Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some “other” for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism.
{"title":"Who's to blame for failed integration of immigrants? Blame attributions as an affectively polarizing force in lay discussions of immigration in Finland","authors":"Helena Rovamo, Katarina Pettersson, Inari Sakki","doi":"10.1111/pops.12917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12917","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some “other” for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42145928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Álvarez, J. Jetten, H. Selvanathan, Roberto González, Héctor Carvacho
Around the world, we witness not only growing levels of economic inequality but also the rise of protests whereby people from different social classes are demanding a more equal society. Our research uses a person‐centered approach to examine subgroups of participants in a social movement against inequality on the basis of their social class, intention to participate in conventional and/or radical collective actions, and social identification with the movement. We used longitudinal data from the Chilean student movement (two time points; total N = 1226) to conduct latent profile and latent transition analysis. We identified four profiles of participants: (1) inactive supporters (mostly from the upper class), (2) low radicals (mostly from the middle class), (3) moderate radicals (mostly from the middle class), and (4) high radicals (mostly from the middle class). The four profiles were generally stable over the one‐year period. We further found that group efficacy and a “nothing to lose” mindset predicted the profile membership of participants. Group efficacy also predicted transitions of participants between different profiles. Our findings highlight the key role that the middle class plays in diverse forms of collective action.
{"title":"Identifying different ‘types’ of participants in the Chilean student movement: A latent transition analysis of collective action intentions, social class and movement identification","authors":"B. Álvarez, J. Jetten, H. Selvanathan, Roberto González, Héctor Carvacho","doi":"10.1111/pops.12918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12918","url":null,"abstract":"Around the world, we witness not only growing levels of economic inequality but also the rise of protests whereby people from different social classes are demanding a more equal society. Our research uses a person‐centered approach to examine subgroups of participants in a social movement against inequality on the basis of their social class, intention to participate in conventional and/or radical collective actions, and social identification with the movement. We used longitudinal data from the Chilean student movement (two time points; total N = 1226) to conduct latent profile and latent transition analysis. We identified four profiles of participants: (1) inactive supporters (mostly from the upper class), (2) low radicals (mostly from the middle class), (3) moderate radicals (mostly from the middle class), and (4) high radicals (mostly from the middle class). The four profiles were generally stable over the one‐year period. We further found that group efficacy and a “nothing to lose” mindset predicted the profile membership of participants. Group efficacy also predicted transitions of participants between different profiles. Our findings highlight the key role that the middle class plays in diverse forms of collective action.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46357995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Kube, M. Wullenkord, L. Rozenkrantz, Peter Kramer, Sophia Lieb, Claudia Menzel
People usually update their beliefs selectively in response to good news and disregard bad news. Here, we investigated in two preregistered experiments (N = 278 and N = 306) (1) whether such valence‐dependent belief updating also underlies information processing in the context of climate change and (2) whether it can be altered by interventions informing about different aspects of climate change. To this end, we adapted a well‐established belief update task to the context of climate change. In multiple trials, participants were asked about their beliefs about adverse consequences of climate change; subsequently, they were asked to update their beliefs in light of new information. Both studies provided evidence against the hypothesis that people integrate good news about climate change more than bad news. After half of the trials, participants were randomized to one of four video‐based interventions, each of which aimed at promoting a more accurate risk perception and increasing pro‐environmental intentions. After the interventions, participants showed a more accurate risk perception, and women rather than men increased their intentions for pro‐environmental behavior. The results provide implications for climate change communication, as they show that when facing the consequences of climate change, people adjust their risk perception accurately and increase their pro‐environmental intentions.
