Emotion最新文献

Anticipated emotions are the feelings one expects if a hypothetical future event were to occur, whereas anticipatory emotions are those one experiences right now while imagining the event. There has been little direct comparison of these two forms of future-oriented emotion, and authors have typically focused on positive emotions (e.g., pleasure). Besides, their sensitivity to depressive symptoms-which may help to explain motivational problems in depression-has only recently been investigated (e.g., Anderson et al., 2023; Gamble et al., 2021). The present study (conducted September-November 2022) used innovative picture-and-text vignettes depicting everyday positive and negative future events, to which participants rated their anticipated and anticipatory responses on separate dimensions of valence (i.e., how positive or negative) and arousal (i.e., emotional intensity). Based on prior literature, anticipatory emotions were expected to be correlated with, yet weaker than, anticipated emotions, reflecting a conceptualization of anticipatory emotions as a "foretaste" of the affective response one expects in the future. We also predicted that high depressive symptoms would coincide with diminished emotion ratings overall and specifically for anticipatory emotions (tightly coupled with event expectations; Carrera et al., 2012). Results largely supported these preregistered predictions, yet anticipatory emotions (positive and negative) were only weaker in more highly depressed participants. Depressive symptoms may therefore affect how one currently feels about future possibilities without altering one's expectations of how such events would actually feel. Implications and future research objectives arising from this are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion dysregulation emerges from an interaction between individual factors and environmental factors. Changes in biological, cognitive, and social systems that characterize adolescence create a complex array of environmental factors contributing to emotion dysregulation during this developmental period. In particular, peer victimization (PV) has long-term consequences for emotion dysregulation. Yet, previous research has also indicated that emotion dysregulation can be both an antecedent to and outcome of PV. The present study evaluated reciprocal associations between longitudinal changes within repeated measures of PV and emotion dysregulation across adolescence and into young adulthood. The sample included 167 adolescents (53% male, M_age = 14.07 years at Time 1) who participated in a longitudinal study across five time points, with approximately 1 year between each assessment. Latent change score modeling was used to examine reciprocal associations between PV and emotion dysregulation. Results emphasize bidirectional associations between PV and emotion dysregulation. Consistent with social information processing theory, greater emotion dysregulation predicted greater relational and overt victimization over time. Moreover, higher overt victimization predicted increases in emotion dysregulation. Our results offer insights toward developmentally informed longitudinal, transactional models linking negative social environments, and emotion dysregulation development across adolescence and into young adulthood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive reappraisal refers to the reinterpretation of a situation to alter its emotional meaning. Theoretically, executive functions (EFs), such as inhibition, updating, and shifting, are core elements of reappraisal processes. However, empirical studies have yielded inconsistent evidence as to whether and to what extent EFs are associated with reappraisal. To address this issue, we conducted a meta-analysis of the literature in which 179 effect sizes from 59 independent samples (N = 4,703) were included. Using random-effects metaregression with robust-variance estimates and small-sample corrections, we also examined whether variation in effect sizes could be accounted for by potential moderators, such as the way reappraisal was assessed (i.e., questionnaires vs. task-based measures) and the type of stimuli used in EF tasks (i.e., affective vs. nonaffective). Overall, results indicate relatively small to typical associations between reappraisal and all three EFs (rs = .13-.19). While the way reappraisal was measured did not moderate any of the relations between EF and reappraisal, we found stronger relations between inhibition and reappraisal when EF was assessed using tasks that involved affective, relative to nonaffective, stimuli. Our meta-analytic findings offer modest support for the idea that EFs are cognitive constituents of reappraisal processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Affect induction procedures are effectively implemented in psychological research. However, because participants are typically asked to self-report their affect immediately after viewing emotional stimuli, the goal of eliciting affect is relatively easy for participants to infer, making their responses susceptible to demand effects. To examine this demand effect, research has used an unrelated-studies paradigm, in which participants are led to believe that they are participating in two different, unrelated studies. While this paradigm has been used in some studies using affect induction procedures, none have examined the extent of demand effects in affect induction procedures. To do so, we conducted six online experiments (N = 170, N = 254, N = 664, N = 260, N = 239, N = 249) by contrasting an unrelated- with a related-studies design. The participants in the related-studies condition were to believe that the affect measurement after the induction belonged to the same pretest as the affect induction, whereas the participants in the unrelated-studies condition were to believe that this measurement was part of a second, unrelated pretest. We found that a related- versus unrelated-studies design produced a significant demand effect for both positive and negative affect, as indicated by greater increases in positive and negative affect in the related-studies compared with the unrelated-studies condition. Demand effects were also found on some indirect measures of affect, as reflected by a significantly smaller self-reported momentary thought-action repertoire, but not by worse memory performance or more distrust in the related-studies condition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The social world requires people to predict others' thoughts, feelings, and actions. People who successfully predict others' emotions experience significant social advantages. What makes a person good at predicting emotions? To predict others' future emotional states, a person must know how one emotion transitions to the next. People learn how emotions transition from at least two sources: (a) internal information, or one's own emotion experiences, and (b) external information, such as the social cues detected in a person's face. Across five studies collected between 2018 and 2020, we find evidence that both sources of information are related to accurate emotion prediction: individuals with atypical personal emotion transitions, difficulty understanding their own emotional experiences, and impaired emotion perception displayed impaired emotion prediction. This ability to predict others' emotions has real-world social implications. Individuals who make accurate emotion predictions have better relationships with their friends and communities and experience less loneliness. In contrast, disruptions in both internal and external information sources explain prediction inaccuracy in individuals with social difficulties, specifically with social communication difficulties common in autism spectrum disorder. These findings provide evidence that successful emotion prediction, which relies on the perception of accurate internal and external data about how emotions transition, may be key to social success. