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Balancing health and sustainability: Optimizing investments in organic vs. conventional agriculture through pesticide reduction 平衡健康和可持续性:通过减少农药来优化有机农业与传统农业的投资
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442
Luca Bargna , Davide La Torre , Rosario Maggistro , Benjamin Montmartin
This paper investigates the trade-offs between organic and conventional farming methods, focusing on their respective impacts on health, environmental sustainability, and economic outcomes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model based on an optimal control problem to examine the dynamic allocation of investments between organic and conventional agriculture. This model incorporates critical social factors, including the environmental and health costs associated with pesticide use in conventional farming, as well as the long-term social benefits of organic practices. Second, we estimate the key parameters of the model using French data on pesticide levels in groundwater. This enables us to compute and analyze the optimal policy proposed by the model and derive implications for reallocating investments towards organic farming. The optimal policy emphasizes the necessity of a tailored approach across both spatial and time dimensions. Along the spatial dimension, areas with high pesticide concentrations should be prioritized, calling for place-based rather than place-neutral policies. Along the temporal dimension, earlier intervention strategies are warranted when social costs related to pesticide exposure are high or when the weight assigned to the environmental conditions of future generations is low. Overall, the optimal policy results in a more balanced distribution of pesticides across the territory.
本文调查了有机和传统耕作方法之间的权衡,重点关注它们各自对健康、环境可持续性和经济成果的影响。我们的贡献是双重的。首先,我们建立了一个基于最优控制问题的理论模型来研究有机农业和传统农业之间的投资动态分配。这一模式纳入了关键的社会因素,包括与传统农业中使用农药有关的环境和健康成本,以及有机做法的长期社会效益。其次,我们使用法国地下水中农药水平的数据估计模型的关键参数。这使我们能够计算和分析模型提出的最优政策,并得出对有机农业重新分配投资的含义。最优政策强调在空间和时间两个维度上采取量身定制的方法的必要性。在空间维度上,应优先考虑农药浓度高的地区,要求采取基于地点而不是中立的政策。在时间维度上,当与农药接触有关的社会成本较高或后代的环境条件权重较低时,早期干预策略是有必要的。总体而言,最优政策的结果是农药在全港的分布更为均衡。
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引用次数: 0
Bonuses and loss aversion 奖金和损失厌恶
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438
Víctor González-Jiménez , Patricio S. Dalton , Charles N. Noussair
To motivate workers, organizations often offer monetary bonuses for meeting production goals. We develop a theoretical framework that predicts that when workers set production goals themselves and are sufficiently loss averse, bonuses lead to conservative goal setting, which worsens performance. Without a bonus, a loss-averse worker sets an ambitious goal to motivate herself through the aversion to falling short of the target. Tying a bonus to goal achievement crowds out this intrinsic motivation by raising the stakes of failure, leading to more cautious goals and lower performance. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment supports the predictions of our model. Our findings underscore the limits of bonuses when workers are loss averse.
为了激励员工,企业经常为达到生产目标的员工提供金钱奖励。我们开发了一个理论框架,预测当工人自己设定生产目标并且足够厌恶损失时,奖金会导致保守的目标设定,从而恶化绩效。如果没有奖金,一个厌恶损失的员工会设定一个雄心勃勃的目标,通过对达不到目标的厌恶来激励自己。将奖金与目标达成捆绑在一起,会增加失败的风险,从而排挤这种内在动机,导致更谨慎的目标和更低的表现。来自实验室实验的经验证据支持我们模型的预测。我们的发现强调了当员工厌恶损失时,奖金的局限性。
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引用次数: 0
Gender differences in choosing fast and slow: Evidence from competitive powerlifting 选择快与慢的性别差异:来自竞技举重的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107435
Scott Abrahams
I examine decision-making across a gradient of time horizons using data from competitive powerlifting, where participants must assess their physical abilities under varying time constraints. Analyzing one million choice sequences in this natural, high-stakes setting, I document systematic gender differences that vary by horizon and feedback direction. Over horizons of thirty minutes to several hours, men consistently overestimate their abilities, failing initial attempts at all three types of lifts, and they are less likely to update sufficiently across lift types following the negative signal of an earlier miss. Under extreme time pressure requiring a decision within one minute, the performance gap shrinks and men are more likely to make beneficial deviations from established guidance. This differential rapid evaluation of the signal content in negative feedback suggests a novel explanatory mechanism for observed gender variation in performance under time pressure.
