Pub Date : 2025-12-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105559
Leila Pereira , Rafael Pucci
We investigate how deregulating and disabling a decentralized structure for monitoring gold transactions in Brazil ultimately led to an increase in violence related to illegal gold mining. We use a Difference-in-Differences design and a unique database that combines the location of gold deposits and protected areas, where mining is forbidden. We demonstrate that municipalities more exposed to illegal gold mining experienced almost ten additional homicides per 100,000 people - roughly 30 % more - after the deregulation. We also find suggestive evidence of more gold-mining land use inside protected areas in exposed municipalities, which serves as an indicator of illegal mining.
{"title":"A tale of gold and blood: The consequences of market deregulation on local violence","authors":"Leila Pereira , Rafael Pucci","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105559","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105559","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how deregulating and disabling a decentralized structure for monitoring gold transactions in Brazil ultimately led to an increase in violence related to illegal gold mining. We use a Difference-in-Differences design and a unique database that combines the location of gold deposits and protected areas, where mining is forbidden. We demonstrate that municipalities more exposed to illegal gold mining experienced almost ten additional homicides per 100,000 people - roughly 30 % more - after the deregulation. We also find suggestive evidence of more gold-mining land use inside protected areas in exposed municipalities, which serves as an indicator of illegal mining.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105559"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105552
Christopher Malloy
This paper examines firm responses to the entire distribution of potential liability by studying power line-ignited fires in California’s electric utility sector. In this setting, when a power line-ignited fire damages a structure, the owner of the power line assumes the cost. The unique setting allows me to estimate how firm precautions vary across the entire distribution of liabilities they face. Using exogenous variation in firms’ expected liabilities from potential fire ignitions across days, I show that, on average, firms are 0.03 percentage points more likely to take costly precautionary actions as the level of expected liability that they face increases by 10 % (mean of 0.6 %). Applying a back of the envelope calculation suggests that, at its mean distribution circuit, the most responsive firm increases precautionary investments by $10 per dollar increase in its expected liability. Furthermore, I show that firms’ precautionary responses weaken as the likelihood of bankruptcy from expected liability increases. Applying the estimates to a stylized model implies that limiting firms’ exposure to liability across their service territory would create aggregate social welfare benefits between $27 million and $270 million.
{"title":"The consequences of wildfire liability for firm precaution: Evidence from power shutoffs in California","authors":"Christopher Malloy","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105552","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105552","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines firm responses to the entire distribution of potential liability by studying power line-ignited fires in California’s electric utility sector. In this setting, when a power line-ignited fire damages a structure, the owner of the power line assumes the cost. The unique setting allows me to estimate how firm precautions vary across the entire distribution of liabilities they face. Using exogenous variation in firms’ expected liabilities from potential fire ignitions across days, I show that, on average, firms are 0.03 percentage points more likely to take costly precautionary actions as the level of expected liability that they face increases by 10 % (mean of 0.6 %). Applying a back of the envelope calculation suggests that, at its mean distribution circuit, the most responsive firm increases precautionary investments by $10 per dollar increase in its expected liability. Furthermore, I show that firms’ precautionary responses weaken as the likelihood of bankruptcy from expected liability increases. Applying the estimates to a stylized model implies that limiting firms’ exposure to liability across their service territory would create aggregate social welfare benefits between $27 million and $270 million.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105552"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105558
Jayant Vivek Ganguli, Friederike Mengel
We investigate the potential of social influence to increase people’s willingness to mitigate their carbon impact. In a large-scale online experiment consisting of two waves of data collection participants are given the choice to spend any share of a 10 GBP endowment on mitigation. If a wave-1 participant is told that their (anonymized) choice will be observed by a wave-2 participant before that participant makes their choice, then the wave-1 participant’s willingness to mitigate (WTM) increases by about . This is not the case if their choice is observed by the wave-2 participant after that participant has already made their choice, which demonstrates that it is indeed the possibility of influence and not only observability that matters. Increasing influence at the extensive margin, i.e. increasing the number of wave-2 participants observing the choice, does not increase WTM. We also elicit beliefs and find that most participants overestimate how much influence they have.
