Emotion最新文献

In recent years, increased attention has gone to studying nonlinear characteristics of affective time series. An example of such nonlinear features is multimodality-the presence of more than one mode in an affective time series-which might mark the presence of discrete-like transitions between one and another affective state. In an attempt to capture these nonlinear features, Loossens et al. (2020) proposed the Affective Ising Model (AIM) as a model of affect dynamics. This model was validated on daily-life data, but these data did not contain any information on potential environmental factors that might have influenced a participant's affective state. Unfortunately, this omission may have led to erroneously concluding that nonlinearity is a defining characteristic of the affective system, even when it is solely driven by extrinsic influences. To accommodate this limitation, we applied the AIM on daily-life data in which the valence of such external events was measured. Overall, we found that nonlinearity persisted after accounting for the valence of daily-life events, suggesting that nonlinearity is a defining characteristic of affect and should thus be accounted for. Interestingly, this effect was more pronounced for composite compared to single-item measures of affect. While in line with previous research, these results should be replicated in a larger, more representative sample. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The emotions of guilt and shame play major roles in forgiveness, social exclusion, face-saving ploys, suicide, and honor killings. Understanding these emotions is thus of vital importance. The outputs of guilt and shame are already well understood: Guilt motivates amends; shame motivates evasion. However, the elicitors and functions of these emotions are disputed. According to attributional theory, guilt and shame are intrapersonal emotions elicited when negative outcomes are attributed to controllable/unstable (guilt) or uncontrollable/stable (shame) aspects of the self. By contrast, functionalist theory claims that guilt and shame are interpersonal emotions for minimizing the imposition of harm on valued others (guilt) and the cost of reputational damage on the self (shame). Although there is confirmatory evidence consistent with both theories, evidence ostensibly supporting one theory has been argued to actually support the other. To solve this problem of data interpretation, here we report contrastive critical tests of the two theories performed on online participant pools in the United States and India in 2021 (N = 853). Results in both countries support functionalist theory over attributional theory, suggesting that the intrapersonal effects reported in the emotion literature are tributary or incidental to the interpersonal functions of guilt and shame. Functionalist theory presents a promising framework for understanding the interpersonal and intrapersonal aspects of guilt, shame, and other self-conscious emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People with autism and higher levels of autistic traits often have difficulty interpreting facial emotion. Research has commonly investigated the association between autistic traits and expression labeling ability. Here, we investigated the association between two relatively understudied abilities, namely, judging whether expressions reflect genuine emotion, and using expressions to make social approach judgements, in a nonclinical sample of undergraduates at an Australian university (N = 149; data collected during 2018). Autistic traits were associated with more difficulty discriminating genuineness and less typical social approach judgements. Importantly, we also investigated whether these associations could be explained by the co-occurring personality trait alexithymia, which describes a difficulty interpreting one's own emotions. Alexithymia is hypothesized to be the source of many emotional difficulties experienced by autistic people and often accounts for expression labeling difficulties associated with autism and autistic traits. In contrast, the current results provided no evidence that alexithymia is associated with differences in genuineness discrimination and social approach judgements. Rather, differences varied as a function of individual differences in specific domains of autistic traits. More autistic-like social skills and communication predicted greater difficulty in genuineness discrimination, and more autistic-like social skills and attention to details and patterns predicted differences in approach judgements. These findings suggest that difficulties in these areas are likely to be better understood as features of the autism phenotype than of alexithymia. Finally, results highlight the importance of considering the authenticity of emotional expressions, with associations between differences in approach judgements being more pronounced for genuine emotional expressions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion regulation (ER) variability refers to how individuals vary their use of ER strategies across time. It helps individuals to meet contextual needs, underscoring its importance in well-being. The theoretical foundation of ER variability recognizes two constituent processes: strategy switching (e.g., moving from distraction to social sharing) and endorsement change (e.g., decreasing the intensity of both