We describe and analyze the voting process leading to the compromise achieved in the Weimar Flag Controversy. We also offer a simple theoretical model that attempts to capture the main forces at work. These forces are: (1) the addition of a compromise alternative that is located between the main ideological positions on the left and on the right; (2) the interdependence of preferences that makes the compromise salient; and (3) a voting process that gradually reveals and aggregates information. Finally, we compare the theoretical insights with the observed outcome.
We analyze the relationship between climate-related disasters and sovereign debt crises using a model with capital accumulation, sovereign default, and disaster risk. We find that disaster risk and default risk together lead to slow post-disaster recovery and heightened borrowing costs. Calibrating the model to Mexico, we find that the increase in cyclone risk due to climate change leads to a welfare loss equivalent to a permanent 0.95% consumption drop. However, financial adaptation via catastrophe bonds and disaster insurance can reduce these losses by about 21%. Our study highlights the importance of financial frictions in analyzing climate change impacts.