{"title":"Social influence and carbon dioxide mitigation","authors":"Jayant Vivek Ganguli, Friederike Mengel","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105558","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105558","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the potential of social influence to increase people’s willingness to mitigate their carbon impact. In a large-scale online experiment consisting of two waves of data collection participants are given the choice to spend any share of a 10 GBP endowment on mitigation. If a wave-1 participant is told that their (anonymized) choice will be observed by a wave-2 participant <em>before</em> that participant makes their choice, then the wave-1 participant’s willingness to mitigate (WTM) increases by about <span><math><mn>17</mn><mspace></mspace><mi>%</mi></math></span>. This is not the case if their choice is observed by the wave-2 participant <em>after</em> that participant has already made their choice, which demonstrates that it is indeed the possibility of influence and not only observability that matters. Increasing influence at the extensive margin, i.e. increasing the number of wave-2 participants observing the choice, does not increase WTM. We also elicit beliefs and find that most participants overestimate how much influence they have.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105558"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-22DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105556
Katy Bergstrom, William Dodds, Nicholas Lacoste, Juan Rios
This paper quantifies how much people would be willing to pay to remove frictions that impede them from working their ideal number of hours using two sufficient statistics: (1) the percentage difference between ideal (i.e., frictionless) hours and actual hours, and (2) the Hicksian elasticity of ideal hours with respect to the after-tax wage rate. We implement this method to construct estimates of the willingness-to-pay to remove frictions in the United States and Germany. There are three core findings: (1) the cost of adjustment frictions (an omnibus measure encompassing, for example, fixed costs of adjustment, discrete choice sets, and search costs) is large for any reasonable value of the Hicksian ideal hours elasticity, even when accounting for multiple labor supply decisions, endogenous wages, and dynamic decisions; (2) the cumulative cost of adjustment frictions and tax misperceptions is even larger: individuals in the U.S. (Germany) would be willing to pay at least 7 % (4 %) of their income on average to remove these two frictions in hours worked; and (3) adjustment frictions appear to be much more costly than tax misperceptions.
{"title":"Estimating the welfare cost of labor supply frictions","authors":"Katy Bergstrom, William Dodds, Nicholas Lacoste, Juan Rios","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105556","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105556","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper quantifies how much people would be willing to pay to remove frictions that impede them from working their ideal number of hours using two sufficient statistics: (1) the percentage difference between ideal (i.e., frictionless) hours and actual hours, and (2) the Hicksian elasticity of ideal hours with respect to the after-tax wage rate. We implement this method to construct estimates of the willingness-to-pay to remove frictions in the United States and Germany. There are three core findings: (1) the cost of adjustment frictions (an omnibus measure encompassing, for example, fixed costs of adjustment, discrete choice sets, and search costs) is large for any reasonable value of the Hicksian ideal hours elasticity, even when accounting for multiple labor supply decisions, endogenous wages, and dynamic decisions; (2) the cumulative cost of adjustment frictions and tax misperceptions is even larger: individuals in the U.S. (Germany) would be willing to pay at least 7 % (4 %) of their income on average to remove these two frictions in hours worked; and (3) adjustment frictions appear to be much more costly than tax misperceptions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105556"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-22DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105544
Jacob Goldin , Sebastian Koehne , Nicholas Lawson
We study the optimal taxation of expenditures that generate income while also serving a consumption function. We characterize the Pareto optimal income tax deduction for such mixed-purpose expenditures within a generalized Atkinson–Stiglitz model. Pareto optimality requires a partial deduction for mixed-purpose expenditures, where the deduction rate depends on the fraction of an expenditure’s marginal benefits that are attributable to income-generation rather than consumption. We extend our results to account for several practical considerations, including potential constraints related to a uniform deduction rate or a fixed income tax schedule.
