Pub Date : 2025-11-04DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105204
Stephan B. Bruns , Anthony Doucouliagos , Hristos Doucouliagos , Johannes König , T.D. Stanley , Katarina Zigova
We explore gender differences in the time taken to accept empirical articles of economics research. On average, female-authored articles take 9 % longer to accept. This gender gap cannot be fully attributed to differences in author affiliation, research productivity, research quality and novelty. The gender composition of editorial boards does not affect acceptance time for female authors. Nevertheless, this gender gap narrows as female representation in an area of research deepens. We find evidence of sub-field differences in this gender gap, consistent with differences in social norms.
{"title":"The delayed acceptance of female research in economics","authors":"Stephan B. Bruns , Anthony Doucouliagos , Hristos Doucouliagos , Johannes König , T.D. Stanley , Katarina Zigova","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105204","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105204","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore gender differences in the time taken to accept empirical articles of economics research. On average, female-authored articles take 9 % longer to accept. This gender gap cannot be fully attributed to differences in author affiliation, research productivity, research quality and novelty. The gender composition of editorial boards does not affect acceptance time for female authors. Nevertheless, this gender gap narrows as female representation in an area of research deepens. We find evidence of sub-field differences in this gender gap, consistent with differences in social norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"182 ","pages":"Article 105204"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105194
Ashani Amarasinghe , Paul A. Raschky , Yves Zenou , Junjie Zhou
This paper studies how natural disasters spread conflicts within a network. We first construct a new panel data set that combines geo-referenced information about conflict events and natural disasters, for 5,944 districts in 53 African countries, over the period 1989–2020. Considering natural disasters as exogenous shocks that affect the combatants’ activity in a locality, we find that natural disasters decrease conflict incidence in the affected locality, increase conflict incidence in neighbouring localities, and lead to an overall net increase in conflict incidence. The spatial dispersion of conflict varies by the level of local rent-seeking opportunities and the level of international, post-disaster aid. We then provide a simple theoretical framework that may explain this conflict dispersion pattern. Findings provide important implications for implementing local and aggregate level conflict mitigation policies.
{"title":"How natural disasters spread conflict","authors":"Ashani Amarasinghe , Paul A. Raschky , Yves Zenou , Junjie Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105194","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105194","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how natural disasters spread conflicts within a network. We first construct a new panel data set that combines geo-referenced information about conflict events and natural disasters, for 5,944 districts in 53 African countries, over the period 1989–2020. Considering natural disasters as exogenous shocks that affect the combatants’ activity in a locality, we find that natural disasters decrease conflict incidence in the affected locality, increase conflict incidence in neighbouring localities, and lead to an overall net increase in conflict incidence. The spatial dispersion of conflict varies by the level of local rent-seeking opportunities and the level of international, post-disaster aid. We then provide a simple theoretical framework that may explain this conflict dispersion pattern. Findings provide important implications for implementing local and aggregate level conflict mitigation policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105194"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105192
Knut Are Aastveit , Hilde C. Bjørnland , Jamie L. Cross , Helene O. Kalstad
After decades of low and stable inflation, advanced economies experienced a sharp and persistent surge in inflation following the COVID-19 pandemic. While many studies have examined the sources of this inflation, less attention has been paid to how domestic inflation expectations amplify global shocks. This paper makes a novel contribution by quantifying that amplification mechanism across six advanced, inflation-targeting economies: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Norway. Using a structural Bayesian vector autoregression model, we jointly identify global demand and supply shocks, including various oil market shocks and global supply chain disruptions, as well as domestic shocks to inflation and inflation expectations. We show that these global shocks were key drivers of the post-pandemic inflation surge in all countries studied. Importantly, our counterfactual analysis reveals that inflation expectations have significantly amplified the transmission of global shocks, particularly in Canada, New Zealand, and the US. These findings demonstrate that the interaction between global forces and country-specific expectations is central to understanding inflation dynamics, and underscore the importance of managing inflation expectations as a tool to mitigate persistent inflation.
