How does exposure to Islamist terrorism change perceptions about Muslims and immigrants? We conducted a large-scale survey that measures misperceptions towards minority groups in four European countries. Our results show that terror attacks in the past increased misperceptions of the share of Muslims and immigrants. We also contend that this increase in misperceptions is particularly large and significant for lower-educated respondents and people from regions with a low share of the foreign population. Given that misperceptions are higher on average in regions with a large share of foreigners, terror attacks make misperceptions across different regions converge.
{"title":"Terrorism and misperceptions: Evidence from Europe","authors":"K. Peren Arin , Umair Khalil , Deni Mazrekaj , Marcel Thum","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107408","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107408","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How does exposure to Islamist terrorism change perceptions about Muslims and immigrants? We conducted a large-scale survey that measures misperceptions towards minority groups in four European countries. Our results show that terror attacks in the past increased misperceptions of the share of Muslims and immigrants. We also contend that this increase in misperceptions is particularly large and significant for lower-educated respondents and people from regions with a low share of the foreign population. Given that misperceptions are higher on average in regions with a large share of foreigners, terror attacks make misperceptions across different regions converge.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107408"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420
Federico Vaccari
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver in binary decision-making problems. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by resolving information asymmetries without incurring these costs—i.e., by attaining the complete-information outcome. Only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and sequential structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations seeking to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
{"title":"Efficient communication in organizations","authors":"Federico Vaccari","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107420","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver in binary decision-making problems. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by resolving information asymmetries without incurring these costs—i.e., by attaining the complete-information outcome. Only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and sequential structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations seeking to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107420"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413
Lu Dong , Lingbo Huang
Preventive war arises from fears of future power shifts threatening the status quo. However, critics argue that since power shifts can be influenced by states’ strategic decisions, preventive war can always be avoided. Using a lab experiment and a representative survey, this paper investigates how states’ endogenous decisions affect the likelihood of conflict. We focus on two strategies: a containment policy, where rising states halt their own growth to prevent a power shift, and a commitment policy, where they make binding future offers without altering the power shift trajectory. Our findings show that while both policies reduce the likelihood of preventive war, containment is much less preferred than commitment. Additionally, declining states often resort to costly coercive containment measures rather than trusting the self-containment of rising states. In the representative survey, we pose conceptually similar questions to understand broader public opinions regarding international politics and find patterns that are consistent with the experimental results.
{"title":"Curtailed ambition: Endogenous power shift and preventive war","authors":"Lu Dong , Lingbo Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Preventive war arises from fears of future power shifts threatening the status quo. However, critics argue that since power shifts can be influenced by states’ strategic decisions, preventive war can always be avoided. Using a lab experiment and a representative survey, this paper investigates how states’ endogenous decisions affect the likelihood of conflict. We focus on two strategies: a containment policy, where rising states halt their own growth to prevent a power shift, and a commitment policy, where they make binding future offers without altering the power shift trajectory. Our findings show that while both policies reduce the likelihood of preventive war, containment is much less preferred than commitment. Additionally, declining states often resort to costly coercive containment measures rather than trusting the self-containment of rising states. In the representative survey, we pose conceptually similar questions to understand broader public opinions regarding international politics and find patterns that are consistent with the experimental results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107413"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418
Nicole Black , Danusha Jayawardana , Gawain Heckley
Recent research shows that birth order affects human capital outcomes, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the underlying mechanisms. This study examines the effect of birth order on children’s time use across activities that are important for human capital development. Using detailed time-use diaries of Australian children aged 2–15, we find that within families with two or three children, later-born children spend less time on enrichment activities and more on digital media, compared to first-born children. We obtain the same findings when we repeat the analysis using detailed time-use diaries of US children. Further investigation reveals that part of the birth order effect is driven by parents spending less time with later-born children compared to first-borns. However, later-borns also independently devote less of their own time to enrichment activities, suggesting that personal time use may be an important mechanism behind the well-documented impact of birth order on human capital development. We find evidence that later-born children experience more lenient parenting, which may help explain this pattern of own time use.
{"title":"The effect of birth order on children’s time use","authors":"Nicole Black , Danusha Jayawardana , Gawain Heckley","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107418","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent research shows that birth order affects human capital outcomes, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the underlying mechanisms. This study examines the effect of birth order on children’s time use across activities that are important for human capital development. Using detailed time-use diaries of Australian children aged 2–15, we find that within families with two or three children, later-born children spend less time on enrichment activities and more on digital media, compared to first-born children. We obtain the same findings when we repeat the analysis using detailed time-use diaries of US children. Further investigation reveals that part of the birth order effect is driven by parents spending less time with later-born children compared to first-borns. However, later-borns also independently devote less of their <em>own</em> time to enrichment activities, suggesting that personal time use may be an important mechanism behind the well-documented impact of birth order on human capital development. We find evidence that later-born children experience more lenient parenting, which may help explain this pattern of own time use.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107418"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145980238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416
Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli
We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.
{"title":"Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters?","authors":"Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107416"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403
Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra
Sellers in real-estate markets, on internet platforms, in auction houses, and so forth, routinely make non-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication affects trade between buyers and sellers. For bilateral trade, the literature has identified efficiency, anchoring, and granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with competition, although some become weaker. Our main findings are the following: (i) The ability of sellers to make non-binding price requests has a positive effect on efficiency in that it helps trading partners close marginal deals both in bilateral bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition weakens the anchoring effect of the level of the price request; (iii) Sellers communicating more granular price requests attract more granular buyer bids; (iv) The granularity of the seller’s price request does not impact the selling price.
