Pub Date : 2024-10-31DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007
David Gill , Zachary Knepper , Victoria Prowse , Junya Zhou
We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.
{"title":"How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment","authors":"David Gill , Zachary Knepper , Victoria Prowse , Junya Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-<em>k</em> model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-<em>k</em> thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 82-95"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
Assaf Romm , Alvin E. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer
Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
{"title":"Stability vs. no justified envy","authors":"Assaf Romm , Alvin E. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 357-366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142531182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely replicable, is allocated to competing firms. In this setting, we demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others. To do so, we first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple datasets to the auction of a single digital good by modeling utility for data through the increase in prediction accuracy it provides. We then derive welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms, highlighting how the form of firms' private information – whether the externalities one exerts on others is known, or vice-versa – affects the resulting structures. In all cases, under appropriate assumptions, the optimal allocation rule is a single threshold per firm, where either all data is allocated or none is.
{"title":"Towards data auctions with externalities","authors":"Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel, Maryann Rui","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely replicable, is allocated to competing firms. In this setting, we demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others. To do so, we first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple datasets to the auction of a single digital good by modeling utility for data through the increase in prediction accuracy it provides. We then derive welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms, highlighting how the form of firms' private information – whether the externalities one exerts on others is known, or vice-versa – affects the resulting structures. In all cases, under appropriate assumptions, the optimal allocation rule is a single threshold per firm, where either all data is allocated or none is.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 323-356"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.001
Yinxiao Chu
We study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity-averse agents modeled by multiple prior preferences. Informed traders generally mix between trading and non-trading, and their trading probability decreases with ambiguity. If agents are sufficiently ambiguous, informed traders do not trade, and only noise traders place orders; trading becomes uninformative. When signal accuracy is ambiguous, trading can make public beliefs more ambiguous over time, which leads to social learning failures in the long run. Moreover, since informed traders may not trade, no-trade can also be informative when signal accuracy is asymmetric. Even with continuous action spaces, sufficiently high ambiguity stops social learning.
{"title":"Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading","authors":"Yinxiao Chu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity-averse agents modeled by multiple prior preferences. Informed traders generally mix between trading and non-trading, and their trading probability decreases with ambiguity. If agents are sufficiently ambiguous, informed traders do not trade, and only noise traders place orders; trading becomes uninformative. When signal accuracy is ambiguous, trading can make public beliefs more ambiguous over time, which leads to social learning failures in the long run. Moreover, since informed traders may not trade, no-trade can also be informative when signal accuracy is asymmetric. Even with continuous action spaces, sufficiently high ambiguity stops social learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 367-384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142531183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-05DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.010
Stefania Minardi , Andrei Savochkin
A consumption event is memorable if the memory of the event affects well-being at times after the material consumption, as originally introduced by Gilboa et al. (2016). Our main contribution is to develop an axiomatic foundation of memorable consumption in a dynamic setting. Preferences are represented by the present value of the sum of utilities derived at each date from the current consumption and from recollecting the past. Our model accommodates well-known phenomena in psychology, such as the peak-end rule, duration neglect, and adaptation trends. We also provide foundations for a prominent special case of the representation with the Markovian property. The model is illustrated with applications in two different contexts: risk-taking behavior in a principal-agent problem and life-cycle consumption-savings decisions.
{"title":"Time for memorable consumption","authors":"Stefania Minardi , Andrei Savochkin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A consumption event is memorable if the memory of the event affects well-being at times after the material consumption, as originally introduced by <span><span>Gilboa et al. (2016)</span></span>. Our main contribution is to develop an axiomatic foundation of memorable consumption in a dynamic setting. Preferences are represented by the present value of the sum of utilities derived at each date from the current consumption and from recollecting the past. Our model accommodates well-known phenomena in psychology, such as the peak-end rule, duration neglect, and adaptation trends. We also provide foundations for a prominent special case of the representation with the Markovian property. The model is illustrated with applications in two different contexts: risk-taking behavior in a principal-agent problem and life-cycle consumption-savings decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 296-322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142437662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-04DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.014
P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Yu Zhou
We consider a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of liquidity constraints on the buyer's side. Liquidity constraints can be either soft or hard. Competitive equilibria do exist in economies with soft liquidity constraints, but not necessarily in the presence of hard liquidity constraints. The limit of a convergent sequence of competitive equilibria in economies with increasingly stringent soft liquidity constraints may fail to be a competitive equilibrium in the limit economy with hard liquidity constraints. We establish equivalence and existence results for two alternative notions of competitive equilibrium, quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium and expectational equilibrium, together with stable outcomes and core outcomes, in economies with both types of liquidity constraints. We argue that these notions of equilibrium and stability do not suffer from discontinuity problems by showing appropriate limit results.
