Pub Date : 2026-02-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107458
Ioana Chioveanu , Yiquan Gu , Tobias Wenzel
This paper explores the strategic use of price framing in a duopoly where firms differ in their prominence and where both frame differentiation and frame complexity are sources of consumer confusion. It analyzes the interaction between the relative effectiveness of the two sources of consumer confusion and firms’ prominence levels, and its impact on equilibrium outcomes. A parametric condition on firms’ prominence delineates different equilibrium outcomes and synthesizes the interaction between firm prominence and consumer confusion. In equilibrium, firms do not always coordinate on the most effective source of confusion. The impact of consumer protection policy on market outcomes, especially consumer surplus, depends crucially on underlying market conditions, and can be ineffective or even detrimental to consumers.
{"title":"Firm prominence and price framing","authors":"Ioana Chioveanu , Yiquan Gu , Tobias Wenzel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107458","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107458","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the strategic use of price framing in a duopoly where firms differ in their prominence and where both frame differentiation and frame complexity are sources of consumer confusion. It analyzes the interaction between the relative effectiveness of the two sources of consumer confusion and firms’ prominence levels, and its impact on equilibrium outcomes. A parametric condition on firms’ prominence delineates different equilibrium outcomes and synthesizes the interaction between firm prominence and consumer confusion. In equilibrium, firms do not always coordinate on the most effective source of confusion. The impact of consumer protection policy on market outcomes, especially consumer surplus, depends crucially on underlying market conditions, and can be ineffective or even detrimental to consumers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107458"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107460
Vincent Geloso , Kelly Hyde , Ilia Murtazashvili
We explore the institutional foundations of public health by distinguishing among three broad categories of disease: diseases of poverty, which are income-sensitive and decline with improved living standards; diseases of commerce, which are contact-transmissible and spread with mobility and exchange; and diseases of affluence, which are longevity-mediated noncommunicable conditions such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes that become more prevalent as people live longer. This classification allows us to examine how economic freedom, through its effects on income, mobility, and survival, reshapes the mix of disease rather than health outcomes in aggregate. Using global health data, we find that economically free societies experience large reductions in diseases of poverty, modest changes in diseases of commerce, and a higher relative share of diseases of affluence even as total age-standardized mortality declines. These results reveal that institutional arrangements influence the composition of mortality more than its overall level: economic freedom enhances prosperity and resilience while shifting the burden of disease toward conditions associated with longer lives.
{"title":"Diseases of commerce: Unbundling economic freedom and public health","authors":"Vincent Geloso , Kelly Hyde , Ilia Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107460","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107460","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the institutional foundations of public health by distinguishing among three broad categories of disease: diseases of poverty, which are income-sensitive and decline with improved living standards; diseases of commerce, which are contact-transmissible and spread with mobility and exchange; and diseases of affluence, which are longevity-mediated noncommunicable conditions such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes that become more prevalent as people live longer. This classification allows us to examine how economic freedom, through its effects on income, mobility, and survival, reshapes the mix of disease rather than health outcomes in aggregate. Using global health data, we find that economically free societies experience large reductions in diseases of poverty, modest changes in diseases of commerce, and a higher relative share of diseases of affluence even as total age-standardized mortality declines. These results reveal that institutional arrangements influence the composition of mortality more than its overall level: economic freedom enhances prosperity and resilience while shifting the burden of disease toward conditions associated with longer lives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107460"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455
Christopher Zosh , Andreas Pape , Todd Guilfoos , Peter DiCola
We develop a novel, game-theoretic computational model in which learning agents explore how much to consume from a common resource.
