Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

英文中文

Success functions in large contests 成功在大型比赛中发挥作用

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004

Yaron Azrieli , Christopher P. Chambers

We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer’s budget constraint. Any such Random Performance Function (RPF) satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents’ effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove that Co-monotonicity, along with standard continuity and monotonicity properties, in fact characterize the class of RPFs. We also describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the noise term to have an additive structure. “The idea of a continuum of traders may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger than a continuum of prices or of strategies or a continuum of <ddq>‘particles’</ddq> in fluid mechanics... It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is the expression of an economic idea.” In: Markets with a continuum of traders, Robert J. Aumann, Econometrica 1964

我们考虑具有大量参与者的比赛，并将比赛成功函数公式化，即当表现由努力和随机元素组成时，当表现超出设计师预算约束所决定的截止时间时，就会出现比赛成功函数。任何这样的随机性能函数（RPF）都满足共单调性，这意味着对手的努力分布可以根据他们的竞争程度进行明确的排名。我们证明了共单调性，以及标准连续性和单调性，实际上是rfp类的特征。我们还描述了噪声项具有加性结构的充分必要条件。在读者看来，交易员连续存在的想法可能有些古怪。实际上，这并不比流体力学中价格或策略的连续体或“粒子”的连续体更奇怪……应该强调的是，我们对交易员连续体的考虑不仅仅是一个数学练习；它是一种经济理念的表达。”见：《连续交易者的市场》，罗伯特·j·奥曼，《计量经济学》，1964

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引用次数: 0

Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio 具有恒定近似比的两个异构设施的防策略机制

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.008

Minming Li , Pinyan Lu , Xingchen Sha , Yuhao Yao , Jialin Zhang

In this paper, we study the two-facility location games with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent’s cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with an approximation ratio of

1 + 2 α

, where α is the approximation ratio of the offline optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, our mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of

1 + \sqrt{2}

, which is tight and improves the previous best upper bound of

n / 2 + 1

(Chen et al., 2020).

在本文中，我们研究了具有可选偏好的两设施位置博弈，其中每个代理的可接受设施集可能不同，并且代理的成本是他到可接受集中最近设施的距离。目标是最小化所有代理的总成本，同时实现策略抗扰性。对于一般指标，我们为问题设计了一个确定性的策略证明机制，近似比为1+2α，其中α为离线优化版本的近似比。特别是，对于一条线上的设置，我们的机制实现了1+2的近似比，这是紧密的，并且改进了之前n/2+1的最佳上界（Chen et al., 2020）。

引用次数: 0

Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences 令人反感的交易：代理的作用和严重后果

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001

Hande Erkut , Dorothea Kübler

Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.

由于必须避免不可接受或令人反感的交易，因此厌恶性限制了市场设计。为了更好地理解是什么让交易令人反感，我们研究了两个潜在的原因：有限的代理，例如，一方被迫接受要约，以及交易的严重后果。在一项实验室实验中，我们发现旁观者比完全代理更频繁地禁止有限代理的交易，特别是当后果严重而不是轻微时。该实验的主要发现被一项关于肾脏销售可接受性的小研究证实。研究结果指出了可以减轻反感的政策。

引用次数: 0

A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games 将冯·诺伊曼的简化方法从分配问题推广到零和博弈

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.009

Ilan Adler , Martin Bullinger , Vijay V. Vazirani

The equivalence between von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny for seven decades. Yet, as observed in this paper, the proof of the difficult direction of this equivalence is unsatisfactory: It does not assign distinct roles to the two players of the game, as is natural from the definition of a zero-sum game.

In retrospect, a partial resolution to this predicament was provided in another brilliant paper of von Neumann (1953), which reduced the assignment problem to zero-sum games. However, the underlying LP is highly specialized — all entries of its objective function vector are strictly positive, the constraint vector is all ones, and the constraint matrix is 0/1.

