Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02474-x
Poppy Mankowitz
{"title":"The form of good","authors":"Poppy Mankowitz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02474-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02474-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02451-4
Stina Björkholm, Julia Mosquera
The fulfillment of the right to be known is considered essential for achieving restorative justice. Victims must have the opportunity to tell their stories and be actively heard for a reparative process to be genuinely successful. The right to be known is a positive right that imposes duties on others, including the obligation to acquire knowledge about victims and their experiences of injustice. While few would deny that victims deserve to be listened to, understood, and recognized for their experiences, Lackey’s proposal remains underspecified in both content and scope of application, leaving some of its practical implications unclear. In the first part of the paper, we argue that depending on how the right to be known is interpreted, it risks imposing both epistemically and emotionally over-demanding requirements on both duty bearers and right holders. In the second part of the paper, we propose that the right to be known and the duty to know are primarily understood as group-based. Partly influenced by Lackey’s own work on collective epistemology, we argue that the group-based versions of the right and the duty avoid worries of over-demandingness and provide an overall plausible view of this essential part of epistemic reparations.
{"title":"The right to be known: its scope, demands, and the role of individuals and collectives","authors":"Stina Björkholm, Julia Mosquera","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02451-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02451-4","url":null,"abstract":"The fulfillment of the right to be known is considered essential for achieving restorative justice. Victims must have the opportunity to tell their stories and be actively heard for a reparative process to be genuinely successful. The right to be known is a positive right that imposes duties on others, including the obligation to acquire knowledge about victims and their experiences of injustice. While few would deny that victims deserve to be listened to, understood, and recognized for their experiences, Lackey’s proposal remains underspecified in both content and scope of application, leaving some of its practical implications unclear. In the first part of the paper, we argue that depending on how the right to be known is interpreted, it risks imposing both epistemically and emotionally over-demanding requirements on both duty bearers and right holders. In the second part of the paper, we propose that the right to be known and the duty to know are primarily understood as group-based. Partly influenced by Lackey’s own work on collective epistemology, we argue that the group-based versions of the right and the duty avoid worries of over-demandingness and provide an overall plausible view of this essential part of epistemic reparations.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145903620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02388-8
Raul Saucedo
I articulate a new version of the view that reality consists of temporally extended simples, which is immune to the argument from vagueness for temporal parts and is perfectly compatible with diachronic universalism. Following Josh Parsons’ classification of views about persistence, I take this to be a four-dimensionalist form of endurantism (4DE, for short). What’s distinctive about my version of 4DE is that it incorporates an independently plausible harmony principle about temporal location; I hence call the view harmonious 4DE. I formulate the relevant harmony principle and show that it affords 4DEists a novel, principled way of resisting the argument from vagueness, and ensures that their view is in fact perfectly compatible with unrestricted diachronic composition.
{"title":"Harmonious four-dimensionalist endurantism","authors":"Raul Saucedo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02388-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02388-8","url":null,"abstract":"I articulate a new version of the view that reality consists of temporally extended simples, which is immune to the argument from vagueness for temporal parts and is perfectly compatible with diachronic universalism. Following Josh Parsons’ classification of views about persistence, I take this to be a four-dimensionalist form of endurantism (4DE, for short). What’s distinctive about my version of 4DE is that it incorporates an independently plausible harmony principle about temporal location; I hence call the view <jats:italic>harmonious</jats:italic> 4DE. I formulate the relevant harmony principle and show that it affords 4DEists a novel, principled way of resisting the argument from vagueness, and ensures that their view is in fact perfectly compatible with unrestricted diachronic composition.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02471-0
Veli Mitova
{"title":"Epistemic reparations and the right to be known: introduction","authors":"Veli Mitova","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02471-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02471-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145902429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02433-6
Frances Darling
Epistemic reparations are argued to be deserved by those wronged by gross injustices and violations, to provide redress for epistemic wrongs incurred by victims and survivors. I apply epistemic reparations and Lackey’s (2022, 2025) “right to be known” to disability injustice. This novel exploration makes three contributions. First, that given widespread historical and contemporary injustice and violations incurred by disabled people – material and epistemic – theoretical resources such as Lackey’s, which aim to account for epistemic wrongs and ameliorate injustice, should have significant value for the pursuit of disability justice. As I demonstrate, this application permits identification of ways in which disabled people are epistemically wronged, and how the concept of disability can be used to wrong, or malign, others. Second, as disability intersects with other populations, taking disability into consideration here serves others contexts of epistemic reparations. Third, despite the potential value of, and need for, epistemic reparations for disability justice, I submit that this will likely be forestalled without acknowledging and addressing the neglect of disability – particularly intellectual disability – in social epistemological theorising. This neglect incurs the cost of some existing theories in the domain being unable to account for the ways in which some disabled people – those with intellectual disability – can be epistemically wronged, or even considered knowers and agents. Through applying Lackey’s framework of epistemic duties, I demonstrate that ameliorating this neglect is epistemically reparative work in itself, as well as being required to realise the value of epistemic reparations for those wronged due to disability status.
{"title":"Epistemic reparations and disability","authors":"Frances Darling","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02433-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02433-6","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemic reparations are argued to be deserved by those wronged by gross injustices and violations, to provide redress for epistemic wrongs incurred by victims and survivors. I apply epistemic reparations and Lackey’s (2022, 2025) “right to be known” to disability injustice. This novel exploration makes three contributions. First, that given widespread historical and contemporary injustice and violations incurred by disabled people – material and epistemic – theoretical resources such as Lackey’s, which aim to account for epistemic wrongs and ameliorate injustice, should have significant value for the pursuit of disability justice. As I demonstrate, this application permits identification of ways in which disabled people are epistemically wronged, and how the concept of disability can be used to wrong, or malign, others. Second, as disability intersects with other populations, taking disability into consideration here serves others contexts of epistemic reparations. Third, despite the potential value of, and need for, epistemic reparations for disability justice, I submit that this will likely be forestalled without acknowledging and addressing the neglect of disability – particularly intellectual disability – in social epistemological theorising. This neglect incurs the cost of some existing theories in the domain being unable to account for the ways in which some disabled people – those with intellectual disability – can be epistemically wronged, or even considered knowers and agents. Through applying Lackey’s framework of epistemic duties, I demonstrate that ameliorating this neglect is epistemically reparative work in itself, as well as being required to realise the value of epistemic reparations for those wronged due to disability status.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145902430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02463-0
Lorenzo Azzano
{"title":"Properties are not powers","authors":"Lorenzo Azzano","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02463-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02463-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"363 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145829981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02469-8
Clayton Littlejohn
{"title":"Disinformation is for degrading the value of information, not confirming falsehoods","authors":"Clayton Littlejohn","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02469-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02469-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145829978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-23DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02465-y
Anton Skretta
{"title":"AI deception and moral standing","authors":"Anton Skretta","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02465-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02465-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145808083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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