{"title":"Unveiling inflation: Oil shocks, supply chain pressures, and expectations","authors":"Knut Are Aastveit , Hilde C. Bjørnland , Jamie L. Cross , Helene O. Kalstad","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105192","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105192","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>After decades of low and stable inflation, advanced economies experienced a sharp and persistent surge in inflation following the COVID-19 pandemic. While many studies have examined the sources of this inflation, less attention has been paid to how domestic inflation expectations amplify global shocks. This paper makes a novel contribution by quantifying that amplification mechanism across six advanced, inflation-targeting economies: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Norway. Using a structural Bayesian vector autoregression model, we jointly identify global demand and supply shocks, including various oil market shocks and global supply chain disruptions, as well as domestic shocks to inflation and inflation expectations. We show that these global shocks were key drivers of the post-pandemic inflation surge in all countries studied. Importantly, our counterfactual analysis reveals that inflation expectations have significantly amplified the transmission of global shocks, particularly in Canada, New Zealand, and the US. These findings demonstrate that the interaction between global forces and country-specific expectations is central to understanding inflation dynamics, and underscore the importance of managing inflation expectations as a tool to mitigate persistent inflation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105192"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105193
Melinda Suveg
Firms relying on working capital raise prices following monetary tightening, and this paper demonstrates that the working capital channel plays a key role in partial and general equilibrium inflation dynamics. The working capital channel arises from firms’ need to pre-fund inputs, determined by their exposure (working capital shares) and price elasticity (working capital sensitivity) to interest rate changes. Using detailed firm-product-level price data, the analysis shows that the average firm holds working capital equal to 16% of sales. For a firm with this average share, a one percentage point policy rate hike leads to a 0.48–2.56% price increase over a 3–33 month horizon.
{"title":"The working capital channel","authors":"Melinda Suveg","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105193","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105193","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Firms relying on working capital raise prices following monetary tightening, and this paper demonstrates that the working capital channel plays a key role in partial and general equilibrium inflation dynamics. The working capital channel arises from firms’ need to pre-fund inputs, determined by their exposure (working capital shares) and price elasticity (working capital sensitivity) to interest rate changes. Using detailed firm-product-level price data, the analysis shows that the average firm holds working capital equal to 16% of sales. For a firm with this average share, a one percentage point policy rate hike leads to a 0.48–2.56% price increase over a 3–33 month horizon.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"182 ","pages":"Article 105193"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-31DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105191
Pei Kuang , Kaushik Mitra , Li Tang , Shihan Xie
This paper studies how macroprudential policy changes affect consumers’ housing market expectations and housing affordability perceptions in the United Kingdom. We conduct a large-scale online survey experiment presenting hypothetical changes of three borrower-based macroprudential tools: residential loan-to-value (LTV), buy-to-let LTV, and loan-to-income ratios. We find that policy tightening lowers house price expectations, reduces homebuying intentions, and worsens affordability assessments, while loosening has the opposite effects. The residential LTV ratio is the most effective tool. To interpret these findings, we embed our survey estimates into a dynamic model linking expectations, credit, and housing demand. The model shows that immediate belief shifts significantly amplify house price and consumption responses, highlighting the importance of expectations in the transmission of macroprudential policy.
