Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324
Maxim Ananyev , Michael Poyker
Inmates’ informal code often ascribes low status to persons perceived as passive homosexuals. We use longitudinal data to investigate whether prison experience might contribute to anti-gay beliefs. We find that prison experience is related to a higher level of anti-gay sentiments among males and their families, while no discernible difference exists before incarceration. We find no effect for female ex-prisoners. We confirm that pre-incarceration trends, changes in trust and social capital, income, mental health, masculinity norms, and other potential alternative explanations do not drive the results. Our study sheds light on the overlooked role of prisons as a potential significant contributor to the propagation of anti-gay attitudes.
{"title":"Impact of prison experience on anti-gay sentiments: Longitudinal analysis of inmates and their families","authors":"Maxim Ananyev , Michael Poyker","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inmates’ informal code often ascribes low status to persons perceived as passive homosexuals. We use longitudinal data to investigate whether prison experience might contribute to anti-gay beliefs. We find that prison experience is related to a higher level of anti-gay sentiments among males and their families, while no discernible difference exists before incarceration. We find no effect for female ex-prisoners. We confirm that pre-incarceration trends, changes in trust and social capital, income, mental health, masculinity norms, and other potential alternative explanations do not drive the results. Our study sheds light on the overlooked role of prisons as a potential significant contributor to the propagation of anti-gay attitudes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107324"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405
Vlad Tarko
As societies become richer, and basic needs are satisfied, zero-sum positional contests gain more prominence, while the regular positive-sum benefits of markets subside in the background. As long argued by Hirsch, Frank and others, the institutions for managing resource scarcity and spurring economic growth, i.e. the institutions of capitalism, may not be particularly well-suited for managing the type of scarcity associated with positional goods. The long-term equilibrium of rich societies may not be as peaceful as many assume if they become overrun by status competitions. This paper provides a typology of positional goods, explaining why some positional competitions are worse than others, and a rent-seeking model of the supply response to positional goods’ price changes. The model leads to surprisingly optimistic predictions: markets tend to fragment the worst kinds of positional goods into competing hierarchies of status, tend to dissipate and eliminate some positional goods, and tend to turn the most damaging status competitions into more beneficial prestige competitions. Government interventions, by contrast, often attempt to prop‑up monopolistic status hierarchies.
{"title":"Polycentric status contests","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>As societies become richer, and basic needs are satisfied, zero-sum positional contests gain more prominence, while the regular positive-sum benefits of markets subside in the background. As long argued by Hirsch, Frank and others, the institutions for managing resource scarcity and spurring economic growth, i.e. the institutions of capitalism, may not be particularly well-suited for managing the type of scarcity associated with positional goods. The long-term equilibrium of rich societies may not be as peaceful as many assume if they become overrun by status competitions. This paper provides a typology of positional goods, explaining why some positional competitions are worse than others, and a rent-seeking model of the supply response to positional goods’ price changes. The model leads to surprisingly optimistic predictions: markets tend to fragment the worst kinds of positional goods into competing hierarchies of status, tend to dissipate and eliminate some positional goods, and tend to turn the most damaging status competitions into more beneficial prestige competitions. Government interventions, by contrast, often attempt to prop‑up monopolistic status hierarchies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107405"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381
Ananyo Brahma , Vidhya Soundararajan
This paper investigates whether rural road infrastructure can foster inclusive entrepreneurship. Using enterprise data from India, we examine how a national rural road construction program, which connected previously isolated villages, affects entrepreneurship across different social groups. Our findings reveal that new feeder roads increase the number of service enterprises for all caste categories, including marginalized groups. However, manufacturing entrepreneurship increases only among the non-marginalized caste groups. For marginalized groups, the increase in entrepreneurship appears to be a response to a relative decline in wage employment opportunities following road construction. Formal finance and education infrastructure serve as key channels through which road connectivity fosters entrepreneurship.
{"title":"Do rural roads promote inclusive entrepreneurship?","authors":"Ananyo Brahma , Vidhya Soundararajan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107381","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates whether rural road infrastructure can foster inclusive entrepreneurship. Using enterprise data from India, we examine how a national rural road construction program, which connected previously isolated villages, affects entrepreneurship across different social groups. Our findings reveal that new feeder roads increase the number of service enterprises for all caste categories, including marginalized groups. However, manufacturing entrepreneurship increases only among the non-marginalized caste groups. For marginalized groups, the increase in entrepreneurship appears to be a response to a relative decline in wage employment opportunities following road construction. Formal finance and education infrastructure serve as key channels through which road connectivity fosters entrepreneurship.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107381"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395
Yuqi (Angela) Jiang , Suraj Prasad
This paper develops a theory of opinionated bosses – this is where a boss reveals her opinions to a worker who is tasked with gathering information. When the worker gathers information across multiple tasks, which he views as substitutes, the boss may selectively reveal her opinions to the worker on a well known task to redirect his effort to the task that is less well known. The benefit is a broader expertise across activities in the organization when rewards across these activities are implicitly determined. The cost is that the worker becomes a yes man. Being opinionated can, i) go hand in hand with weaker opinions, ii) lead to excessive levels of conformity and initiative, and finally, iii) improve the tradeoff between insurance and explicit incentives when a worker is risk averse.
