Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107404
Marco Clemens , Laszlo Goerke
This study provides the first comprehensive investigation of the relationship between trade union membership and non-performance-oriented bonuses. We expect a positive impact of union membership because members can benefit from special entitlements, increased bargaining power and informational advantages. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), we observe that union members are more likely to receive at least one bonus payment per year, a higher number and amount of bonuses than comparable non-members. We also observe the positive union membership effect for employees covered by collective bargaining or co-determination via works councils. Employing a novel instrumental variable, we find evidence of a positive effect of union membership on the number and level of bonus payments. Furthermore, higher bonuses do not go along with decreases in base wages or other pay components.
{"title":"Trade union membership and bonus payments: German survey evidence","authors":"Marco Clemens , Laszlo Goerke","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107404","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107404","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study provides the first comprehensive investigation of the relationship between trade union membership and non-performance-oriented bonuses. We expect a positive impact of union membership because members can benefit from special entitlements, increased bargaining power and informational advantages. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), we observe that union members are more likely to receive at least one bonus payment per year, a higher number and amount of bonuses than comparable non-members. We also observe the positive union membership effect for employees covered by collective bargaining or co-determination via works councils. Employing a novel instrumental variable, we find evidence of a positive effect of union membership on the number and level of bonus payments. Furthermore, higher bonuses do not go along with decreases in base wages or other pay components.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107404"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360
Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen
Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.
{"title":"Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment","authors":"Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107360"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145898048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107325
Muneer Kalliyil , Soham Sahoo
We investigate the role of political favouritism in the private education market. Using constituency-level panel data and a close-election regression discontinuity design, we estimate the causal effect of having a politician aligned with the state ruling party on the growth of private educational institutions in India. We find that constituencies represented by aligned politicians have a higher growth rate in the number of private schools, while the effect is insignificant for government schools. Similar patterns are also found for higher education institutions. As potential mechanisms, we explore political influence over bureaucratic processes and the direct involvement of politicians in opening the schools. A mediation analysis and examination of heterogeneous effects across the electoral term suggest that economic growth driven by ruling party-aligned leaders is unlikely to explain the increase in private school establishments. Additionally, we find that the effect of aligned politicians is concentrated in constituencies with lower-quality government schools, although the newly established private schools do not necessarily provide higher-quality education.
{"title":"The political economy of privatization of education: Role of local politicians in India","authors":"Muneer Kalliyil , Soham Sahoo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107325","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107325","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the role of political favouritism in the private education market. Using constituency-level panel data and a close-election regression discontinuity design, we estimate the causal effect of having a politician aligned with the state ruling party on the growth of private educational institutions in India. We find that constituencies represented by aligned politicians have a higher growth rate in the number of private schools, while the effect is insignificant for government schools. Similar patterns are also found for higher education institutions. As potential mechanisms, we explore political influence over bureaucratic processes and the direct involvement of politicians in opening the schools. A mediation analysis and examination of heterogeneous effects across the electoral term suggest that economic growth driven by ruling party-aligned leaders is unlikely to explain the increase in private school establishments. Additionally, we find that the effect of aligned politicians is concentrated in constituencies with lower-quality government schools, although the newly established private schools do not necessarily provide higher-quality education.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107325"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390
Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons
We examine the long-run institutional and economic effects of successful one-time nonviolent campaigns. Using an event study on panel data (1950–2022) from the NAVCO and V-Dem datasets, we compare countries with successful one-time nonviolent campaigns to politically stable counterparts without any campaigns. This design plausibly mitigates concerns about selection bias, simultaneity, and timing endogeneity. Pre-treatment trends support the assumption of parallel trends. We find that nonviolent campaigns are associated with lasting improvements in liberal democracy, rule of law, civil liberties, and government accountability, alongside reduced state ownership of the economy. These results suggest that collective action can strengthen market-supporting institutions and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of liberal market systems.
{"title":"The invisible hand meets the raised fist: Social movements and market legitimacy","authors":"Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the long-run institutional and economic effects of successful one-time nonviolent campaigns. Using an event study on panel data (1950–2022) from the NAVCO and V-Dem datasets, we compare countries with successful one-time nonviolent campaigns to politically stable counterparts without any campaigns. This design plausibly mitigates concerns about selection bias, simultaneity, and timing endogeneity. Pre-treatment trends support the assumption of parallel trends. We find that nonviolent campaigns are associated with lasting improvements in liberal democracy, rule of law, civil liberties, and government accountability, alongside reduced state ownership of the economy. These results suggest that collective action can strengthen market-supporting institutions and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of liberal market systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107390"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401
Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki
Cooperative game theory addresses two main problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence and size of the core, a central concept in cooperative game theory, influence the formation of the grand coalition, and we test this in a laboratory experiment. In each group, three subjects simultaneously engage in unstructured bargaining over both coalition formation and payoff distribution, mimicking real-world negotiation. Our results highlight four key findings. First, a nonempty core strongly facilitates the formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of a chat window increases the likelihood of forming the grand coalition and reduces inequality in the resulting allocations. Third, resulting allocations are often in the core when it exists, and otherwise fall within the equal division core, an extension of the core. Fourth, the resulting allocations reflect the subjects’ theoretical bargaining power: players with higher bargaining power tend to receive larger shares. Finally, allocations outside the equal division core arise mainly because subjects overlook domination via coalition BC, the two-person coalition with the lowest value.
