Pub Date : 2025-12-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107338
Daniel Wheadon , Gonzalo Castex , George Kudrna , Alan Woodland
We study the macroeconomic and fiscal effects of self-control preferences on household saving, labor supply, and public pension design. Building on the framework of Gul and Pesendorfer, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which agents face temptations over both consumption and leisure. We use this model to analyze how varying degrees of self-control costs interact with key pension parameters: the taper rate (means testing), the maximum pension benefit, and the eligibility age. We find that stronger self-control preferences increase reliance on public pensions, amplifying fiscal pressure and altering labor supply patterns, particularly among older workers. Means testing can partially mitigate these effects by encouraging private saving and later retirement but involves trade-offs in taxation and welfare. By incorporating self-control preferences into a macroeconomic framework, we highlight how behavioral biases can influence the performance and fiscal impact of alternative pension policies.
{"title":"Self-Control preferences and public pension analysis","authors":"Daniel Wheadon , Gonzalo Castex , George Kudrna , Alan Woodland","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107338","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107338","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the macroeconomic and fiscal effects of self-control preferences on household saving, labor supply, and public pension design. Building on the framework of Gul and Pesendorfer, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which agents face temptations over both consumption and leisure. We use this model to analyze how varying degrees of self-control costs interact with key pension parameters: the taper rate (means testing), the maximum pension benefit, and the eligibility age. We find that stronger self-control preferences increase reliance on public pensions, amplifying fiscal pressure and altering labor supply patterns, particularly among older workers. Means testing can partially mitigate these effects by encouraging private saving and later retirement but involves trade-offs in taxation and welfare. By incorporating self-control preferences into a macroeconomic framework, we highlight how behavioral biases can influence the performance and fiscal impact of alternative pension policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107338"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363
Nurun Naher Moni , Muhammad Habibur Rahman , Ruhul Salim
Do earthquakes affect parents’ preferences for raising responsible children? By merging data on random variations in the frequency and timing of earthquakes with five waves of the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2022 at the district level across 90 countries, our event-specific difference-in-differences estimates reveal that parents affected by moderate earthquakes increase their preference for responsible children by 5.9 percentage points due to perceived risks. We argue that moderate shocks heighten risk perceptions without depleting parental capacity, whereas strong earthquakes dampen this effect by reducing the capacity required to instill responsibility. Our empirical evidence suggests that governments should embed child-centred disaster risk reduction frameworks within post-disaster recovery strategies to enhance long-term disaster resilience.
{"title":"Earthquakes and the intergenerational delegation of responsibility","authors":"Nurun Naher Moni , Muhammad Habibur Rahman , Ruhul Salim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do earthquakes affect parents’ preferences for raising responsible children? By merging data on random variations in the frequency and timing of earthquakes with five waves of the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2022 at the district level across 90 countries, our event-specific difference-in-differences estimates reveal that parents affected by moderate earthquakes increase their preference for responsible children by 5.9 percentage points due to perceived risks. We argue that moderate shocks heighten risk perceptions without depleting parental capacity, whereas strong earthquakes dampen this effect by reducing the capacity required to instill responsibility. Our empirical evidence suggests that governments should embed child-centred disaster risk reduction frameworks within post-disaster recovery strategies to enhance long-term disaster resilience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107363"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107368
Kai Barron , Mette Trier Damgaard , Christina Gravert
Reminders are widely used in public policy to promote beneficial behaviors, but little is known about how individuals value them. We conduct a field experiment with over 4,000 pregnant women in South Africa, delivered via the national mobile health platform, to assess how different reminder types—purely attentional, informational, and morally persuasive—affect both adherence to iron supplementation and willingness to pay (WTP) for future reminders. Despite high self-reported adherence, demand for reminders is substantial: over 80% choose additional reminders when free, and many are willing to pay to receive them. Exposure to reminders increases both adherence and WTP. However, reminders that include additional health information significantly reduce both outcomes relative to simple reminders, showing that even well-intended information can have unintended consequences. Our results can help inform the design of public health communications.
{"title":"Nudge Me! A field experiment on reminders for medication adherence","authors":"Kai Barron , Mette Trier Damgaard , Christina Gravert","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107368","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107368","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Reminders are widely used in public policy to promote beneficial behaviors, but little is known about how individuals value them. We conduct a field experiment with over 4,000 pregnant women in South Africa, delivered via the national mobile health platform, to assess how different reminder types—purely attentional, informational, and morally persuasive—affect both adherence to iron supplementation and willingness to pay (WTP) for future reminders. Despite high self-reported adherence, demand for reminders is substantial: over 80% choose additional reminders when free, and many are willing to pay to receive them. Exposure to reminders increases both adherence and WTP. However, reminders that include additional health information significantly reduce both outcomes relative to simple reminders, showing that even well-intended information can have unintended consequences. Our results can help inform the design of public health communications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107368"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378
Bryan Cheang , Mark Pennington
Proponents of “new industrial policy” claim that systemic directionality can be imparted to market economies in ways recognising the epistemic challenges of complexity and uncertainty. This paper evaluates these efforts to reformulate industrial policy on a more epistemically modest, evolutionary footing and argues that they fail. We contend that the focus on “systemic directionality” undercuts the emphasis placed on evolutionary learning and the epistemic limitations of centralised authority. Proper attention to these problems implies neither a laissez-faire/market fundamentalist position nor one that favours “systemic directionality.” Rather, it points towards a largely directionless environment where market-state entanglements arise through a polycentric evolutionism at multiple different scales.
