Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887
Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi , Daniel Sgroi
Iran has the world’s only government-regulated kidney market. We report the results of the first field study of donor behaviour in this unusual market. Participants have lower risk tolerance and higher patience levels than the Iranian average but display no difference in rationality from population averages and there is evidence of altruism among participants. We provide an examination of decision-making in extreme situations by individuals in this market, typically at the very bottom of the income distribution, and shed light on the sort of people likely to participate if other nations were to operate such markets.
{"title":"A field study of donor behaviour in the Iranian kidney market","authors":"Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi , Daniel Sgroi","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104887","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Iran has the world’s only government-regulated kidney market. We report the results of the first field study of donor behaviour in this unusual market. Participants have lower risk tolerance and higher patience levels than the Iranian average but display no difference in rationality from population averages and there is evidence of altruism among participants. We provide an examination of decision-making in extreme situations by individuals in this market, typically at the very bottom of the income distribution, and shed light on the sort of people likely to participate if other nations were to operate such markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-15DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884
Juha Tolvanen
This paper constructs a new, information-based explanation for political ambiguity and the success of anti-median platforms. It argues that voters’ and candidates’ correlated preferences about the appropriate policy combined with ambiguous platforms can help candidates with non-median preferences increase their support and even win against a median candidate. I show how ambiguity can arise in a standard citizen-candidate setting where voters have different preferences, in its extension with primaries, and even in a Condorcet jury model where disagreement arises only from differences in voters’ information. The paper also offers a formal framework that allows for dog whistle politics. The model illustrates how ambiguity can have important negative welfare implications. Specifically, I show that despite having ex-ante identical preferences with voters, politicians may choose ambiguous platforms even if voters would be keen on banning them.
{"title":"On political ambiguity and anti-median platforms","authors":"Juha Tolvanen","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104884","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper constructs a new, information-based explanation for political ambiguity and the success of anti-median platforms. It argues that voters’ and candidates’ correlated preferences about the appropriate policy combined with ambiguous platforms can help candidates with non-median preferences increase their support and even win against a median candidate. I show how ambiguity can arise in a standard citizen-candidate setting where voters have different preferences, in its extension with primaries, and even in a Condorcet jury model where disagreement arises only from differences in voters’ information. The paper also offers a formal framework that allows for dog whistle politics. The model illustrates how ambiguity can have important negative welfare implications. Specifically, I show that despite having ex-ante identical preferences with voters, politicians may choose ambiguous platforms even if voters would be keen on banning them.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the impact of robot adoption on employment composition using novel micro data on robot use of German manufacturing plants linked with social security records and data on job tasks. Our task-based model predicts more favorable employment effects for the least routine-task intensive occupations and for young workers, the latter being better at adapting to change. An event-study analysis for robot adoption confirms both predictions. We do not find decreasing employment for any occupational or age group but churning among low-skilled workers rises sharply. We conclude that the displacement effect of robots is occupation-biased but age neutral whereas the reinstatement effect is age-biased and benefits young workers most.
{"title":"Robots, occupations, and worker age: A production-unit analysis of employment","authors":"Liuchun Deng , Steffen Müller , Verena Plümpe , Jens Stegmaier","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104881","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104881","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the impact of robot adoption on employment composition using novel micro data on robot use of German manufacturing plants linked with social security records and data on job tasks. Our task-based model predicts more favorable employment effects for the least routine-task intensive occupations and for young workers, the latter being better at adapting to change. An event-study analysis for robot adoption confirms both predictions. We do not find decreasing employment for any occupational or age group but churning among low-skilled workers rises sharply. We conclude that the displacement effect of robots is occupation-biased but age neutral whereas the reinstatement effect is age-biased and benefits young workers most.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-11DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104874
Stephanie Ettmeier , Alexander Kriwoluzky
We investigate the interplay of the monetary–fiscal policy mix during times of crisis by drawing insights from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. We use a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm to estimate a DSGE model with three distinct monetary/fiscal policy regimes. We show that, in such a model, SMC outperforms standard sampling algorithms because it is better suited to deal with multimodal posteriors, an outcome that is highly likely in a DSGE model with monetary–fiscal policy interactions. From the estimation with SMC, a differentiated perspective results: pre-Volcker macroeconomic dynamics were similarly driven by passive monetary/passive fiscal policy and fiscal dominance. We apply these insights to study the post-pandemic inflation period.
