Pub Date : 2025-11-15DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02413-w
José Luis Bermúdez, InJoon Seo
{"title":"Are there epistemic norms of inquiry? Comments on David Thorstad’s Inquiry Under Bounds","authors":"José Luis Bermúdez, InJoon Seo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02413-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02413-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145515839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-14DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02435-4
Pablo Magaña, Devon Cass
{"title":"Relational equality and the status of animals","authors":"Pablo Magaña, Devon Cass","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02435-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02435-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145508886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-14DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02436-3
Katharine Browne, Sebastian Watzl
Attention is described as a “scarce commodity” that is traded in “a marketplace.” This, it is further claimed, contributes to a “widespread sense of attentional crisis.” But is there really an attention market, and if so, what, if anything, is wrong with it? We defend the claim that there are markets in attention. We provide an account of such attention markets and use that account to address what is morally wrong with them. Our account draws on knowledge of how attention works and what roles it plays in the mind. The attention market trades in an ability to influence our attention – somewhat (though not exactly) like the labor market trades in an ability to influence how we use our capacity for work. Specifically, the commodity it trades in is attentional landscaping potential , viz. the ability to systematically influence patterns of attention by changes to the sensory environment individuals are exposed to. Attention markets thus, we argue, commodify influence over a human capacity that plays a central role in shaping individual experience, agency, and belief formation. This feature of attention markets makes them ethically problematic. As markets in access to external influence, attention markets pose a special threat to individual autonomy and escape the classical liberal defense of free markets. Those who value autonomy should worry about the attention markets that exist today.
{"title":"The attention market—and what is wrong with it","authors":"Katharine Browne, Sebastian Watzl","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02436-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02436-3","url":null,"abstract":"Attention is described as a “scarce commodity” that is traded in “a marketplace.” This, it is further claimed, contributes to a “widespread sense of attentional crisis.” But is there really an attention market, and if so, what, if anything, is wrong with it? We defend the claim that there are markets in attention. We provide an account of such attention markets and use that account to address what is morally wrong with them. Our account draws on knowledge of how attention works and what roles it plays in the mind. The attention market trades in an ability to influence our attention – somewhat (though not exactly) like the labor market trades in an ability to influence how we use our capacity for work. Specifically, the commodity it trades in is <jats:italic>attentional landscaping potential</jats:italic> , viz. the ability to systematically influence patterns of attention by changes to the sensory environment individuals are exposed to. Attention markets thus, we argue, commodify influence over a human capacity that plays a central role in shaping individual experience, agency, and belief formation. This feature of attention markets makes them ethically problematic. As markets in access to external influence, attention markets pose a special threat to individual autonomy and escape the classical liberal defense of free markets. Those who value autonomy should worry about the attention markets that exist today.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145508887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-10DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02428-3
Fintan Mallory
The ability to control the direction of a conversation, which topics are raised, which questions are asked, and which lines of inquiry are followed, is a basic and powerful form of social control that has been under studied within the philosophy of language. This paper draws on work from formal pragmatics, social epistemology, and critical discourse analysis to identify the mechanisms by which social power influences who gets to set the question under discussion. In the process, it introduces the category of inquisitive injustice and identifies several underlying structural causes behind it. By making these mechanisms explicit, the paper aims to empower speakers to challenge existing but subtle forms of manipulation.
{"title":"Inquisitive injustice","authors":"Fintan Mallory","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02428-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02428-3","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to control the direction of a conversation, which topics are raised, which questions are asked, and which lines of inquiry are followed, is a basic and powerful form of social control that has been under studied within the philosophy of language. This paper draws on work from formal pragmatics, social epistemology, and critical discourse analysis to identify the mechanisms by which social power influences who gets to set the question under discussion. In the process, it introduces the category of inquisitive injustice and identifies several underlying structural causes behind it. By making these mechanisms explicit, the paper aims to empower speakers to challenge existing but subtle forms of manipulation.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145478388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02425-6
Caroline West
Many liberals maintain that individuals have a right to autonomy while at the same time insisting that strong group rights are unjustified. The traditional justification for this position implicitly relies on assumptions about the nature of personal identity that are increasingly controversial—in particular, the assumption that individual persons, unlike groups, persist self-identically (or “endure”) through time. If instead we assume an increasingly popular alternative four-dimensionalist (“perdurantist”) account of the nature of personal identity, then the asymmetrical treatment of individual and strong groups rights to autonomy appears prima facie inconsistent. For, from the perspective of four-dimensionalism, exercises of individual autonomy are metaphysically on a par with exercises of group authority: each involves exercises of authority among numerically distinct person-stages, justified by a unity relation. This raises a challenge for liberals. If perdurantism turns out to be the correct account of personal identity over time, what—if anything—would justify attributing a right to autonomy to individuals, while denying it to groups? I consider several possible responses to this challenge, none of which succeed in vindicating the orthodox liberal position fully.
{"title":"Personal identity, individual autonomy and group rights","authors":"Caroline West","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02425-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02425-6","url":null,"abstract":"Many liberals maintain that individuals have a right to autonomy while at the same time insisting that strong group rights are unjustified. The traditional justification for this position implicitly relies on assumptions about the nature of personal identity that are increasingly controversial—in particular, the assumption that individual persons, unlike groups, persist self-identically (or “endure”) through time. If instead we assume an increasingly popular alternative four-dimensionalist (“perdurantist”) account of the nature of personal identity, then the asymmetrical treatment of individual and strong groups rights to autonomy appears <jats:italic>prima facie</jats:italic> inconsistent. For, from the perspective of four-dimensionalism, exercises of individual autonomy are metaphysically on a par with exercises of group authority: each involves exercises of authority among numerically distinct person-stages, justified by a unity relation. This raises a challenge for liberals. If perdurantism turns out to be the correct account of personal identity over time, what—if anything—would justify attributing a right to autonomy to individuals, while denying it to groups? I consider several possible responses to this challenge, none of which succeed in vindicating the orthodox liberal position fully.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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