distraction and social sharing). ER variability is commonly operationalized as the SD between strategies per observation (between-strategy SD) or within a strategy across time (within-strategy SD). In this article, we show that these SD-based approaches cannot sufficiently capture strategy switching and endorsement change, leading to ER variability indices with poor validity. We propose Bray-Curtis dissimilarity, a measure used in ecology to quantify biodiversity variability, as a theory-informed ER variability index. First, we demonstrate how Bray-Curtis dissimilarity is more sensitive than SD-based approaches in detecting ER variability through two simulation studies. Second, assuming that higher ER variability is adaptive in daily life, we test the relation between ER variability and negative affect in three experience sampling method data sets (total N = [70, 95, 200], number of moment-level observations = [5,040, 6,329, 14,098]). At both the moment level and person level, higher Bray-Curtis dissimilarity predicted lower negative affect more consistently than SD-based indices. We conclude that Bray-Curtis dissimilarity may better capture moment-level within-person ER variability and could have implications for studying variability in other multivariate dynamic processes. The article is accompanied by an R tutorial and practical recommendations for using Bray-Curtis dissimilarity with experience sampling method data. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Expressing emotions with others can be difficult as it puts individuals in a position of potential vulnerability. Research suggests that people are willing to express their emotions with communal partners; however, few studies have examined processes that might explain how this occurs. Using a cross-sectional design, we examined interpersonal accuracy and empathic effort as factors that support the likelihood of expression in communal relationships. Participants (N = 219) reported the communal motivation, accuracy, and effort they perceived from five targets varying in closeness (e.g., best friend, acquaintance, etc.); they rated their likelihood of expressing happiness, pride, gratitude, sadness, anxiety, guilt, and anger with each target. Perceived accuracy and effort were both significant mediators of the association between perceived communal motivation and reported likelihood of expressing all emotions. Perceived accuracy was a stronger predictor of the likelihood of expression than effort. These findings indicate that perceiving greater accuracy and effort each independently supports a greater likelihood of expression. A willingness to express emotions is critical to developing close relationships and the current work identifies processes that may encourage this willingness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Hormetic models of stress resilience describe nonlinear relations for exposure to adversity and health outcomes, where exposure induces salutary changes up to a threshold, with changes becoming deleterious afterward. Here we apply a hormetic model of stress to reactivity to daily stressors, examining whether mental and physical health benefits arise from low-to-moderate reactivity but then decrease at higher levels. Data are from the second wave of the National Study of Daily Experiences (NSDE). Adults (N = 2,022; M_age = 58.61, SD = 12.12, age range: 35-86; 57% female) completed telephone interviews detailing their stressors and affect on eight consecutive evenings. A series of multilevel structural equation models estimated within-person associations between daily stressors and negative affect (i.e., stress reactivity), and between-person linear and quadratic effects of stress reactivity on mental and physical health outcomes (i.e., life satisfaction, psychological distress, and number of chronic conditions). Findings reveal a significant quadratic effect for each outcome, indicating a U-shaped pattern (inverse U for positively valenced life satisfaction), such that low and high levels of stress reactivity were associated with poorer health and well-being, whereas moderate levels of daily stress reactivity predicted better health outcomes. These findings suggest that individuals who display either very low- or very high-stress reactivity may benefit from interventions that target their emotion regulation skills and coping resources. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

According to cybernetic approaches, emotion regulation is motivated by the desire to reduce discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions. Yet, this assumption has rarely been tested directly in healthy or unhealthy populations. In two ecological momentary assessment studies, we monitored motivated emotion regulation in daily life in participants who varied in the severity of their depressive symptoms (Study 1; N = 173) and in clinically depressed and nondepressed participants (Study 2; N = 120). Across studies, associations between motivation in emotion regulation and discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions differed by depression. As expected, as discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions increased, individuals with lower depressive symptoms or without a clinical depression diagnosis were more motivated to regulate their emotions. In contrast, we found no evidence (Study 1) or weaker evidence (Study 2) for sensitivity