Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献

英文中文

Business drinking: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106881

Jianxin Wang , Daniel Houser

Alcohol consumption is an important component of business negotiations across many cultures, yet this behavior remains unmodeled and its potential explanations untested. Here, we develop a theory that combines guilt-aversion with the canonical alcohol myopia framework. Our GAAM (guilt aversion and alcohol myopia) model predicts that intoxication increases promise-making, and will not decrease rate of promise-breaking. We test these predictions using a Prisoner's Dilemma game with pre-play communication in a lab-in-the-field experiment. Among males, we find behavior consistent with predictions: intoxication promotes promise-making but does not impact the rate at which promises are broken. Importantly, this implies intoxication increases the efficiency of communication. We do not observe intoxication to impact female promise-making or promise-breaking behaviors. This is consistent with previous empirical findings that females can display less sensitivity than males to alcohol-induced myopia. Our results provide an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of business drinking.

引用次数: 0

Does credit expansion encourage small businesses to incorporate? Evidence from US bank deregulations

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106880

Jiantao Ma , Anindo Sarker , Bulent Unel

We use state-level bank deregulations to study the impact of changes in credit on incorporation among unincorporated self-employed business owners. Exploiting the variation in the staggered timing of banking deregulations and using the recent advances in difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation techniques, we find that banking reforms considerably increased unincorporated businesses to incorporate. Further, the effects of reforms are different across groups based on gender, race, education, and age. We find stronger effects on incorporated business creation among female, less-educated, and younger unincorporated business owners. Our results are robust to the choice of controls, samples, and estimation approaches.

引用次数: 0

The poor, the rich and the middle class: Experimental evidence from heterogeneous public good games

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106913

Daniel W. Derbyshire , Michalis Drouvelis , Brit Grosskopf

This study sheds light on how different sources of inequality can affect cooperation in public good games. We present the results of one-shot and repeated public good experiments that seek to understand the interaction between the endowment and marginal return in heterogeneous groups. Our focus is on situations where endowments and marginal returns are either inversely or proportionally related. While two normatively appealing contribution rules are aligned in the proportional treatment, a conflict arises in the inverse treatment. In the one-shot experiment, we do not find significant differences across treatments. Contributions increase when the endowment, the marginal return or both increase. This is observed in all treatments except when endowment and marginal return are inversely related. Then the ‘middle class’ participants (those with medium endowment and marginal return) contribute more than both the high and low endowment types, mirroring real world observations of a ‘squeezed middle’. This suggests a conflict between the highly endowed subjects (but with low marginal return) and those with a high marginal return (but with low endowment). This pattern is similar when eliciting beliefs about others’ contributions - the two conflicting types expect others to contribute more than they do themselves. The novel treatments are repeated for 15 periods in a subsequent experiment to investigate potential convergence and dynamics. The results are similar to those of the one-shot interaction.

{"title":"The poor, the rich and the middle class: Experimental evidence from heterogeneous public good games","authors":"Daniel W. Derbyshire , Michalis Drouvelis , Brit Grosskopf","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106913","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106913","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study sheds light on how different sources of inequality can affect cooperation in public good games. We present the results of one-shot and repeated public good experiments that seek to understand the interaction between the endowment and marginal return in heterogeneous groups. Our focus is on situations where endowments and marginal returns are either inversely or proportionally related. While two normatively appealing contribution rules are aligned in the proportional treatment, a conflict arises in the inverse treatment. In the one-shot experiment, we do not find significant differences across treatments. Contributions increase when the endowment, the marginal return or both increase. This is observed in all treatments except when endowment and marginal return are inversely related. Then the ‘middle class’ participants (those with medium endowment and marginal return) contribute more than both the high and low endowment types, mirroring real world observations of a ‘squeezed middle’. This suggests a conflict between the highly endowed subjects (but with low marginal return) and those with a high marginal return (but with low endowment). This pattern is similar when eliciting beliefs about others’ contributions - the two conflicting types expect others to contribute more than they do themselves. The novel treatments are repeated for 15 periods in a subsequent experiment to investigate potential convergence and dynamics. The results are similar to those of the one-shot interaction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106913"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Framing effects in consumer expectations surveys

