Journal of Monetary Economics最新文献

Is excessive risk-taking in credit cycles driven by incentives or biased beliefs? I propose a framework suggesting that the two are actually related and, specifically, that procyclical overoptimism can arise rationally from risk-taking incentives. I show that when firms and banks have a limited liability payoff structure, they have lower incentives to pay attention to the aggregate conditions that generate risk. This leads to systematic underestimation of the accumulation of risk during economic booms and overoptimistic beliefs. As a result, agents lend and borrow excessively, further increasing downside risk. Credit cycles driven by this new “uninformed” risk-taking are consistent with existing evidence such as high credit and low-risk premia predicting a higher probability of crises and negative returns for banks. My model suggests that regulating incentives can decrease overoptimistic beliefs and thus mitigate boom-and-bust cycles.

Surprise changes in monetary policy rates have a causal impact on credit risk measures, which display a significant post-FOMC drift. I employ a tight identification strategy to decompose the influence of firm-specific and creditor-specific factors across horizons. Firms with narrower income gaps and lower Tobin’s Q ratios exhibit heightened sensitivity at both short and long horizons. Bonds predominantly held by bond funds demonstrate only temporarily more sensitivity, indicating that credit market segmentation fails to account for the observed drift. Aggregate broker dealer capital scarcity is linked to an amplified response in the drift component. A large portion of the drift remains unexplained, revealing the limitations of cross-sectional characteristics in explaining the transmission mechanism.

The empirical literature often uses disagreement (dispersion in forecasts) as a proxy for uncertainty, yet disagreement and uncertainty behave differently throughout the business cycle. The difference is especially salient in non-crisis periods, in which measures of disagreement are positively correlated with growth, while measures of uncertainty are negatively correlated with it. I explain this finding using a noisy information model with endogenous learning. In the model, agents observe noisy private information, but only when they are active. Holding uncertainty fixed, a rise in activity introduces noisy information to the market, and agents’ beliefs diverge, i.e., disagreement rises.

We employ a nonlinear vector autoregression and a non-recursive identification strategy to show that an equal-sized uncertainty shock generates a larger contraction in real activity when growth is low (as in recessions) than when growth is high (as in expansions). An estimated New Keynesian model with recursive preferences replicates these state-contingent responses when approximated to third order around its risky steady state due to a stronger upward nominal pricing bias in recessions than in expansions. Empirical evidence supports this state-contingent channel, and we show that it can greatly reduce the ability of systematic monetary policy to stabilize output during recessions.

Recent survey evidence reveals misaligned inflation expectations among economic agents. While households associate higher expected inflation with lower output growth, professional forecasters link higher future inflation to higher output growth. Firms’ expectations display neither negative nor positive correlations. We explain such patterns jointly in a general equilibrium New Keynesian framework. Asymmetric information arises naturally as (i) households and firms receive imperfect, asymmetric information about supply and demand shocks, and (ii) the central bank learns from equilibrium outcomes (i.e., output and inflation) as opposed to the private sector. Survey data help uncover the magnitudes of information frictions among economic agents.

Using the Spanish Christmas lottery as a natural experiment, the impact of geographically clustered lottery winnings on consumer sentiment and intended durable consumption is analyzed. Albeit not receiving lottery prizes, consumers in winning provinces become significantly more optimistic about the Spanish macroeconomic conditions than those living elsewhere. This variation in sentiment is shown to be orthogonal to changes in regional fundamentals and leads to a rise in spending intentions. Young, less educated, low-income, and unemployed individuals react stronger to the lottery shock. At the regional level, lottery wins significantly increase car licenses, reduce unemployment, and intensify job creation and prices.

How effective are forward-guidance and make-up strategies? Standard models find them extremely effective, but by assuming households’ inflation expectations respond much more strongly than in the data. Models where households discount the future find them much less effective and match the small reaction of inflation expectations, but not the actual large reaction of asset prices. We build a model that rationalizes both. Households cognitively discount the future, but more forward-looking financial market professionals incorporate their expectations of future policy into the long-term nominal rates faced by all. We find that make-up strategies have sizably better stabilization properties than inflation targeting.

We formulate a framework showing that differences in capital returns and capital intensity between groups of firms can identify relative differences in consumer demand and credit constraints. Using micro-data on Black- and White-owned startups, we find robust evidence that Black-owned startups have lower capital returns, implying that Black-owned startups face lower consumer demand due to race. In contrast, we find mixed evidence of tighter credit constraints due to race. We further show that differences in capital returns are persistent over time, whereas capital intensity differences are transitory. This suggests that lower demand, rather than credit constraints, might be the main barrier to growth for Black-owned startups.

This paper examines heterogeneity in household income and consumption responses to unemployment, using granular administrative tax data from Norway. On average, unemployment results in a significant, lasting income reduction, accompanied by a decrease in consumption expenditures of between one-third to one-half of the income loss. We find that households with greater liquid assets at the outset experience less of a decline in consumption, whereas those with higher levels of debt encounter a more substantial decrease. Notably, also the interaction of liquid assets and debt holdings matters for the consumption response. While households with larger initial liquid asset holdings on average respond less, the analyses show that this is not the case among households that simultaneously hold substantial amounts of debt, thus adding to a more nuanced view of the importance of household heterogeneity for economic outcomes. Furthermore, our investigation into heterogeneity across family composition and child age uncovers distinct patterns in consumption responses, highlighting the varied impacts of unemployment. Lastly, we find that spending patterns, as indicated by the marginal propensity to consume (MPC), become more pronounced during recessions.

How does a monetary union alter the impact of business cycle shocks at the household level? We develop a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model of two countries (HANK${}^2$) and show in closed form that a monetary union shifts the adjustment to a shock horizontally across countries, within the brackets of the union-wide wealth distribution, rather than vertically, that is, across the brackets of the union-wide wealth distribution. Calibrating the model to the euro area reveals that a monetary union alters the impact of shocks most strongly in the tails of the wealth distribution but leaves the middle class almost unaffected.