Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献

英文中文

Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters? 人们愿意为预防自然灾害买单吗？

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416

Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli

We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.

我们实施了一项调查实验，研究水文地质风险后果意识是否会影响人们对抗水文地质风险的意愿。从2023年10月开始，我们使用了一个由5000名意大利人组成的代表性小组，每季度采访一次。在不同的信息处理方式下，我们激发了调查参与者向公共基金捐款的意愿，以资助对面临水文地质风险地区的投资。我们发现，披露水文地质风险后果的信息会增加个人对公共资金的支持和个人支付政策的意愿。与对照组相比，接受治疗的人向基金捐款的可能性高出9个百分点，并且更愿意额外捐款29欧元。将信息处理应用于整个劳动年龄人口，每年可筹集高达2.6亿欧元。支付意愿取决于个人的认知，即政策的成功关键取决于其他公民的支付意愿。我们的研究结果还表明，一次性活动只会在短期内增加支付意愿，而有效的活动不应该有时间限制。事实上，在后续调查中更新治疗可以恢复其效果。

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引用次数: 0

Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk 竞争调节了买家对卖家廉价言论的反应

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403

Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra

Sellers in real-estate markets, on internet platforms, in auction houses, and so forth, routinely make non-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication affects trade between buyers and sellers. For bilateral trade, the literature has identified efficiency, anchoring, and granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with competition, although some become weaker. Our main findings are the following: (i) The ability of sellers to make non-binding price requests has a positive effect on efficiency in that it helps trading partners close marginal deals both in bilateral bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition weakens the anchoring effect of the level of the price request; (iii) Sellers communicating more granular price requests attract more granular buyer bids; (iv) The granularity of the seller’s price request does not impact the selling price.

房地产市场、互联网平台、拍卖行等的卖家通常会提出不具约束力的价格要求。通过实验室实验，我们研究了竞争如何调节这种廉价的沟通方式影响买卖双方之间的贸易。对于双边贸易，文献已经确定了便宜货沟通对谈判结果的效率、锚定和粒度效应。我们的研究结果表明，这些效应中的大多数在竞争中存活下来，尽管有些会减弱。我们的主要发现如下：(i)卖方提出非约束性价格要求的能力对效率有积极影响，因为它有助于贸易伙伴在双边议价和竞争中达成边际交易；（二）竞争削弱了价格要求水平的锚定效应；（iii）卖方传达更细粒度的价格请求会吸引更细粒度的买方出价；（iv）卖方价格要求的粒度不影响销售价格。

引用次数: 0

Experimental evidence on covert bargaining markets 关于秘密议价市场的实验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402

Margherita Comola , Marcel Fafchamps

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.

我们进行了一个实验室实验来研究参与者参与多种（双边和多边）交易的分散市场。我们提出了一种新的议价协议，允许玩家对彼此隐瞒出价金额（隐蔽议价）。我们表明，相对于没有讨价还价的机制，这些讨价还价协议的事后效率提高了一倍，这主要有利于玩家（尤其是买家），而不是沉默的拍卖商。尽管如此，总效率还是受到这样一个事实的影响，即买方比卖方更努力地讨价还价，一些参与者过度讨价还价，以获得更大份额的未知剩余。

引用次数: 0

A model of moral balancing under motivated reasoning 动机推理下的道德平衡模型

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107393

Daniela Flörchinger

While there is abundant empirical evidence of individuals switching between selfish and prosocial behavior, few economic models formalize these findings. This paper presents a novel model that jointly analyzes three key concepts for understanding prosocial behavior: moral balancing, self-signaling, and motivated reasoning. Individuals maximize material utility under the constraint of maintaining a minimum level of self-image (moral balancing), where self-image depends on signals extracted from past behavior (self-signaling). The processing of these signals is biased toward arriving at a positive self-image (motivated reasoning). The time horizon for which the self-image constraint is active depends on individuals’ intrinsic motivation and their awareness of self-image relevant choices. Selfish behavior tends to be higher when the constraint is only active in the long term and it increases with the tendency toward motivated reasoning. These results are partially consistent with experimental results. The model suggests that voluntary prosocial behavior is unlikely to be sustained and thus calls for adequate policy measures.