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106899

Lora Pavlova

In a randomized survey experiment, I test how variations in question wording and format influence response behavior. Participants from a representative sample in Germany are divided into four groups, each receiving a different version of a question about expected inflation over the next 12 months. I compare two wordings used in leading consumer surveys: (i) the change in prices in general and (ii) the inflation rate. Additionally, I examine responses to a question about probabilistic beliefs regarding future inflation and a simpler one asking for the expected minimum, maximum, and most likely inflation rate. The findings show that response behavior varies significantly with framing. Simpler wording like ‘prices in general’ and less restrictive format produce higher mean expected inflation. While simpler wording leads to higher individual uncertainty, asking for the minimum, maximum, and mode yields lower uncertainty. The results suggest that framing in consumer expectations surveys can shape the elicited data, underscoring the importance of careful question design.

引用次数: 0

The determinants of missed funding: Predicting the paradox of increased need and reduced allocation

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106910

Roberta Di Stefano , Giuliano Resce

This research investigates how local governments overlook funding opportunities within the cohesion policies, utilizing machine learning and analysing data from open calls within the European Next Generation EU funds. The focus is on predicting which local governments may face challenges in utilizing available funding, specifically examining the allocation of funds for Italian childcare services. The results demonstrate that it is possible to make out-of-sample predictions of municipalities likely to abstain from invitations, by identifying key determinants. Population-related factors play an important role in predicting inertia, alongside other demand-related elements, particularly in regions with limited services. The study emphasizes the importance of local institutional quality and individual attributes of policymakers. The factors justifying fund allocation have adverse effects on participation, placing regions with greater investment needs at a competitive disadvantage. Anticipating non-participation in calls can aid in achieving policy targets and optimizing the allocation of funds across various local governments.

{"title":"The determinants of missed funding: Predicting the paradox of increased need and reduced allocation","authors":"Roberta Di Stefano , Giuliano Resce","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106910","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106910","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This research investigates how local governments overlook funding opportunities within the cohesion policies, utilizing machine learning and analysing data from open calls within the European Next Generation EU funds. The focus is on predicting which local governments may face challenges in utilizing available funding, specifically examining the allocation of funds for Italian childcare services. The results demonstrate that it is possible to make out-of-sample predictions of municipalities likely to abstain from invitations, by identifying key determinants. Population-related factors play an important role in predicting inertia, alongside other demand-related elements, particularly in regions with limited services. The study emphasizes the importance of local institutional quality and individual attributes of policymakers. The factors justifying fund allocation have adverse effects on participation, placing regions with greater investment needs at a competitive disadvantage. Anticipating non-participation in calls can aid in achieving policy targets and optimizing the allocation of funds across various local governments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106910"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Epidemic disease and innovation

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106917

Jiafu An , Boyang Chen , Ruoran Zhao

It is well-documented that the TseTse fly, which transmits an epidemic disease lethal to livestock, has precluded technology adoption in Africa. In this study, we systematically examine the impact of the TseTse fly on firm innovation in modern Africa. Exploiting newly georeferenced firm data across the world, we find that firms in places that satisfy the TseTse survival conditions are less likely to innovate, and this relationship is unique to Africa and more pronounced in industries with higher innovation intensity. Exploring the channel, we find that people hold more hostile attitude towards technology in historically heavily infested areas.

引用次数: 0

Disinformation in group chat social media network

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106891

Yaping Shan

This paper introduces a model exploring disinformation propagation within group chat social media networks and its sway on public opinions. The model highlights the observation that disinformation disseminators not only distribute misleading content to sway undecided individuals but also engage in a learning process to augment their influence. Undecided agents form divergent long-term opinions influenced by both their direct exposure to disinformation and their interactions within the social network. Identifying the key influencers in the network becomes crucial in mitigating the impact of disinformation. This study proposes novel centrality measures to pinpoint these influencers, providing social media companies with effective strategies to mitigate the impact of disinformation on their platforms.

