Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107350
Zeng Lian , Donald Lien , Jiawei Sun
This study investigates the impact of pro-drop language usage on divorce behaviours and attitudes. Using country-level divorce data and individual responses from the World Values Survey, we find that pro-drop speakers are less likely to be divorced and express lower support for divorce. These patterns hold after controlling for linguistic, cultural, and agro-climatic factors, and persist in within-country and matched-sample analyses. Mechanism analysis shows that while pro-drop aligns with collectivist values that discourage divorce, its association with divorce attitudes is only partly explained by them. Evidence from second-generation immigrants links parental exposure to pro-drop with children’s views on divorce, suggesting intergenerational influence of linguistic environments. The findings highlight the role of grammar in familial outcomes and offer insights for policymakers designing linguistically informed policy nudges.
{"title":"The linguistic driver of divorce","authors":"Zeng Lian , Donald Lien , Jiawei Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107350","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107350","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the impact of pro-drop language usage on divorce behaviours and attitudes. Using country-level divorce data and individual responses from the World Values Survey, we find that pro-drop speakers are less likely to be divorced and express lower support for divorce. These patterns hold after controlling for linguistic, cultural, and agro-climatic factors, and persist in within-country and matched-sample analyses. Mechanism analysis shows that while pro-drop aligns with collectivist values that discourage divorce, its association with divorce attitudes is only partly explained by them. Evidence from second-generation immigrants links parental exposure to pro-drop with children’s views on divorce, suggesting intergenerational influence of linguistic environments. The findings highlight the role of grammar in familial outcomes and offer insights for policymakers designing linguistically informed policy nudges.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107350"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107362
Alberto Posso , Riyana Miranti
This paper investigates the effect of transitioning the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN), a standardized assessment of student literacy and numeracy skills in Australia, to an online format on student test scores, with a particular focus on the disproportionate impact on lower-income groups. Utilizing school-level administrative data, we construct a panel of test scores across subjects (reading, writing, spelling, grammar, punctuation, and numeracy) and grades (3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th) for 10,529 schools over the period from 2008 to 2023, yielding a total of 1409,955 observations, with 919,934 from public schools. NAPLAN began its transition to online testing in 2018 and, by 2022, reached record-high participation, making it the largest online testing program in the world. Employing a staggered Difference-in-Differences methodology, the study shows that the shift to online testing is associated with a significant decrease in test scores, with this adverse effect being more pronounced among students from lower-income backgrounds. Specifically, online testing decreases average test scores by between 0.05 and 0.25 standard deviations (depending on the specification), while test scores from schools in the lowest income quintile are found to be between 0.10 and 0.17 standard deviations lower than those in the highest quintile.
{"title":"Online testing and educational inequality: Evidence from a national standardized test in Australia","authors":"Alberto Posso , Riyana Miranti","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107362","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107362","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the effect of transitioning the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN), a standardized assessment of student literacy and numeracy skills in Australia, to an online format on student test scores, with a particular focus on the disproportionate impact on lower-income groups. Utilizing school-level administrative data, we construct a panel of test scores across subjects (reading, writing, spelling, grammar, punctuation, and numeracy) and grades (3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th) for 10,529 schools over the period from 2008 to 2023, yielding a total of 1409,955 observations, with 919,934 from public schools. NAPLAN began its transition to online testing in 2018 and, by 2022, reached record-high participation, making it the largest online testing program in the world. Employing a staggered Difference-in-Differences methodology, the study shows that the shift to online testing is associated with a significant decrease in test scores, with this adverse effect being more pronounced among students from lower-income backgrounds. Specifically, online testing decreases average test scores by between 0.05 and 0.25 standard deviations (depending on the specification), while test scores from schools in the lowest income quintile are found to be between 0.10 and 0.17 standard deviations lower than those in the highest quintile.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107362"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107358
Xuan Li , Xiang Zhou
This paper examines whether sitting by a window can influence cognitive performance in a high-stakes setting. Leveraging unique administrative data from Chinese college entrance exams with randomized seating assignments, we find that a seat by a window with an outside view significantly enhances cognitive performance, resulting in 8.9 percent of a standard deviation increase in exam scores. Further evidence suggests that this finding aligns with Attention Restoration Theory. This study highlights the value of restorative environments in enhancing cognitive performance.