{"title":"How people update their beliefs about climate change: An experimental investigation of the optimistic update bias and how to reduce it","authors":"T. Kube, M. Wullenkord, L. Rozenkrantz, Peter Kramer, Sophia Lieb, Claudia Menzel","doi":"10.1111/pops.12920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12920","url":null,"abstract":"People usually update their beliefs selectively in response to good news and disregard bad news. Here, we investigated in two preregistered experiments (N = 278 and N = 306) (1) whether such valence‐dependent belief updating also underlies information processing in the context of climate change and (2) whether it can be altered by interventions informing about different aspects of climate change. To this end, we adapted a well‐established belief update task to the context of climate change. In multiple trials, participants were asked about their beliefs about adverse consequences of climate change; subsequently, they were asked to update their beliefs in light of new information. Both studies provided evidence against the hypothesis that people integrate good news about climate change more than bad news. After half of the trials, participants were randomized to one of four video‐based interventions, each of which aimed at promoting a more accurate risk perception and increasing pro‐environmental intentions. After the interventions, participants showed a more accurate risk perception, and women rather than men increased their intentions for pro‐environmental behavior. The results provide implications for climate change communication, as they show that when facing the consequences of climate change, people adjust their risk perception accurately and increase their pro‐environmental intentions.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44746013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The effectiveness of and its boundary conditions regarding fact–checking news exposure have significant normative and practical implications. While many of the prior studies have focused on the attitudinal consequences of fact–checking news delivered by neutral third parties such as fact–check organizations, relatively less is known as to the effect of fact–checking news delivered by partisan media. Based on the frameworks of motivated reasoning and the hostile‐media effect, we investigate the possibility of decoupling between attitudinal persuasion and perceptual backfire by fact–checking news by partisan media—that is, exposure to fact–checking news increases bias perception of such news yet nevertheless attitudinally persuades audiences. Based on a series of original experiments conducted in South Korea and in the United States, we find consistent support for our prediction, in that exposure to fact–checking news produces the corrective effects, yet at the same time perceived bias of the fact–checking news systematically varies as a function of the ideological slant of partisan media.
{"title":"Perceiving as biased but nevertheless persuaded? Effects of fact–checking news delivered by partisan media","authors":"Je Hoon Chae, Sang Yup Lee, Hyunjin Song","doi":"10.1111/pops.12914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12914","url":null,"abstract":"The effectiveness of and its boundary conditions regarding fact–checking news exposure have significant normative and practical implications. While many of the prior studies have focused on the attitudinal consequences of fact–checking news delivered by neutral third parties such as fact–check organizations, relatively less is known as to the effect of fact–checking news delivered by partisan media. Based on the frameworks of motivated reasoning and the hostile‐media effect, we investigate the possibility of decoupling between attitudinal persuasion and perceptual backfire by fact–checking news by partisan media—that is, exposure to fact–checking news increases bias perception of such news yet nevertheless attitudinally persuades audiences. Based on a series of original experiments conducted in South Korea and in the United States, we find consistent support for our prediction, in that exposure to fact–checking news produces the corrective effects, yet at the same time perceived bias of the fact–checking news systematically varies as a function of the ideological slant of partisan media.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46473607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories, this research seeks to explain a paradox in conspiracy theory research, namely, that conspiracy beliefs are associated with both derogation and justification of the social system. Study 1 (N = 1,481) was a survey in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic in China, and the results revealed a negative correlation between belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs. In Study 2 (N = 195), exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories positively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a finding that was serially mediated by external attributions and collective narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 256), exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories negatively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a result that was serially mediated by internal attributions and anomie. In Study 4 (N = 616), exposure to a conspiracy theory about the US government increased system‐justifying beliefs among Chinese participants and decreased them among US participants. The distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories hence implies two different processes through which conspiracy theories affect system‐justifying beliefs.
{"title":"Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs from an intergroup perspective","authors":"Jia‐Yan Mao, Zhaoxie Zeng, Shen-Long Yang, Yongyu Guo, Jan‐Willem van Prooijen","doi":"10.1111/pops.12924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12924","url":null,"abstract":"By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories, this research seeks to explain a paradox in conspiracy theory research, namely, that conspiracy beliefs are associated with both derogation and justification of the social system. Study 1 (N = 1,481) was a survey in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic in China, and the results revealed a negative correlation between belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs. In Study 2 (N = 195), exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories positively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a finding that was serially mediated by external attributions and collective narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 256), exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories negatively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a result that was serially mediated by internal attributions and anomie. In Study 4 (N = 616), exposure to a conspiracy theory about the US government increased system‐justifying beliefs among Chinese participants and decreased them among US participants. The distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories hence implies two different processes through which conspiracy theories affect system‐justifying beliefs.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41467895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current research explores refugee integration through the analysis of active constructions of everyday life in Greek cities. It draws from critical social and political psychology literature that explores spatial aspects of intergroup relations and developments in citizenship and migration studies. For the purposes of the study, 25 walking interviews with refugees from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, and Syria were conducted in the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki. Interviews were analyzed with tools and concepts of critical discursive social psychology. Analysis indicated three main repertoires related to corresponding space nuclei: “city squares and surrounding areas as minorities' spatial nuclei,” “political spaces as urban enclaves of belonging,” and “neighborhoods as un/familiar places.” Each of these broader compounds represented different people–place dynamics and presupposed different citizenship constructions and claims. These constructions entailed different ways of positioning oneself and others and constituted the ground for redefining integration based on local experiences and multilevel connections with urban networks. Drawing on these findings, the article proposes to reconsider integration through the concept of urban citizenship to explore everyday politics of intergroup relations in contexts of migration.