These agents live under three different political regimes: private provision, a benevolent and powerful social planner, and competitive direct democracy. The policies of the latter two regimes are vectors of Pigouvian fines. Both agent consumption and voting decisions are guided by a single process: reinforcement learning with action similarity. The model produces panel data of fine vectors for each regime and setting. We find the benevolent social planner’s fines have significant welfare gains over uncoordinated private action, and that competitive direct democracy’s fines can nearly achieve the same gains. We also find that learning changes the optimal solution; that is, the fine vector found by the benevolent social planner is both distinct from and performs better than the socially optimal fine vector analytically derived from this setting, were it populated with rational, fully-informed agents. Elinor Ostrom empirically identified eight “design principles” common to social structures of communities which successfully cultivate a common resource. One of these principles is “graduated sanctions,” in which punishment accumulates at an accelerating rate as the degree of offense increases. We find that graduated sanctions only emerges when the agents use similarity in decision-making. We also find that, if fines generate revenue which can be costlessly redistributed, draconian (not graduated) sanctions emerge.
{"title":"Evolving sustainable institutions in agent-based simulations with learning","authors":"Christopher Zosh , Andreas Pape , Todd Guilfoos , Peter DiCola","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a novel, game-theoretic computational model in which learning agents explore how much to consume from a common resource.</div><div>These agents live under three different political regimes: private provision, a benevolent and powerful social planner, and competitive direct democracy. The policies of the latter two regimes are vectors of Pigouvian fines. Both agent consumption and voting decisions are guided by a single process: reinforcement learning with action similarity. The model produces panel data of fine vectors for each regime and setting. We find the benevolent social planner’s fines have significant welfare gains over uncoordinated private action, and that competitive direct democracy’s fines can nearly achieve the same gains. We also find that learning changes the optimal solution; that is, the fine vector found by the benevolent social planner is both distinct from and performs better than the socially optimal fine vector analytically derived from this setting, were it populated with rational, fully-informed agents. Elinor Ostrom empirically identified eight “design principles” common to social structures of communities which successfully cultivate a common resource. One of these principles is “graduated sanctions,” in which punishment accumulates at an accelerating rate as the degree of offense increases. We find that graduated sanctions only emerges when the agents use similarity in decision-making. We also find that, if fines generate revenue which can be costlessly redistributed, draconian (not graduated) sanctions emerge.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107455"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107454
Chih-Wei Wang , Weizheng Lin , Nina Shi
Utilizing a novel measure of firm complexity derived from textual analysis by Loughran and McDonald (2024), we examine the relationship between firm complexity and carbon emissions in the United States from 2005 to 2021, considering the roles of AI investment levels and firm leverage as mediating factors. We find that more complex firms are inclined to invest in AI technologies associated with increased carbon emissions. Additionally, these firms tend to have higher leverage, further amplifying their carbon emissions. Our results indicate that this relationship is more pronounced when oil price uncertainty is low and in manufacturing and high-tech industries. The relationship is also stronger among smaller firms, as they face more significant challenges in adopting ESG policies. Finally, firms with higher returns on assets, long-term debt, and gross profit demonstrate a more substantial positive relation between complexity and carbon emissions.
{"title":"Firm complexity and carbon emissions: Evidence from textual analysis","authors":"Chih-Wei Wang , Weizheng Lin , Nina Shi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107454","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107454","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Utilizing a novel measure of firm complexity derived from textual analysis by Loughran and McDonald (2024), we examine the relationship between firm complexity and carbon emissions in the United States from 2005 to 2021, considering the roles of AI investment levels and firm leverage as mediating factors. We find that more complex firms are inclined to invest in AI technologies associated with increased carbon emissions. Additionally, these firms tend to have higher leverage, further amplifying their carbon emissions. Our results indicate that this relationship is more pronounced when oil price uncertainty is low and in manufacturing and high-tech industries. The relationship is also stronger among smaller firms, as they face more significant challenges in adopting ESG policies. Finally, firms with higher returns on assets, long-term debt, and gross profit demonstrate a more substantial positive relation between complexity and carbon emissions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107454"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107464
Yi Zhang , Chenchen Deng , Chun Liu , Yunyan Wei
This paper investigates how domestic institutions, specifically Confucian clan culture, influence firms’ participation in international trade. Using a nationally representative survey of small and medium-sized private enterprises in China, we show that firms located in counties with a stronger historical presence of clans are more likely to export and achieve higher export values. These findings remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity through instrumental variable estimation, matching analysis, alternative model specifications, and an extensive set of control variables. Mechanism analysis reveals that clan culture promotes exports primarily by alleviating financial constraints and enhancing contract enforcement, with the financing channel playing the more prominent role. Moreover, the effect of clan culture on exports is significantly stronger in regions with weaker formal institutions, suggesting that clans can serve as effective substitutes for formal market-supporting institutions.