{"title":"The core and the equal division core in a three-person unstructured bargaining experiment","authors":"Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cooperative game theory addresses two main problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence and size of the core, a central concept in cooperative game theory, influence the formation of the grand coalition, and we test this in a laboratory experiment. In each group, three subjects simultaneously engage in unstructured bargaining over both coalition formation and payoff distribution, mimicking real-world negotiation. Our results highlight four key findings. First, a nonempty core strongly facilitates the formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of a chat window increases the likelihood of forming the grand coalition and reduces inequality in the resulting allocations. Third, resulting allocations are often in the core when it exists, and otherwise fall within the equal division core, an extension of the core. Fourth, the resulting allocations reflect the subjects’ theoretical bargaining power: players with higher bargaining power tend to receive larger shares. Finally, allocations outside the equal division core arise mainly because subjects overlook domination via coalition BC, the two-person coalition with the lowest value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107401"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394
Christine Harbring, Stella Simons
Performance appraisals by supervisors are often used in organizations as a basis for bonus and promotion decisions. These subjective appraisals are often prone to supervisors’ biases (e.g., centrality and leniency bias) resulting in ratings that seem not sufficiently differentiated. Previous research shows that forcing supervisors to differentiate in subjective performance appraisals by implementing a forced distribution system may increase worker productivity. However, forced distribution systems pose a variety of other problems. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate two alternative rating policies which aim to foster differentiation and thus productivity. Firstly, supervisors are simply advised to differentiate across different appraisal levels. We find that this simple recommendation results in less lenient and less compressed performance ratings and tends to increase workers’ performance. Secondly, we analyze how supervisors evaluate workers’ performance when the rewards, which are tied to ratings, may not exceed a certain budget. We detect that specifying a financial budget mitigates the leniency bias and increases workers’ performance. Under both rating policies, the performance differences wear off over the course of the experiment.
{"title":"Make a difference? – An experiment on the effectiveness of performance rating policies","authors":"Christine Harbring, Stella Simons","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Performance appraisals by supervisors are often used in organizations as a basis for bonus and promotion decisions. These subjective appraisals are often prone to supervisors’ biases (e.g., centrality and leniency bias) resulting in ratings that seem not sufficiently differentiated. Previous research shows that forcing supervisors to differentiate in subjective performance appraisals by implementing a forced distribution system may increase worker productivity. However, forced distribution systems pose a variety of other problems. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate two alternative rating policies which aim to foster differentiation and thus productivity. Firstly, supervisors are simply advised to differentiate across different appraisal levels. We find that this simple recommendation results in less lenient and less compressed performance ratings and tends to increase workers’ performance. Secondly, we analyze how supervisors evaluate workers’ performance when the rewards, which are tied to ratings, may not exceed a certain budget. We detect that specifying a financial budget mitigates the leniency bias and increases workers’ performance. Under both rating policies, the performance differences wear off over the course of the experiment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107394"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324
Maxim Ananyev , Michael Poyker
Inmates’ informal code often ascribes low status to persons perceived as passive homosexuals. We use longitudinal data to investigate whether prison experience might contribute to anti-gay beliefs. We find that prison experience is related to a higher level of anti-gay sentiments among males and their families, while no discernible difference exists before incarceration. We find no effect for female ex-prisoners. We confirm that pre-incarceration trends, changes in trust and social capital, income, mental health, masculinity norms, and other potential alternative explanations do not drive the results. Our study sheds light on the overlooked role of prisons as a potential significant contributor to the propagation of anti-gay attitudes.