{"title":"Of opinionated bosses and yes men","authors":"Yuqi (Angela) Jiang , Suraj Prasad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a theory of opinionated bosses – this is where a boss reveals her opinions to a worker who is tasked with gathering information. When the worker gathers information across multiple tasks, which he views as substitutes, the boss may <em>selectively</em> reveal her opinions to the worker on a well known task to redirect his effort to the task that is less well known. The benefit is a broader expertise across activities in the organization when rewards across these activities are implicitly determined. The cost is that the worker becomes a yes man. Being opinionated can, i) go hand in hand with weaker opinions, ii) lead to excessive levels of conformity and initiative, and finally, iii) improve the tradeoff between insurance and explicit incentives when a worker is risk averse.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107395"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406
Bartosz Gebka , Han Jin , Vasileios Kallinterakis , Rabaa Karaa , Skander Slim
We empirically investigate the relationship between informed trading and market herding in China for the 2003–2022 period and find a negative contemporaneous relationship, which grows stronger for specific market/economic conditions. Herding comprises of a very strong noise-driven herding and a fundamentals-driven anti-herding; informed trading dampens the former, while boosting the latter. Our results hold when controlling for the 2012 anti-insider trading laws and days of price-limit hits. Evidence on the dynamic relationship between informed trading and herding demonstrates that informed trading Granger-causes herding. Overall, informed traders motivate stronger herding over time, dampening it contemporaneously, thus suggesting that they prey on the very herding they attract.
{"title":"Herding and informed trading: Evidence from Chinese equity markets","authors":"Bartosz Gebka , Han Jin , Vasileios Kallinterakis , Rabaa Karaa , Skander Slim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We empirically investigate the relationship between informed trading and market herding in China for the 2003–2022 period and find a negative contemporaneous relationship, which grows stronger for specific market/economic conditions. Herding comprises of a very strong noise-driven herding and a fundamentals-driven anti-herding; informed trading dampens the former, while boosting the latter. Our results hold when controlling for the 2012 anti-insider trading laws and days of price-limit hits. Evidence on the dynamic relationship between informed trading and herding demonstrates that informed trading Granger-causes herding. Overall, informed traders motivate stronger herding over time, dampening it contemporaneously, thus suggesting that they prey on the very herding they attract.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107406"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384
Eldar Dadon , Marie Claire Villeval , Ro’i Zultan
Working for a firm engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) appeals to potential workers by boosting their self-image and sense of purpose. We propose an additional mechanism: CSR signals a firm’s future treatment of workers. Our model links CSR engagement with a firm’s propensity to support workers during unforeseen times of need. Under this assumption, a potential future need of the worker leads to more firms engaging in CSR and to a higher workers’ willingness to accept lower wages. Our experiment manipulates potential future needs across treatments. While the aggregate analysis does not fully support our theory, exploratory analysis reveals that male workers respond as predicted, whereas female workers do not. Consistently, in a risky environment, male employers increase their CSR engagement, which raises the acceptance rate among male workers. These results do not hold for female employers and workers.
{"title":"Corporate social responsibility as a signal in the labor market","authors":"Eldar Dadon , Marie Claire Villeval , Ro’i Zultan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Working for a firm engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) appeals to potential workers by boosting their self-image and sense of purpose. We propose an additional mechanism: CSR signals a firm’s future treatment of workers. Our model links CSR engagement with a firm’s propensity to support workers during unforeseen times of need. Under this assumption, a potential future need of the worker leads to more firms engaging in CSR and to a higher workers’ willingness to accept lower wages. Our experiment manipulates potential future needs across treatments. While the aggregate analysis does not fully support our theory, exploratory analysis reveals that male workers respond as predicted, whereas female workers do not. Consistently, in a risky environment, male employers increase their CSR engagement, which raises the acceptance rate among male workers. These results do not hold for female employers and workers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107384"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392
Anastasia Antsygina
This paper studies optimal information disclosure in two competing contests where contestants face a constraint on their total effort contribution, or budget. The contestants are ex ante uninformed about the value of the prize to be allocated in one of the contests. Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown prize value chooses a public disclosure rule that maximizes the total effort exerted in her competition, and commits to it. We find that the optimal disclosure rule is generally not unique and can reveal (at least some) information to the contestants. In the absence of competition for effort among contests, the size of the budget has a non-monotonic effect on the designer’s incentives to share information. When competition for effort is at place, the designer’s incentives to share information decline with the size of the budget, which is driven by the substitution effect that forces contestants to reallocate their effort towards a competition with a higher perceived prize.