{"title":"Integration and urban citizenship: A social‐psychological approach to refugee integration through active constructions of place attachment to the city","authors":"Anastasia Zisakou, Lia Figgou, Eleni Andreouli","doi":"10.1111/pops.12919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12919","url":null,"abstract":"The current research explores refugee integration through the analysis of active constructions of everyday life in Greek cities. It draws from critical social and political psychology literature that explores spatial aspects of intergroup relations and developments in citizenship and migration studies. For the purposes of the study, 25 walking interviews with refugees from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, and Syria were conducted in the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki. Interviews were analyzed with tools and concepts of critical discursive social psychology. Analysis indicated three main repertoires related to corresponding space nuclei: “city squares and surrounding areas as minorities' spatial nuclei,” “political spaces as urban enclaves of belonging,” and “neighborhoods as un/familiar places.” Each of these broader compounds represented different people–place dynamics and presupposed different citizenship constructions and claims. These constructions entailed different ways of positioning oneself and others and constituted the ground for redefining integration based on local experiences and multilevel connections with urban networks. Drawing on these findings, the article proposes to reconsider integration through the concept of urban citizenship to explore everyday politics of intergroup relations in contexts of migration.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42433191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frames enable individuals to locate and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. In this article, we study the framing of moral issues with the help of Moral Foundations Theory and by relying on rich qualitative data. Existing studies are primarily based on laboratory experiments, without a focus on how such processes are shaped in a real‐life setting. Through a detailed study of the 2018 Irish referendum on abortion, we ask: How is moral framing used in a referendum setting? This case is important not only because referendum campaigns may have higher chances of influencing public opinion than election campaigns but also because of the highly contentious nature of abortion and the recent societal changes in the Irish context. Based on in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with campaigners and politicians, as well as focus groups with voters, we find that the campaigners from opposing sides used moral foundations (the Care foundation) deliberately in their campaign to appeal to undecided voters, focusing on the health of women or the plight of unborn babies. Our findings also show that not every moral foundation is relevant for the campaigners due to the national and historical context.
{"title":"Moral framing and referendum politics: Navigating the empathy battlefield","authors":"E. Atikcan, Karen Hand","doi":"10.1111/pops.12921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12921","url":null,"abstract":"Frames enable individuals to locate and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. In this article, we study the framing of moral issues with the help of Moral Foundations Theory and by relying on rich qualitative data. Existing studies are primarily based on laboratory experiments, without a focus on how such processes are shaped in a real‐life setting. Through a detailed study of the 2018 Irish referendum on abortion, we ask: How is moral framing used in a referendum setting? This case is important not only because referendum campaigns may have higher chances of influencing public opinion than election campaigns but also because of the highly contentious nature of abortion and the recent societal changes in the Irish context. Based on in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with campaigners and politicians, as well as focus groups with voters, we find that the campaigners from opposing sides used moral foundations (the Care foundation) deliberately in their campaign to appeal to undecided voters, focusing on the health of women or the plight of unborn babies. Our findings also show that not every moral foundation is relevant for the campaigners due to the national and historical context.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45744832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vilja Helminen, Hanna Wass, A. Kantola, M. Elovainio
This article explores how authoritarianism as a factor in child‐rearing values (CRV) is associated with political orientation, party support, and policy preferences among voters and societal elites in the Nordic context, which is characterized by social trust and solidarity, feelings of affinity, and a modest degree of ideological polarization. Based on a representative citizen survey conducted in 2018 (n = 4,076) and an elite survey conducted in 2020 (n = 948) among Finnish political, administrative, advocacy, business, and influence elites, our findings suggest that authoritarianism in Finland mostly relates to culturally conservative, and less to economically conservative, political orientations. While authoritarianism is connected to policy preferences and political orientations on both cultural and economic dimensions, it has more relevance for preferences regarding cultural issues than economic ones. Our findings support the notion that authoritarianism plays a role in political orientation mainly in the cultural realm. Overall, our study indicates that authoritarianism as captured by the CRV scale might be a politically important underpinning among both citizens and societal elites also outside the U.S.