引用次数: 0

The contractual dispute resolution game: Real-effort experiments on contract negotiation and arbitration

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902

Brice Corgnet , Simon Gächter , Roberto Hernán-González

In many contractual arrangements where product or service delivery occurs sometime after contracts have been concluded, conditions may change, leading to disputes that need to be resolved often by a third party (arbitrator/mediator). In this paper we introduce the Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG), which allows us to study dispute resolution through arbitration. Unlike prior research studying arbitration at impasse using zero-sum bargaining games, we analyze a situation where parties can create additional value. We introduce a novel real-effort task, the Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), and show in two studies how automated arbitration rules (Study 1) and human arbitrators (Study 2) affect dispute resolution and surplus creation. In Study 1, we find that high-accuracy arbitration enhances efficiency. In Study 2, we find that arbitrators who are incentivized based on the total surplus of the negotiation do also promote greater efficiency. The CDRG provides a valuable tool for examining the effects of arbitration and mediation in settings where contracts are incomplete and can be impacted by shocks.

{"title":"The contractual dispute resolution game: Real-effort experiments on contract negotiation and arbitration","authors":"Brice Corgnet , Simon Gächter , Roberto Hernán-González","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In many contractual arrangements where product or service delivery occurs sometime after contracts have been concluded, conditions may change, leading to disputes that need to be resolved often by a third party (arbitrator/mediator). In this paper we introduce the Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG), which allows us to study dispute resolution through arbitration. Unlike prior research studying arbitration at impasse using zero-sum bargaining games, we analyze a situation where parties can create additional value. We introduce a novel real-effort task, the Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), and show in two studies how automated arbitration rules (Study 1) and human arbitrators (Study 2) affect dispute resolution and surplus creation. In Study 1, we find that high-accuracy arbitration enhances efficiency. In Study 2, we find that arbitrators who are incentivized based on the total surplus of the negotiation do also promote greater efficiency. The CDRG provides a valuable tool for examining the effects of arbitration and mediation in settings where contracts are incomplete and can be impacted by shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106902"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effect of superstitious beliefs on financial reporting conservatism: Evidence from Chinese “Zodiac Year”

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106916

Deng-Kui Si , Qianqian Du , Yukun Pan

Superstition persists in human societies despite economic and social progress, influencing behavior and decision-making across cultures. In this paper, we investigate the impact of superstitious beliefs on financial reporting practices. By exploiting within-individual variation in superstitious beliefs among top executives of Chinese private firms, we provide solid evidence that companies led by chairpersons in their zodiac year tend to respond to perceived misfortune by timely writing off impaired assets and are more likely to exhibit greater financial reporting conservatism. Further evidence suggests that both pessimism and regulatory concerns induced by zodiac year beliefs can explain the increase in financial reporting conservatism. Overall, our findings advance behavioral finance research on the relationship between top executives’ superstitious beliefs and firm outcomes.

引用次数: 0

Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908

Yang-Ming Chang , Manaf Sellak

This paper examines the impact of alliances and moving order on strategic advantage, conflict intensity, and expected payoffs in three-player sequential-move contests. The study shows that in a scenario where multiple players act as defenders while facing aggression from a lone player that moves first as an attacker, they must make their arming decisions jointly to gain a strategic advantage. Conversely, when attacking a lone player that moves second as a defender, multiple players acting as first movers must make their arming decisions autonomously. Compared to the benchmark equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game, the overall conflict intensity is higher if multiple players arm independently and lower if they arm cooperatively as an alliance. The expected payoffs of all players are the highest in a sequential-move game when two players ally, regardless of their moving order. Based on the analysis, we find that it is effective to launch an offensive strategy when allied players make arming decisions autonomously and strike first as attackers. On the other hand, a defensive strategy is effective when allied players make arming decisions collectively and move second as defenders.

{"title":"Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies","authors":"Yang-Ming Chang , Manaf Sellak","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of alliances and moving order on strategic advantage, conflict intensity, and expected payoffs in three-player sequential-move contests. The study shows that in a scenario where multiple players act as defenders while facing aggression from a lone player that moves first as an attacker, they must make their arming decisions jointly to gain a strategic advantage. Conversely, when attacking a lone player that moves second as a defender, multiple players acting as first movers must make their arming decisions autonomously. Compared to the benchmark equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game, the overall conflict intensity is higher if multiple players arm independently and lower if they arm cooperatively as an alliance. The expected payoffs of all players are the highest in a sequential-move game when two players ally, regardless of their moving order. Based on the analysis, we find that it is effective to launch an <em>offensive</em> strategy when allied players make arming decisions autonomously and strike first as attackers. On the other hand, a <em>defensive</em> strategy is effective when allied players make arming decisions collectively and move second as defenders.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106908"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

首页上一页

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