{"title":"Impact of prison experience on anti-gay sentiments: Longitudinal analysis of inmates and their families","authors":"Maxim Ananyev , Michael Poyker","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inmates’ informal code often ascribes low status to persons perceived as passive homosexuals. We use longitudinal data to investigate whether prison experience might contribute to anti-gay beliefs. We find that prison experience is related to a higher level of anti-gay sentiments among males and their families, while no discernible difference exists before incarceration. We find no effect for female ex-prisoners. We confirm that pre-incarceration trends, changes in trust and social capital, income, mental health, masculinity norms, and other potential alternative explanations do not drive the results. Our study sheds light on the overlooked role of prisons as a potential significant contributor to the propagation of anti-gay attitudes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107324"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405
Vlad Tarko
As societies become richer, and basic needs are satisfied, zero-sum positional contests gain more prominence, while the regular positive-sum benefits of markets subside in the background. As long argued by Hirsch, Frank and others, the institutions for managing resource scarcity and spurring economic growth, i.e. the institutions of capitalism, may not be particularly well-suited for managing the type of scarcity associated with positional goods. The long-term equilibrium of rich societies may not be as peaceful as many assume if they become overrun by status competitions. This paper provides a typology of positional goods, explaining why some positional competitions are worse than others, and a rent-seeking model of the supply response to positional goods’ price changes. The model leads to surprisingly optimistic predictions: markets tend to fragment the worst kinds of positional goods into competing hierarchies of status, tend to dissipate and eliminate some positional goods, and tend to turn the most damaging status competitions into more beneficial prestige competitions. Government interventions, by contrast, often attempt to prop‑up monopolistic status hierarchies.
{"title":"Polycentric status contests","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>As societies become richer, and basic needs are satisfied, zero-sum positional contests gain more prominence, while the regular positive-sum benefits of markets subside in the background. As long argued by Hirsch, Frank and others, the institutions for managing resource scarcity and spurring economic growth, i.e. the institutions of capitalism, may not be particularly well-suited for managing the type of scarcity associated with positional goods. The long-term equilibrium of rich societies may not be as peaceful as many assume if they become overrun by status competitions. This paper provides a typology of positional goods, explaining why some positional competitions are worse than others, and a rent-seeking model of the supply response to positional goods’ price changes. The model leads to surprisingly optimistic predictions: markets tend to fragment the worst kinds of positional goods into competing hierarchies of status, tend to dissipate and eliminate some positional goods, and tend to turn the most damaging status competitions into more beneficial prestige competitions. Government interventions, by contrast, often attempt to prop‑up monopolistic status hierarchies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107405"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381
Ananyo Brahma , Vidhya Soundararajan
This paper investigates whether rural road infrastructure can foster inclusive entrepreneurship. Using enterprise data from India, we examine how a national rural road construction program, which connected previously isolated villages, affects entrepreneurship across different social groups. Our findings reveal that new feeder roads increase the number of service enterprises for all caste categories, including marginalized groups. However, manufacturing entrepreneurship increases only among the non-marginalized caste groups. For marginalized groups, the increase in entrepreneurship appears to be a response to a relative decline in wage employment opportunities following road construction. Formal finance and education infrastructure serve as key channels through which road connectivity fosters entrepreneurship.
{"title":"Do rural roads promote inclusive entrepreneurship?","authors":"Ananyo Brahma , Vidhya Soundararajan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates whether rural road infrastructure can foster inclusive entrepreneurship. Using enterprise data from India, we examine how a national rural road construction program, which connected previously isolated villages, affects entrepreneurship across different social groups. Our findings reveal that new feeder roads increase the number of service enterprises for all caste categories, including marginalized groups. However, manufacturing entrepreneurship increases only among the non-marginalized caste groups. For marginalized groups, the increase in entrepreneurship appears to be a response to a relative decline in wage employment opportunities following road construction. Formal finance and education infrastructure serve as key channels through which road connectivity fosters entrepreneurship.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107381"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395
Yuqi (Angela) Jiang , Suraj Prasad
This paper develops a theory of opinionated bosses – this is where a boss reveals her opinions to a worker who is tasked with gathering information. When the worker gathers information across multiple tasks, which he views as substitutes, the boss may selectively reveal her opinions to the worker on a well known task to redirect his effort to the task that is less well known. The benefit is a broader expertise across activities in the organization when rewards across these activities are implicitly determined. The cost is that the worker becomes a yes man. Being opinionated can, i) go hand in hand with weaker opinions, ii) lead to excessive levels of conformity and initiative, and finally, iii) improve the tradeoff between insurance and explicit incentives when a worker is risk averse.
{"title":"Of opinionated bosses and yes men","authors":"Yuqi (Angela) Jiang , Suraj Prasad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a theory of opinionated bosses – this is where a boss reveals her opinions to a worker who is tasked with gathering information. When the worker gathers information across multiple tasks, which he views as substitutes, the boss may <em>selectively</em> reveal her opinions to the worker on a well known task to redirect his effort to the task that is less well known. The benefit is a broader expertise across activities in the organization when rewards across these activities are implicitly determined. The cost is that the worker becomes a yes man. Being opinionated can, i) go hand in hand with weaker opinions, ii) lead to excessive levels of conformity and initiative, and finally, iii) improve the tradeoff between insurance and explicit incentives when a worker is risk averse.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107395"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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