{"title":"Markets and New Industrial Policy: Systemic directionality or polycentric evolutionism?","authors":"Bryan Cheang , Mark Pennington","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Proponents of “new industrial policy” claim that systemic directionality can be imparted to market economies in ways recognising the epistemic challenges of complexity and uncertainty. This paper evaluates these efforts to reformulate industrial policy on a more epistemically modest, evolutionary footing and argues that they fail. We contend that the focus on “systemic directionality” undercuts the emphasis placed on evolutionary learning and the epistemic limitations of centralised authority. Proper attention to these problems implies <em>neither</em> a laissez-faire/market fundamentalist position <em>nor</em> one that favours “systemic directionality.” Rather, it points towards a largely directionless environment where market-state entanglements arise through a polycentric evolutionism at multiple different scales.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107378"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329
Nils Brouwer , Jakob De Haan
We conducted a survey of Dutch households to examine public knowledge of central bank independence. The results suggest that the public knows little about the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). For instance, many respondents believe the ECB is influenced by the European Commission, EU governments, or financial institutions. Using a randomized controlled trial, we analyzed whether information about the ECB’s independence affects trust in the central bank and inflation expectations. Our experiment revealed that providing this information increased trust in the central bank, particularly among older individuals, individuals knowledgeable about central banks, and individuals who trusted the European Commission less. However, our results also suggest that providing this information does not affect inflation expectations.
{"title":"The impact of public knowledge about central bank independence on trust and inflation expectations","authors":"Nils Brouwer , Jakob De Haan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conducted a survey of Dutch households to examine public knowledge of central bank independence. The results suggest that the public knows little about the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). For instance, many respondents believe the ECB is influenced by the European Commission, EU governments, or financial institutions. Using a randomized controlled trial, we analyzed whether information about the ECB’s independence affects trust in the central bank and inflation expectations. Our experiment revealed that providing this information increased trust in the central bank, particularly among older individuals, individuals knowledgeable about central banks, and individuals who trusted the European Commission less. However, our results also suggest that providing this information does not affect inflation expectations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107329"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366
Jafar M. Olimov
This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.
{"title":"Bribery, secrecy, and communication: theory and evidence from firms","authors":"Jafar M. Olimov","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107366"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352
George Beknazar-Yuzbashev , Sota Ichiba , Mateusz Stalinski
Despite being often discussed both in practice and academic circles, the sunk cost effect remains empirically elusive. Our model based on reference point dependence suggests that the traditional way of testing it—by assigning discounts—may not produce the desired effect. Motivated by this, we evaluate it across the gain-loss divide in two pre-registered experiments. In an online study with N = 1,806, we randomize the price (low, medium, or high) of a ticket to enter a real-effort task, and observe its effect on play time. Our intervention, which varies the sunk cost by $2 for a 14-minute task, results in a moderate sunk cost effect (0.12 SD or 1.3 min). We further explore the economic applications of the effect in a field experiment on YouTube with N = 11,328 videos in which we randomize whether the time until a pre-video ad becomes skippable is shortened (0 s), default (5 s), or extended (10 s). The intervention has an overall insignificant effect on video engagement. This is driven by a sizable negative effect on the extensive margin, a channel which is not present in the online study. Specifically, more users leave before the video starts in the extended treatment (5.2 pp or 28 % more relative to the shortened treatment). Taking the results of both studies together, we offer evidence of the sunk cost effect in a controlled environment, but its application in policy settings may prove challenging.
{"title":"To the depths of the sunk cost: Experiments revisiting the elusive effect","authors":"George Beknazar-Yuzbashev , Sota Ichiba , Mateusz Stalinski","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107352","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite being often discussed both in practice and academic circles, the sunk cost effect remains empirically elusive. Our model based on reference point dependence suggests that the traditional way of testing it—by assigning discounts—may not produce the desired effect. Motivated by this, we evaluate it across the gain-loss divide in two pre-registered experiments. In an online study with N = 1,806, we randomize the price (low, medium, or high) of a ticket to enter a real-effort task, and observe its effect on play time. Our intervention, which varies the sunk cost by $2 for a 14-minute task, results in a moderate sunk cost effect (0.12 SD or 1.3 min). We further explore the economic applications of the effect in a field experiment on YouTube with N = 11,328 videos in which we randomize whether the time until a pre-video ad becomes skippable is shortened (0 s), default (5 s), or extended (10 s). The intervention has an overall insignificant effect on video engagement. This is driven by a sizable negative effect on the extensive margin, a channel which is not present in the online study. Specifically, more users leave before the video starts in the extended treatment (5.2 pp or 28 % more relative to the shortened treatment). Taking the results of both studies together, we offer evidence of the sunk cost effect in a controlled environment, but its application in policy settings may prove challenging.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107352"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145685009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364
Derek J. Clark , Tapas Kundu , Tore Nilssen
In a contest, rivals compete for a prize by making irretrievable outlays. Commonly, researchers assume that contestants spontaneously start to compete at some designated time. In practice, however, preparation is an important part of the actual contest, where rivals may undertake actions in order to improve their chance of winning the prize. We model this as a two-player all-pay auction under complete information in which rivals can make an investment to try to get a head start before the contest is played. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which the player with the high prize valuation invests and the opponent does not. A pure-strategy equilibrium can also exist in which it is the player with the low prize valuation that makes the investment. The investment opportunity allows the rivals to move some of the competition to the investment stage, reducing the intensity of fighting in the contest. An important feature of our model is that investment does not necessarily preclude fighting in the contest. We show when investment leads to active participation in the contest, and when it leads a rival to simply capitulate. This is an important distinction, especially if the overall aim is to minimize contest effort, such as in armed conflicts.
