Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7
Lisa Vogt
According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incoherent, potential cases of upwards essence abound. The arguments that have been raised against upwards essence or naturally come to mind turn out to be wanting on closer examination. And we can even derive the existence of certain cases of upwards essence from fairly innocuous general principles.
{"title":"Upwards essence","authors":"Lisa Vogt","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02440-7","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incoherent, potential cases of upwards essence abound. The arguments that have been raised against upwards essence or naturally come to mind turn out to be wanting on closer examination. And we can even derive the existence of certain cases of upwards essence from fairly innocuous general principles.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0
Sara Aronowitz
{"title":"How many beliefs can you fit in your head?","authors":"Sara Aronowitz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02401-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146138583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-28DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02470-1
Sonya M. Ringer
{"title":"Birth and the maiden","authors":"Sonya M. Ringer","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02470-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02470-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-28DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02472-z
Alexander Gebharter, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Michał Sikorski
{"title":"A causal theory of suppositional reasoning","authors":"Alexander Gebharter, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Michał Sikorski","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02472-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02472-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"143 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-27DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02438-1
Jon Erling Litland, Taylor-Grey Miller
The fact that it is essential that p in some sense explains that p . This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not ground , and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of essentialist explanation.
{"title":"Towards an inferentialist account of essentialist explanation","authors":"Jon Erling Litland, Taylor-Grey Miller","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02438-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02438-1","url":null,"abstract":"The fact that it is essential that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> in some sense explains that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> . This paper makes one negative and one positive contribution. Negatively, the paper argues that the sense of explanation is not <jats:italic>ground</jats:italic> , and we prove—contra Vogt—that the issue has nothing to do with whether one works with a representational or worldly notion of ground. Positively, the paper proposes an inferentialist account of essence and uses that to develop an account of essentialist explanation.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-19DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02476-9
Tomasz Zyglewicz, Kevin Reuter, Eric Mandelbaum
Philosophers, psychologists and linguists routinely use truth-value judgments as a source of evidence for the meaning of specific expressions. This method presupposes that truth-value judgments track whether what was said corresponds with facts. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that ordinary people’s behavior on the truth-value judgment task is sensitive to a range of factors beyond correspondence with facts. In this paper, we investigate how judgments of truth are influenced by considerations of truthfulness. In a series of three experiments, we present results indicating that the truth-truthfulness entanglement is at the heart of the debate over the semantics of color predicates. We use these findings to challenge contextualism about color predicates. While our substantive contribution is quite targeted, we show that the methodological lessons are likely to generalize broadly to other areas of research in cognitive science.
{"title":"Truth-value judgments","authors":"Tomasz Zyglewicz, Kevin Reuter, Eric Mandelbaum","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02476-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02476-9","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers, psychologists and linguists routinely use truth-value judgments as a source of evidence for the meaning of specific expressions. This method presupposes that truth-value judgments track whether what was said corresponds with facts. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that ordinary people’s behavior on the truth-value judgment task is sensitive to a range of factors beyond correspondence with facts. In this paper, we investigate how judgments of truth are influenced by considerations of truthfulness. In a series of three experiments, we present results indicating that the truth-truthfulness entanglement is at the heart of the debate over the semantics of color predicates. We use these findings to challenge contextualism about color predicates. While our substantive contribution is quite targeted, we show that the methodological lessons are likely to generalize broadly to other areas of research in cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146005890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02477-8
Kenneth Galbraith, Kareem Khalifa
In this paper, we propose a new account of understanding. Its guiding idea is that the objects that are understood have the semantic structure of questions . Understanding is achieved by grasping correct and complete answers to these questions. We develop this idea, and then argue that various kinds of propositional, objectual, and explanatory understanding are limiting cases of our “interrogative” account of understanding. In doing so, we also highlight several kinds of understanding that have received scant attention.
{"title":"Understanding: it’s all interrogative","authors":"Kenneth Galbraith, Kareem Khalifa","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02477-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02477-8","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a new account of understanding. Its guiding idea is that the objects that are understood have the semantic structure of <jats:italic>questions</jats:italic> . Understanding is achieved by grasping correct and complete <jats:italic>answers</jats:italic> to these questions. We develop this idea, and then argue that various kinds of propositional, objectual, and explanatory understanding are limiting cases of our “interrogative” account of understanding. In doing so, we also highlight several kinds of understanding that have received scant attention.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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