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Different defaults affect different groups differently
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106876
Jochem de Bresser, Marike Knoef
We analyze heterogeneity in default effects on retirement saving in a randomized survey experiment. In the Dutch context of universal, mandatory, and high pensions, respondents make realistic choices in which they can maintain the status-quo, suspend, or double pension contributions for one, three, or five years. The aggregate effect sizes of defaults at a three-year suspension and doubling of contributions are similar, increasing the fraction choosing these options by 22%-points. The former most strongly affects those with low incomes and high pension entitlements, while the latter affects patient, non-procrastinating, and especially impulsive individuals. Average savings are influenced in different directions, depending on the alternatives that individuals would have chosen in absence of the default. When setting defaults, it is important to consider variation in counterfactuals.
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引用次数: 0
Authority and screening in a principal agent model
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106862
Christoph Luelfesmann
I compare authority structures in a principal agent screening model where the agent’s type determines his payoff and his preferred activity level. The uninformed principal incurs an externality and she is able to propose a revelation mechanism with contingent transfers. Under ‘principal authority’ (the agent needs the principal’s agreement for his activity), the optimal mechanism is a standard screening contract and activities are downwards distorted. Under ‘agent authority’ (the agent can pursue the activity at his own discretion), reservation utilities become type dependent and the sign of the payoff externality shapes contractual outcomes. Specifically, (1) negative externalities (the principal prefers a smaller activity than her agent) now trigger upwards distortions; (2) a subset of agents is being ‘left alone’ under the mechanism; and (3) agent authority is always associated with larger activities than principal authority. Finally, I show that under simple symmetry assumptions, agent authority always generates a higher total surplus than principal authority.
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引用次数: 0
Shifting social norms through endorsements
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903
Andrea Gallice , Edoardo Grillo
The attitude of individuals towards prevailing social norms can change over time. When these changes are not observable, norm abidance can remain high due to social costs. We study how an opinion leader with private information about the societal change can influence norm abidance. We show that the opinion leader can affect abidance when she is neither too ideologically sided in favor of the norm violation nor too popularity concerned. The opinion leader has a stronger impact on society when social costs are higher, the societal change is more uncertain, and citizens interact more often with like-minded individuals.
{"title":"Shifting social norms through endorsements","authors":"Andrea Gallice ,&nbsp;Edoardo Grillo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The attitude of individuals towards prevailing social norms can change over time. When these changes are not observable, norm abidance can remain high due to social costs. We study how an opinion leader with private information about the societal change can influence norm abidance. We show that the opinion leader can affect abidance when she is neither too ideologically sided in favor of the norm violation nor too popularity concerned. The opinion leader has a stronger impact on society when social costs are higher, the societal change is more uncertain, and citizens interact more often with like-minded individuals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106903"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to JEBO special issue on wars, economic sanctions, economic behaviors, and institutions
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106860
Luu Duc Toan Huynh , Steven Ongena
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引用次数: 0
The impact of search frictions in experimental asset markets: Over-the-counter versus double auction
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829
Shuze Ding , Dong Lu , Daniela Puzzello
This paper compares the performance of a centralized trading institution, Double Auction (DA), with a decentralized Over-the-Counter (OTC) trading institution in experimental asset markets. Variants of both are commonly used in field financial markets. While bids and asks are publicly displayed in the DA, they are only visible to the parties involved in a trade in the OTC market due to search frictions. We study the impact of these trading institutions on transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume, and bubble measures in controlled laboratory long-lived asset markets. We find that transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume and some bubble measures are significantly lower in OTC than in DA markets, due to reduced trading activities and stronger selling pressures brought about by search frictions.
{"title":"The impact of search frictions in experimental asset markets: Over-the-counter versus double auction","authors":"Shuze Ding ,&nbsp;Dong Lu ,&nbsp;Daniela Puzzello","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper compares the performance of a centralized trading institution, Double Auction (DA), with a decentralized Over-the-Counter (OTC) trading institution in experimental asset markets. Variants of both are commonly used in field financial markets. While bids and asks are <em>publicly</em> displayed in the DA, they are only visible to the parties involved in a trade in the OTC market due to search frictions. We study the impact of these trading institutions on transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume, and bubble measures in controlled laboratory long-lived asset markets. We find that transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume and some bubble measures are significantly lower in OTC than in DA markets, due to reduced trading activities and stronger selling pressures brought about by search frictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106829"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Investigative journalism: Market failures and government intervention through public broadcasters
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870
Ole-Andreas Elvik Næss
Investigative journalism plays a vital role in promoting democratic accountability and transparency. This paper surveys nearly 5,000 participants from the U.S., the U.K., and Norway, demonstrating that investigative journalism functions as a public good prone to underprovision. I explore how governments can address this potential market failure through the intervention of public broadcasters. A majority of participants are willing to pay higher taxes to support increased journalism through public broadcasters. However, in countries with well-established public broadcasters, subsidies to private media are preferred, largely due to perceived political non-neutrality. Public broadcasters may garner broader support by focusing their journalism on non-political contexts. A Coasian approach proves ineffective, as the willingness to pay rises with the broader sharing of output.