{"title":"Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk","authors":"Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sellers in real-estate markets, on internet platforms, in auction houses, and so forth, routinely make non-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication affects trade between buyers and sellers. For bilateral trade, the literature has identified efficiency, anchoring, and granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with competition, although some become weaker. Our main findings are the following: (i) The ability of sellers to make non-binding price requests has a positive effect on efficiency in that it helps trading partners close marginal deals both in bilateral bargaining and in competition; (ii) Competition weakens the anchoring effect of the level of the price request; (iii) Sellers communicating more granular price requests attract more granular buyer bids; (iv) The granularity of the seller’s price request does not impact the selling price.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107403"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402
Margherita Comola , Marcel Fafchamps
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.
{"title":"Experimental evidence on covert bargaining markets","authors":"Margherita Comola , Marcel Fafchamps","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107402","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107402"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107393
Daniela Flörchinger
While there is abundant empirical evidence of individuals switching between selfish and prosocial behavior, few economic models formalize these findings. This paper presents a novel model that jointly analyzes three key concepts for understanding prosocial behavior: moral balancing, self-signaling, and motivated reasoning. Individuals maximize material utility under the constraint of maintaining a minimum level of self-image (moral balancing), where self-image depends on signals extracted from past behavior (self-signaling). The processing of these signals is biased toward arriving at a positive self-image (motivated reasoning). The time horizon for which the self-image constraint is active depends on individuals’ intrinsic motivation and their awareness of self-image relevant choices. Selfish behavior tends to be higher when the constraint is only active in the long term and it increases with the tendency toward motivated reasoning. These results are partially consistent with experimental results. The model suggests that voluntary prosocial behavior is unlikely to be sustained and thus calls for adequate policy measures.
{"title":"A model of moral balancing under motivated reasoning","authors":"Daniela Flörchinger","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107393","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107393","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While there is abundant empirical evidence of individuals switching between selfish and prosocial behavior, few economic models formalize these findings. This paper presents a novel model that jointly analyzes three key concepts for understanding prosocial behavior: moral balancing, self-signaling, and motivated reasoning. Individuals maximize material utility under the constraint of maintaining a minimum level of self-image (moral balancing), where self-image depends on signals extracted from past behavior (self-signaling). The processing of these signals is biased toward arriving at a positive self-image (motivated reasoning). The time horizon for which the self-image constraint is active depends on individuals’ intrinsic motivation and their awareness of self-image relevant choices. Selfish behavior tends to be higher when the constraint is only active in the long term and it increases with the tendency toward motivated reasoning. These results are partially consistent with experimental results. The model suggests that voluntary prosocial behavior is unlikely to be sustained and thus calls for adequate policy measures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107393"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107409
He Huang , Ruipeng Tan , Zhiming Yang
This paper investigates the impact of intergenerational coresidence on household financial outcomes in patriarchal societies. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, we find that coresiding parents significantly increase the likelihood of their biological child assuming household headship, a result that remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Intergenerational coresidence positively affects households’ financial market participation, portfolio diversification, and asset returns. Parents’ consistent support and adherence to traditional gender norms play crucial roles and the effects of intergenerational coresidence is unidirectional. Moreover, we find that a negative shock to community-level gender equality dampens the positive influence of intergenerational coresidence on financial behavior, highlighting the intricate interplay between household structure and financial decision-making. These findings offer valuable insights into how family dynamics and social gender norms shape economic outcomes, with implications for policies aimed at enhancing financial inclusion and intergenerational well-being.
{"title":"Supporters or hinderances? Intergenerational coresidence and household finance under patriarchy","authors":"He Huang , Ruipeng Tan , Zhiming Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107409","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107409","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of intergenerational coresidence on household financial outcomes in patriarchal societies. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, we find that coresiding parents significantly increase the likelihood of their biological child assuming household headship, a result that remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Intergenerational coresidence positively affects households’ financial market participation, portfolio diversification, and asset returns. Parents’ consistent support and adherence to traditional gender norms play crucial roles and the effects of intergenerational coresidence is unidirectional. Moreover, we find that a negative shock to community-level gender equality dampens the positive influence of intergenerational coresidence on financial behavior, highlighting the intricate interplay between household structure and financial decision-making. These findings offer valuable insights into how family dynamics and social gender norms shape economic outcomes, with implications for policies aimed at enhancing financial inclusion and intergenerational well-being.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107409"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400
Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin
Incentivized experiments employ various designs of experimental currency units, yet there is typically little justification for choosing a particular currency framework. We study how different nominal values of experimental currency units affect risky decision-making in investment tasks. Our online experiments find no difference in risk-taking even if conversion rates vary by a factor of 1,000. Hence, we empirically reconfirm the experimental practice used for decades.
{"title":"Experimental currency units in investment tasks","authors":"Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Incentivized experiments employ various designs of experimental currency units, yet there is typically little justification for choosing a particular currency framework. We study how different nominal values of experimental currency units affect risky decision-making in investment tasks. Our online experiments find no difference in risk-taking even if conversion rates vary by a factor of 1,000. Hence, we empirically reconfirm the experimental practice used for decades.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107400"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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