{"title":"Optimal income tax deductions for mixed business and personal expenditures","authors":"Jacob Goldin , Sebastian Koehne , Nicholas Lawson","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105544","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105544","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal taxation of expenditures that generate income while also serving a consumption function. We characterize the Pareto optimal income tax deduction for such mixed-purpose expenditures within a generalized Atkinson–Stiglitz model. Pareto optimality requires a partial deduction for mixed-purpose expenditures, where the deduction rate depends on the fraction of an expenditure’s marginal benefits that are attributable to income-generation rather than consumption. We extend our results to account for several practical considerations, including potential constraints related to a uniform deduction rate or a fixed income tax schedule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105544"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-22DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105543
Erhan Artuc , Guillermo Falcone , Guido Porto , Bob Rijkers
This paper analyzes the welfare impacts of import bans in Nigeria and how these impacts are shaped by evasion. Bans were not effectively enforced, thus fostering informal trade. The imposition of bans nonetheless increased consumer prices by 9.9 percent on average. However, price increases were substantially attenuated for goods for which trade policy is harder to enforce. Import bans disproportionately hurt richer households, who likewise disproportionately benefit from evasion.
{"title":"Protectionism, evasion and household welfare evidence from Nigeria’s import bans","authors":"Erhan Artuc , Guillermo Falcone , Guido Porto , Bob Rijkers","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105543","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105543","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the welfare impacts of import bans in Nigeria and how these impacts are shaped by evasion. Bans were not effectively enforced, thus fostering informal trade. The imposition of bans nonetheless increased consumer prices by 9.9 percent on average. However, price increases were substantially attenuated for goods for which trade policy is harder to enforce. Import bans disproportionately hurt richer households, who likewise disproportionately benefit from evasion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105543"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior research has established that objective, test-score-based school accountability measures impact school leaders. Subjective evaluations, on the other hand, can provide a more nuanced assessment of school quality. This paper investigates the impact of subjective school inspection ratings on the salary and career outcomes of school principals. Ratings capture not just overall school quality, but also more granular aspects such as leadership quality, teaching and student achievement. Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the overall school inspection rating has substantial impact on principals’ salaries and their rate of exit from public sector schooling. These effects are highly asymmetric: worse ratings have a substantially larger impact compared to rating improvements. Our findings suggest that competition is a key mechanism through which changes in school inspection ratings affect principals. Crucially, by leveraging detailed quality ratings, we show for the first time that the labor market can distinguish between signals concerning overall school quality and those specific to senior management quality.
{"title":"The impact of subjective school ratings on principal compensation and turnover","authors":"Iftikhar Hussain , Vincenzo Scrutinio , Shqiponja Telhaj","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105524","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105524","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Prior research has established that objective, test-score-based school accountability measures impact school leaders. Subjective evaluations, on the other hand, can provide a more nuanced assessment of school quality. This paper investigates the impact of subjective school inspection ratings on the salary and career outcomes of school principals. Ratings capture not just overall school quality, but also more granular aspects such as leadership quality, teaching and student achievement. Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the overall school inspection rating has substantial impact on principals’ salaries and their rate of exit from public sector schooling. These effects are highly asymmetric: worse ratings have a substantially larger impact compared to rating improvements. Our findings suggest that competition is a key mechanism through which changes in school inspection ratings affect principals. Crucially, by leveraging detailed quality ratings, we show for the first time that the labor market can distinguish between signals concerning overall school quality and those specific to senior management quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105524"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105540
Mario Bossler , Ying Liang , Thorsten Schank
Germany introduced a national minimum wage in 2015. While prior studies find limited effects on overall employment, we go into detail and examine its impact on working hours and minijobs. The minimum wage significantly reduces inequality in hourly and monthly wages. While average working hours remain stable, minijobbers experience notable cuts in working hours, which can be explained by the institutional context shaping the effects of the minimum wage. Employment in regular jobs remains unaffected, but minijobs decline, driven by transitions into both regular jobs and non-employment. The latter implies an employment elasticity of for minijob employment. Following the first major minimum wage increase in 2022, we reveal a reduction in working hours that is not limited to minijobs, corresponding to an employment volume elasticity of .