{"title":"Investigative journalism: Market failures and government intervention through public broadcasters","authors":"Ole-Andreas Elvik Næss","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Investigative journalism plays a vital role in promoting democratic accountability and transparency. This paper surveys nearly 5,000 participants from the U.S., the U.K., and Norway, demonstrating that investigative journalism functions as a public good prone to underprovision. I explore how governments can address this potential market failure through the intervention of public broadcasters. A majority of participants are willing to pay higher taxes to support increased journalism through public broadcasters. However, in countries with well-established public broadcasters, subsidies to private media are preferred, largely due to perceived political non-neutrality. Public broadcasters may garner broader support by focusing their journalism on non-political contexts. A Coasian approach proves ineffective, as the willingness to pay rises with the broader sharing of output.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106870"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opinion dynamics meet agent-based climate economics: An integrated analysis of carbon taxation
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106816
Teresa Lackner , Luca E. Fierro , Patrick Mellacher
We introduce an integrated approach, blending Opinion Dynamics with a Macroeconomic Agent-Based Model (OD-MABM) to explore the co-evolution of climate change mitigation policy and public support. The OD-MABM links a novel opinion dynamics model that is calibrated for European countries using survey data to the Dystopian Schumpeter meeting Keynes model (DSK). Opinion dynamics regarding climate policy arise from complex interactions among social, political, economic and climate systems where a household’s opinion is affected by individual economic conditions, perception of climate change, industry-led (dis-)information and social influence. We examine 133 policy pathways in the EU, integrating various carbon tax schemes and revenue recycling mechanisms. Our findings reveal that effective carbon tax policies initially lead to a decline in public support due to substantial macroeconomic transition costs, threatening political feasibility. However, they also pave the way for a positive social tipping point in the future. This shift stems from the evolving economic and political influence associated with the fossil fuel-based industry, which gradually diminishes as the transition unfolds. Second, hybrid revenue recycling strategies that combine green subsidies with climate dividends successfully address this intertemporal trade-off in our model by accelerating the transition and mitigating its economic fallout, thus broadening public support.
{"title":"Opinion dynamics meet agent-based climate economics: An integrated analysis of carbon taxation","authors":"Teresa Lackner ,&nbsp;Luca E. Fierro ,&nbsp;Patrick Mellacher","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106816","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106816","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce an integrated approach, blending Opinion Dynamics with a Macroeconomic Agent-Based Model (OD-MABM) to explore the co-evolution of climate change mitigation policy and public support. The OD-MABM links a novel opinion dynamics model that is calibrated for European countries using survey data to the Dystopian Schumpeter meeting Keynes model (DSK). Opinion dynamics regarding climate policy arise from complex interactions among social, political, economic and climate systems where a household’s opinion is affected by individual economic conditions, perception of climate change, industry-led (dis-)information and social influence. We examine 133 policy pathways in the EU, integrating various carbon tax schemes and revenue recycling mechanisms. Our findings reveal that effective carbon tax policies initially lead to a decline in public support due to substantial macroeconomic transition costs, threatening political feasibility. However, they also pave the way for a positive social tipping point in the future. This shift stems from the evolving economic and political influence associated with the fossil fuel-based industry, which gradually diminishes as the transition unfolds. Second, hybrid revenue recycling strategies that combine green subsidies with climate dividends successfully address this intertemporal trade-off in our model by accelerating the transition and mitigating its economic fallout, thus broadening public support.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106816"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of prudential regulation on the UK housing market and economy: Insights from an agent-based model
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106839
Marco Bardoscia , Adrian Carro , Marc Hinterschweiger , Mauro Napoletano , Lilit Popoyan , Andrea Roventini , Arzu Uluc
We develop a macroeconomic agent-based model to study the joint impact of borrower- and lender-based prudential policies on the housing and credit markets and the economy more widely. We perform three experiments: (i) an increase of total capital requirements; (ii) an introduction of a loan-to-income (LTI) cap on mortgages to owner–occupiers; and (iii) a joint introduction of both experiments at the same time. Our results suggest that tightening capital requirements leads to a sharp decrease in commercial and mortgage lending, and housing transactions. When the LTI cap is in place, house prices fall sharply relative to income, and the homeownership rate decreases. When both policy instruments are combined, we find that housing transactions and prices drop. Both policies have a positive impact on real GDP and unemployment, while there is no material impact on inflation and the real interest rate.