{"title":"Active or passive? Revisiting the role of fiscal policy during high inflation","authors":"Stephanie Ettmeier , Alexander Kriwoluzky","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104874","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104874","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the interplay of the monetary–fiscal policy mix during times of crisis by drawing insights from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. We use a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm to estimate a DSGE model with three distinct monetary/fiscal policy regimes. We show that, in such a model, SMC outperforms standard sampling algorithms because it is better suited to deal with multimodal posteriors, an outcome that is highly likely in a DSGE model with monetary–fiscal policy interactions. From the estimation with SMC, a differentiated perspective results: pre-Volcker macroeconomic dynamics were similarly driven by passive monetary/passive fiscal policy and fiscal dominance. We apply these insights to study the post-pandemic inflation period.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-10DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104878
Yu-Chen Liu , Yiting Li
We construct a monetary model in which entrepreneurs facing uncertainty in input costs and returns of projects may finance investment internally and with bank credit. Entrepreneurs using money as a down payment and bonds as collateral can reduce the default probability. Working through these key channels, lower nominal policy rates and open market sales can reduce the real lending rate. The central bank’s private asset purchases improve availability of credit and compress risk spreads. Our model identifies the risk-reducing channel of private asset purchases—the policy functions as if the government had supplied more bonds, and the increased collateralizable bonds are allocated more to corporate borrowings with a higher lending risk. Risk-retention requirements associated with asset purchases are essential to welfare. As uncertainty with respect to input costs and investment returns intensifies, the central bank should lower the optimal risk-retention rate to encourage lending and reduce business failures.
{"title":"Corporate finance, collateralized borrowing, and monetary policy","authors":"Yu-Chen Liu , Yiting Li","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104878","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104878","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We construct a monetary model in which entrepreneurs facing uncertainty in input costs and returns of projects may finance investment internally and with bank credit. Entrepreneurs using money as a down payment and bonds as collateral can reduce the default probability. Working through these key channels, lower nominal policy rates and open market sales can reduce the real lending rate. The central bank’s private asset purchases improve availability of credit and compress risk spreads. Our model identifies the risk-reducing channel of private asset purchases—the policy functions as if the government had supplied more bonds, and the increased collateralizable bonds are allocated more to corporate borrowings with a higher lending risk. Risk-retention requirements associated with asset purchases are essential to welfare. As uncertainty with respect to input costs and investment returns intensifies, the central bank should lower the optimal risk-retention rate to encourage lending and reduce business failures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104876
Luis E. Rojas , Dominik Thaler
The feedback loop between sovereign and financial sector insolvency, termed the “doom loop”, was a key driver of the European debt crisis and motivated an array of policy proposals. This paper revisits the “doom loop” focusing on governments’ incentives to default. We introduce a 3-period model with strategic sovereign default, where debt is held by both domestic banks and foreign investors. The government maximizes domestic welfare; thus, the temptation to default increases with externally-held debt. Importantly, the cost of default arises endogenously from the damage that default causes to domestic banks’ balance sheets. Domestically-held debt thus serves as a commitment device for the government. We show that two prominent policy prescriptions – lower exposure of domestic banks to domestic sovereign debt or a commitment not to bailout banks – can backfire, since default incentives depend not only on the quantity of debt, but also on who holds it. Conversely, allowing domestic banks to buy additional domestic sovereign debt during times of sovereign distress can avert the doom loop. In the context of a monetary union similar unintended negative consequences may arise from a backstop by the central bank (e.g., the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument) if imprecisely calibrated or the pooling of debt (e.g., European safe bond, also known as ESBies).