to the size of the discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions among individuals with higher depressive symptoms or those diagnosed with clinical depression. These individuals were consistently motivated to regulate their emotions, regardless of the size of the discrepancies. These findings suggest that individuals prone to or suffering from depression may be less sensitive than nondepressed individuals to regulatory demands in emotion regulation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The ability to reliably discriminate vocal expressions of emotion is crucial to engage in successful social interactions. This process is arguably more crucial for blind individuals, since they cannot extract social information from faces and bodies, and therefore chiefly rely on voices to infer the emotional state of their interlocutors. Blind have demonstrated superior abilities in several aspects of auditory perception, but research on their ability to discriminate vocal features is still scarce and has provided unclear results. Here, we used a gating psychophysical paradigm to test whether early blind people would differ from individually matched sighted controls at the recognition of emotional expressions. Surprisingly, blind people showed lower performance than controls in discriminating specific vocal emotions. We presented segments of nonlinguistic emotional vocalizations of increasing duration (100-400 ms), portraying five basic emotions (fear, happy, sad, disgust, and angry), and we asked our participants for an explicit emotion categorization task. We then calculated sensitivity indices and confusion patterns of their performance. We observed better performance of the sighted group in the discrimination of angry and fearful expression, with no between-group differences for other emotions. This result supports the view that vision plays a calibrating role for specific threat-related emotions specifically. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People often feel mixed and conflicting feelings (i.e., ambivalence) toward their romantic partner. So far, research has primarily shown that ambivalence is linked to negative outcomes in relationships, but is this always true? Building off the affect, behavior, cognition model of ambivalence, the present work tests the idea that, when ambivalent, individuals can experience both positive and negative cognitive and behavioral responses toward their partner. This idea was tested in three different studies with people in romantic relationships: a cross-sectional international study (n = 665), a 10-day daily diary study (n = 171), and a 12-day daily diary study with two follow-ups (n = 176 couples and nine individuals). Across studies, when people experienced greater subjective ambivalence (i.e., explicitly reported feeling mixed and conflicted) toward their partner, they spent more time thinking about the difficulties they faced in their relationship but also about ways in which they can make it better and, in turn, engaged in both constructive (e.g., wanting to spend more time with the partner) and destructive (e.g., ignoring or criticizing the partner) behaviors toward their partner. Ambivalence was also associated with greater fluctuations in both constructive and destructive behaviors daily and over time. This work advances the current knowledge about ambivalence in romantic relationships and further demonstrates that individuals can experience both positive and negative cognitions and behaviors toward a partner when ambivalent. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Previous work suggests that sometimes the more people value happiness, the less happy they are. For whom and why is this the case? To answer these questions, we examined a model of happiness pursuit that disentangles two previously conflated individual differences related to valuing happiness. The first individual difference operates at the strength of the value itself and involves viewing happiness as a very important goal (i.e., aspiring to happiness). The second individual difference occurs later in the process of pursuing happiness and involves judging one's levels of happiness (i.e., concern about happiness). This model predicts that aspiring to happiness is relatively innocuous. Conversely, being concerned about happiness leads people to judge their happiness, thereby infusing negativity (i.e., negative meta-emotions) into potentially positive events, which, in turn, interferes with well-being. We tested these hypotheses using cross-sectional, daily-diary, and longitudinal methods in student and community samples, collected between 2009 and 2020, which are diverse in gender, ethnicity, age, and geographic location (N_total = 1,815). In Studies 1a and 1b, aspiring to happiness and concern about happiness represented distinct individual differences. In Study 2, concern about happiness (but not aspiring to happiness) was associated with lower well-being cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In Study 3, these links between concern about happiness and worse well-being were partially accounted for by experiencing greater negative meta-emotions during daily positive events. These findings suggest that highly valuing happiness is not inherently problematic; however, concern and judgment about one's happiness can undermine it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).