Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107441
Lawrence Choo , Zhen Lei , Wei Tang
We conduct an experiment to examine how karmic reasoning—the belief that good deeds lead to favourable outcomes—affects belief formation in unrelated chance events. We motivate our design by observations from the China Family Panel Studies, which show that respondents who donated in the past 12 months are more likely to make risky choices. To investigate this further, we design a controlled laboratory experiment to evaluate the impact of real charitable donations on subjects’ beliefs about winning an even-chance lottery. Our results reveal that beliefs about winning increase with the amount donated, but this effect is significant only among those who voluntarily donated and more sensitive to karmic beliefs. This study underscores the role of karmic reasoning in shaping beliefs, contributing to the broader understanding of wishful thinking and motivated beliefs.
{"title":"Motivated by karma","authors":"Lawrence Choo , Zhen Lei , Wei Tang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107441","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107441","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct an experiment to examine how karmic reasoning—the belief that good deeds lead to favourable outcomes—affects belief formation in unrelated chance events. We motivate our design by observations from the China Family Panel Studies, which show that respondents who donated in the past 12 months are more likely to make risky choices. To investigate this further, we design a controlled laboratory experiment to evaluate the impact of real charitable donations on subjects’ beliefs about winning an even-chance lottery. Our results reveal that beliefs about winning increase with the amount donated, but this effect is significant only among those who voluntarily donated and more sensitive to karmic beliefs. This study underscores the role of karmic reasoning in shaping beliefs, contributing to the broader understanding of wishful thinking and motivated beliefs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107441"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107434
Stanton Hudja , Daniel Woods , J. Braxton Gately
This paper investigates behavior in environments with forced experimentation. We analyze behavior in novel bandit problems where individuals repeatedly choose between an inconsistent option that may randomly be blocked in any given decision and a consistent option that is always available to be implemented. We analyze two environments with forced experimentation: an “Ex-Ante” environment and an “Ex-Post” environment. In the Ex-Ante environment, an individual knows at the start of a decision whether the inconsistent option can be implemented. In the Ex-Post environment, an individual only observes if the inconsistent option can be implemented by trying to implement it. We conduct an experiment where individuals in these two environments are predicted to choose the inconsistent option more often than the consistent option. Contrary to this prediction, we find evidence that subjects choose the consistent option more often. Structural analysis suggests that this result is driven by subjects who exhibit inertia after being forced into the consistent option and subjects who are averse to choosing an inconsistent option. Our results suggest that subjects may avoid inconsistently available options and that the presence of blocking in bandit problems leads to new behavioral factors to consider.
{"title":"Forced experimentation: An analysis of multi-armed bandits with an inconsistent option","authors":"Stanton Hudja , Daniel Woods , J. Braxton Gately","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates behavior in environments with forced experimentation. We analyze behavior in novel bandit problems where individuals repeatedly choose between an inconsistent option that may randomly be blocked in any given decision and a consistent option that is always available to be implemented. We analyze two environments with forced experimentation: an “Ex-Ante” environment and an “Ex-Post” environment. In the Ex-Ante environment, an individual knows at the start of a decision whether the inconsistent option can be implemented. In the Ex-Post environment, an individual only observes if the inconsistent option can be implemented by trying to implement it. We conduct an experiment where individuals in these two environments are predicted to choose the inconsistent option more often than the consistent option. Contrary to this prediction, we find evidence that subjects choose the consistent option more often. Structural analysis suggests that this result is driven by subjects who exhibit inertia after being forced into the consistent option and subjects who are averse to choosing an inconsistent option. Our results suggest that subjects may avoid inconsistently available options and that the presence of blocking in bandit problems leads to new behavioral factors to consider.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107434"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107365
Karna Basu
“Exponential growth bias” – the tendency to underestimate exponential growth – has been shown to affect how much people save and borrow. I develop a simple theoretical framework to show that this bias, through its interaction with individual risk preferences, also affects how people save and borrow. Relatively risk-tolerant consumers will choose inefficiently safe investments, appearing more risk-averse than they are. In contrast, relatively risk-averse consumers will choose inefficiently risky investments, appearing less risk-averse than they are. I present survey data to support this hypothesis. The model introduces a new perspective on some apparent anomalies in intertemporal choice and raises additional considerations for consumer protection and financial literacy programs.