{"title":"The devil is in the details: Heterogeneous effects of the German minimum wage on working hours and minijobs","authors":"Mario Bossler , Ying Liang , Thorsten Schank","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105540","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105540","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Germany introduced a national minimum wage in 2015. While prior studies find limited effects on overall employment, we go into detail and examine its impact on working hours and minijobs. The minimum wage significantly reduces inequality in hourly and monthly wages. While average working hours remain stable, minijobbers experience notable cuts in working hours, which can be explained by the institutional context shaping the effects of the minimum wage. Employment in regular jobs remains unaffected, but minijobs decline, driven by transitions into both regular jobs and non-employment. The latter implies an employment elasticity of <span><math><mo>−</mo><mn>0.16</mn></math></span> for minijob employment. Following the first major minimum wage increase in 2022, we reveal a reduction in working hours that is not limited to minijobs, corresponding to an employment volume elasticity of <span><math><mo>−</mo><mn>0.38</mn></math></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105540"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105541
Andy Brownback , Alex Imas , Michael A. Kuhn
Food choices are canonical examples used to illustrate the importance of time preferences in behavioral economics. However, the literature lacks a direct demonstration that they are well-predicted by incentivized time preference measures. We offer direct evidence by combining a novel, two-question, incentivized time preference measurement with data from a field experiment that includes grocery purchases and consumption. Both our measures of standard discounting and non-stationary discounting are predictive of food choices, capturing a number of behaviors consistent with self-control problems.
{"title":"Time preferences and food choice","authors":"Andy Brownback , Alex Imas , Michael A. Kuhn","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105541","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105541","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Food choices are canonical examples used to illustrate the importance of time preferences in behavioral economics. However, the literature lacks a direct demonstration that they are well-predicted by incentivized time preference measures. We offer direct evidence by combining a novel, two-question, incentivized time preference measurement with data from a field experiment that includes grocery purchases and consumption. Both our measures of standard discounting and non-stationary discounting are predictive of food choices, capturing a number of behaviors consistent with self-control problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105541"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145738168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105534
Jordan S. Berne , Brian A. Jacob , Christina Weiland , Katharine O. Strunk
State laws that mandate in-grade retention for struggling readers are widespread in the U.S., and retention at the secondary school level is common in many countries. Researchers often use regression discontinuity (RD) methods to study such policies, leveraging strict performance cutoffs as an instrument to estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of retention on student achievement. In this paper, we document a likely threat to the internal validity of these studies. Examining two cohorts of Michigan students, we find that being flagged for retention increases reading performance by roughly 0.05 SD, a modest but meaningful impact. However, because being flagged increases the likelihood of actually being retained by only 3.4 percentage points, the implied effect of retention itself under standard assumptions would be an implausibly large 1.3 SD. Survey evidence suggests that flagged students receive more intensive reading support even if they are not retained, a violation of the exclusion restriction. Moreover, we estimate similar effects in districts that did not retain any students. These results raise concerns about potential bias in previously estimated retention effects and highlight the importance of carefully considering exclusion assumptions in analyses of multifaceted education interventions.
{"title":"Assessing the impact of grade retention: A cautionary tale of exclusion restriction violations","authors":"Jordan S. Berne , Brian A. Jacob , Christina Weiland , Katharine O. Strunk","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105534","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105534","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>State laws that mandate in-grade retention for struggling readers are widespread in the U.S., and retention at the secondary school level is common in many countries. Researchers often use regression discontinuity (RD) methods to study such policies, leveraging strict performance cutoffs as an instrument to estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of retention on student achievement. In this paper, we document a likely threat to the internal validity of these studies. Examining two cohorts of Michigan students, we find that being flagged for retention increases reading performance by roughly 0.05 SD, a modest but meaningful impact. However, because being flagged increases the likelihood of actually being retained by only 3.4 percentage points, the implied effect of retention itself under standard assumptions would be an implausibly large 1.3 SD. Survey evidence suggests that flagged students receive more intensive reading support even if they are not retained, a violation of the exclusion restriction. Moreover, we estimate similar effects in districts that did not retain <em>any</em> students. These results raise concerns about potential bias in previously estimated retention effects and highlight the importance of carefully considering exclusion assumptions in analyses of multifaceted education interventions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"253 ","pages":"Article 105534"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145665454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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