Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363
Nurun Naher Moni , Muhammad Habibur Rahman , Ruhul Salim
Do earthquakes affect parents’ preferences for raising responsible children? By merging data on random variations in the frequency and timing of earthquakes with five waves of the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2022 at the district level across 90 countries, our event-specific difference-in-differences estimates reveal that parents affected by moderate earthquakes increase their preference for responsible children by 5.9 percentage points due to perceived risks. We argue that moderate shocks heighten risk perceptions without depleting parental capacity, whereas strong earthquakes dampen this effect by reducing the capacity required to instill responsibility. Our empirical evidence suggests that governments should embed child-centred disaster risk reduction frameworks within post-disaster recovery strategies to enhance long-term disaster resilience.
{"title":"Earthquakes and the intergenerational delegation of responsibility","authors":"Nurun Naher Moni , Muhammad Habibur Rahman , Ruhul Salim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do earthquakes affect parents’ preferences for raising responsible children? By merging data on random variations in the frequency and timing of earthquakes with five waves of the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2022 at the district level across 90 countries, our event-specific difference-in-differences estimates reveal that parents affected by moderate earthquakes increase their preference for responsible children by 5.9 percentage points due to perceived risks. We argue that moderate shocks heighten risk perceptions without depleting parental capacity, whereas strong earthquakes dampen this effect by reducing the capacity required to instill responsibility. Our empirical evidence suggests that governments should embed child-centred disaster risk reduction frameworks within post-disaster recovery strategies to enhance long-term disaster resilience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107363"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377
Yalin Tang , Chengfang Liu , Yingquan Song
Since its inception in 2009, the One Village One Preschool (OVOP) initiative has emerged as one of China’s most extensive social experiments in rural early childhood education (ECE), distinguished by stringent teacher entry standards and sustained professional development. Utilizing variations in OVOP’s access cross villages and cohorts, we find that high-school-aged students exposed to OVOP have gained human capital benefits. Specifically, an additional one-year of OVOP exposure generates a 4.6 percentage point (pp) increase in the likelihood of attending selective senior high schools and a 3.8 pp reduction in the probability of grade retention. Further examination suggests that the quality of OVOP centers, particularly teacher qualifications, plays a crucial role in generating these benefits. Moreover, the program’s impact is mediated through boosting preschool skill development and subsequent academic performance in compulsory education. Notably, students from upper-middle ability distribution derive more substantial benefits from OVOP exposure. Finally, a preliminary benefit-cost analysis indicates a return of at least 4.1:1 on OVOP investments, with the marginal value of public funds spanning from 6.2 to infinity. These findings underscore the efficacy of OVOP as a scalable model for enhancing educational equity and human capital development in rural China.
{"title":"The long-run human capital benefits of the one-village-one-preschool pilot in rural northwestern China","authors":"Yalin Tang , Chengfang Liu , Yingquan Song","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Since its inception in 2009, the One Village One Preschool (OVOP) initiative has emerged as one of China’s most extensive social experiments in rural early childhood education (ECE), distinguished by stringent teacher entry standards and sustained professional development. Utilizing variations in OVOP’s access cross villages and cohorts, we find that high-school-aged students exposed to OVOP have gained human capital benefits. Specifically, an additional one-year of OVOP exposure generates a 4.6 percentage point (pp) increase in the likelihood of attending selective senior high schools and a 3.8 pp reduction in the probability of grade retention. Further examination suggests that the quality of OVOP centers, particularly teacher qualifications, plays a crucial role in generating these benefits. Moreover, the program’s impact is mediated through boosting preschool skill development and subsequent academic performance in compulsory education. Notably, students from upper-middle ability distribution derive more substantial benefits from OVOP exposure. Finally, a preliminary benefit-cost analysis indicates a return of at least 4.1:1 on OVOP investments, with the marginal value of public funds spanning from 6.2 to infinity. These findings underscore the efficacy of OVOP as a scalable model for enhancing educational equity and human capital development in rural China.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107377"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392
Anastasia Antsygina
This paper studies optimal information disclosure in two competing contests where contestants face a constraint on their total effort contribution, or budget. The contestants are ex ante uninformed about the value of the prize to be allocated in one of the contests. Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown prize value chooses a public disclosure rule that maximizes the total effort exerted in her competition, and commits to it. We find that the optimal disclosure rule is generally not unique and can reveal (at least some) information to the contestants. In the absence of competition for effort among contests, the size of the budget has a non-monotonic effect on the designer’s incentives to share information. When competition for effort is at place, the designer’s incentives to share information decline with the size of the budget, which is driven by the substitution effect that forces contestants to reallocate their effort towards a competition with a higher perceived prize.