{"title":"Home ties, global trade: How clan culture shapes Chinese exports","authors":"Yi Zhang , Chenchen Deng , Chun Liu , Yunyan Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how domestic institutions, specifically Confucian clan culture, influence firms’ participation in international trade. Using a nationally representative survey of small and medium-sized private enterprises in China, we show that firms located in counties with a stronger historical presence of clans are more likely to export and achieve higher export values. These findings remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity through instrumental variable estimation, matching analysis, alternative model specifications, and an extensive set of control variables. Mechanism analysis reveals that clan culture promotes exports primarily by alleviating financial constraints and enhancing contract enforcement, with the financing channel playing the more prominent role. Moreover, the effect of clan culture on exports is significantly stronger in regions with weaker formal institutions, suggesting that clans can serve as effective substitutes for formal market-supporting institutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452
Marcello Antonini , Josefa Henriquez , Richard van Kleef , Adrian Melia , Francesco Paolucci
Several mandatory health insurance schemes include some consumer choice of coverage (e.g., in terms of deductible levels). Premiums in these schemes are typically community-rated per insurance plan. While community-rated premiums help achieve objectives of fairness, they can also lead to adverse selection across coverage options. Consequently, consumers may sort inefficiently across these coverage options resulting in forgone welfare gains. This paper aims to explore under what conditions risk rating of incremental premiums for more comprehensive coverage (compared to a basic plan) can improve consumer sorting. In a simulation analysis on Chilean data, results show that under perfect risk adjustment, risk rating of incremental premiums can improve consumer sorting. With imperfect risk adjustment, however, the effects of risk rating on consumer sorting are ambigous as incremental premiums will not just reflect the direct effect of more comprehensive coverage on healthcare spending, but also the under/overcompensation from the (imperfect) risk adjustment system. Moreover, we find that in the presence of imperfect risk adjustment, risk rating improves welfare over community rating but does not fully solve the problem of inefficient sorting.
{"title":"Can risk-rating of incremental premiums improve consumer sorting across coverage options in mandatory health insurance markets?","authors":"Marcello Antonini , Josefa Henriquez , Richard van Kleef , Adrian Melia , Francesco Paolucci","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Several mandatory health insurance schemes include some consumer choice of coverage (e.g., in terms of deductible levels). Premiums in these schemes are typically community-rated per insurance plan. While community-rated premiums help achieve objectives of fairness, they can also lead to adverse selection across coverage options. Consequently, consumers may sort inefficiently across these coverage options resulting in forgone welfare gains. This paper aims to explore under what conditions risk rating of incremental premiums for more comprehensive coverage (compared to a basic plan) can improve consumer sorting. In a simulation analysis on Chilean data, results show that under perfect risk adjustment, risk rating of incremental premiums can improve consumer sorting. With imperfect risk adjustment, however, the effects of risk rating on consumer sorting are ambigous as incremental premiums will not just reflect the direct effect of more comprehensive coverage on healthcare spending, but also the under/overcompensation from the (imperfect) risk adjustment system. Moreover, we find that in the presence of imperfect risk adjustment, risk rating improves welfare over community rating but does not fully solve the problem of inefficient sorting<strong>.</strong></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107452"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291
Oana Borcan , Laura Gee , Laura Harvey , Boon Han Koh , Ernesto Reuben
{"title":"An introduction to the special issue on discrimination and diversity","authors":"Oana Borcan , Laura Gee , Laura Harvey , Boon Han Koh , Ernesto Reuben","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107291"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107359
Joan Madia , Catia Nicodemo , Cristina Tealdi
{"title":"Editorial introduction to the JEBO special issue on immigration, health, and well-being","authors":"Joan Madia , Catia Nicodemo , Cristina Tealdi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107359","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107359","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107359"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-31DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107463