我使用竞技性举重比赛的数据,在不同的时间范围内考察决策的梯度。在举重比赛中,参与者必须在不同的时间限制下评估自己的身体能力。在这个自然的、高风险的环境中,我分析了一百万个选择序列,记录了系统的性别差异,这些差异随视野和反馈方向而变化。在30分钟到几个小时的时间跨度内,男性总是高估自己的能力,在所有三种类型的电梯尝试中都失败了,而且他们不太可能在先前失败的负面信号之后充分更新不同类型的电梯。在要求在一分钟内做出决定的极端时间压力下,表现差距缩小了,男性更有可能在既定指导下做出有益的偏离。这种对负反馈中信号内容的差异快速评价为观察到的时间压力下表现的性别差异提供了一种新的解释机制。
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引用次数: 0
Does allocative fairness matter? experimental evidence from India 分配公平重要吗?来自印度的实验证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436
Rohit Jindal
Fairness is impartial selection when allocating scarce goods or resources. Previous studies indicate that people consider auctions and random allocations less fair than alternate mechanisms. However, these studies are based on survey research in industrialized countries. It is unclear if fairness preferences are generalizable or if these preferences lead to a change in peoples’ behavior. This paper addresses these gaps through two field studies in rural India. In the first study, 94 of 206 subjects received contracts to collect tree leaves in return for INR100 each. Participants were selected through four different allocation mechanisms - random allocation, deliberation among subjects, selection by criteria, and lowest bids in auctions. Participants selected through deliberation and criteria-based allocations collect significantly more leaves than those selected through auctions or random allocations. In the second study, a separate set of 124 subjects compared the fairness of these four allocation mechanisms, yielding 744 observations. Deliberation and criteria are ranked fairer than auctions or random allocations. The comparisons are robust to transitivity with an 86.3 percent coefficient of consistency. The close matching between experimental and survey results indicates that people provide significantly more effort when selected through allocation mechanisms that are considered fair. The study results also indicate how auctions are not always efficient.
公平是分配稀缺物品或资源时的公正选择。先前的研究表明,人们认为拍卖和随机分配不如其他机制公平。然而,这些研究是基于工业化国家的调查研究。目前尚不清楚公平偏好是否具有普遍性,或者这些偏好是否会导致人们行为的改变。本文通过在印度农村的两个实地研究来解决这些差距。在第一项研究中,206名受试者中有94人获得了收集树叶的合同,每人获得100卢比的报酬。参与者是通过四种不同的分配机制来选择的——随机分配、对象审议、标准选择和拍卖中的最低出价。通过审议和标准分配选择的参与者比通过拍卖或随机分配选择的参与者收集到更多的叶子。在第二项研究中,一组单独的124名受试者比较了这四种分配机制的公平性,产生了744个观察结果。审议和标准比拍卖或随机分配更公平。这些比较对传递性具有86.3%的一致性系数。实验结果和调查结果之间的密切匹配表明,当人们通过被认为是公平的分配机制选择时,他们会付出更多的努力。研究结果还表明,拍卖并不总是有效的。
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引用次数: 0
Fragility and regime stability in a state–society dynamic model 国家-社会动态模型中的脆弱性和政权稳定性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439
Constantin Colonescu
This paper develops a continuous-time dynamic model in which state capacity and societal power evolve jointly as institutional stocks subject to investment incentives, contest effects, and baseline decay. The interaction between these forces generates multiple political regimes, including a despotic regime, a weak-state regime, and a balanced regime in which state and society co-develop. The model admits a corridor of regime stability whose thickness depends on contest intensity and structural parameters, and whose boundaries determine the basins of attraction of the competing regimes. Extending the system to a stochastic environment, the paper characterizes regime fragility by deriving corridor-exit probabilities, showing how volatility increases the likelihood of transitions toward despotism or state collapse. The analysis highlights how institutional balance can be sustained dynamically, yet remains inherently fragile in the presence of shocks.