{"title":"The impact of prudential regulation on the UK housing market and economy: Insights from an agent-based model","authors":"Marco Bardoscia ,&nbsp;Adrian Carro ,&nbsp;Marc Hinterschweiger ,&nbsp;Mauro Napoletano ,&nbsp;Lilit Popoyan ,&nbsp;Andrea Roventini ,&nbsp;Arzu Uluc","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106839","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106839","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a macroeconomic agent-based model to study the joint impact of borrower- and lender-based prudential policies on the housing and credit markets and the economy more widely. We perform three experiments: <em>(i)</em> an increase of total capital requirements; <em>(ii)</em> an introduction of a loan-to-income (LTI) cap on mortgages to owner–occupiers; and <em>(iii)</em> a joint introduction of both experiments at the same time. Our results suggest that tightening capital requirements leads to a sharp decrease in commercial and mortgage lending, and housing transactions. When the LTI cap is in place, house prices fall sharply relative to income, and the homeownership rate decreases. When both policy instruments are combined, we find that housing transactions and prices drop. Both policies have a positive impact on real GDP and unemployment, while there is no material impact on inflation and the real interest rate.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106839"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The cost of the COVID-19 crisis: Lockdowns, macroeconomic expectations, and consumer spending
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106846
Olivier Coibion , Yuriy Gorodnichenko , Michael Weber
We study how the differential timing of local lockdowns due to COVID-19 causally affects households’ spending and macroeconomic expectations at the local level using several waves of a customized survey with more than 10,000 respondents. About 50 % of survey participants reported income and wealth losses due to the corona virus, with the average losses being $5,293 and $33,482 respectively. Aggregate consumer spending dropped by 31 log percentage points with the largest drops in travel and clothing. We find that households living in counties that went into lockdown earlier expected the unemployment rate over the next twelve months to be 13 percentage points higher and continued to expect higher unemployment at horizons of three to five years. They also expected lower future inflation, reported higher uncertainty, expected lower mortgage rates for up to 10 years, and had moved out of foreign stocks into liquid forms of savings. The imposition of lockdowns can account for much of the decline in employment during the crisis as well as declines in consumer spending. While lockdowns had pronounced effects on local economic conditions and households’ expectations, they had little impact on approval ratings of Congress, the Fed, or the Treasury but led to declines in the approval of the President.
{"title":"The cost of the COVID-19 crisis: Lockdowns, macroeconomic expectations, and consumer spending","authors":"Olivier Coibion ,&nbsp;Yuriy Gorodnichenko ,&nbsp;Michael Weber","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106846","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106846","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how the differential timing of local lockdowns due to COVID-19 causally affects households’ spending and macroeconomic expectations at the local level using several waves of a customized survey with more than 10,000 respondents. About 50 % of survey participants reported income and wealth losses due to the corona virus, with the average losses being $5,293 and $33,482 respectively. Aggregate consumer spending dropped by 31 log percentage points with the largest drops in travel and clothing. We find that households living in counties that went into lockdown earlier expected the unemployment rate over the next twelve months to be 13 percentage points higher and continued to expect higher unemployment at horizons of three to five years. They also expected lower future inflation, reported higher uncertainty, expected lower mortgage rates for up to 10 years, and had moved out of foreign stocks into liquid forms of savings. The imposition of lockdowns can account for much of the decline in employment during the crisis as well as declines in consumer spending. While lockdowns had pronounced effects on local economic conditions and households’ expectations, they had little impact on approval ratings of Congress, the Fed, or the Treasury but led to declines in the approval of the President.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106846"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trading off autonomy and efficiency in choice architectures: Self-nudging versus social nudging
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859
Johannes Diederich , Timo Goeschl , Israel Waichman
To overcome ethical objections to choice architecture interventions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest asking individuals to set their own nudge autonomously. Our online experiment (n=1080) faithfully implements this idea for social dilemmas where individual and collective interests often diverge and social nudges can conflict with autonomy. General-population subjects play a ten-round, ten-day public goods game. Non-participation triggers default contributions. We test three default nudges: An exogenous selfish nudge of zero contribution, an exogenous social nudge of full contribution, and an autonomous self-nudge where subjects select their own default contribution. Their performance is tested under four different information structures. We, first, document default choice under autonomy: Only between three and eight percent of subjects set their own default to either zero or full contribution. Second, autonomy and efficiency conflict: Group-level contributions under self-nudging are consistently lower than under the social nudge, which strictly dominates the selfish nudge. When committed to autonomy, the policy-maker – to maximize efficiency – best combines self-nudging with an information structure with public defaults.
{"title":"Trading off autonomy and efficiency in choice architectures: Self-nudging versus social nudging","authors":"Johannes Diederich ,&nbsp;Timo Goeschl ,&nbsp;Israel Waichman","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To overcome ethical objections to choice architecture interventions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest asking individuals to set their own nudge autonomously. Our online experiment (n=1080) faithfully implements this idea for social dilemmas where individual and collective interests often diverge and social nudges can conflict with autonomy. General-population subjects play a ten-round, ten-day public goods game. Non-participation triggers default contributions. We test three default nudges: An exogenous selfish nudge of zero contribution, an exogenous social nudge of full contribution, and an autonomous self-nudge where subjects select their own default contribution. Their performance is tested under four different information structures. We, first, document default choice under autonomy: Only between three and eight percent of subjects set their own default to either zero or full contribution. Second, autonomy and efficiency conflict: Group-level contributions under self-nudging are consistently lower than under the social nudge, which strictly dominates the selfish nudge. When committed to autonomy, the policy-maker – to maximize efficiency – best combines self-nudging with an information structure with public defaults.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106859"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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