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People who report frequently using cognitive reappraisal to decrease the impact of potentially upsetting situations report better affective functioning than people who report using cognitive reappraisal less frequently. However, most work linking everyday reappraisal use to affective outcomes has been correlational, making causal inference difficult. In this study, we examined whether 2 weeks of daily practice of reappraising negatively valenced personally relevant events would improve affective functioning compared with a wait-list control. Data were collected between 2021 and 2022 from a sample mainly comprised of females (82%) and who identified as Asian (35%) or White/Caucasian (40%). Our planned analyses indicated that reappraisal decreased depressive symptoms and perceived stress as well as increased life satisfaction both immediately and 4 weeks postintervention. Reductions in depressive symptoms and perceived stress were mediated by increases in reappraisal self-efficacy. These findings support the causal efficacy of brief reappraisal training. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Affect-as-information theory posits that understanding of one's emotions (i.e., emotional clarity) can be leveraged to make decisions and attain goals. Furthermore, recent work has emphasized the dynamic nature of emotional clarity and its fluctuations in daily life. Therefore, we sought to test how momentary emotional clarity, experienced in everyday life, would be associated with levels of indecisiveness and goal pursuit. Following affect-as-information, we hypothesized that emotional clarity would be associated with lower indecisiveness but greater goal pursuit. We also hypothesized that indecisiveness would be associated with less goal pursuit with momentary emotional clarity being a potential moderator of this association. Adults (N = 215, M_age = 44.3) experiencing a range of depression, a disorder characterized by indecisiveness, completed a self-report measure of indecisiveness and 2 weeks of experience sampling assessing momentary emotional clarity, goal pursuit, and negative affect. Momentary emotional clarity showed robust links to lower indecisiveness and greater goal pursuit that were not accounted for by negative affect. We did not observe a link between indecisiveness and goal pursuit. Emotional clarity appears to play a role in motivational and cognitive processes that unfold in daily life. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The ongoing repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic provide an unparalleled context to examine how distressing events are remembered. Prior theory and research suggest that (a) distress during lockdowns may fade and be remembered as less distressing, or remain salient and be remembered as more distressing, than initially experienced and (b) emotional suppression and cognitive reappraisal may predict these memory biases. We test these possibilities by assessing depressive symptoms and emotion regulation during two lockdowns: at the start of the pandemic (Lockdown 2020) and 17 months later (Lockdown 2021) in a sample of parents with young children (N = 272). We assessed tracking accuracy, directional bias, and projection bias in memory of depressive symptoms in Lockdown 2020, and the moderating role of emotion regulation at the time of encoding (Lockdown 2020) and recall (Lockdown 2021). People experiencing more depressive symptoms later in the pandemic (2021) remembered the start of the pandemic (2020) to involve more depressive symptoms than initially experienced (projection bias). People engaging in greater emotional suppression at recall (2021) were less likely to project their current depressive symptoms onto memory of the prior lockdown (lower projection bias) and remembered feeling lower depressive symptoms than initially experienced (underestimation directional bias). By contrast, people engaging in cognitive reappraisal at recall (2021) remembered feeling greater depressive symptoms than they initially experienced (overestimation directional bias). These unexpected results indicate that emotion regulation may shape memory of emotion during real-life challenges differently than patterns observed in lab-based research and may reflect helpful coping with life events. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People make countless decisions every day. We explored the self-regulatory function of decisions and assumed that the very act of making a decision in everyday life enhances people's mood. We expected that this decision-related mood change would be more pronounced for intuitive decisions than for analytical ones. The ease of making a decision and the feeling of rightness were expected to mediate the effect of intuitive (vs. analytical) decisions on participants' mood. In a preregistered experimental experience sampling study, participants from the general population were asked to report when they were about to make an everyday decision over the course of 14 days (N = 256 participants, 6,779 decisions). For each decision, participants were randomly instructed to decide either based on their intuition or based on careful analysis. We assessed several variables before and immediately after the decision. Participants also reported retrospectively on their choices in voluntary follow-up assessments. Making a decision per se immediately enhanced participants' mood. This mood enhancement was stronger for intuitive compared to analytic decisions and persisted until follow-up. Ease of decision, but not feeling of rightness, mediated this effect. Intuitive decisions compared to analytic decisions were more likely to be implemented and led to greater satisfaction and pleasantness of the chosen option. Having more options for a particular decision led to generally higher mood improvement and satisfaction. This is the first empirical demonstration showing that using one's gut has beneficial effects in everyday life. Study limitations and implications for theory and practice are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People often draw on their current affective experience to inform their decisions, yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms of this process. Understanding them has important implications for many big questions in both the affective and decision sciences. Do the same neural circuits that generate affect generate value? What differentiates people who have greater contextual flexibility in their reliance on affect? Do affective choices invoke processes that are distinct from less affective choices? To investigate these questions, we developed a neurocomputational model of affect-informed choice, in which people convert subjective affect into context-sensitive decision value through a process of weighted evidence accumulation. We then tested model predictions by recording electroencephalography and facial electromyography during a novel affective choice paradigm in a sample of racially diverse undergraduate participants (data collected in 2018-2019). In addition to validating our model, we found that generation of affective responses occurs earlier than, and is neurally distinct from, valuation of that affect. Moreover, individual differences in contextual flexibility of affective weighting correlated only with later valuation processes, not earlier affect generation processes. Our results have important theoretical implications for emotion, emotion regulation, and decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).