Pub Date : 2025-11-28DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1
Emilie Pagano
{"title":"Being social, being socially constructed, and being fundamental relative to social reality","authors":"Emilie Pagano","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"255 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145610867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02423-8
Sam Baron, Claudio Calosi, Cristian Mariani
We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.
{"title":"Spacetime emergence and the fear of intimacy","authors":"Sam Baron, Claudio Calosi, Cristian Mariani","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02423-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02423-8","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for <jats:italic>identity</jats:italic> but not <jats:italic>priority</jats:italic> super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145608827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02443-4
Matthew Parrott
People often tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony is a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds, a way of knowing that does not epistemically depend on any other way of knowing. In this essay, I shall argue that this view is plausible only if we assume a conception of testimony that aligns it with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we adopt a conception of testimony as a type of assurance, then testimonial knowledge would epistemically depend upon our having some non-testimonial knowledge of others’ mental states. More specifically, I shall argue, it would epistemically depend on knowledge based on expressive behaviour. Although one might naturally think this knowledge is either perceptual or inferential, I shall develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressions of mental states secure knowledge of others’ minds.
{"title":"Expression, testimony, and other minds","authors":"Matthew Parrott","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02443-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02443-4","url":null,"abstract":"People often tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony is a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds, a way of knowing that does not epistemically depend on any other way of knowing. In this essay, I shall argue that this view is plausible only if we assume a conception of testimony that aligns it with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we adopt a conception of testimony as a type of assurance, then testimonial knowledge would epistemically depend upon our having some non-testimonial knowledge of others’ mental states. More specifically, I shall argue, it would epistemically depend on knowledge based on expressive behaviour. Although one might naturally think this knowledge is either perceptual or inferential, I shall develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressions of mental states secure knowledge of others’ minds.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145608824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02454-1
James Woodward
{"title":"There is no such thing as a statistical explanation","authors":"James Woodward","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02454-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02454-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145608823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02450-5
Karen Kovaka
There is an ongoing debate about the quality of the evidence that meta-analysis provides. But both critics and defenders of meta-analysis generally assume that the core purpose and contribution of meta-analysis is to tell us what the evidence really says about the existence and magnitude of causal relationships, to extract conclusions that agree from datasets that do not. I argue that while delivering such information about cause-and-effect relationships is the most common use of meta-analysis, this is only an application of the tool, and that its primary epistemic role of meta-analysis is something else entirely: to help us explore and understand variation among populations of studies.
{"title":"What is meta-analysis good for?","authors":"Karen Kovaka","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02450-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02450-5","url":null,"abstract":"There is an ongoing debate about the quality of the evidence that meta-analysis provides. But both critics and defenders of meta-analysis generally assume that the core purpose and contribution of meta-analysis is to tell us what the evidence really says about the existence and magnitude of causal relationships, to extract conclusions that agree from datasets that do not. I argue that while delivering such information about cause-and-effect relationships is the most common use of meta-analysis, this is only an application of the tool, and that its primary epistemic role of meta-analysis is something else entirely: to help us explore and understand variation among populations of studies.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145608826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-21DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02447-0
Katharina Anna Sodoma
{"title":"What is the object of an empathetic emotion?","authors":"Katharina Anna Sodoma","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02447-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02447-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"359 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145575645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-21DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02452-3
A. K. Flowerree
In this paper, I argue that epistemic reparations are complex social achievements. Previous accounts of epistemic reparations have failed to highlight the complex social nature of the epistemic goods that constitute epistemic reparations. To generate the knowledge required, a speaker must successfully communicate evaluatively robust content in a way that generates common knowledge. It is not sufficient for a speaker to offer information , they must generate knowledge . I argue that there are two conditions for a successful epistemic reparation: it must receive audience uptake , and it must generate a reparative response . Since most cases of egregious wrongdoing intersect with systematic oppression and active ignorance, the barriers to epistemic reparations are high. Epistemic reparations are achievements because of myriad barriers to successful uptake and response. This shows an additional value to epistemic reparations. Epistemic Reparations can serve as a work of epistemic justice by providing pinpricks of light in systems of epistemic oppression.
{"title":"Epistemic reparations as social epistemic achievement","authors":"A. K. Flowerree","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02452-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02452-3","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that epistemic reparations are complex social achievements. Previous accounts of epistemic reparations have failed to highlight the complex social nature of the epistemic goods that constitute epistemic reparations. To generate the knowledge required, a speaker must successfully communicate evaluatively robust content in a way that generates common knowledge. It is not sufficient for a speaker to offer <jats:italic>information</jats:italic> , they must generate <jats:italic>knowledge</jats:italic> . I argue that there are two conditions for a successful epistemic reparation: it must receive audience <jats:italic>uptake</jats:italic> , and it must generate a <jats:italic>reparative response</jats:italic> . Since most cases of egregious wrongdoing intersect with systematic oppression and active ignorance, the barriers to epistemic reparations are high. Epistemic reparations are <jats:italic>achievements</jats:italic> because of myriad barriers to successful uptake and response. This shows an additional value to epistemic reparations. Epistemic Reparations can serve as a work of epistemic justice by providing pinpricks of light in systems of epistemic oppression.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145575646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：