Andrea Modena , Luca Regis , Giorgio Rizzini
In this paper, we investigate how mortality risk affects agents’ optimal decisions and asset prices within a general equilibrium framework. In our model, risk-averse households facing a stochastic mortality rate allocate their net worth among consumption, risky capital production, and risk-free bonds to maximise intertemporal utility. In this setting, we show that a negative and time-varying correlation exists between mortality and risky asset prices, even when production and mortality risks are mutually independent. The correlation arises because higher mortality rates reduce the incentive to save for the future, leading to increased current consumption and decreased capital investment. As a result, higher mortality lowers the prices of risky capital and raises the risk-free rate in equilibrium. Calibrated simulations suggest that endogenous price effects account for the largest share of welfare gains and losses following sharp changes in mortality, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
{"title":"The equilibrium effects of mortality risk","authors":"Andrea Modena , Luca Regis , Giorgio Rizzini","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we investigate how mortality risk affects agents’ optimal decisions and asset prices within a general equilibrium framework. In our model, risk-averse households facing a stochastic mortality rate allocate their net worth among consumption, risky capital production, and risk-free bonds to maximise intertemporal utility. In this setting, we show that a negative and time-varying correlation exists between mortality and risky asset prices, even when production and mortality risks are mutually independent. The correlation arises because higher mortality rates reduce the incentive to save for the future, leading to increased current consumption and decreased capital investment. As a result, higher mortality lowers the prices of risky capital and raises the risk-free rate in equilibrium. Calibrated simulations suggest that endogenous price effects account for the largest share of welfare gains and losses following sharp changes in mortality, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430
Anthony Harding , Juan Moreno-Cruz
We propose a theory of climate-policy foreign intervention in which the climate policy is characterized in a policy externality space spanned by differences between two countries exposure to foreign policy, exposure divergence, and in preferred policy levels, preference asymmetry. Within this framework, we show that strategic behavior such as free-riding and free-driving emerge as equilibrium outcomes of position in this policy externality space, rather than as intrinsic features of a climate policy technology, such as mitigation, adaptation, or geoengineering. We also examine preferences for foreign intervention when a hegemon has three options to intervene in the domestic climate policy of a potential Target: i.) Agreements with Extraction; ii.) Agreements with Rewards; and iii.) Agreements with Sanctions. The hegemon’s choice is determined by the availability of rents that can be extracted from the target country, which is, in turn, a function of the policy externality. This explains why the same technology may require different governance approaches in different contexts and why some climate policies attract foreign intervention while others do not.
{"title":"A unifying theory of foreign intervention in domestic climate policy","authors":"Anthony Harding , Juan Moreno-Cruz","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a theory of climate-policy foreign intervention in which the climate policy is characterized in a policy externality space spanned by differences between two countries exposure to foreign policy, exposure divergence, and in preferred policy levels, preference asymmetry. Within this framework, we show that strategic behavior such as free-riding and free-driving emerge as equilibrium outcomes of position in this policy externality space, rather than as intrinsic features of a climate policy technology, such as mitigation, adaptation, or geoengineering. We also examine preferences for foreign intervention when a hegemon has three options to intervene in the domestic climate policy of a potential Target: i.) Agreements with Extraction; ii.) Agreements with Rewards; and iii.) Agreements with Sanctions. The hegemon’s choice is determined by the availability of rents that can be extracted from the target country, which is, in turn, a function of the policy externality. This explains why the same technology may require different governance approaches in different contexts and why some climate policies attract foreign intervention while others do not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107430"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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