虽然有大量的经验证据表明个体在自私行为和亲社会行为之间转换，但很少有经济模型将这些发现形式化。本文提出了一个新的模型，该模型联合分析了理解亲社会行为的三个关键概念：道德平衡、自我信号和动机推理。个体在保持最低水平的自我形象（道德平衡）的约束下最大化物质效用，其中自我形象依赖于从过去行为中提取的信号（自我信号）。这些信号的处理偏向于达到积极的自我形象（动机推理）。自我形象约束作用的时间范围取决于个体的内在动机和对自我形象相关选择的认识。当约束只在长期内有效时，自私行为倾向于更高，并且随着动机推理的倾向而增加。这些结果与实验结果部分吻合。该模型表明，自愿的亲社会行为不太可能持续，因此需要适当的政策措施。

引用次数: 0

Supporters or hinderances? Intergenerational coresidence and household finance under patriarchy 支持者还是阻碍？父权制下的代际同居与家庭财务

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107409

He Huang , Ruipeng Tan , Zhiming Yang

This paper investigates the impact of intergenerational coresidence on household financial outcomes in patriarchal societies. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, we find that coresiding parents significantly increase the likelihood of their biological child assuming household headship, a result that remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Intergenerational coresidence positively affects households’ financial market participation, portfolio diversification, and asset returns. Parents’ consistent support and adherence to traditional gender norms play crucial roles and the effects of intergenerational coresidence is unidirectional. Moreover, we find that a negative shock to community-level gender equality dampens the positive influence of intergenerational coresidence on financial behavior, highlighting the intricate interplay between household structure and financial decision-making. These findings offer valuable insights into how family dynamics and social gender norms shape economic outcomes, with implications for policies aimed at enhancing financial inclusion and intergenerational well-being.

本文研究了父权社会中代际同居对家庭财务结果的影响。使用中国家庭金融调查的数据，我们发现共同居住的父母显著增加其亲生子女担任家庭户主的可能性，这一结果在一系列稳健性检验后仍然是稳健的。代际共居正向影响家庭金融市场参与、投资组合多元化和资产收益。父母对传统性别规范的一贯支持和坚持起着至关重要的作用，代际共居的影响是单向的。此外，我们发现，对社区层面性别平等的负面冲击抑制了代际共居对金融行为的积极影响，凸显了家庭结构与金融决策之间错综复杂的相互作用。这些发现为了解家庭动态和社会性别规范如何影响经济结果提供了有价值的见解，并对旨在加强金融包容性和代际福祉的政策产生影响。

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引用次数: 0

Experimental currency units in investment tasks 实验性货币单位投资任务

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400

Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin

Incentivized experiments employ various designs of experimental currency units, yet there is typically little justification for choosing a particular currency framework. We study how different nominal values of experimental currency units affect risky decision-making in investment tasks. Our online experiments find no difference in risk-taking even if conversion rates vary by a factor of 1,000. Hence, we empirically reconfirm the experimental practice used for decades.

激励性实验采用各种实验性货币单位设计，但通常没有理由选择特定的货币框架。我们研究了不同的实验性货币单位的名义价值如何影响投资任务中的风险决策。我们的在线实验发现，即使转化率相差1000倍，人们在承担风险方面也没有差异。因此，我们在经验上再次证实了几十年来使用的实验实践。

引用次数: 0

Trade union membership and bonus payments: German survey evidence 工会会员资格和奖金支付：德国调查证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107404

Marco Clemens , Laszlo Goerke

This study provides the first comprehensive investigation of the relationship between trade union membership and non-performance-oriented bonuses. We expect a positive impact of union membership because members can benefit from special entitlements, increased bargaining power and informational advantages. Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), we observe that union members are more likely to receive at least one bonus payment per year, a higher number and amount of bonuses than comparable non-members. We also observe the positive union membership effect for employees covered by collective bargaining or co-determination via works councils. Employing a novel instrumental variable, we find evidence of a positive effect of union membership on the number and level of bonus payments. Furthermore, higher bonuses do not go along with decreases in base wages or other pay components.

本研究首次全面探讨了工会会员资格与非绩效导向奖金之间的关系。我们期待工会会员资格的积极影响，因为会员可以从特殊权利、增加的议价能力和信息优势中受益。根据德国社会经济研究小组（GSOEP）的数据，我们观察到工会成员更有可能每年至少获得一次奖金，奖金的数量和金额高于可比的非会员。我们还观察到，通过劳资委员会进行集体谈判或共同决定的员工加入工会的积极影响。采用一个新的工具变量，我们发现工会成员对奖金支付的数量和水平有积极影响的证据。此外，更高的奖金不会伴随着基本工资或其他薪酬组成部分的降低。

引用次数: 0

Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment 序贯议价中的承诺——一个实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360

Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen

Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.