{"title":"A miscalculated risk: Investment choices under exponential growth bias","authors":"Karna Basu","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107365","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107365","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>“Exponential growth bias” – the tendency to underestimate exponential growth – has been shown to affect how much people save and borrow. I develop a simple theoretical framework to show that this bias, through its interaction with individual risk preferences, also affects <em>how</em> people save and borrow. Relatively risk-tolerant consumers will choose inefficiently safe investments, appearing more risk-averse than they are. In contrast, relatively risk-averse consumers will choose inefficiently risky investments, appearing less risk-averse than they are. I present survey data to support this hypothesis. The model introduces a new perspective on some apparent anomalies in intertemporal choice and raises additional considerations for consumer protection and financial literacy programs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107417
Benito Arruñada , Lucas López-Manuel
We argue that the main Mendicant Orders of the Late Middle Ages—Dominican and Franciscan—were instrumental in shaping key cultural and institutional traits of impersonal exchange by updating both moral codes and religious practice. As one of the three pillars of impersonal exchange—alongside state capacity and merchant institutions—religiously infused moral cognition provides the focus of our analysis. In line with their specializations, we document opposing effects of the two Orders on individualism, impersonal prosociality, and impartial enforcement: positive from exposure to the Dominicans and negative from exposure to the Franciscans. These effects stem from deep moral changes tied to the emotions of guilt, shame, and compassion, with knowledge and education accounting for historical persistence. We assess these differences across multiple datasets, analytical levels, and historical contexts—always focusing on the differential effects of the two Orders. Our findings invite a reassessment of the Church’s role in cultural and institutional development and underscore the divergent effects of its branches and doctrines.
{"title":"Mendicant orders and the foundations of impersonal exchange","authors":"Benito Arruñada , Lucas López-Manuel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107417","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107417","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We argue that the main Mendicant Orders of the Late Middle Ages—Dominican and Franciscan—were instrumental in shaping key cultural and institutional traits of impersonal exchange by updating both moral codes and religious practice. As one of the three pillars of impersonal exchange—alongside state capacity and merchant institutions—religiously infused moral cognition provides the focus of our analysis. In line with their specializations, we document opposing effects of the two Orders on individualism, impersonal prosociality, and impartial enforcement: positive from exposure to the Dominicans and negative from exposure to the Franciscans. These effects stem from deep moral changes tied to the emotions of guilt, shame, and compassion, with knowledge and education accounting for historical persistence. We assess these differences across multiple datasets, analytical levels, and historical contexts—always focusing on the differential effects of the two Orders. Our findings invite a reassessment of the Church’s role in cultural and institutional development and underscore the divergent effects of its branches and doctrines.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107417"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442
Luca Bargna , Davide La Torre , Rosario Maggistro , Benjamin Montmartin
This paper investigates the trade-offs between organic and conventional farming methods, focusing on their respective impacts on health, environmental sustainability, and economic outcomes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model based on an optimal control problem to examine the dynamic allocation of investments between organic and conventional agriculture. This model incorporates critical social factors, including the environmental and health costs associated with pesticide use in conventional farming, as well as the long-term social benefits of organic practices. Second, we estimate the key parameters of the model using French data on pesticide levels in groundwater. This enables us to compute and analyze the optimal policy proposed by the model and derive implications for reallocating investments towards organic farming. The optimal policy emphasizes the necessity of a tailored approach across both spatial and time dimensions. Along the spatial dimension, areas with high pesticide concentrations should be prioritized, calling for place-based rather than place-neutral policies. Along the temporal dimension, earlier intervention strategies are warranted when social costs related to pesticide exposure are high or when the weight assigned to the environmental conditions of future generations is low. Overall, the optimal policy results in a more balanced distribution of pesticides across the territory.