{"title":"Investing to get a head start in contests","authors":"Derek J. Clark , Tapas Kundu , Tore Nilssen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a contest, rivals compete for a prize by making irretrievable outlays. Commonly, researchers assume that contestants spontaneously start to compete at some designated time. In practice, however, preparation is an important part of the actual contest, where rivals may undertake actions in order to improve their chance of winning the prize. We model this as a two-player all-pay auction under complete information in which rivals can make an investment to try to get a head start before the contest is played. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which the player with the high prize valuation invests and the opponent does not. A pure-strategy equilibrium can also exist in which it is the player with the low prize valuation that makes the investment. The investment opportunity allows the rivals to move some of the competition to the investment stage, reducing the intensity of fighting in the contest. An important feature of our model is that investment does not necessarily preclude fighting in the contest. We show when investment leads to active participation in the contest, and when it leads a rival to simply capitulate. This is an important distinction, especially if the overall aim is to minimize contest effort, such as in armed conflicts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107364"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145685010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367
Ville Korpela , Michele Lombardi , Julius Zachariassen
Behavioral implementation studies the social choice rules that a planner can implement when individuals’ choice behavior need not be rational. Existing results cannot determine which social choice rules are behaviorally implementable when individuals’ choices exhibit significant choice anomalies such as decoy effect, choice overload, and compromise effect. We improve the situation by fully identifying the class of social choice rules behaviorally implementable by individual-based rights structures. In this framework, the planner designs an individual-based rights structure, which specifies rights of individuals to change the status-quo outcome of the society. It turns out that the key to a full characterization is to understand which condition should replace unanimity when individuals’ choices are non-rational.
{"title":"Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization","authors":"Ville Korpela , Michele Lombardi , Julius Zachariassen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Behavioral implementation studies the social choice rules that a planner can implement when individuals’ choice behavior need not be rational. Existing results cannot determine which social choice rules are behaviorally implementable when individuals’ choices exhibit significant choice anomalies such as decoy effect, choice overload, and compromise effect. We improve the situation by fully identifying the class of social choice rules behaviorally implementable by individual-based rights structures. In this framework, the planner designs an individual-based rights structure, which specifies rights of individuals to change the status-quo outcome of the society. It turns out that the key to a full characterization is to understand which condition should replace unanimity when individuals’ choices are non-rational.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107367"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107361
Elif E. Demiral , Brianna Halladay
Persistent gender gaps in economic outcomes and leadership representation remain a major challenge. One contributing factor is the lower propensity of women to enter competitive environments, a behavioral difference shown to impact career advancement and earnings. In this study, we examine whether introducing flexibility in compensation decisions—specifically, the ability to revise one’s choice between piece rate and tournament after task completion—can reduce gender differences in willingness to compete. We experimentally vary both the availability and timing of this flexibility: some participants learn ex-ante that they may revise their choice, while others are surprised ex-post. Our results show that surprise flexibility can impact the gender gap in tournament entry, helping slightly more women to switch into competition after task completion. In contrast, when participants are informed in advance, the gender gap slightly widens, as men respond more assertively to the competitive option. These findings highlight how the structure and timing of choice flexibility can shape competitive behavior.
{"title":"Choice flexibility and decision to compete","authors":"Elif E. Demiral , Brianna Halladay","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107361","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107361","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Persistent gender gaps in economic outcomes and leadership representation remain a major challenge. One contributing factor is the lower propensity of women to enter competitive environments, a behavioral difference shown to impact career advancement and earnings. In this study, we examine whether introducing <em>flexibility</em> in compensation decisions—specifically, the ability to revise one’s choice between piece rate and tournament after task completion—can reduce gender differences in willingness to compete. We experimentally vary both the availability and <em>timing</em> of this flexibility: some participants learn ex-ante that they may revise their choice, while others are surprised ex-post. Our results show that surprise flexibility can impact the gender gap in tournament entry, helping slightly more women to switch into competition after task completion. In contrast, when participants are informed in advance, the gender gap slightly widens, as men respond more assertively to the competitive option. These findings highlight how the structure and timing of choice flexibility can shape competitive behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107361"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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