谢林（1956）首先阐明了减少个人选择自由的权力如何可能使谈判方受益。当提案成功时，拒绝提案的承诺可能会迫使反对者让步，否则他们可能会占上风。本文通过实验研究了序贯最后通牒博弈前的可信承诺。研究发现，应答者会利用先发制人承诺策略，但比理论预测的要少。在一个回应者可以单方面预先做出承诺的博弈中，她面临的激励与最后通牒博弈中的提议者相同。然而，在最后通牒博弈中，观察到的应答者承诺比提议者的提议更具攻击性。在同时承诺博弈中，不能从承诺中获益的提议者仍然被观察到承诺。观察到的双方的待遇内收益差异不符合博弈承诺变体的理论预测。令人惊讶的是，在最后几轮中，允许预先承诺产生几乎100%的效率，而标准的最后通牒游戏仍然具有显著的低效率。我们讨论了四种互补的行为解释，发现互惠和对机会平等的关注与观察到的模式是一致的。根据经验，我们观察到机会均等偏好的道德标准在起作用。

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引用次数: 0

The political economy of privatization of education: Role of local politicians in India 教育私有化的政治经济学：印度地方政治家的角色

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107325

Muneer Kalliyil , Soham Sahoo

We investigate the role of political favouritism in the private education market. Using constituency-level panel data and a close-election regression discontinuity design, we estimate the causal effect of having a politician aligned with the state ruling party on the growth of private educational institutions in India. We find that constituencies represented by aligned politicians have a higher growth rate in the number of private schools, while the effect is insignificant for government schools. Similar patterns are also found for higher education institutions. As potential mechanisms, we explore political influence over bureaucratic processes and the direct involvement of politicians in opening the schools. A mediation analysis and examination of heterogeneous effects across the electoral term suggest that economic growth driven by ruling party-aligned leaders is unlikely to explain the increase in private school establishments. Additionally, we find that the effect of aligned politicians is concentrated in constituencies with lower-quality government schools, although the newly established private schools do not necessarily provide higher-quality education.

我们调查了政治偏袒在私立教育市场中的作用。使用选区级面板数据和接近选举回归不连续设计，我们估计了政治家与国家执政党结盟对印度私立教育机构增长的因果效应。我们发现，由结盟政治家所代表的选区在私立学校数量上有更高的增长率，而对公立学校的影响不显著。高等教育机构也发现了类似的模式。作为潜在的机制，我们探讨了政治对官僚程序的影响以及政治家在开设学校方面的直接参与。一项对选举期间异质效应的中介分析和检验表明，由与执政党结盟的领导人推动的经济增长不太可能解释私立学校机构的增加。此外，我们发现结盟政治家的影响集中在公立学校质量较低的选区，尽管新成立的私立学校不一定提供更高质量的教育。

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引用次数: 0

The invisible hand meets the raised fist: Social movements and market legitimacy 看不见的手碰到举起的拳头：社会运动和市场合法性

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107390

Shishir Shakya , Joshua D. Ammons

We examine the long-run institutional and economic effects of successful one-time nonviolent campaigns. Using an event study on panel data (1950–2022) from the NAVCO and V-Dem datasets, we compare countries with successful one-time nonviolent campaigns to politically stable counterparts without any campaigns. This design plausibly mitigates concerns about selection bias, simultaneity, and timing endogeneity. Pre-treatment trends support the assumption of parallel trends. We find that nonviolent campaigns are associated with lasting improvements in liberal democracy, rule of law, civil liberties, and government accountability, alongside reduced state ownership of the economy. These results suggest that collective action can strengthen market-supporting institutions and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of liberal market systems.

我们考察了成功的一次性非暴力运动的长期制度和经济影响。利用NAVCO和V-Dem数据集的面板数据（1950-2022）的事件研究，我们将一次性非暴力运动成功的国家与没有任何运动的政治稳定的国家进行了比较。这种设计似乎减轻了对选择偏差、同时性和时间内生性的担忧。预处理趋势支持平行趋势的假设。我们发现，非暴力运动与自由民主、法治、公民自由和政府问责制的持续改善有关，同时也与减少国家对经济的所有权有关。这些结果表明，集体行动可以加强支持市场的机构，并加强自由市场体系的合法性。

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全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

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