{"title":"Balancing health and sustainability: Optimizing investments in organic vs. conventional agriculture through pesticide reduction","authors":"Luca Bargna , Davide La Torre , Rosario Maggistro , Benjamin Montmartin","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the trade-offs between organic and conventional farming methods, focusing on their respective impacts on health, environmental sustainability, and economic outcomes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model based on an optimal control problem to examine the dynamic allocation of investments between organic and conventional agriculture. This model incorporates critical social factors, including the environmental and health costs associated with pesticide use in conventional farming, as well as the long-term social benefits of organic practices. Second, we estimate the key parameters of the model using French data on pesticide levels in groundwater. This enables us to compute and analyze the optimal policy proposed by the model and derive implications for reallocating investments towards organic farming. The optimal policy emphasizes the necessity of a tailored approach across both spatial and time dimensions. Along the spatial dimension, areas with high pesticide concentrations should be prioritized, calling for place-based rather than place-neutral policies. Along the temporal dimension, earlier intervention strategies are warranted when social costs related to pesticide exposure are high or when the weight assigned to the environmental conditions of future generations is low. Overall, the optimal policy results in a more balanced distribution of pesticides across the territory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107442"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438
Víctor González-Jiménez , Patricio S. Dalton , Charles N. Noussair
To motivate workers, organizations often offer monetary bonuses for meeting production goals. We develop a theoretical framework that predicts that when workers set production goals themselves and are sufficiently loss averse, bonuses lead to conservative goal setting, which worsens performance. Without a bonus, a loss-averse worker sets an ambitious goal to motivate herself through the aversion to falling short of the target. Tying a bonus to goal achievement crowds out this intrinsic motivation by raising the stakes of failure, leading to more cautious goals and lower performance. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment supports the predictions of our model. Our findings underscore the limits of bonuses when workers are loss averse.
{"title":"Bonuses and loss aversion","authors":"Víctor González-Jiménez , Patricio S. Dalton , Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To motivate workers, organizations often offer monetary bonuses for meeting production goals. We develop a theoretical framework that predicts that when workers set production goals themselves and are sufficiently loss averse, bonuses lead to conservative goal setting, which worsens performance. Without a bonus, a loss-averse worker sets an ambitious goal to motivate herself through the aversion to falling short of the target. Tying a bonus to goal achievement crowds out this intrinsic motivation by raising the stakes of failure, leading to more cautious goals and lower performance. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment supports the predictions of our model. Our findings underscore the limits of bonuses when workers are loss averse.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107438"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436
Rohit Jindal
Fairness is impartial selection when allocating scarce goods or resources. Previous studies indicate that people consider auctions and random allocations less fair than alternate mechanisms. However, these studies are based on survey research in industrialized countries. It is unclear if fairness preferences are generalizable or if these preferences lead to a change in peoples’ behavior. This paper addresses these gaps through two field studies in rural India. In the first study, 94 of 206 subjects received contracts to collect tree leaves in return for INR100 each. Participants were selected through four different allocation mechanisms - random allocation, deliberation among subjects, selection by criteria, and lowest bids in auctions. Participants selected through deliberation and criteria-based allocations collect significantly more leaves than those selected through auctions or random allocations. In the second study, a separate set of 124 subjects compared the fairness of these four allocation mechanisms, yielding 744 observations. Deliberation and criteria are ranked fairer than auctions or random allocations. The comparisons are robust to transitivity with an 86.3 percent coefficient of consistency. The close matching between experimental and survey results indicates that people provide significantly more effort when selected through allocation mechanisms that are considered fair. The study results also indicate how auctions are not always efficient.
{"title":"Does allocative fairness matter? experimental evidence from India","authors":"Rohit Jindal","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Fairness is impartial selection when allocating scarce goods or resources. Previous studies indicate that people consider auctions and random allocations less fair than alternate mechanisms. However, these studies are based on survey research in industrialized countries. It is unclear if fairness preferences are generalizable or if these preferences lead to a change in peoples’ behavior. This paper addresses these gaps through two field studies in rural India. In the first study, 94 of 206 subjects received contracts to collect tree leaves in return for INR100 each. Participants were selected through four different allocation mechanisms - random allocation, deliberation among subjects, selection by criteria, and lowest bids in auctions. Participants selected through deliberation and criteria-based allocations collect significantly more leaves than those selected through auctions or random allocations. In the second study, a separate set of 124 subjects compared the fairness of these four allocation mechanisms, yielding 744 observations. Deliberation and criteria are ranked fairer than auctions or random allocations. The comparisons are robust to transitivity with an 86.3 percent coefficient of consistency. The close matching between experimental and survey results indicates that people provide significantly more effort when selected through allocation mechanisms that are considered fair. The study results also indicate how auctions are not always efficient.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107436"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107435
Scott Abrahams
I examine decision-making across a gradient of time horizons using data from competitive powerlifting, where participants must assess their physical abilities under varying time constraints. Analyzing one million choice sequences in this natural, high-stakes setting, I document systematic gender differences that vary by horizon and feedback direction. Over horizons of thirty minutes to several hours, men consistently overestimate their abilities, failing initial attempts at all three types of lifts, and they are less likely to update sufficiently across lift types following the negative signal of an earlier miss. Under extreme time pressure requiring a decision within one minute, the performance gap shrinks and men are more likely to make beneficial deviations from established guidance. This differential rapid evaluation of the signal content in negative feedback suggests a novel explanatory mechanism for observed gender variation in performance under time pressure.