{"title":"The cognitive benefit of a window view","authors":"Xuan Li , Xiang Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107358","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107358","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines whether sitting by a window can influence cognitive performance in a high-stakes setting. Leveraging unique administrative data from Chinese college entrance exams with randomized seating assignments, we find that a seat by a window with an outside view significantly enhances cognitive performance, resulting in 8.9 percent of a standard deviation increase in exam scores. Further evidence suggests that this finding aligns with Attention Restoration Theory. This study highlights the value of restorative environments in enhancing cognitive performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107358"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107355
Daniela Grieco , Patrick Llerena , Anne-Gaëlle Maltese
This paper explores how individuals perceive open versus closed tasks in creative contexts and how this perception influences their choice between tasks. The experiment has a 2 × 2 design, where we give the possibility (or not) to choose between tasks, and vary the incentive scheme (flat payment vs. performance-based incentives). We find that subjects perceive a task as more open the lower the goal clarity and the more they feel free to explore. Additionally, we show that the likelihood of choosing an open task increases with the perceived freedom to explore, while it decreases with goal clarity, particularly when incentives in place. The effects of self-selection on creative performance are then investigated.
{"title":"Creativity and task perception","authors":"Daniela Grieco , Patrick Llerena , Anne-Gaëlle Maltese","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107355","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107355","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores how individuals perceive open versus closed tasks in creative contexts and how this perception influences their choice between tasks. The experiment has a 2 × 2 design, where we give the possibility (or not) to choose between tasks, and vary the incentive scheme (flat payment vs. performance-based incentives). We find that subjects perceive a task as more open the lower the goal clarity and the more they feel free to explore. Additionally, we show that the likelihood of choosing an open task increases with the perceived freedom to explore, while it decreases with goal clarity, particularly when incentives in place. The effects of self-selection on creative performance are then investigated.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107355"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349
Petter Berg
I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.
{"title":"Can ratings mitigate consumer inattention? Evidence from the swedish housing market","authors":"Petter Berg","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107349"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353
Emin Karagözoğlu , Kerim Keskin , Deren Çağlayan
We study costly argumentation in two canonical bargaining games, where the proposer needs to justify her offer by providing arguments, because the responder derives disutility from accepting an offer that lacks sufficient justification. Argument provision is costly. Since justifying a less generous offer always requires more arguments, there is a strategic trade-off for the proposer: either invest in argument provision to persuade the responder to accept a lower offer, or refrain from providing arguments in which case the responder expects a more generous offer. Assuming an increasing and convex cost of argumentation, we show that an equilibrium with positive levels of argumentation exists in both models if the cost of argument provision is sufficiently low. Our comparative static analyses further reveal that an increase in one’s aversion to lack of sound arguments can make her worse off in equilibrium, both in terms of agreed pie share and collected utility.
{"title":"Costly argumentation in bargaining","authors":"Emin Karagözoğlu , Kerim Keskin , Deren Çağlayan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study costly argumentation in two canonical bargaining games, where the proposer needs to justify her offer by providing arguments, because the responder derives disutility from accepting an offer that lacks sufficient justification. Argument provision is costly. Since justifying a less generous offer always requires more arguments, there is a strategic trade-off for the proposer: either invest in argument provision to persuade the responder to accept a lower offer, or refrain from providing arguments in which case the responder expects a more generous offer. Assuming an increasing and convex cost of argumentation, we show that an equilibrium with positive levels of argumentation exists in both models if the cost of argument provision is sufficiently low. Our comparative static analyses further reveal that an increase in one’s aversion to lack of sound arguments can make her worse off in equilibrium, both in terms of agreed pie share and collected utility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107353"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341
Gary Charness , Diana Caporale, Anna Rinaldi
The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.