本文建立了一个连续时间动态模型,在该模型中,国家能力和社会权力作为受投资激励、竞争效应和基线衰减影响的制度存量共同演变。这些力量之间的相互作用产生了多种政体,包括专制政体、弱国政体和国家与社会共同发展的平衡政体。该模型承认一个制度稳定走廊,其厚度取决于竞争强度和结构参数,其边界决定竞争制度的吸引力盆地。将系统扩展到随机环境,本文通过导出走廊出口概率来表征政权脆弱性,显示波动性如何增加向专制主义过渡或国家崩溃的可能性。该分析强调了制度平衡如何能够动态维持,但在面临冲击时仍然具有内在的脆弱性。
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引用次数: 0
WARNings – The impact of negative economic news on racial animus 警告-负面经济新闻对种族敌意的影响
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399
Adam Bestenbostel , Abigail Peralta
Racially charged rhetoric often surrounds layoff events, with specific minorities blamed for the loss of “American jobs.” We examine whether information about impending mass layoffs causes racial animus. Our data consist of information on mass layoff notices linked to Google Search Trends and FBI Hate Crime Statistics. We compare outcomes across areas that vary in the timing of impending mass layoffs. Results indicate an increase in both racist internet searches (1.4 percent) and hate crimes (1.2 percent) following layoff notices.
围绕裁员事件,经常会出现带有种族主义色彩的言论,将“美国就业”的流失归咎于特定的少数族裔。我们研究关于即将到来的大规模裁员的信息是否会导致种族仇恨。我们的数据包括与谷歌搜索趋势和联邦调查局仇恨犯罪统计数据相关的大规模裁员通知信息。我们比较了在即将到来的大规模裁员时间不同的地区的结果。结果表明,在裁员通知发布后,种族主义互联网搜索(1.4%)和仇恨犯罪(1.2%)都有所增加。
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引用次数: 0
Does democratic decision-making process enhance cooperation among children and adolescents? A large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment with students 民主决策过程是否能加强儿童和青少年之间的合作?与学生一起进行的大规模野外实验室实验
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107432
Yexin Zhou 周晔馨 , Siwei Chen 陈思玮 , Jubo Yan 闫巨博
The endogeneity premium refers to the increased cooperation observed when institutional rules are determined through a democratic decision-making process by group members rather than imposed externally. While this phenomenon has been documented among adults, little is known about whether it also appears in children. We investigate this question through a lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1600 student subjects aged 7–17, who participated in a setting where a reward or punishment rule was implemented either through democratic (i.e., endogenously chosen) or non-democratic (i.e., exogenously imposed) decision-making processes. We find that students exhibit substantial cooperation across all settings. Notably, their contributions are significantly higher under exogenously imposed institutions than under endogenously chosen ones, regardless of the rule types (i.e., reward or punishment). We provide explanatory evidence for this observation, suggesting that theoretical frameworks commonly used to explain the endogeneity premium in adult participants may not apply to children. Primary school-aged children may not yet have developed a preference for democratic decision-making and may be more accustomed to top-down rule enforcement. This explanation is further supported by the emergence of the endogeneity premium among adolescent participants, in contrast to its absence in child participants.