We generalize von Neumann’s result along two directions, each allowing negative entries in certain parts of the LP. Our reductions make explicit the roles of the two players of the reduced game, namely their maximin strategies are to play optimal solutions to the primal and dual LPs. Furthermore, unlike previous reductions, the value of the reduced game reveals the value of the given LP. Our generalizations encompass several basic economic scenarios.

冯·诺伊曼的零和博弈极小极大定理与LP对偶定理之间的等价性，分别连接了博弈论和优化这两个领域的基石问题，70年来一直是人们密切关注的主题。然而，正如本文所观察到的那样，这种等价的困难方向的证明并不令人满意：它没有为游戏的两个参与者分配不同的角色，这是零和游戏定义的自然结果。回想起来，冯·诺伊曼（1953）的另一篇杰出论文为这一困境提供了部分解决方案，该论文将分配问题简化为零和博弈。然而，底层LP是高度专门化的——它的目标函数向量的所有项都是严格正的，约束向量都是1，约束矩阵是0/1。我们沿着两个方向推广冯·诺伊曼的结果，每个方向都允许在LP的某些部分出现负值。我们的约简明确了两个博弈参与者的角色，即他们的最大化策略是对原始lp和双lp进行最优解。此外，与之前的缩减不同，缩减后的游戏价值揭示了给定LP的价值。我们的概括包括几种基本的经济情景。

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引用次数: 0

Outcome destabilization 结果不稳定

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004

Francesc Dilmé

In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means of ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maximally destabilizing sequence of trembles (destabilizing all outcomes but one) significantly simplifies studying strategically stable behavior in complex games such as finitely repeated games.

在广泛形式的博弈中，我们说，如果没有相应的收益扰动序列和纳什结果收敛于结果，则震荡序列会破坏结果的稳定性。我们使用平衡不稳定性来描述顺序平衡和顺序稳定的结果，并重新解释信号博弈中的标准选择标准，通过识别不稳定的颤抖序列来排除不合理的平衡。我们证明了最大不稳定震荡序列（不稳定除一个结果外的所有结果）的存在显著简化了有限重复博弈等复杂博弈中策略稳定行为的研究。

引用次数: 0

Duality in financial networks 金融网络的二元性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.002

Martijn W. Ketelaars, Peter Borm, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

This article introduces the concept of duality in financial networks, which entails the division of losses versus gains. In bankruptcy problems, in which a bankrupt entity divides its non-negative assets among a group of claimants, duality is well understood. Financial networks generalize bankruptcy problems by allowing for multiple agents with individual assets interconnected by mutual claims. We argue that allowing for negative assets is imperative to adequately formulate duality for financial networks. We show that there is a linear relationship between transfer schemes based on claims rules in a financial network and transfer schemes based on the dual of those claims rules in the dual financial network. Moreover, dual financial networks enable us to define dual transfer rules and dual allocation rules. We show that both self-dual transfer rules and self-dual allocation rules have to be based on self-dual claims rules. On the other hand, we demonstrate that transfer rules based on self-dual claims rules need not be self-dual, whereas allocation rules based on self-dual claims rules are always self-dual.

本文介绍了金融网络中的对偶概念，即损失与收益的划分。在破产问题中，破产实体将其非负资产分配给一组索赔人，对偶性是很好的理解。金融网络通过允许多个代理通过相互索赔将个人资产相互连接来概括破产问题。我们认为，允许负资产是必要的，以充分制定金融网络的二元性。我们证明了在金融网络中基于索赔规则的转移方案与在对偶金融网络中基于索赔规则对偶的转移方案之间存在线性关系。此外，双重金融网络使我们能够定义双重转移规则和双重分配规则。我们证明了自对偶转移规则和自对偶分配规则都必须基于自对偶索赔规则。另一方面，我们证明了基于自对偶声明规则的转移规则不一定是自对偶的，而基于自对偶声明规则的分配规则总是自对偶的。

引用次数: 0

Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs 随机抽取收益的大型游戏中的惯例

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.006

Jonathan Newton , Ryoji Sawa

By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games with i.i.d. randomly drawn payoffs in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993a) exists, long-run outcomes under behavioral rules are characterized by social choice rules.