{"title":"Macroprudential policy and housing market expectations","authors":"Pei Kuang , Kaushik Mitra , Li Tang , Shihan Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105191","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105191","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how macroprudential policy changes affect consumers’ housing market expectations and housing affordability perceptions in the United Kingdom. We conduct a large-scale online survey experiment presenting hypothetical changes of three borrower-based macroprudential tools: residential loan-to-value (LTV), buy-to-let LTV, and loan-to-income ratios. We find that policy tightening lowers house price expectations, reduces homebuying intentions, and worsens affordability assessments, while loosening has the opposite effects. The residential LTV ratio is the most effective tool. To interpret these findings, we embed our survey estimates into a dynamic model linking expectations, credit, and housing demand. The model shows that immediate belief shifts significantly amplify house price and consumption responses, highlighting the importance of expectations in the transmission of macroprudential policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105191"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-30DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105179
Mahmut S. İpek , Burçin Kısacıkoğlu
We estimate the output gap for the euro area and 20 member countries using a variety of statistical models, based on 55 years of data. We also update the Area-Wide Model Database (AWMD) through 2025Q2, ensuring it remains publicly accessible. Our key findings are: (1) while statistical models broadly agree on the timing of the peaks and troughs, uncertainty persists about the business cycle’s exact state due to differing estimates of the potential output, (2) statistical and institutional estimates generally align but diverge on the size of the output gap, (3) the output gaps of the five largest euro area countries are strongly correlated with each other and the overall euro area. Our work provides an important tool for understanding the business cycle dynamics of Europe’s economy and offers a reliable, official output gap measure for policymakers and economists.
{"title":"Estimating euro area output gap dynamics: Evidence from the updated Area-Wide Model Database","authors":"Mahmut S. İpek , Burçin Kısacıkoğlu","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105179","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105179","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We estimate the output gap for the euro area and 20 member countries using a variety of statistical models, based on 55 years of data. We also update the Area-Wide Model Database (AWMD) through 2025Q2, ensuring it remains publicly accessible. Our key findings are: (1) while statistical models broadly agree on the timing of the peaks and troughs, uncertainty persists about the business cycle’s exact state due to differing estimates of the potential output, (2) statistical and institutional estimates generally align but diverge on the size of the output gap, (3) the output gaps of the five largest euro area countries are strongly correlated with each other and the overall euro area. Our work provides an important tool for understanding the business cycle dynamics of Europe’s economy and offers a reliable, official output gap measure for policymakers and economists.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105179"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-27DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105161
Florian Heine , Arno Riedl
Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems, but little is known about the effect of leadership in group contests. In a group contest experiment, we compare two types of leadership – leading-by-example and transactional leadership – and also investigate the effect of communication between leaders under both leadership styles. We find that the introduction of leaders mostly increases contest investment. Transactional leaders increase followers’ investment through the allocation of a relatively larger share of the prize to followers who have invested more. Communication between leaders decreases contest investments when there is leading-by-example but not when there is transactional leadership. Overall, leaders do not mitigate the over-investment problem in group contests.
{"title":"Let’s (not) escalate this! Leadership and communication in a group contest","authors":"Florian Heine , Arno Riedl","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105161","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105161","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems, but little is known about the effect of leadership in group contests. In a group contest experiment, we compare two types of leadership – leading-by-example and transactional leadership – and also investigate the effect of communication between leaders under both leadership styles. We find that the introduction of leaders mostly increases contest investment. Transactional leaders increase followers’ investment through the allocation of a relatively larger share of the prize to followers who have invested more. Communication between leaders decreases contest investments when there is leading-by-example but not when there is transactional leadership. Overall, leaders do not mitigate the over-investment problem in group contests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105161"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145419634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105190
Arianna Gatta
Using a field experiment on Italy’s Youth Guarantee subsidised internships, this work investigates whether employers discriminate against candidates who participated in Active Labour Market policies at the beginning of their career. Specifically, 4,066 fictitious resumes were sent to real employers in 11 Italian cities. Each resume randomly displayed participation in the Youth Guarantee internship, a regular internship, or an unemployment gap after university graduation, followed by additional work experience. The results revealed that employers discriminate against former Youth Guarantee interns compared with those who are unemployed or regular interns. Discrimination is strongest when the resume does not show sectoral IT skills, suggesting that employers perceive the program to be detrimental to human capital accumulation and use it as a cue to statistically discriminate.