{"title":"Nordic authoritarianism: Child‐rearing values and political behavior in a multiparty context","authors":"Vilja Helminen, Hanna Wass, A. Kantola, M. Elovainio","doi":"10.1111/pops.12915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12915","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores how authoritarianism as a factor in child‐rearing values (CRV) is associated with political orientation, party support, and policy preferences among voters and societal elites in the Nordic context, which is characterized by social trust and solidarity, feelings of affinity, and a modest degree of ideological polarization. Based on a representative citizen survey conducted in 2018 (n = 4,076) and an elite survey conducted in 2020 (n = 948) among Finnish political, administrative, advocacy, business, and influence elites, our findings suggest that authoritarianism in Finland mostly relates to culturally conservative, and less to economically conservative, political orientations. While authoritarianism is connected to policy preferences and political orientations on both cultural and economic dimensions, it has more relevance for preferences regarding cultural issues than economic ones. Our findings support the notion that authoritarianism plays a role in political orientation mainly in the cultural realm. Overall, our study indicates that authoritarianism as captured by the CRV scale might be a politically important underpinning among both citizens and societal elites also outside the U.S.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42211886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefanie Hechler, Maria Chayinska, Clara Sophie Wekenborg, Felipe Moraga‐Villablanca, T. Kessler, C. McGarty
{"title":"Why Chile “Woke Up.” Antecedents of the Formation of Prochange Group Consciousness Promoting Collective Action","authors":"Stefanie Hechler, Maria Chayinska, Clara Sophie Wekenborg, Felipe Moraga‐Villablanca, T. Kessler, C. McGarty","doi":"10.1111/pops.12906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12906","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47163001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2017, media coverage of the #MeToo movement brought attention to the pervasive problem of sexual harassment against women, highlighting several prominent American cases including Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and Donald Trump. In survey experiments with nationally representative samples in the United States ( N = 2,843), the Netherlands ( N = 3,770), and Germany ( N = 2,357), we tested how thinking about the American cases influences public opinion towards the issue across countries. As predicted, being reminded of the Weinstein, Cosby, and Trump cases increased the evaluation that sexual harassment is a serious problem in the United States. We further tested how thinking about the U.S. cases influences participants' evaluations of sexual harassment in European countries: Does it pale by comparison to the prominent U.S. cases, or do the cases increase the assessment that harassment is a problem everywhere? All samples evaluated sexual harassment in the European countries as a more serious issue when the U.S. cases were brought to mind, which is compatible with the assumption that sexual harassment is seen as a global gender issue rather than a country‐specific issue. These results provide experimental evidence that attention‐grabbing cases can shift evaluations of a policy issue within and across countries.
{"title":"How Prominent Cases of Sexual Harassment Influence Public Opinion Across Countries: The Cases of Cosby, Trump, and Weinstein","authors":"Pragya Arya, Norbert Schwarz","doi":"10.1111/pops.12904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12904","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017, media coverage of the #MeToo movement brought attention to the pervasive problem of sexual harassment against women, highlighting several prominent American cases including Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and Donald Trump. In survey experiments with nationally representative samples in the United States ( N = 2,843), the Netherlands ( N = 3,770), and Germany ( N = 2,357), we tested how thinking about the American cases influences public opinion towards the issue across countries. As predicted, being reminded of the Weinstein, Cosby, and Trump cases increased the evaluation that sexual harassment is a serious problem in the United States. We further tested how thinking about the U.S. cases influences participants' evaluations of sexual harassment in European countries: Does it pale by comparison to the prominent U.S. cases, or do the cases increase the assessment that harassment is a problem everywhere? All samples evaluated sexual harassment in the European countries as a more serious issue when the U.S. cases were brought to mind, which is compatible with the assumption that sexual harassment is seen as a global gender issue rather than a country‐specific issue. These results provide experimental evidence that attention‐grabbing cases can shift evaluations of a policy issue within and across countries.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136355775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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