{"title":"Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players","authors":"Anastasia Antsygina","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal information disclosure in two competing contests where contestants face a constraint on their total effort contribution, or budget. The contestants are ex ante uninformed about the value of the prize to be allocated in one of the contests. Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown prize value chooses a public disclosure rule that maximizes the total effort exerted in her competition, and commits to it. We find that the optimal disclosure rule is generally not unique and can reveal (at least some) information to the contestants. In the absence of competition for effort among contests, the size of the budget has a non-monotonic effect on the designer’s incentives to share information. When competition for effort is at place, the designer’s incentives to share information decline with the size of the budget, which is driven by the <em>substitution effect</em> that forces contestants to reallocate their effort towards a competition with a higher perceived prize.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107392"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-27DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107396
Scott Fulford , Cortnie Shupe
Time preferences are central to all welfare analyses involving intertemporal tradeoffs. We use a model with endogenous interest rates to study the relationship between underlying time preferences and the interest rates people pay. The model suggests that bad shocks push people to pay higher rates than normal, so a single measurement of a preference for “money earlier or later” (MEL) provides little information on underlying preferences. We use several surveys associated with a panel of respondents’ credit bureau records to compare MEL responses to actual borrowing and saving behavior. While people who are paying higher interest rates do tend to prefer money earlier, the relationship is weak; we strongly reject the hypothesis that survey participants directly respond to MEL questions through comparison to their real-world rates of return on investments. As predicted by the model, negative shocks induce people to borrow more, want money earlier, and pay higher interest rates. Borrowing behavior appears to quickly mean revert, however. We propose an alternative approach to measuring time preferences that uses repeated observations of interest rates in large financial data sets.
{"title":"Time preferences, rates of return, and real-world investment decisions","authors":"Scott Fulford , Cortnie Shupe","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107396","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107396","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Time preferences are central to all welfare analyses involving intertemporal tradeoffs. We use a model with endogenous interest rates to study the relationship between underlying time preferences and the interest rates people pay. The model suggests that bad shocks push people to pay higher rates than normal, so a single measurement of a preference for “money earlier or later” (MEL) provides little information on underlying preferences. We use several surveys associated with a panel of respondents’ credit bureau records to compare MEL responses to actual borrowing and saving behavior. While people who are paying higher interest rates do tend to prefer money earlier, the relationship is weak; we strongly reject the hypothesis that survey participants directly respond to MEL questions through comparison to their real-world rates of return on investments. As predicted by the model, negative shocks induce people to borrow more, want money earlier, and pay higher interest rates. Borrowing behavior appears to quickly mean revert, however. We propose an alternative approach to measuring time preferences that uses repeated observations of interest rates in large financial data sets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107396"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-27DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385
Thiemo Fetzer , Oliver Vanden Eynde , Austin L. Wright
Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.
{"title":"Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan","authors":"Thiemo Fetzer , Oliver Vanden Eynde , Austin L. Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107385"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107389
Simone Marsiglio , Tatyana Perevalova , Marco Tolotti
We analyze the mutual relation between infectious diseases, climate change and economic capability, focusing on the role of individual decisions and public measures. Climate change favors the spread of novel communicable diseases which determine the size of the healthy workforce; healthy workers are the input in the economic production process which generate polluting emissions; polluting emissions are the main driver of carbon concentration ultimately driving climate change. Individuals’ decisions to comply with social distancing regulations as well as income taxation to finance disease treatment and emissions abatement jointly determine epidemiological and compliance dynamics. We show that according to the specific parametrization a broad variety of possible outcomes may arise, such as the coexistence of multiple stable equilibria, path dependency and metastable transitions. We assess the relative desirability of public policies aiming to speed up recovery or to reduce environmental degradation, showing that in a COVID-like disease parametrization it may be convenient to achieve full carbon neutrality to reduce the climate-induced risk of new epidemic outbreaks.
{"title":"Epidemics and climate change: Disease containment or climate mitigation?","authors":"Simone Marsiglio , Tatyana Perevalova , Marco Tolotti","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107389","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107389","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the mutual relation between infectious diseases, climate change and economic capability, focusing on the role of individual decisions and public measures. Climate change favors the spread of novel communicable diseases which determine the size of the healthy workforce; healthy workers are the input in the economic production process which generate polluting emissions; polluting emissions are the main driver of carbon concentration ultimately driving climate change. Individuals’ decisions to comply with social distancing regulations as well as income taxation to finance disease treatment and emissions abatement jointly determine epidemiological and compliance dynamics. We show that according to the specific parametrization a broad variety of possible outcomes may arise, such as the coexistence of multiple stable equilibria, path dependency and metastable transitions. We assess the relative desirability of public policies aiming to speed up recovery or to reduce environmental degradation, showing that in a COVID-like disease parametrization it may be convenient to achieve full carbon neutrality to reduce the climate-induced risk of new epidemic outbreaks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107389"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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