{"title":"Gender differences in choosing fast and slow: Evidence from competitive powerlifting","authors":"Scott Abrahams","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I examine decision-making across a gradient of time horizons using data from competitive powerlifting, where participants must assess their physical abilities under varying time constraints. Analyzing one million choice sequences in this natural, high-stakes setting, I document systematic gender differences that vary by horizon and feedback direction. Over horizons of thirty minutes to several hours, men consistently overestimate their abilities, failing initial attempts at all three types of lifts, and they are less likely to update sufficiently across lift types following the negative signal of an earlier miss. Under extreme time pressure requiring a decision within one minute, the performance gap shrinks and men are more likely to make beneficial deviations from established guidance. This differential rapid evaluation of the signal content in negative feedback suggests a novel explanatory mechanism for observed gender variation in performance under time pressure.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107435"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146025750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-23DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439
Constantin Colonescu
This paper develops a continuous-time dynamic model in which state capacity and societal power evolve jointly as institutional stocks subject to investment incentives, contest effects, and baseline decay. The interaction between these forces generates multiple political regimes, including a despotic regime, a weak-state regime, and a balanced regime in which state and society co-develop. The model admits a corridor of regime stability whose thickness depends on contest intensity and structural parameters, and whose boundaries determine the basins of attraction of the competing regimes. Extending the system to a stochastic environment, the paper characterizes regime fragility by deriving corridor-exit probabilities, showing how volatility increases the likelihood of transitions toward despotism or state collapse. The analysis highlights how institutional balance can be sustained dynamically, yet remains inherently fragile in the presence of shocks.
{"title":"Fragility and regime stability in a state–society dynamic model","authors":"Constantin Colonescu","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a continuous-time dynamic model in which state capacity and societal power evolve jointly as institutional stocks subject to investment incentives, contest effects, and baseline decay. The interaction between these forces generates multiple political regimes, including a despotic regime, a weak-state regime, and a balanced regime in which state and society co-develop. The model admits a corridor of regime stability whose thickness depends on contest intensity and structural parameters, and whose boundaries determine the basins of attraction of the competing regimes. Extending the system to a stochastic environment, the paper characterizes regime fragility by deriving corridor-exit probabilities, showing how volatility increases the likelihood of transitions toward despotism or state collapse. The analysis highlights how institutional balance can be sustained dynamically, yet remains inherently fragile in the presence of shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107439"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-23DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399
Adam Bestenbostel , Abigail Peralta
Racially charged rhetoric often surrounds layoff events, with specific minorities blamed for the loss of “American jobs.” We examine whether information about impending mass layoffs causes racial animus. Our data consist of information on mass layoff notices linked to Google Search Trends and FBI Hate Crime Statistics. We compare outcomes across areas that vary in the timing of impending mass layoffs. Results indicate an increase in both racist internet searches (1.4 percent) and hate crimes (1.2 percent) following layoff notices.
{"title":"WARNings – The impact of negative economic news on racial animus","authors":"Adam Bestenbostel , Abigail Peralta","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Racially charged rhetoric often surrounds layoff events, with specific minorities blamed for the loss of “American jobs.” We examine whether information about impending mass layoffs causes racial animus. Our data consist of information on mass layoff notices linked to Google Search Trends and FBI Hate Crime Statistics. We compare outcomes across areas that vary in the timing of impending mass layoffs. Results indicate an increase in both racist internet searches (1.4 percent) and hate crimes (1.2 percent) following layoff notices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107399"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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