Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献

Experimental research typically shows that best-response rates are below what plausible error rates would suggest. We experimentally test the conjecture that observed action–belief inconsistencies are related to belief uncertainty. We rely on a belief-sampling model that has been highly successful in explaining behavior in multi-armed bandit problems and aggregate outcomes in games, markets, and surveys. Our data shows that inducing higher belief uncertainty leads more frequently to choices that are inconsistent with stated beliefs and – in an experiment directly testing the mechanism – to stochastic belief reports. The uncertainty–inconsistency relationship continues to hold when we control for error costs econometrically in several ways.

This paper investigates the role of strategy assortativity for the evolution of parochialism. Individuals belonging to different groups are matched in pairs to play a prisoner’s dilemma, conditioning their choice on the identity of the partner. Strategy assortativity implies that a player is more likely to be matched with someone playing the same strategy. We find that, if the degree of strategy assortativity is sufficiently high, then parochialism (i.e., cooperate with your own group and defect with others) spreads over a group, while egoism (i.e., defect with everyone) emerges otherwise. Notably, parochialism is more likely to emerge in smaller groups.

Free speech is essential for informed decision-making, government efficacy, and fostering innovation in liberal societies. But what promotes or hinders freedom of speech values? Exploiting the natural experiment of German separation and later reunification, we show that living under communism has had lasting effects on free speech opinions, and the convergence process has been slow. East Germans are still less likely to consider freedom of speech a key government priority than West Germans. The effects are the largest for cohorts that lived the longest under communism. This provides evidence that more prolonged exposure to the features of socialism—including indoctrination and repression—collectively lowers the appreciation of freedom of speech values. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks and provide suggestive evidence pointing to indoctrination as a mechanism behind our findings. As such, our paper contributes to the scarce body of literature on the economics of free speech, suggesting that freedom of speech may be a part of informal institutions and slow-changing cultural values.

We study the effectiveness of delegation as a conflict resolution mechanism for managing common pool resources (CPR). Delegation involves empowering stakeholders to make collective decisions on behalf of resource users. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, a delegation approval mechanism (DAM) in a three-player common-pool resource (CPR) game in which players can vote for extractions. In case of disapproval, in stage 2, one player is randomly selected to choose authoritatively the uniform extraction for the group, putting the disapproval arbitration at an endogenous level. Backwards elimination of weakly dominated strategies ($BEWDS$) predicts the socially optimum extraction under unanimity, but not under majority. Our experimental findings show that the DAM strongly reduces extractions and that most selected delegates choose the optimal extraction.

Despite compelling evidence of widespread gain–loss-domain-dependent behavior, research on domain-dependent diversification is scarce. We recruited 251 experienced US retail investors to participate in a controlled experiment with the task to select portfolios that differ in asset correlation and, hence, diversification benefits in both the gain and the loss domain. We find evidence of domain-dependent diversification, both unconditional and conditional on benchmark portfolio preferences. Consistent with a loss-attention hypothesis, diversification errors are not observed in the loss domain but are clearly present in the gain domain (with much lower diversification relative to the benchmark).

How far are people willing to go to reduce inequality and enact what they perceive as a fair distribution of income? We address this question in South Africa, one of the most unequal countries in the world, where questions of fairness and redistribution are part of everyday considerations. We carry out an experiment where a third-party stakeholder is paired with two “workers” and makes a series of redistributive decisions over their earnings. These redistributive decisions carry varying personal costs to the stakeholder, and the inequality in worker payout is also varied. Additionally, we randomly vary the source of inequality: luck or merit. We show that stakeholders’ willingness to redistribute increases with initial pay inequality and decreases with personal cost to redistribute. The source of inequality also makes a difference, with higher redistribution in the luck treatment. The source matters less at higher levels of inequality, suggesting a degree of aversion to extreme disparities, even when payouts are seen as rightfully earned. On the other hand, the effect of stakeholders’ personal cost does not interact with the source of inequality, indicating a robust self-interest motivation. The interplay of these effects can result in significantly different levels of post-redistribution inequality. We suggest that substantial redistribution might be acceptable to most as a tool for reducing high inequality - such as that observed in South Africa - especially when income allocation is deemed unfair. However, self-interest may be a significant limiting factor.

We study whether negotiators adopt commitment tactics in bargaining, a concept first proposed by Schelling (1956), and their choice of the credibility of commitment. In a modified ultimatum game experiment, the responder is allowed to pre-commit to a minimum acceptable offer (MAO) before an offer is proposed. Meanwhile, they choose the credibility of the commitment, measured by a cost of backing down (CBD) incurred if the responder accepts an offer lower than the MAO. We find that nearly 40% of responders chose a CBD substantially lower than their MAO, despite the fact that proposers were more likely to cave in and offer a larger share of the bargaining surplus when fully credible commitments were made. Informing responders of the proposers' minimum acceptable share of the bargaining surplus does not reduce partially credible commitments, suggesting that these commitments were unlikely made to enlarge the contract zone. Further treatments and analyses suggest that other-regarding preferences may be the reason behind partially credible commitments.

We develop a conflict model but rather than output being subject to appropriation, one of the inputs to production is partially insecure. We find that how a player responds to an increase in the secure portion of its resource depends on the returns to scale in production. With increasing (decreasing) returns to scale, an increase in the secure portion of the resource will increase (decrease) that player’s effort to contest the resource. We also show that with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale the player controlling more of the secure resource exerts higher (lower) equilibrium effort in the contest for the unsecure resource. For constant returns to scale, players’ efforts remain unaffected by the amount of secured resources controlled. Our findings imply that territorial expansions by large actors will be more likely observed within the context of production technologies subject to increasing returns to scale (e.g. oil extraction). With decreasing returns to scale (e.g. alluvial diamonds, agricultural land), we predict more intense conflict by small actors.

As cardiovascular diseases (CVD) become the leading cause of death in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), this raises new challenges for health systems. Regular screening is a key measure to manage CVD risk, but the uptake of such services remains low. We conducted a randomized controlled trial in Indonesia to assess whether personalized and targeted text messages increase the usage of public screening services for diabetes and hypertension in the at-risk population. Our intervention increased screening uptake by 6.6 percentage points. We show that text messages can be effective in the context of a relatively new disease burden in LMICs, where population responses may still be shaped by low salience and missing screening routines.

In this study, we explore economic consequences of the absence of a political leader utilizing China's political system characterized by interlocked movements of personnel and a sophisticated procedure of selection and appointment before a local leader takes office. Using data during 2009–2018, we find that the absence of a leader weakens economic growth during the absence period, but local economic growth is stronger during the new leader's tenure. We propose two potential mechanisms, compensation effect and selection effect, and find evidence supporting the latter. These results imply that political selection process is worthwhile even if it harms the economy in the short run.