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Gender differences in choosing fast and slow: Evidence from competitive powerlifting 选择快与慢的性别差异:来自竞技举重的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107435
Scott Abrahams
I examine decision-making across a gradient of time horizons using data from competitive powerlifting, where participants must assess their physical abilities under varying time constraints. Analyzing one million choice sequences in this natural, high-stakes setting, I document systematic gender differences that vary by horizon and feedback direction. Over horizons of thirty minutes to several hours, men consistently overestimate their abilities, failing initial attempts at all three types of lifts, and they are less likely to update sufficiently across lift types following the negative signal of an earlier miss. Under extreme time pressure requiring a decision within one minute, the performance gap shrinks and men are more likely to make beneficial deviations from established guidance. This differential rapid evaluation of the signal content in negative feedback suggests a novel explanatory mechanism for observed gender variation in performance under time pressure.
我使用竞技性举重比赛的数据,在不同的时间范围内考察决策的梯度。在举重比赛中,参与者必须在不同的时间限制下评估自己的身体能力。在这个自然的、高风险的环境中,我分析了一百万个选择序列,记录了系统的性别差异,这些差异随视野和反馈方向而变化。在30分钟到几个小时的时间跨度内,男性总是高估自己的能力,在所有三种类型的电梯尝试中都失败了,而且他们不太可能在先前失败的负面信号之后充分更新不同类型的电梯。在要求在一分钟内做出决定的极端时间压力下,表现差距缩小了,男性更有可能在既定指导下做出有益的偏离。这种对负反馈中信号内容的差异快速评价为观察到的时间压力下表现的性别差异提供了一种新的解释机制。
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引用次数: 0
Fragility and regime stability in a state–society dynamic model 国家-社会动态模型中的脆弱性和政权稳定性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439
Constantin Colonescu
This paper develops a continuous-time dynamic model in which state capacity and societal power evolve jointly as institutional stocks subject to investment incentives, contest effects, and baseline decay. The interaction between these forces generates multiple political regimes, including a despotic regime, a weak-state regime, and a balanced regime in which state and society co-develop. The model admits a corridor of regime stability whose thickness depends on contest intensity and structural parameters, and whose boundaries determine the basins of attraction of the competing regimes. Extending the system to a stochastic environment, the paper characterizes regime fragility by deriving corridor-exit probabilities, showing how volatility increases the likelihood of transitions toward despotism or state collapse. The analysis highlights how institutional balance can be sustained dynamically, yet remains inherently fragile in the presence of shocks.
本文建立了一个连续时间动态模型,在该模型中,国家能力和社会权力作为受投资激励、竞争效应和基线衰减影响的制度存量共同演变。这些力量之间的相互作用产生了多种政体,包括专制政体、弱国政体和国家与社会共同发展的平衡政体。该模型承认一个制度稳定走廊,其厚度取决于竞争强度和结构参数,其边界决定竞争制度的吸引力盆地。将系统扩展到随机环境,本文通过导出走廊出口概率来表征政权脆弱性,显示波动性如何增加向专制主义过渡或国家崩溃的可能性。该分析强调了制度平衡如何能够动态维持,但在面临冲击时仍然具有内在的脆弱性。
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引用次数: 0
WARNings – The impact of negative economic news on racial animus 警告-负面经济新闻对种族敌意的影响
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399
Adam Bestenbostel , Abigail Peralta
Racially charged rhetoric often surrounds layoff events, with specific minorities blamed for the loss of “American jobs.” We examine whether information about impending mass layoffs causes racial animus. Our data consist of information on mass layoff notices linked to Google Search Trends and FBI Hate Crime Statistics. We compare outcomes across areas that vary in the timing of impending mass layoffs. Results indicate an increase in both racist internet searches (1.4 percent) and hate crimes (1.2 percent) following layoff notices.
围绕裁员事件,经常会出现带有种族主义色彩的言论,将“美国就业”的流失归咎于特定的少数族裔。我们研究关于即将到来的大规模裁员的信息是否会导致种族仇恨。我们的数据包括与谷歌搜索趋势和联邦调查局仇恨犯罪统计数据相关的大规模裁员通知信息。我们比较了在即将到来的大规模裁员时间不同的地区的结果。结果表明,在裁员通知发布后,种族主义互联网搜索(1.4%)和仇恨犯罪(1.2%)都有所增加。
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引用次数: 0
Does democratic decision-making process enhance cooperation among children and adolescents? A large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment with students 民主决策过程是否能加强儿童和青少年之间的合作?与学生一起进行的大规模野外实验室实验
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107432
Yexin Zhou 周晔馨 , Siwei Chen 陈思玮 , Jubo Yan 闫巨博
The endogeneity premium refers to the increased cooperation observed when institutional rules are determined through a democratic decision-making process by group members rather than imposed externally. While this phenomenon has been documented among adults, little is known about whether it also appears in children. We investigate this question through a lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1600 student subjects aged 7–17, who participated in a setting where a reward or punishment rule was implemented either through democratic (i.e., endogenously chosen) or non-democratic (i.e., exogenously imposed) decision-making processes. We find that students exhibit substantial cooperation across all settings. Notably, their contributions are significantly higher under exogenously imposed institutions than under endogenously chosen ones, regardless of the rule types (i.e., reward or punishment). We provide explanatory evidence for this observation, suggesting that theoretical frameworks commonly used to explain the endogeneity premium in adult participants may not apply to children. Primary school-aged children may not yet have developed a preference for democratic decision-making and may be more accustomed to top-down rule enforcement. This explanation is further supported by the emergence of the endogeneity premium among adolescent participants, in contrast to its absence in child participants.