内生性溢价指的是,当制度规则是由集团成员通过民主决策过程而不是外部强加时,所观察到的合作增加。虽然这种现象在成年人中有记录,但对于儿童是否也会出现这种情况却知之甚少。我们通过对1600多名年龄在7-17岁的学生进行现场实验室公共物品实验来研究这个问题,这些学生参与了奖惩规则通过民主(即内源性选择)或非民主(即外源性强加)决策过程实施的设置。我们发现学生们在所有情况下都表现出了很强的合作精神。值得注意的是,无论规则类型(即奖励或惩罚)如何,在外部强加的制度下,他们的贡献明显高于内部选择的制度。我们为这一观察结果提供了解释性证据,表明通常用于解释成人参与者内生性溢价的理论框架可能不适用于儿童。小学学龄儿童可能还没有形成对民主决策的偏好,可能更习惯于自上而下的规则执行。这一解释进一步得到了青少年参与者中内生性溢价的出现的支持,而在儿童参与者中则没有。
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引用次数: 0
Norms as a solution to the tragedy of the commons: A co-evolutionary model 规范作为公地悲剧的解决方案:一个共同进化模型
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107433
Fabian Mankat
This paper examines how societies can conserve a common-pool resource (CPR) through the cultural transmission of norms. To this end, we introduce a novel model that endogenizes the formation of behavior, personal, social injunctive, and social descriptive norms, and the resource stock. We find that the resource can persist through (1) asymptotically stable equilibrium points where personal norms and behavior are either homogeneous or heterogeneous across individuals and (2) an asymptotically stable limit cycle where herding causes alternating aggregate behavior and fluctuating resource stocks. We examine the degree of substitutability between two key factors—(a) institutional pressure and (b) social sanctions as a co-determinant of reproductive fitness—for upholding norms and, thus, the CPR. Moreover, we find that, in some cases, an increase in behavioral incentives for not exploiting the resource may, surprisingly, adversely affect resource conservation in the long run by interfering with cultural dynamics.
本文探讨了社会如何通过规范的文化传播来保护公共资源(CPR)。为此,我们引入了一个新的模型,该模型将行为、个人、社会禁令和社会描述性规范以及资源储备的形成内化。我们发现资源可以通过(1)渐近稳定的平衡点,其中个人规范和行为在个体之间是同质或异质的;(2)渐近稳定的极限环,其中羊群导致交替的总行为和波动的资源存量。我们研究了两个关键因素之间的可替代性程度——(a)制度压力和(b)社会制裁作为生殖健康的共同决定因素——以维护规范,因此,CPR。此外,我们发现,在某些情况下,不开发资源的行为激励的增加可能会干扰文化动态,从长远来看对资源保护产生不利影响。
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引用次数: 0
When do peers influence preventive health behavior? Evidence from breast cancer screening 同伴什么时候影响预防性健康行为?来自乳腺癌筛查的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391
Peter Redler , Friederike Johanna Reichel
We analyze the potential for social choice architecture to increase take-up rates of breast cancer check-ups in a large sample of women in Germany. We provide causal evidence that the relative timing of check-up appointments among peers matters for participation: A woman is more likely to participate in breast cancer screening when her peers’ appointments are scheduled shortly before her own. A simple intervention, however, shows that scheduling peers’ appointments on the same day does not affect participation. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the observed pattern of peer effects and highlight policy implications.
我们分析了社会选择架构在德国大量女性样本中增加乳腺癌检查率的潜力。我们提供了因果证据,证明同伴之间预约检查的相对时间对参与有影响:当她的同伴的预约安排在她自己之前不久时,女性更有可能参加乳腺癌筛查。然而,一个简单的干预表明,将同行的约会安排在同一天并不影响参与。我们讨论了观察到的同伴效应模式的可能机制,并强调了政策含义。
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引用次数: 0
Trust in banks: Fostering (Naïve) firm-bank relationships 对银行的信任:培养(Naïve)商行关系
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431
Jérémie Bertrand , Aurore Burietz , Paul-Olivier Klein
We refine the definition of trust in banking by isolating the role of institution-based trust, defined as trust in banks in general, and look at the effects of variations of institution-based trust on the development of recurring firm-bank relationships. Using U.S. syndicated loan transaction data from 1998 to 2016, we show that borrowers and lenders deploy more intense interpersonal relationships in enhanced trust environments. However, when generally trusted, banks tend to exploit these relationships by reducing their lending commitments and raising loan spreads. This outcome can be attributed to the emergence of a naïve form of interpersonal trust on the part of the borrower.
我们通过孤立机构信任的作用来完善银行信任的定义,将机构信任定义为一般的银行信任,并研究机构信任的变化对反复出现的公司-银行关系发展的影响。利用1998年至2016年的美国银团贷款交易数据,我们发现借款人和贷款人在增强的信任环境中部署了更紧密的人际关系。然而,当人们普遍信任时,银行往往会通过减少贷款承诺和提高贷款利差来利用这些关系。这一结果可归因于借款人出现了naïve形式的人际信任。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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