Pub Date : 2026-03-01Epub Date: 2026-01-22DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391
Peter Redler , Friederike Johanna Reichel
We analyze the potential for social choice architecture to increase take-up rates of breast cancer check-ups in a large sample of women in Germany. We provide causal evidence that the relative timing of check-up appointments among peers matters for participation: A woman is more likely to participate in breast cancer screening when her peers’ appointments are scheduled shortly before her own. A simple intervention, however, shows that scheduling peers’ appointments on the same day does not affect participation. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the observed pattern of peer effects and highlight policy implications.
{"title":"When do peers influence preventive health behavior? Evidence from breast cancer screening","authors":"Peter Redler , Friederike Johanna Reichel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the potential for social choice architecture to increase take-up rates of breast cancer check-ups in a large sample of women in Germany. We provide causal evidence that the relative timing of check-up appointments among peers matters for participation: A woman is more likely to participate in breast cancer screening when her peers’ appointments are scheduled shortly before her own. A simple intervention, however, shows that scheduling peers’ appointments on the same day does not affect participation. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying the observed pattern of peer effects and highlight policy implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107391"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146015781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2025-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291
Oana Borcan , Laura Gee , Laura Harvey , Boon Han Koh , Ernesto Reuben
{"title":"An introduction to the special issue on discrimination and diversity","authors":"Oana Borcan , Laura Gee , Laura Harvey , Boon Han Koh , Ernesto Reuben","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107291"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415
Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel
Multiple choice question tests are often the gateway to important professional outcomes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess among highly skilled and trained candidates in a high stakes multiple choice question test, before and after a reduction in the number of alternative answers to each question, lowering the penalty for incorrect answers to the critical value, i.e, the one yielding zero expected value upon uniform beliefs. We find heterogeneous gender differences, replicate the previous finding that women answer fewer questions than men, and conclude that reducing the number of alternative answers levels the field for men and women among those candidates who answer most of the questions.
{"title":"Gender differences in willingness to guess revisited: Heterogeneity in a high stakes professional setting","authors":"Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multiple choice question tests are often the gateway to important professional outcomes. We study gender differences in willingness to guess among highly skilled and trained candidates in a high stakes multiple choice question test, before and after a reduction in the number of alternative answers to each question, lowering the penalty for incorrect answers to the critical value, i.e, the one yielding zero expected value upon uniform beliefs. We find heterogeneous gender differences, replicate the previous finding that women answer fewer questions than men, and conclude that reducing the number of alternative answers levels the field for men and women among those candidates who answer most of the questions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107415"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431
Jérémie Bertrand , Aurore Burietz , Paul-Olivier Klein
We refine the definition of trust in banking by isolating the role of institution-based trust, defined as trust in banks in general, and look at the effects of variations of institution-based trust on the development of recurring firm-bank relationships. Using U.S. syndicated loan transaction data from 1998 to 2016, we show that borrowers and lenders deploy more intense interpersonal relationships in enhanced trust environments. However, when generally trusted, banks tend to exploit these relationships by reducing their lending commitments and raising loan spreads. This outcome can be attributed to the emergence of a naïve form of interpersonal trust on the part of the borrower.
{"title":"Trust in banks: Fostering (Naïve) firm-bank relationships","authors":"Jérémie Bertrand , Aurore Burietz , Paul-Olivier Klein","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We refine the definition of trust in banking by isolating the role of institution-based trust, defined as trust in banks in general, and look at the effects of variations of institution-based trust on the development of recurring firm-bank relationships. Using U.S. syndicated loan transaction data from 1998 to 2016, we show that borrowers and lenders deploy more intense interpersonal relationships in enhanced trust environments. However, when generally trusted, banks tend to exploit these relationships by reducing their lending commitments and raising loan spreads. This outcome can be attributed to the emergence of a <em>naïve</em> form of interpersonal trust on the part of the borrower.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107431"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146038647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400
Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin
Incentivized experiments employ various designs of experimental currency units, yet there is typically little justification for choosing a particular currency framework. We study how different nominal values of experimental currency units affect risky decision-making in investment tasks. Our online experiments find no difference in risk-taking even if conversion rates vary by a factor of 1,000. Hence, we empirically reconfirm the experimental practice used for decades.
{"title":"Experimental currency units in investment tasks","authors":"Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Incentivized experiments employ various designs of experimental currency units, yet there is typically little justification for choosing a particular currency framework. We study how different nominal values of experimental currency units affect risky decision-making in investment tasks. Our online experiments find no difference in risk-taking even if conversion rates vary by a factor of 1,000. Hence, we empirically reconfirm the experimental practice used for decades.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107400"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410
Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer
We study competitive disclosure of information on idiosyncratic product quality by two firms to a rationally inattentive consumer. Unless attention costs are low, there is an equilibrium in which the firms provide the consumer with as much information as she would process if she controlled information provision. This is not true if there is only one firm. Our main welfare result reveals a surprising implication: when attention costs are moderate, the probability that consumers select the higher-quality product can be strictly greater under costly attention than under costless attention. This finding has important implications for policy debates about information disclosure requirements and consumer protection in markets with cognitively constrained agents.
{"title":"Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive agent","authors":"Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study competitive disclosure of information on idiosyncratic product quality by two firms to a rationally inattentive consumer. Unless attention costs are low, there is an equilibrium in which the firms provide the consumer with as much information as she would process if she controlled information provision. This is not true if there is only one firm. Our main welfare result reveals a surprising implication: when attention costs are moderate, the probability that consumers select the higher-quality product can be strictly greater under costly attention than under costless attention. This finding has important implications for policy debates about information disclosure requirements and consumer protection in markets with cognitively constrained agents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107410"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360
Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen
Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.
{"title":"Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment","authors":"Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107360"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145898048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416
Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli
We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.
{"title":"Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters?","authors":"Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107416"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403
Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra
Sellers in real-estate markets, on internet platforms, in auction houses, and so forth, routinely make non-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication affects trade between buyers and sellers. For bilateral trade, the literature has identified efficiency, anchoring, and granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with competition, although some become weaker. Our main findings are the following: (i) The ability of sellers to make non-binding price requests has a positive effect on efficiency in that it helps trading partners close marginal deals both in bilateral bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition weakens the anchoring effect of the level of the price request; (iii) Sellers communicating more granular price requests attract more granular buyer bids; (iv) The granularity of the seller’s price request does not impact the selling price.
{"title":"Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk","authors":"Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sellers in real-estate markets, on internet platforms, in auction houses, and so forth, routinely make non-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication affects trade between buyers and sellers. For bilateral trade, the literature has identified efficiency, anchoring, and granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with competition, although some become weaker. Our main findings are the following: (i) The ability of sellers to make non-binding price requests has a positive effect on efficiency in that it helps trading partners close marginal deals both in bilateral bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition weakens the anchoring effect of the level of the price request; (iii) Sellers communicating more granular price requests attract more granular buyer bids; (iv) The granularity of the seller’s price request does not impact the selling price.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107403"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-01Epub Date: 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402
Margherita Comola , Marcel Fafchamps
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.
{"title":"Experimental evidence on covert bargaining markets","authors":"Margherita Comola , Marcel Fafchamps","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107402"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号