Pub Date : 2025-12-22DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02462-1
Bill Wringe
{"title":"What can we do? Collective ability, and co-agential capacity","authors":"Bill Wringe","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02462-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02462-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145808095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-20DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02455-0
Andreas L. Mogensen
I show that there are good reasons to think that some individuals without any capacity for consciousness should be counted as welfare subjects, assuming that desire-fulfilment is a welfare good and that any individuals who can accrue welfare goods are welfare subjects. While other philosophers have argued for similar conclusions, I show that they have done so by relying on a simplistic understanding of the desire-fulfilment theory. My argument is intended to be sensitive to the complexities and nuances of contemporary developments of the theory, while avoiding highly counter-intuitive implications of previous arguments for the same conclusion.
{"title":"Desire-fulfilment and consciousness","authors":"Andreas L. Mogensen","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02455-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02455-0","url":null,"abstract":"I show that there are good reasons to think that some individuals without any capacity for consciousness should be counted as welfare subjects, assuming that desire-fulfilment is a welfare good and that any individuals who can accrue welfare goods are welfare subjects. While other philosophers have argued for similar conclusions, I show that they have done so by relying on a simplistic understanding of the desire-fulfilment theory. My argument is intended to be sensitive to the complexities and nuances of contemporary developments of the theory, while avoiding highly counter-intuitive implications of previous arguments for the same conclusion.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145796052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-18DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02441-6
Felix Lambrecht
Philosophers have recently argued that epistemic injustices require epistemic reparations. I draw attention to a particular kind of epistemic injustice: Epistemic moral remainders. Epistemic moral remainders are epistemic harms victims of epistemic injustices experience even if the goods the epistemic injustice interfered with have been restored. Available theories of epistemic reparations have tended to focus on establishing how reparations can restore the goods that the epistemic injustice interfered with. However, victims who experience epistemic remainders seem to be owed something even when the epistemic goods the injustice interfered with have been restored or are impossible to restore. So, we must supplement our theories of epistemic reparations to explain epistemic remainders. I develop a novel theory of reparative justice that can do this. I do so by turning to our fundamental principles of general reparative justice. Doing so, however, reveals a tension. Theories of reparative justice must choose between addressing the particular goods a wrong interfered with or the harms that result from a wrong. I offer a novel hybrid theory of reparations that avoids this tension. And, I use this hybrid theory to develop a theory of epistemic reparations that explains epistemic remainders.
{"title":"Epistemic Reparations and a Hybrid Theory of Reparative Justice","authors":"Felix Lambrecht","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02441-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02441-6","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have recently argued that epistemic injustices require epistemic reparations. I draw attention to a particular kind of epistemic injustice: Epistemic moral remainders. Epistemic moral remainders are epistemic harms victims of epistemic injustices experience even if the goods the epistemic injustice interfered with have been restored. Available theories of epistemic reparations have tended to focus on establishing how reparations can restore the goods that the epistemic injustice interfered with. However, victims who experience epistemic remainders seem to be owed something even when the epistemic goods the injustice interfered with have been restored or are impossible to restore. So, we must supplement our theories of epistemic reparations to explain epistemic remainders. I develop a novel theory of reparative justice that can do this. I do so by turning to our fundamental principles of general reparative justice. Doing so, however, reveals a tension. Theories of reparative justice must choose between addressing the particular goods a wrong interfered with or the harms that result from a wrong. I offer a novel hybrid theory of reparations that avoids this tension. And, I use this hybrid theory to develop a theory of epistemic reparations that explains epistemic remainders.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145770603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-13DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02411-y
Martin Miragoli
{"title":"Structural epistemic reparations: lessons from the military comfort system in Japan during World War II","authors":"Martin Miragoli","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02411-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02411-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"150 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145753115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-13DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02373-1
Ralf Busse
This paper examines what role generalised or higher-order identity can and should play in the context of essence and grounding. Emphasising important analogies to ordinary identity, I will speak of quasi-identity. While many philosophers embrace essence and grounding as primitive notions, F. Correia and A. Skiles offer an analysis in terms of identifications linking sentences and open formulas instead of singular terms. Their basic idea is to construe an essential feature as a conjunctive part and a ground as a disjunctive part of the target item. This paper focuses on grounding. First, in the ingredient argument , I assume that the determinative and explanatory character of grounding comes with an inherent and non-trivial necessitating force and argue that quasi-identity is a poor candidate ingredient in an analysis of grounding, because it lacks any sign of such a force. For an alleged de dicto necessitation principle for quasi-identity is dubitable and, in any case, fails to represent an inherent necessitating force. And a de re necessitating force that might be attributed to quasi-identity blatantly fails to be non-trivial. Secondly, in the arrangement argument , I argue that grounding cannot be gained from a subtle arrangement of quasi-identity and truth-functions, because to understand when the arrangement applies and when it does not one already needs a grounding-like notion. Two constructive insights are suggested. First, grounding relations in the general sense are generated by chaining specific grounding operations, of which conjoining and disjoining are only examples. Secondly, quasi-identity is not part of a generation mechanism for grounding but serves as an important transport mechanism for grounding from transparent to opaque cases.