通过证明一次偏差属性适用于几乎所有随机抽取收益的大型游戏，行为规则下的长期结果以社会选择规则为特征。

引用次数: 0

Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice 二元社会选择的顺序一致投票规则

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002

Stergios Athanasoglou , Somouaoga Bonkoungou

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, M-winning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.

我们考虑一群需要在两位候选人之间做出决定的选民。在这种情况下，m获胜联盟规则的特点是中立性和防战略性（Moulin, 1983）。它们的实际实施激励了顺序一致同意规则的引入。我们开发了一种算法，将给定的m获胜联盟规则转换为等效的顺序一致同意规则，反之亦然。与m获胜的对手相比，构建的顺序一致规则具有计算优势。分析扩展到完整的偏好域。由于m获胜联盟规则与强而适当的简单博弈密切相关，因此本文的分析也与博弈论文献的这一分支相关。

引用次数: 0

Present-bias and the value of sophistication: Splurging vs. smoothing 现在偏见和复杂的价值：挥霍与平滑

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.007

Subas Acharya , David Jimenez-Gomez , Dmitrii Rachinskii , Alejandro Rivera

This paper develops a dynamic wealth management model for risk-averse agents displaying present-bias in the form of hyperbolic discounting. The agent chooses optimal consumption and labor supply policies and allocates her funds between a risk-free asset, a traded liquid asset, and a non-traded illiquid asset. We characterize these policies for both sophisticated and naive present-biased agents. There are three results. First, sophisticated agents overconsume more and supply less labor than their naive counterparts if and only if their elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is greater than one. This result arises from the interplay of the smoothing and the splurging effect, which exactly cancel out when the EIS equals one. As a result, sophistication is welfare reducing (increasing) when EIS is high (low). Second, higher stock market volatility and worsening investment opportunities make the sophisticated agent relatively better off than her naive counterpart. Finally, when borrowing constraints are binding and absorbing asset illiquidity serves as a commitment device to mitigate overconsumption and thereby increase welfare.

本文建立了一个以双曲折现形式表现现在偏差的风险规避主体的动态财富管理模型。代理人选择最优的消费和劳动力供给政策，并在无风险资产、可交易的流动资产和不可交易的非流动资产之间分配资金。我们描述了复杂和幼稚的现在偏向代理人的这些政策。有三个结果。首先，当且仅当复杂主体的跨期替代弹性（EIS）大于1时，它们比幼稚主体过度消费更多劳动力而提供更少劳动力。这一结果源于平滑效应和挥霍效应的相互作用，当EIS等于1时，这两种效应正好相互抵消。因此，当环境影响因子高（低）时，复杂性是福利减少（增加）。其次，股市波动率的上升和投资机会的恶化使得老练的代理人比天真的代理人相对富裕。最后，当借贷约束具有约束力并吸收资产时，非流动性可以作为一种承诺手段来缓解过度消费，从而增加福利。

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引用次数: 0

Choice and welfare under social constraints 社会约束下的选择与福利

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.010

Mauricio Ribeiro

Economists often rely on people’ s choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group’ s choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of group members, whereas homogeneity in choices hinders it. I further argue that standard approaches to choice-based welfare analysis can lead to misleading inferences about welfare when there are unobserved social constraints.

经济学家经常依靠人们的选择来推断他们的偏好。然而，当人们面对未观察到的约束时，从选择中推断偏好就会出现问题。在这篇论文中，我研究了当一个社会群体的成员的选择受制于我们不完全知道的约束时，如何（谨慎地）从选择中推断出偏好。当这种情况发生时，群体选择的异质性，以及更多关于约束的信息，有助于恢复群体成员的偏好，而选择的同质性则会阻碍这种偏好。我进一步认为，当存在未观察到的社会约束时，基于选择的福利分析的标准方法可能导致对福利的误导性推论。

引用次数: 0

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Games and Economic Behavior

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