Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349
Petter Berg
I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.
{"title":"Can ratings mitigate consumer inattention? Evidence from the swedish housing market","authors":"Petter Berg","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107349"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353
Emin Karagözoğlu , Kerim Keskin , Deren Çağlayan
We study costly argumentation in two canonical bargaining games, where the proposer needs to justify her offer by providing arguments, because the responder derives disutility from accepting an offer that lacks sufficient justification. Argument provision is costly. Since justifying a less generous offer always requires more arguments, there is a strategic trade-off for the proposer: either invest in argument provision to persuade the responder to accept a lower offer, or refrain from providing arguments in which case the responder expects a more generous offer. Assuming an increasing and convex cost of argumentation, we show that an equilibrium with positive levels of argumentation exists in both models if the cost of argument provision is sufficiently low. Our comparative static analyses further reveal that an increase in one’s aversion to lack of sound arguments can make her worse off in equilibrium, both in terms of agreed pie share and collected utility.
{"title":"Costly argumentation in bargaining","authors":"Emin Karagözoğlu , Kerim Keskin , Deren Çağlayan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study costly argumentation in two canonical bargaining games, where the proposer needs to justify her offer by providing arguments, because the responder derives disutility from accepting an offer that lacks sufficient justification. Argument provision is costly. Since justifying a less generous offer always requires more arguments, there is a strategic trade-off for the proposer: either invest in argument provision to persuade the responder to accept a lower offer, or refrain from providing arguments in which case the responder expects a more generous offer. Assuming an increasing and convex cost of argumentation, we show that an equilibrium with positive levels of argumentation exists in both models if the cost of argument provision is sufficiently low. Our comparative static analyses further reveal that an increase in one’s aversion to lack of sound arguments can make her worse off in equilibrium, both in terms of agreed pie share and collected utility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107353"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341
Gary Charness , Diana Caporale, Anna Rinaldi
The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.
This paper investigates whether trust can be strategically incentivized to support the adoption of group-based mitigation in such contexts. We design a repeated coordination game in which participants first choose the number of players to group with (2, 3, or 4), and then select a mitigation strategy: no action, individual mitigation, or group mitigation. Group mitigation offers the lowest cost but only succeeds if all group members independently choose it; its cost decreases as group size increases. Results reveal a shift in participants' preferences over time, with a progressive transition toward larger groups. Participants increasingly abandon individual strategies in favor of group mitigation. Our findings also show that trust is not a stable trait, but a strategic belief that adapts over time. Players’ choices change dynamically in response to observed payoffs, perceived cooperation probabilities, and perceived disaster risk. The game provides insights into when and why cooperation emerges or collapses, allowing for the pre-testing of institutional interventions before they are implemented in real-world contexts.
{"title":"Vulnerability game","authors":"Gary Charness , Diana Caporale, Anna Rinaldi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.</div><div>This paper investigates whether trust can be strategically incentivized to support the adoption of group-based mitigation in such contexts. We design a repeated coordination game in which participants first choose the number of players to group with (2, 3, or 4), and then select a mitigation strategy: no action, individual mitigation, or grou<sub>p</sub> mitigation. Group mitigation offers the lowest cost but only succeeds if all group members independently choose it; its cost decreases as group size increases. Results reveal a shift in participants' preferences over time, with a progressive transition toward larger groups. Participants increasingly abandon individual strategies in favor of group mitigation. Our findings also show that trust is not a stable trait, but a strategic belief that adapts over time. Players’ choices change dynamically in response to observed payoffs, perceived cooperation probabilities, and perceived disaster risk. The game provides insights into when and why cooperation emerges or collapses, allowing for the pre-testing of institutional interventions before they are implemented in real-world contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107341"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317
Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai
Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.
{"title":"Delayed school entry increases internal locus of control","authors":"Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107317"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337
Marcello Antonini , Joan Costa-Font
Health status can alter individuals' social preferences, including individuals' preferences regarding a fair financing of health care. If individuals follow a healthy self-interested rationale, health improvements can weaken individuals' support for fairer health care financing, insofar as they perceive a reduced need for healthcare. Conversely, healthier people might anticipate facing greater opportunity costs if their health declines in an unfairly funded system, and hence may endorse fairer financing in anticipation of future health challenges—which we label as the 'unhealthy self-interest' hypothesis. We draw on a dataset of 73,452 individuals across 22 countries and a novel instrumental variable strategy that exploits variation in health status resulting from cross-country and cohort-specific exposure to the national childhood Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccination schedules. We document causal evidence consistent with the unhealthy self-interest hypothesis, namely that better (worst) health increases (reduces) preferences for a fairer health care system. We estimate that a one-unit increase in self-reported health increases support for fair health care access by 11 % and the willingness to support fair financing by 8 %. Our findings suggest that improving population health may give rise to stronger support for interventions to improve equitable health system access and financing.