This paper investigates whether trust can be strategically incentivized to support the adoption of group-based mitigation in such contexts. We design a repeated coordination game in which participants first choose the number of players to group with (2, 3, or 4), and then select a mitigation strategy: no action, individual mitigation, or group mitigation. Group mitigation offers the lowest cost but only succeeds if all group members independently choose it; its cost decreases as group size increases. Results reveal a shift in participants' preferences over time, with a progressive transition toward larger groups. Participants increasingly abandon individual strategies in favor of group mitigation. Our findings also show that trust is not a stable trait, but a strategic belief that adapts over time. Players’ choices change dynamically in response to observed payoffs, perceived cooperation probabilities, and perceived disaster risk. The game provides insights into when and why cooperation emerges or collapses, allowing for the pre-testing of institutional interventions before they are implemented in real-world contexts.
{"title":"Vulnerability game","authors":"Gary Charness , Diana Caporale, Anna Rinaldi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.</div><div>This paper investigates whether trust can be strategically incentivized to support the adoption of group-based mitigation in such contexts. We design a repeated coordination game in which participants first choose the number of players to group with (2, 3, or 4), and then select a mitigation strategy: no action, individual mitigation, or grou<sub>p</sub> mitigation. Group mitigation offers the lowest cost but only succeeds if all group members independently choose it; its cost decreases as group size increases. Results reveal a shift in participants' preferences over time, with a progressive transition toward larger groups. Participants increasingly abandon individual strategies in favor of group mitigation. Our findings also show that trust is not a stable trait, but a strategic belief that adapts over time. Players’ choices change dynamically in response to observed payoffs, perceived cooperation probabilities, and perceived disaster risk. The game provides insights into when and why cooperation emerges or collapses, allowing for the pre-testing of institutional interventions before they are implemented in real-world contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107341"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317
Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai
Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.
{"title":"Delayed school entry increases internal locus of control","authors":"Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107317"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337
Marcello Antonini , Joan Costa-Font
Health status can alter individuals' social preferences, including individuals' preferences regarding a fair financing of health care. If individuals follow a healthy self-interested rationale, health improvements can weaken individuals' support for fairer health care financing, insofar as they perceive a reduced need for healthcare. Conversely, healthier people might anticipate facing greater opportunity costs if their health declines in an unfairly funded system, and hence may endorse fairer financing in anticipation of future health challenges—which we label as the 'unhealthy self-interest' hypothesis. We draw on a dataset of 73,452 individuals across 22 countries and a novel instrumental variable strategy that exploits variation in health status resulting from cross-country and cohort-specific exposure to the national childhood Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccination schedules. We document causal evidence consistent with the unhealthy self-interest hypothesis, namely that better (worst) health increases (reduces) preferences for a fairer health care system. We estimate that a one-unit increase in self-reported health increases support for fair health care access by 11 % and the willingness to support fair financing by 8 %. Our findings suggest that improving population health may give rise to stronger support for interventions to improve equitable health system access and financing.
{"title":"Healthy self-interest? Health dependent preferences for fairer health care","authors":"Marcello Antonini , Joan Costa-Font","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Health status can alter individuals' social preferences, including individuals' preferences regarding a fair financing of health care. If individuals follow a <em>healthy self-interested rationale</em>, health improvements can weaken individuals' support for fairer health care financing, insofar as they perceive a reduced need for healthcare. Conversely, healthier people might anticipate facing greater opportunity costs if their health declines in an unfairly funded system, and hence may endorse fairer financing in anticipation of future health challenges—which we label as the '<em>unhealthy self-interest</em>' hypothesis. We draw on a dataset of 73,452 individuals across 22 countries and a novel instrumental variable strategy that exploits variation in health status resulting from cross-country and cohort-specific exposure to the national childhood Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccination schedules. We document causal evidence consistent with the <em>unhealthy self-interest hypothesis</em>, namely that better (worst) health increases (reduces) preferences for a fairer health care system. We estimate that a one-unit increase in self-reported health increases support for fair health care access by 11 % and the willingness to support fair financing by 8 %. Our findings suggest that improving population health may give rise to stronger support for interventions to improve equitable health system access and financing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107337"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145614998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323
Daniele Caliari , Ivan Soraperra
Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.
{"title":"Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control","authors":"Daniele Caliari , Ivan Soraperra","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107323"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145615050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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