{"title":"Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players","authors":"Anastasia Antsygina","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal information disclosure in two competing contests where contestants face a constraint on their total effort contribution, or budget. The contestants are ex ante uninformed about the value of the prize to be allocated in one of the contests. Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown prize value chooses a public disclosure rule that maximizes the total effort exerted in her competition, and commits to it. We find that the optimal disclosure rule is generally not unique and can reveal (at least some) information to the contestants. In the absence of competition for effort among contests, the size of the budget has a non-monotonic effect on the designer’s incentives to share information. When competition for effort is at place, the designer’s incentives to share information decline with the size of the budget, which is driven by the <em>substitution effect</em> that forces contestants to reallocate their effort towards a competition with a higher perceived prize.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107392"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2026-01-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398
Gönül Doğan , Kenan Kalaycı , Priscilla Man
We invite experiment participants to invest their endowment in a pyramid scheme with a negative expected return. In two samples, one from the general U.S. population and one from a major German university involving higher stakes, more than half invest regardless of their age, gender, income, and trust and fairness beliefs. Higher risk tolerance positively correlates with investment in both populations, whereas preference for positively-skewed risk, and lower cognitive skills explain investment only in the general U.S. population. We vary the level of assistance provided to participants in inferring the distribution of payoff from the pyramid scheme in four treatments, and find that only those requiring no further extrapolation of information are successful in reducing investment.
{"title":"Pyramid schemes","authors":"Gönül Doğan , Kenan Kalaycı , Priscilla Man","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We invite experiment participants to invest their endowment in a pyramid scheme with a negative expected return. In two samples, one from the general U.S. population and one from a major German university involving higher stakes, more than half invest regardless of their age, gender, income, and trust and fairness beliefs. Higher risk tolerance positively correlates with investment in both populations, whereas preference for positively-skewed risk, and lower cognitive skills explain investment only in the general U.S. population. We vary the level of assistance provided to participants in inferring the distribution of payoff from the pyramid scheme in four treatments, and find that only those requiring no further extrapolation of information are successful in reducing investment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107398"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317
Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai
Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.
{"title":"Delayed school entry increases internal locus of control","authors":"Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107317"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349
Petter Berg
I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.
{"title":"Can ratings mitigate consumer inattention? Evidence from the swedish housing market","authors":"Petter Berg","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107349"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-11-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342
Peter Bossaerts , John Duffy , Jean Paul Rabanal , Olga A. Rud , Nitin Yadav
We experimentally examine whether and how the indexing strategy used by exchange traded funds (ETFs) affects the prices of the constituent assets. We study this issue in both the primary market (ETF creations and redemptions using bots as authorized participants) and the secondary market. The experiment includes three environments: (i) no ETF, (ii) an equal weighted ETF, and (iii) an unequal, market cap weighted ETF. We find that compared to the baseline of no ETFs, the introduction of ETFs significantly affects the relative prices of the constituent assets in the equal weighted ETF but not in the unequal weighted, market-cap based ETF. The introduction of ETFs also affects order imbalances and bid-ask spreads particularly for the asset in shortest supply.
{"title":"ETF indexing strategies and asset prices: Experimental evidence","authors":"Peter Bossaerts , John Duffy , Jean Paul Rabanal , Olga A. Rud , Nitin Yadav","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally examine whether and how the indexing strategy used by exchange traded funds (ETFs) affects the prices of the constituent assets. We study this issue in both the primary market (ETF creations and redemptions using bots as authorized participants) and the secondary market. The experiment includes three environments: (i) no ETF, (ii) an equal weighted ETF, and (iii) an unequal, market cap weighted ETF. We find that compared to the baseline of no ETFs, the introduction of ETFs significantly affects the relative prices of the constituent assets in the equal weighted ETF but not in the unequal weighted, market-cap based ETF. The introduction of ETFs also affects order imbalances and bid-ask spreads particularly for the asset in shortest supply.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107342"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145617463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-27DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385
Thiemo Fetzer , Oliver Vanden Eynde , Austin L. Wright
Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.
{"title":"Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan","authors":"Thiemo Fetzer , Oliver Vanden Eynde , Austin L. Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107385"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366
Jafar M. Olimov
This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.
{"title":"Bribery, secrecy, and communication: theory and evidence from firms","authors":"Jafar M. Olimov","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107366"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01Epub Date: 2025-12-20DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107379
Peter Brummund , Michael D. Makowsky
Participation in social groups ties members to local communities. Employers can capture these benefits as rents when geographically-specific club goods raise the cost of labor mobility. We measure ties to local clubs using the shares of households identifying with a minority religion, enrollment of children in Islamic schools, and membership in secular savings clubs. We identify larger wage markdowns where households have stronger ties to local club goods. Complementarity between labor market concentration and club goods offers an explanation of rising wage markdowns absent increases in concentration, while adding to the difficulty in separating monopsony rents from compensating wage differentials.
{"title":"Labor market monopsony and local clubs: Evidence from Indonesia","authors":"Peter Brummund , Michael D. Makowsky","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107379","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107379","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Participation in social groups ties members to local communities. Employers can capture these benefits as rents when geographically-specific club goods raise the cost of labor mobility. We measure ties to local clubs using the shares of households identifying with a minority religion, enrollment of children in Islamic schools, and membership in secular savings clubs. We identify larger wage markdowns where households have stronger ties to local club goods. Complementarity between labor market concentration and club goods offers an explanation of rising wage markdowns absent increases in concentration, while adding to the difficulty in separating monopsony rents from compensating wage differentials.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107379"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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