, we characterize the Nash equilibria that emerge in this strategic scenario.

在敌对的环境中，有意降低自己的竞争能力能提供战略利益吗？我们研究了竞争对手是否可以通过将有价值的资产让与对手而获得优势，这一研究框架被称为通用乐透游戏。虽然直觉告诉我们这是不可能做到的，但我们证明，如果做出正确的让步，确实会带来战略上的好处。我们在两种情况下探讨让步：1)一般的乐透游戏，描绘1对1。2)联合乐透游戏，描述两个独立的玩家在不重叠的比赛中与一个共同的对手竞争（2比1）。我们的第一个结果表明，在任何一种情况下，让出预算资源都不会有利。然而，我们证明，在联盟环境中，承认有价值的竞争是有益的，当它们存在时，表现为最优让步。当联盟中的两个独立参与方都可以选择让步时，我们描述了这种战略情景中出现的纳什均衡。

引用次数: 0

A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts 一个动态优化的委托方法与一个应用程序的志愿合同

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002

Rene Saran

We present a novel and tractable method that is widely applicable to general delegation problems. Every delegation set is equivalent to an incentive feasible mechanism. We characterize mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity and prove that the corresponding constrained problem is equivalent to a discrete-time, finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. This transformation makes the problem tractable: The dynamic problem is essentially a shortest-path problem that is amenable to different solution methods. By analyzing the dynamic problem, we show that restricting to mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity broadly entails no loss to the principal and identify a novel sufficient condition for such mechanisms to be optimal. We also provide a numerical method to find an approximately optimal mechanism. Lastly, we illustrate the results in a new delegation model of volunteer contracts.

本文提出了一种新颖易行的方法，可广泛应用于一般委托问题。每个委托集都相当于一个激励可行机制。我们刻画了至多有有限多个不连续点的机构，并证明了相应的约束问题等价于一个离散时间、有限视界、动态优化问题。这种转换使问题易于处理：动态问题本质上是一个最短路径问题，可以采用不同的解决方法。通过对动力学问题的分析，我们证明了约束至多有有限个不连续点的机构广义上不会对主体造成损失，并确定了该机构为最优的一个新的充分条件。我们还提供了一种求近似最优机构的数值方法。最后，我们用一个新的委托契约模型来说明结果。

引用次数: 0

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice 单交显性：偏好格

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004

Gregorio Curello , Ludvig Sinander

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general ‘maxmin’ class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.

大多数偏好比较都是单交优势的例子。我们研究了单交优势的晶格结构，证明了任意偏好集的最小上界的表征、存在性和唯一性结果。我们应用这些定理来推导新的比较静力学定理，用于集体选择和分析不确定性下的比较静力学定理，并描述相对于野蛮行为的不确定性厌恶偏好的一般“最大”类。

引用次数: 0

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