{"title":"Healthy self-interest? Health dependent preferences for fairer health care","authors":"Marcello Antonini , Joan Costa-Font","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107337","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Health status can alter individuals' social preferences, including individuals' preferences regarding a fair financing of health care. If individuals follow a <em>healthy self-interested rationale</em>, health improvements can weaken individuals' support for fairer health care financing, insofar as they perceive a reduced need for healthcare. Conversely, healthier people might anticipate facing greater opportunity costs if their health declines in an unfairly funded system, and hence may endorse fairer financing in anticipation of future health challenges—which we label as the '<em>unhealthy self-interest</em>' hypothesis. We draw on a dataset of 73,452 individuals across 22 countries and a novel instrumental variable strategy that exploits variation in health status resulting from cross-country and cohort-specific exposure to the national childhood Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccination schedules. We document causal evidence consistent with the <em>unhealthy self-interest hypothesis</em>, namely that better (worst) health increases (reduces) preferences for a fairer health care system. We estimate that a one-unit increase in self-reported health increases support for fair health care access by 11 % and the willingness to support fair financing by 8 %. Our findings suggest that improving population health may give rise to stronger support for interventions to improve equitable health system access and financing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107337"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145614998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323
Daniele Caliari , Ivan Soraperra
Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.
{"title":"Dishonesty: The role of planning, temptation, and self-control","authors":"Daniele Caliari , Ivan Soraperra","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Accumulated evidence shows that, when people face the opportunity to cheat, they often take it. However, it remains unclear whether this behavior reflects a genuine preference for dishonesty or a lack of self-control in the face of temptation. To address this question, we apply the temptation and self-control framework of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to cheating opportunities and experimentally test its predictions for the first time. We find that (i) only 5 % of participants are willing to pay to avoid a cheating opportunity and (ii) 90 % exhibit consistent planning. Specifically, those who deliberately seek out cheating opportunities exploit them (50 %), and those who do not seek out remain honest when confronted with them (40 %). This evidence suggests that temptation plays a limited role while ruling out both naivete and uncertainty about future behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107323"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145615050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107340
Andy Chung , Daniel S. Hamermesh , Carl Singleton , Zhengxin Wang , Junsen Zhang
Americans spend 2.5 percent of their waking hours video-gaming. Using the American Add Health Study, we show that adults who are better-looking have more close friends. Gaming being costlier for them, they engage in less of it. Physically attractive teens are less likely than others to game at all. Attractive adults are less likely than others to spend any time gaming; if they do, they spend less time on it than other gamers. The reverse is true among teens and adults for some other non-market activities—sports and hobby groups. Using the longitudinal nature of the Study, we find that these relationships may be causal for adults: good looks decrease gaming time, not vice-versa. The results provide new evidence on how looks affect non-market time use and perhaps indicate the role that they play in personal development.
{"title":"Looks and gaming: Who and why?","authors":"Andy Chung , Daniel S. Hamermesh , Carl Singleton , Zhengxin Wang , Junsen Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107340","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107340","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Americans spend 2.5 percent of their waking hours video-gaming. Using the American Add Health Study, we show that adults who are better-looking have more close friends. Gaming being costlier for them, they engage in less of it. Physically attractive teens are less likely than others to game at all. Attractive adults are less likely than others to spend any time gaming; if they do, they spend less time on it than other gamers. The reverse is true among teens and adults for some other non-market activities—sports and hobby groups. Using the longitudinal nature of the Study, we find that these relationships may be causal for adults: good looks decrease gaming time, not vice-versa. The results provide new evidence on how looks affect non-market time use and perhaps indicate the role that they play in personal development.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107340"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145614999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107346
Yukari Iwanami , Ryosuke Okazawa
We develop a political agency model, which takes into account the asymmetry in information revelation across policy outcomes, and explore how the policymaker’s reputational concerns and transparency in actions influence her defense policy choice and its consequences. We demonstrate that the policymaker’s reputational concerns may have perverse effects as her fear of losing reputation by failing to deter a threat or her incentive to posture may lead her to enact defense policies that are suboptimal for citizens. We also find that policy transparency has mixed effects on citizens’ welfare: whereas transparency makes the incompetent policymaker less inclined to overallocate resources to national defense and reduces inefficient arms buildups (the positive effect), it also prompts her to choose insufficient military preparedness and increases the risk of deterrence failure (the negative effect). Our results suggest that when the policymaker has access to sufficiently accurate information, enhancing policy transparency may improve the welfare of citizens.