{"title":"Do employers discriminate against Active Labour Market Policies participants? A field experiment on the Youth Guarantee internship in Italy","authors":"Arianna Gatta","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105190","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105190","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a field experiment on Italy’s Youth Guarantee subsidised internships, this work investigates whether employers discriminate against candidates who participated in Active Labour Market policies at the beginning of their career. Specifically, 4,066 fictitious resumes were sent to real employers in 11 Italian cities. Each resume randomly displayed participation in the Youth Guarantee internship, a regular internship, or an unemployment gap after university graduation, followed by additional work experience. The results revealed that employers discriminate against former Youth Guarantee interns compared with those who are unemployed or regular interns. Discrimination is strongest when the resume does not show sectoral IT skills, suggesting that employers perceive the program to be detrimental to human capital accumulation and use it as a cue to statistically discriminate.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"184 ","pages":"Article 105190"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145927377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188
Joël J. van der Weele , Cristina Figueroa-Sisniega
Previous literature has shown that people are often reluctant to learn whether individually profitable actions have negative consequences for others. In an experimental allocation decision, we vary the ‘inconvenience’ of becoming informed about the payoffs of another player by changing the costs and benefits of choosing the fair outcome. Making the fair allocation cheaper to implement turns out to have a multiplier effect, raising both altruistic choices of informed subjects and the fraction of subjects that chooses to become informed. Thus, in situations of uncertainty, subsidizing altruistic choices to decision makers could be an effective tool for raising social welfare. By contrast, variations in the size of recipients’ potential payoffs have a smaller effect on ignorance and fair choices.
{"title":"Inconvenient truths: A note on information avoidance and the price of fairness","authors":"Joël J. van der Weele , Cristina Figueroa-Sisniega","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Previous literature has shown that people are often reluctant to learn whether individually profitable actions have negative consequences for others. In an experimental allocation decision, we vary the ‘inconvenience’ of becoming informed about the payoffs of another player by changing the costs and benefits of choosing the fair outcome. Making the fair allocation cheaper to implement turns out to have a multiplier effect, raising both altruistic choices of informed subjects and the fraction of subjects that chooses to become informed. Thus, in situations of uncertainty, subsidizing altruistic choices to decision makers could be an effective tool for raising social welfare. By contrast, variations in the size of recipients’ potential payoffs have a smaller effect on ignorance and fair choices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105188"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145419635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105159
Frauke von Bieberstein , Eberhard Feess , Natalie Packham
People who can increase their payoff by violating a moral norm may delegate decisions to dilute their perception of responsibility, which can lead to a higher overall frequency of moral transgressions. To structure the different effects at work, we first develop a model with multiple delegation stages where decision makers have private information on their lying costs and dilution of responsibility. Our model shows that the impact of delegation is generally ambiguous, but also identifies intuitive sufficient conditions for more moral transgressions with delegation. We then perform a large-scale online experiment where subjects in groups of three can increase their payoff by lying about the outcome of a lottery. We find no evidence that delegation increases the overall lying frequency. Estimating the subjects’ preferences from the data, we find a normal distribution for lying costs and a strongly negatively skewed distribution for a rather low dilution effect.
{"title":"Multi-step delegation and the frequency of immoral decisions: Theory and experiment","authors":"Frauke von Bieberstein , Eberhard Feess , Natalie Packham","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105159","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105159","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People who can increase their payoff by violating a moral norm may delegate decisions to dilute their perception of responsibility, which can lead to a higher overall frequency of moral transgressions. To structure the different effects at work, we first develop a model with multiple delegation stages where decision makers have private information on their lying costs and dilution of responsibility. Our model shows that the impact of delegation is generally ambiguous, but also identifies intuitive sufficient conditions for more moral transgressions with delegation. We then perform a large-scale online experiment where subjects in groups of three can increase their payoff by lying about the outcome of a lottery. We find no evidence that delegation increases the overall lying frequency. Estimating the subjects’ preferences from the data, we find a normal distribution for lying costs and a strongly negatively skewed distribution for a rather low dilution effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105159"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145419637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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