内生性溢价指的是,当制度规则是由集团成员通过民主决策过程而不是外部强加时,所观察到的合作增加。虽然这种现象在成年人中有记录,但对于儿童是否也会出现这种情况却知之甚少。我们通过对1600多名年龄在7-17岁的学生进行现场实验室公共物品实验来研究这个问题,这些学生参与了奖惩规则通过民主(即内源性选择)或非民主(即外源性强加)决策过程实施的设置。我们发现学生们在所有情况下都表现出了很强的合作精神。值得注意的是,无论规则类型(即奖励或惩罚)如何,在外部强加的制度下,他们的贡献明显高于内部选择的制度。我们为这一观察结果提供了解释性证据,表明通常用于解释成人参与者内生性溢价的理论框架可能不适用于儿童。小学学龄儿童可能还没有形成对民主决策的偏好,可能更习惯于自上而下的规则执行。这一解释进一步得到了青少年参与者中内生性溢价的出现的支持,而在儿童参与者中则没有。
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引用次数: 0
Norms as a solution to the tragedy of the commons: A co-evolutionary model 规范作为公地悲剧的解决方案:一个共同进化模型
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107433
Fabian Mankat
This paper examines how societies can conserve a common-pool resource (CPR) through the cultural transmission of norms. To this end, we introduce a novel model that endogenizes the formation of behavior, personal, social injunctive, and social descriptive norms, and the resource stock. We find that the resource can persist through (1) asymptotically stable equilibrium points where personal norms and behavior are either homogeneous or heterogeneous across individuals and (2) an asymptotically stable limit cycle where herding causes alternating aggregate behavior and fluctuating resource stocks. We examine the degree of substitutability between two key factors—(a) institutional pressure and (b) social sanctions as a co-determinant of reproductive fitness—for upholding norms and, thus, the CPR. Moreover, we find that, in some cases, an increase in behavioral incentives for not exploiting the resource may, surprisingly, adversely affect resource conservation in the long run by interfering with cultural dynamics.
本文探讨了社会如何通过规范的文化传播来保护公共资源(CPR)。为此,我们引入了一个新的模型,该模型将行为、个人、社会禁令和社会描述性规范以及资源储备的形成内化。我们发现资源可以通过(1)渐近稳定的平衡点,其中个人规范和行为在个体之间是同质或异质的;(2)渐近稳定的极限环,其中羊群导致交替的总行为和波动的资源存量。我们研究了两个关键因素之间的可替代性程度——(a)制度压力和(b)社会制裁作为生殖健康的共同决定因素——以维护规范,因此,CPR。此外,我们发现,在某些情况下,不开发资源的行为激励的增加可能会干扰文化动态,从长远来看对资源保护产生不利影响。
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引用次数: 0
When do peers influence preventive health behavior? Evidence from breast cancer screening 同伴什么时候影响预防性健康行为?来自乳腺癌筛查的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391
Peter Redler , Friederike Johanna Reichel
We analyze the potential for social choice architecture to increase take-up rates of breast cancer check-ups in a large sample of women in Germany. We provide causal evidence that the relative timing of check-up appointments among peers matters for participation: A woman is more likely to participate in breast cancer screening when her peers’ appointments are scheduled shortly before her own. A simple intervention, however, shows that scheduling peers’ appointments on the same day does not affect participation. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the observed pattern of peer effects and highlight policy implications.