{"title":"Political responsiveness and transparency in defense policymaking","authors":"Yukari Iwanami , Ryosuke Okazawa","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107346","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107346","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a political agency model, which takes into account the asymmetry in information revelation across policy outcomes, and explore how the policymaker’s reputational concerns and transparency in actions influence her defense policy choice and its consequences. We demonstrate that the policymaker’s reputational concerns may have perverse effects as her fear of losing reputation by failing to deter a threat or her incentive to posture may lead her to enact defense policies that are suboptimal for citizens. We also find that policy transparency has mixed effects on citizens’ welfare: whereas transparency makes the incompetent policymaker less inclined to overallocate resources to national defense and reduces inefficient arms buildups (the positive effect), it also prompts her to choose insufficient military preparedness and increases the risk of deterrence failure (the negative effect). Our results suggest that when the policymaker has access to sufficiently accurate information, enhancing policy transparency may improve the welfare of citizens.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107346"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145615003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Covid-19 pandemic caused a global economic crisis, leading governments to provide substantial State aid to support firms. This paper examines the effectiveness of Covid-related financial support in Spain and Italy, focusing on its impact on firm recovery. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach combined with propensity score weighting, it compares outcomes of similar firms receiving aid to those without. The results show significant benefits for micro-firms, including mitigated turnover declines and increased investments in both tangible and intangible assets. The findings highlight the critical role of government support in business survival and recovery, especially for SMEs, during the pandemic.
{"title":"The impact of financial support to firms during crises: The case of Covid aid in the EU","authors":"Giulia Canzian , Elena Crivellaro , Tomaso Duso , Antonella Rita Ferrara , Alessandro Sasso , Stefano Verzillo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107339","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107339","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Covid-19 pandemic caused a global economic crisis, leading governments to provide substantial State aid to support firms. This paper examines the effectiveness of Covid-related financial support in Spain and Italy, focusing on its impact on firm recovery. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach combined with propensity score weighting, it compares outcomes of similar firms receiving aid to those without. The results show significant benefits for micro-firms, including mitigated turnover declines and increased investments in both tangible and intangible assets. The findings highlight the critical role of government support in business survival and recovery, especially for SMEs, during the pandemic.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107339"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145615002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107345
Grace Xun Gong , Ziqi Qiao , Randall Wright
Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s classic “Middlemen” paper introduced search theoretic models of intermediation. While this inspired much research, existing analysis of the model is incomplete. Rubinstein and Wolinsky show in equilibrium middlemen intermediate (buy from sellers and sell to buyers) when the rate at which they meet buyers exceeds the rate at which sellers meet buyers – but these rates should be endogenous. We characterize equilibrium in terms of fundamentals, not endogenous variables, providing novel existence, uniqueness and comparative static results. Also, being explicit about meeting technologies shows middlemen may intermediate even if their meeting technology is fundamentally inferior to sellers’ technology.
{"title":"Revisiting the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model of middlemen","authors":"Grace Xun Gong , Ziqi Qiao , Randall Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107345","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107345","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s classic “Middlemen” paper introduced search theoretic models of intermediation. While this inspired much research, existing analysis of the model is incomplete. Rubinstein and Wolinsky show in equilibrium middlemen intermediate (buy from sellers and sell to buyers) when the rate at which they meet buyers exceeds the rate at which sellers meet buyers – but these rates should be endogenous. We characterize equilibrium in terms of fundamentals, not endogenous variables, providing novel existence, uniqueness and comparative static results. Also, being explicit about meeting technologies shows middlemen may intermediate even if their meeting technology is fundamentally inferior to sellers’ technology.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"240 ","pages":"Article 107345"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145615000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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