{"title":"The bright side of the doom loop: Banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives","authors":"Luis E. Rojas , Dominik Thaler","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104876","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104876","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The feedback loop between sovereign and financial sector insolvency, termed the “doom loop”, was a key driver of the European debt crisis and motivated an array of policy proposals. This paper revisits the “doom loop” focusing on governments’ incentives to default. We introduce a 3-period model with strategic sovereign default, where debt is held by both domestic banks and foreign investors. The government maximizes domestic welfare; thus, the temptation to default increases with externally-held debt. Importantly, the cost of default arises endogenously from the damage that default causes to domestic banks’ balance sheets. Domestically-held debt thus serves as a commitment device for the government. We show that two prominent policy prescriptions – lower exposure of domestic banks to domestic sovereign debt or a commitment not to bailout banks – can backfire, since default incentives depend not only on the quantity of debt, but also on who holds it. Conversely, allowing domestic banks to buy additional domestic sovereign debt during times of sovereign distress can avert the doom loop. In the context of a monetary union similar unintended negative consequences may arise from a backstop by the central bank (<em>e.g.</em>, the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument) if imprecisely calibrated or the pooling of debt (<em>e.g.</em>, European safe bond, also known as ESBies).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142446743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104875
Enisse Kharroubi , Frank Smets
This paper analyses the economic impact of and the optimal policy response to energy supply shocks in a flexible price model with heterogeneous households. We introduce energy as a consumption good on the demand side and as an input to production on the supply side. A distinguishing feature is that, in line with empirical evidence, we allow households’ energy demand to be non-homothetic. The model provides three main insights. First, (negative) energy supply shocks act as a (negative) demand shocks, or Keynesian supply shocks, when two conditions are met: On the demand side household income inequality needs to be large, while on the supply side, the price elasticity of consumption goods needs to be high. Second, the social planner can implement the first-best allocation by subsidising firms and poor households while taxing rich households. Energy shocks then act as standard supply shocks. Last, issuing public debt can help implement the first best allocation when energy shocks are large and/or the economy’s overall energy intensity is low.
{"title":"Energy shocks as Keynesian supply shocks: Implications for fiscal policy","authors":"Enisse Kharroubi , Frank Smets","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104875","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104875","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyses the economic impact of and the optimal policy response to energy supply shocks in a flexible price model with heterogeneous households. We introduce energy as a consumption good on the demand side and as an input to production on the supply side. A distinguishing feature is that, in line with empirical evidence, we allow households’ energy demand to be non-homothetic. The model provides three main insights. First, (negative) energy supply shocks act as a (negative) demand shocks, or Keynesian supply shocks, when two conditions are met: On the demand side household income inequality needs to be large, while on the supply side, the price elasticity of consumption goods needs to be high. Second, the social planner can implement the first-best allocation by subsidising firms and poor households while taxing rich households. Energy shocks then act as standard supply shocks. Last, issuing public debt can help implement the first best allocation when energy shocks are large and/or the economy’s overall energy intensity is low.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142530026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ambitious climate policy, coupled with financial frictions, has the potential to create macrofinancial stability risk. Such stability risk may expand beyond the economy implementing climate policy, potentially catching other countries off guard. International spillovers may occur because of trade and financial channels. Hence, we study the design and effects of climate policies in the world economy with international trade and financial flows. We develop a two-sector, two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions, climate policies, including carbon tariffs, and macroprudential policies. Using the calibrated model, we evaluate spillovers from unilateral domestic carbon pricing to foreign economies and back. We also examine more ambitious climate architectures involving carbon tariffs or a global carbon price. We find that accounting for cross-border financial flows and frictions in credit markets is crucial to understand the effects of climate policies and to guide the implementation of macroprudential policies at the global scale aimed at minimizing transition risk and paving the way for ambitious climate policy.
