Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390
Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons
We examine the long-run institutional and economic effects of successful one-time nonviolent campaigns. Using an event study on panel data (1950–2022) from the NAVCO and V-Dem datasets, we compare countries with successful one-time nonviolent campaigns to politically stable counterparts without any campaigns. This design plausibly mitigates concerns about selection bias, simultaneity, and timing endogeneity. Pre-treatment trends support the assumption of parallel trends. We find that nonviolent campaigns are associated with lasting improvements in liberal democracy, rule of law, civil liberties, and government accountability, alongside reduced state ownership of the economy. These results suggest that collective action can strengthen market-supporting institutions and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of liberal market systems.
{"title":"The invisible hand meets the raised fist: Social movements and market legitimacy","authors":"Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the long-run institutional and economic effects of successful one-time nonviolent campaigns. Using an event study on panel data (1950–2022) from the NAVCO and V-Dem datasets, we compare countries with successful one-time nonviolent campaigns to politically stable counterparts without any campaigns. This design plausibly mitigates concerns about selection bias, simultaneity, and timing endogeneity. Pre-treatment trends support the assumption of parallel trends. We find that nonviolent campaigns are associated with lasting improvements in liberal democracy, rule of law, civil liberties, and government accountability, alongside reduced state ownership of the economy. These results suggest that collective action can strengthen market-supporting institutions and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of liberal market systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107390"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401
Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki
Cooperative game theory addresses two main problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence and size of the core, a central concept in cooperative game theory, influence the formation of the grand coalition, and we test this in a laboratory experiment. In each group, three subjects simultaneously engage in unstructured bargaining over both coalition formation and payoff distribution, mimicking real-world negotiation. Our results highlight four key findings. First, a nonempty core strongly facilitates the formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of a chat window increases the likelihood of forming the grand coalition and reduces inequality in the resulting allocations. Third, resulting allocations are often in the core when it exists, and otherwise fall within the equal division core, an extension of the core. Fourth, the resulting allocations reflect the subjects’ theoretical bargaining power: players with higher bargaining power tend to receive larger shares. Finally, allocations outside the equal division core arise mainly because subjects overlook domination via coalition BC, the two-person coalition with the lowest value.
{"title":"The core and the equal division core in a three-person unstructured bargaining experiment","authors":"Taro Shinoda , Yukihiko Funaki","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107401","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cooperative game theory addresses two main problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence and size of the core, a central concept in cooperative game theory, influence the formation of the grand coalition, and we test this in a laboratory experiment. In each group, three subjects simultaneously engage in unstructured bargaining over both coalition formation and payoff distribution, mimicking real-world negotiation. Our results highlight four key findings. First, a nonempty core strongly facilitates the formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of a chat window increases the likelihood of forming the grand coalition and reduces inequality in the resulting allocations. Third, resulting allocations are often in the core when it exists, and otherwise fall within the equal division core, an extension of the core. Fourth, the resulting allocations reflect the subjects’ theoretical bargaining power: players with higher bargaining power tend to receive larger shares. Finally, allocations outside the equal division core arise mainly because subjects overlook domination via coalition BC, the two-person coalition with the lowest value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107401"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394
Christine Harbring, Stella Simons
Performance appraisals by supervisors are often used in organizations as a basis for bonus and promotion decisions. These subjective appraisals are often prone to supervisors’ biases (e.g., centrality and leniency bias) resulting in ratings that seem not sufficiently differentiated. Previous research shows that forcing supervisors to differentiate in subjective performance appraisals by implementing a forced distribution system may increase worker productivity. However, forced distribution systems pose a variety of other problems. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate two alternative rating policies which aim to foster differentiation and thus productivity. Firstly, supervisors are simply advised to differentiate across different appraisal levels. We find that this simple recommendation results in less lenient and less compressed performance ratings and tends to increase workers’ performance. Secondly, we analyze how supervisors evaluate workers’ performance when the rewards, which are tied to ratings, may not exceed a certain budget. We detect that specifying a financial budget mitigates the leniency bias and increases workers’ performance. Under both rating policies, the performance differences wear off over the course of the experiment.
{"title":"Make a difference? – An experiment on the effectiveness of performance rating policies","authors":"Christine Harbring, Stella Simons","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107394","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Performance appraisals by supervisors are often used in organizations as a basis for bonus and promotion decisions. These subjective appraisals are often prone to supervisors’ biases (e.g., centrality and leniency bias) resulting in ratings that seem not sufficiently differentiated. Previous research shows that forcing supervisors to differentiate in subjective performance appraisals by implementing a forced distribution system may increase worker productivity. However, forced distribution systems pose a variety of other problems. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate two alternative rating policies which aim to foster differentiation and thus productivity. Firstly, supervisors are simply advised to differentiate across different appraisal levels. We find that this simple recommendation results in less lenient and less compressed performance ratings and tends to increase workers’ performance. Secondly, we analyze how supervisors evaluate workers’ performance when the rewards, which are tied to ratings, may not exceed a certain budget. We detect that specifying a financial budget mitigates the leniency bias and increases workers’ performance. Under both rating policies, the performance differences wear off over the course of the experiment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107394"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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