我们分析了社会选择架构在德国大量女性样本中增加乳腺癌检查率的潜力。我们提供了因果证据,证明同伴之间预约检查的相对时间对参与有影响:当她的同伴的预约安排在她自己之前不久时,女性更有可能参加乳腺癌筛查。然而,一个简单的干预表明,将同行的约会安排在同一天并不影响参与。我们讨论了观察到的同伴效应模式的可能机制,并强调了政策含义。
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引用次数: 0
Trust in banks: Fostering (Naïve) firm-bank relationships 对银行的信任:培养(Naïve)商行关系
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431
Jérémie Bertrand , Aurore Burietz , Paul-Olivier Klein
We refine the definition of trust in banking by isolating the role of institution-based trust, defined as trust in banks in general, and look at the effects of variations of institution-based trust on the development of recurring firm-bank relationships. Using U.S. syndicated loan transaction data from 1998 to 2016, we show that borrowers and lenders deploy more intense interpersonal relationships in enhanced trust environments. However, when generally trusted, banks tend to exploit these relationships by reducing their lending commitments and raising loan spreads. This outcome can be attributed to the emergence of a naïve form of interpersonal trust on the part of the borrower.
我们通过孤立机构信任的作用来完善银行信任的定义,将机构信任定义为一般的银行信任,并研究机构信任的变化对反复出现的公司-银行关系发展的影响。利用1998年至2016年的美国银团贷款交易数据,我们发现借款人和贷款人在增强的信任环境中部署了更紧密的人际关系。然而,当人们普遍信任时,银行往往会通过减少贷款承诺和提高贷款利差来利用这些关系。这一结果可归因于借款人出现了naïve形式的人际信任。
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引用次数: 0
(Mis)use of power in the ivory tower: Evidence from deans in Chinese universities 象牙塔中的权力滥用:来自中国大学院长的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107419
Yuyu Chen , Ming Fang , Xuan Wang
In a hierarchical academic system, power can distort the allocation of research resources and output ownership. We study the role of power in intellectual property acquisition. Using biographical information on deans in elite universities in China, we find that holding a deanship increases patent applications by 15.2%. Further analysis suggests that the deanship effect is driven by misuse of power rather than ability or research resources. We provide causal evidence by showing that an anti-corruption campaign, which increases the cost of misusing power, substantially reduces the deanship effect. Finally, we find that misusing power distorts resource allocation. Our results highlight the importance of an improved institutional environment in allocating resources toward productive innovation.
在等级制的学术体系中,权力会扭曲研究资源和产出所有权的分配。我们研究了权力在知识产权获取中的作用。利用中国精英大学院长的简历信息,我们发现拥有院长职位会使专利申请增加15.2%。进一步的分析表明,院长效应是由滥用权力而不是能力或研究资源驱动的。我们提供了因果证据,表明反腐败运动增加了滥用权力的成本,大大降低了院长效应。最后,我们发现权力滥用扭曲了资源配置。我们的研究结果强调了改善制度环境在为生产创新配置资源方面的重要性。
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引用次数: 0
Gender differences in willingness to guess revisited: Heterogeneity in a high stakes professional setting 猜测意愿的性别差异:高风险专业环境中的异质性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415
Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel
Multiple choice question tests are often the gateway to important professional outcomes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess among highly skilled and trained candidates in a high stakes multiple choice question test, before and after a reduction in the number of alternative answers to each question, lowering the penalty for incorrect answers to the critical value, i.e, the one yielding zero expected value upon uniform beliefs. We find heterogeneous gender differences, replicate the previous finding that women answer fewer questions than men, and conclude that reducing the number of alternative answers levels the field for men and women among those candidates who answer most of the questions.
多项选择题测试通常是通往重要专业成果的大门。我们研究了高技能和训练有素的候选人在高风险多项选择题测试中猜测意愿的性别差异,在减少每个问题的备选答案数量之前和之后,将错误答案的惩罚降低到临界值,即在统一信念下产生零期望值的那个。我们发现了异质的性别差异,重复了之前的发现,即女性回答的问题比男性少,并得出结论,在回答大多数问题的候选人中,减少可选答案的数量会使男性和女性的领域变得平等。
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引用次数: 0
Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive agent 竞争性地向理性上不注意的代理人披露信息
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410
Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer
We study competitive disclosure of information on idiosyncratic product quality by two firms to a rationally inattentive consumer. Unless attention costs are low, there is an equilibrium in which the firms provide the consumer with as much information as she would process if she controlled information provision. This is not true if there is only one firm. Our main welfare result reveals a surprising implication: when attention costs are moderate, the probability that consumers select the higher-quality product can be strictly greater under costly attention than under costless attention. This finding has important implications for policy debates about information disclosure requirements and consumer protection in markets with cognitively constrained agents.
我们研究了两家公司对一个理性不注意的消费者的特殊产品质量信息的竞争性披露。除非注意成本很低,否则存在一种均衡,在这种均衡中,企业向消费者提供的信息与她在控制信息提供时所能处理的信息一样多。如果只有一家公司,情况就不一样了。我们的主要福利结果揭示了一个令人惊讶的含义:当注意成本适中时,消费者在有成本的注意下选择高质量产品的概率严格高于无成本的注意。这一发现对有关信息披露要求和消费者保护的政策辩论具有重要意义。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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