{"title":"Carbon taxes and tariffs, financial frictions, and international spillovers","authors":"Stefano Carattini , Giseong Kim , Givi Melkadze , Aude Pommeret","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104883","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104883","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Ambitious climate policy, coupled with financial frictions, has the potential to create macrofinancial stability risk. Such stability risk may expand beyond the economy implementing climate policy, potentially catching other countries off guard. International spillovers may occur because of trade and financial channels. Hence, we study the design and effects of climate policies in the world economy with international trade and financial flows. We develop a two-sector, two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions, climate policies, including carbon tariffs, and macroprudential policies. Using the calibrated model, we evaluate spillovers from unilateral domestic carbon pricing to foreign economies and back. We also examine more ambitious climate architectures involving carbon tariffs or a global carbon price. We find that accounting for cross-border financial flows and frictions in credit markets is crucial to understand the effects of climate policies and to guide the implementation of macroprudential policies at the global scale aimed at minimizing transition risk and paving the way for ambitious climate policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-06DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104882
Sourafel Girma , David Paton
Machine learning approaches provide an alternative to traditional fixed effects estimators in causal inference. In particular, double-debiased machine learning (DDML) can control for confounders without making subjective judgements about appropriate functional forms. In this paper, we use DDML to examine the impact of differential Covid-19 vaccination rates on care home mortality and other outcomes. Our approach accommodates fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to standard fixed effects estimates, the DDML results provide some evidence that higher vaccination take-up amongst residents, but not staff, reduced Covid mortality in elderly care homes. However, this effect was relatively small, is not robust to alternative measures of mortality and was restricted to the initial vaccination roll-out period.
{"title":"Using double-debiased machine learning to estimate the impact of Covid-19 vaccination on mortality and staff absences in elderly care homes.","authors":"Sourafel Girma , David Paton","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104882","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104882","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Machine learning approaches provide an alternative to traditional fixed effects estimators in causal inference. In particular, double-debiased machine learning (DDML) can control for confounders without making subjective judgements about appropriate functional forms. In this paper, we use DDML to examine the impact of differential Covid-19 vaccination rates on care home mortality and other outcomes. Our approach accommodates fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to standard fixed effects estimates, the DDML results provide some evidence that higher vaccination take-up amongst residents, but not staff, reduced Covid mortality in elderly care homes. However, this effect was relatively small, is not robust to alternative measures of mortality and was restricted to the initial vaccination roll-out period.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142421639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104873
Mirko Abbritti , Agostino Consolo
This paper analyses how labour market heterogeneity affects unemployment, productivity and business cycle dynamics. To this aim, we set up a model with asymmetric search and matching frictions across skilled and unskilled workers, and endogenous productivity through R&D investment and intangible capital accumulation. Skill mismatch and skill-specific labour market institutions have three main effects on business cycles and growth dynamics. First, the relative scarcity of skilled workers increases the natural rate of unemployment and reduces total factor productivity with long-run effects on the growth rate of output. Second, skill heterogeneity in the labour market generates asymmetric outcomes and amplifies measures of employment, wages and consumption inequality. Finally, the model provides important insights for the Phillips and Beveridge curves. Incorporating skill heterogeneity leads to a flattening of the Phillips curve as wages and unemployment respond unevenly across skill types. Also, the model generates sideward shifts of the Beveridge curve following business cycle shocks, with the extent of these shifts depending on the degree of skill heterogeneity.
{"title":"Labour market skills, endogenous productivity and business cycles","authors":"Mirko Abbritti , Agostino Consolo","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104873","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104873","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyses how labour market heterogeneity affects unemployment, productivity and business cycle dynamics. To this aim, we set up a model with asymmetric search and matching frictions across skilled and unskilled workers, and endogenous productivity through R&D investment and intangible capital accumulation. Skill mismatch and skill-specific labour market institutions have three main effects on business cycles and growth dynamics. First, the relative scarcity of skilled workers increases the natural rate of unemployment and reduces total factor productivity with long-run effects on the growth rate of output. Second, skill heterogeneity in the labour market generates asymmetric outcomes and amplifies measures of employment, wages and consumption inequality. Finally, the model provides important insights for the Phillips and Beveridge curves. Incorporating skill heterogeneity leads to a flattening of the Phillips curve as wages and unemployment respond unevenly across skill types. Also, the model generates sideward shifts of the Beveridge curve following business cycle shocks, with the extent of these shifts depending on the degree of skill heterogeneity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号