{"title":"Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Yu Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of liquidity constraints on the buyer's side. Liquidity constraints can be either soft or hard. Competitive equilibria do exist in economies with soft liquidity constraints, but not necessarily in the presence of hard liquidity constraints. The limit of a convergent sequence of competitive equilibria in economies with increasingly stringent soft liquidity constraints may fail to be a competitive equilibrium in the limit economy with hard liquidity constraints. We establish equivalence and existence results for two alternative notions of competitive equilibrium, quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium and expectational equilibrium, together with stable outcomes and core outcomes, in economies with both types of liquidity constraints. We argue that these notions of equilibrium and stability do not suffer from discontinuity problems by showing appropriate limit results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 264-278"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009
Zhonghong Kuang , Hangcheng Zhao , Jie Zheng
Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.
{"title":"Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests","authors":"Zhonghong Kuang , Hangcheng Zhao , Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 218-243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.012
Yingjie Niu , Zhentao Zou
We develop a continuous-time dynamic multi-agent contracting model in which the principal is unsure about the distributions of the project's terminal payoffs and worries about model misspecification. With model uncertainty, workers' wages depend on the outputs of other unrelated projects and the optimal contracts exhibit overdetermination. We demonstrate an inverse U-shaped relationship between the extent of overdetermination and group size. Moreover, model uncertainty induces wage compression, especially in small firms as the empirical evidence demonstrates. Finally, expanding the group size increases the average project value by mitigating the negative impacts of ambiguity.
我们建立了一个连续时间动态多代理合同模型，在这个模型中，委托人不确定项目最终收益的分布，并担心模型的错误规范。在模型不确定的情况下，工人的工资取决于其他无关项目的产出，最优合同表现出过度确定性。我们证明了过度决定的程度与群体规模之间的反 U 型关系。此外，正如经验证据所证明的那样，模型的不确定性会导致工资压缩，尤其是在小企业中。最后，扩大集团规模可以减轻不确定性的负面影响，从而增加项目的平均价值。
{"title":"Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents","authors":"Yingjie Niu , Zhentao Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a continuous-time dynamic multi-agent contracting model in which the principal is unsure about the distributions of the project's terminal payoffs and worries about model misspecification. With model uncertainty, workers' wages depend on the outputs of other unrelated projects and the optimal contracts exhibit overdetermination. We demonstrate an inverse U-shaped relationship between the extent of overdetermination and group size. Moreover, model uncertainty induces wage compression, especially in small firms as the empirical evidence demonstrates. Finally, expanding the group size increases the average project value by mitigating the negative impacts of ambiguity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 196-217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.011
Nicolas Jacquemet , Stéphane Luchini , Jason F. Shogren , Adam Zylbersztejn
Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior thanks to an improvement in communication; but we also show that the oath induces selection into communication — it makes people more wary of using communication, precisely because communication speaks louder under oath. We next designed additional treatments featuring mild and deterrent fines for deception to measure the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary incentives implemented by a truth-telling oath. We find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. Altogether, these results confirm that allowing for interactions under oath within a trust game with communication creates significantly more economic value than the identical exchange institutions without the oath.
{"title":"Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence","authors":"Nicolas Jacquemet , Stéphane Luchini , Jason F. Shogren , Adam Zylbersztejn","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior thanks to an improvement in communication; but we also show that the oath induces selection into communication — it makes people more wary of using communication, precisely because communication speaks louder under oath. We next designed additional treatments featuring mild and deterrent fines for deception to measure the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary incentives implemented by a truth-telling oath. We find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. Altogether, these results confirm that allowing for interactions under oath within a trust game with communication creates significantly more economic value than the identical exchange institutions without the oath.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 279-295"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003
Coralio Ballester , Antonio Rodriguez-Moral , Marc Vorsatz
The cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., Brañas-Garza et al., 2012). In an extended level-k model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in Ballester et al. (2023) into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-k hierarchy or their level-k iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.
{"title":"Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games","authors":"Coralio Ballester , Antonio Rodriguez-Moral , Marc Vorsatz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The cognitive reflection test or CRT (<span><span>Frederick, 2005</span></span>) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>). In an extended level-<em>k</em> model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in <span><span>Ballester et al. (2023)</span></span> into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level-<em>k</em> hierarchy or their level-<em>k</em> iteration process must begin from a starting point (called “seed”) that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of “seed distance” (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in <span><span>Brañas-Garza et al., 2012</span></span>), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 179-195"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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