{"title":"Is generalised identity a basis for essence and grounding?","authors":"Ralf Busse","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02373-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02373-1","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines what role generalised or higher-order identity can and should play in the context of essence and grounding. Emphasising important analogies to ordinary identity, I will speak of quasi-identity. While many philosophers embrace essence and grounding as primitive notions, F. Correia and A. Skiles offer an analysis in terms of identifications linking sentences and open formulas instead of singular terms. Their basic idea is to construe an essential feature as a conjunctive part and a ground as a disjunctive part of the target item. This paper focuses on grounding. First, in the <jats:italic>ingredient argument</jats:italic> , I assume that the determinative and explanatory character of grounding comes with an inherent and non-trivial necessitating force and argue that quasi-identity is a poor candidate ingredient in an analysis of grounding, because it lacks any sign of such a force. For an alleged <jats:italic>de dicto</jats:italic> necessitation principle for quasi-identity is dubitable and, in any case, fails to represent an inherent necessitating force. And a <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic> necessitating force that might be attributed to quasi-identity blatantly fails to be non-trivial. Secondly, in the <jats:italic>arrangement argument</jats:italic> , I argue that grounding cannot be gained from a subtle arrangement of quasi-identity and truth-functions, because to understand when the arrangement applies and when it does not one already needs a grounding-like notion. Two constructive insights are suggested. First, grounding relations in the general sense are generated by chaining specific grounding operations, of which conjoining and disjoining are only examples. Secondly, quasi-identity is not part of a generation mechanism for grounding but serves as an important transport mechanism for grounding from transparent to opaque cases.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145753113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-13DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02466-x
Tien-Chun Lo, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Alexander Skiles
A number of grounding-theorists hold that some truths are grounded but they are not grounded in anything. These are zero-grounded truths. Some have used the idea of zero-grounding to account for the grounds of identity truths, truths of iterated grounding, negative existentials, arithmetical truths, and necessary truths. In this paper we give two arguments to the effect that zero-grounding is an unintelligible idea, and then we show that, as should be expected with an unintelligible idea, the proposed elucidations of the notion of zero-grounding fail.
{"title":"Against zero-grounding","authors":"Tien-Chun Lo, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Alexander Skiles","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02466-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02466-x","url":null,"abstract":"A number of grounding-theorists hold that some truths are grounded but they are not grounded in anything. These are zero-grounded truths. Some have used the idea of zero-grounding to account for the grounds of identity truths, truths of iterated grounding, negative existentials, arithmetical truths, and necessary truths. In this paper we give two arguments to the effect that zero-grounding is an unintelligible idea, and then we show that, as should be expected with an unintelligible idea, the proposed elucidations of the notion of zero-grounding fail.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145752966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02421-w
Thaddeus Metz
I aim to make headway towards understanding how to compensate properly for epistemic injustices committed during large-scale forms of intergroup domination, with my focus being European colonialism in much of Africa and apartheid in South Africa. I point out that there is a wide array of suggestions about how concretely to effect reparations for these injustices in the literature, and seek to discover which (if any) are justified by a plausible theory of compensatory justice. One potential theory is the principle that people done an injustice should be put into the position they would have been in had the injustice not occurred, while another is to give wrongfully harmed peoples control over what had been taken away from them. These principles have frequently been applied to major racial injustices pertaining to property and opportunity, but I present new reason to think that both have counterintuitive implications when applied to epistemic injustices. Drawing on values and practices salient in parts of South America and Africa as well as some Anglo-American thought about restorative justice, I advance a unique third account of compensatory justice in general that I show both avoids the criticisms facing rivals and has plausible implications for how to respond to the relevant epistemic injustices in particular.
{"title":"Principles for compensating the epistemic injustices of colonialism","authors":"Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02421-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02421-w","url":null,"abstract":"I aim to make headway towards understanding how to compensate properly for epistemic injustices committed during large-scale forms of intergroup domination, with my focus being European colonialism in much of Africa and apartheid in South Africa. I point out that there is a wide array of suggestions about how concretely to effect reparations for these injustices in the literature, and seek to discover which (if any) are justified by a plausible theory of compensatory justice. One potential theory is the principle that people done an injustice should be put into the position they would have been in had the injustice not occurred, while another is to give wrongfully harmed peoples control over what had been taken away from them. These principles have frequently been applied to major racial injustices pertaining to property and opportunity, but I present new reason to think that both have counterintuitive implications when applied to epistemic injustices. Drawing on values and practices salient in parts of South America and Africa as well as some Anglo-American thought about restorative justice, I advance a unique third account of compensatory justice in general that I show both avoids the criticisms facing rivals and has plausible implications for how to respond to the relevant epistemic injustices in particular.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02456-z
David Storrs-Fox
According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), someone is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Since Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article on PAP, the literature has mostly concerned whether Frankfurt-type cases are counterexamples to the principle. There is still no consensus on that. The positive case for PAP has received much less attention. This article addresses a source of support for PAP that appears frequently in the literature, but is rarely discussed at length. This source of support involves cases where it seems someone is not morally responsible because she is unable to do otherwise. I argue that these cases provide poor support for PAP. My argument relies on the thought – developed recently by Alfred Mele, Romy Jaster, Chandra Sripada, and David Storrs Fox – that our abilities are often fallible. The challenge for PAP’s adherents is to provide a better positive case for their principle.
{"title":"Inability, fallibility, and the positive case for PAP","authors":"David Storrs-Fox","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02456-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02456-z","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), someone is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Since Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article on PAP, the literature has mostly concerned whether Frankfurt-type cases are counterexamples to the principle. There is still no consensus on that. The positive case for PAP has received much less attention. This article addresses a source of support for PAP that appears frequently in the literature, but is rarely discussed at length. This source of support involves cases where it seems someone is not morally responsible because she is unable to do otherwise. I argue that these cases provide poor support for PAP. My argument relies on the thought – developed recently by Alfred Mele, Romy Jaster, Chandra Sripada, and David Storrs Fox – that our abilities are often fallible. The challenge for PAP’s adherents is to provide a better positive case for their principle.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-28DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1
Emilie Pagano
{"title":"Being social, being socially constructed, and being fundamental relative to social reality","authors":"Emilie Pagano","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02446-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"255 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145610867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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