Journal of Public Economics最新文献

We use regression discontinuity design and difference-in-differences methods to estimate the impact of a one-time hiring subsidy for low-educated unemployed youths in Belgium during the recovery from the Great Recession. Within a year of unemployment, the subsidy increases job-finding in the private sector by 10 percentage points. Over six years, high school graduates secure 2.8 more quarters of private employment. However, they transition from public jobs and self-employment, resulting in no net increase in overall employment, albeit with better wages. High school dropouts experience no lasting benefits. Additionally, in tight labor markets near Luxembourg’s employment hub, the subsidy results in a complete deadweight loss.

Rural households contend with numerous uninsured risks that hinder their ability to leverage profitable yet risky opportunities. We study whether the provision of insurance coverage for medical expenditure, one of the most substantial and unpredictable risk, can stimulate entrepreneurship and other risky financial decisions among rural households. We leverage the progressive nationwide rollout of a universal public health insurance program in rural China. We find that the introduction of health insurance led to a substantial increase in rural households engagement in entrepreneurship. This increase is mainly driven by the risk sharing of health insurance, rather than a reduction in realized medical expenses. The entrepreneurship-promoting effect is also evident at an aggregate level, fostering the growth of smallholder businesses in rural counties. Our findings shed light on the understudied, favorable impact of health insurance on household’s risk taking in rural markets of developing countries.

Can political leaders influence macroeconomic expectations on a global scale? We design a large-scale survey experiment among influential economic experts working in more than 100 countries and use the 2020 US presidential election as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effect of the US incumbent change on global macroeconomic expectations. We find large effects of the change in US leadership on growth expectations of international experts. The effect works through both economic (more positive expectations about trade) and psychological (irrational exuberance at the defeat of an unpopular but powerful leader) channels. Our findings suggest important political spillover effects in the formation of macroeconomic expectations.

Multinational profit shifting is a major concern for low and middle income countries (LMICs). Many have enacted anti-profit shifting rules in order to constrain this type of tax avoidance behavior. Yet, not much is known on the rules’ effects. We offer a first empirical assessment, providing two pieces of evidence: First, we draw on macro data for more than 120 LMICs for a 30-year-period and show that the introduction of transfer pricing (TP) rules – provisions that constrain profit shifting from mis-pricing of intra-firm trade – significantly increased corporate tax revenue collection in LMICs. Second, we use rich tax administrative and trade data for South Africa to provide “first-stage” evidence for firms’ behavioral response to stricter TP provisions: we establish that a tightening of South African TP rules reduced intra-firm trade mis-pricing and increased taxable income reporting of affected multinational firms.

Despite a longstanding interest in the potential substitution of labor and capital, limited empirical evidence exists regarding the causal relationship between labor supply and the development of labor-saving technologies. This study examines the impact of exogenous changes in regional labor supply on automation innovation by leveraging a German immigrant allocation policy during the 1990s and 2000s. The findings reveal that an increase in the low-skilled workforce reduces automation innovation, as measured by patents. This reduction is most pronounced for large firms within the manufacturing sector and primarily concerns process-related automation innovations. This suggests that the effect is channeled through changes in internal demand for automation innovation. Consistent with a labor scarcity mechanism, the effect is confined to tight labor markets.

Economic inequality may affect a wide range of societal outcomes, for example crime rates, economic growth, and political polarization. In this paper we discuss how to model such effects in welfarist frameworks. Our main suggestion is to treat economic inequality itself as an externality, which has wide-ranging implications for classical economic theory. We show this through the Mirrlees (1971) optimal non-linear income taxation model, where we focus on a post-tax income inequality externality. Optimal top marginal tax rates are particularly affected by the externality, implying a novel equality dimension to optimal top tax rate design. We propose that inequality’s externality properties may have larger optimal top tax rate implications than standard revenue concerns; our model thus provides a theoretical basis for real-world governmental tax choices that seem irrational under standard optimal taxation models. We also show that the total inequality aversion implied by the current U.S. tax system is insufficient to accommodate both social welfare weights that are decreasing in income and a significant concern for inequality’s externality effects.

We report on a large-scale urban resettlement program in Uruguay. Under the program, thousands of low- to middle-income households were randomly assigned over the course of seven years to ownership of apartments in new buildings in more central areas and received a subsidy averaging $44,000 per household. We match applicants to comprehensive administrative data on employment, schooling, fertility, and voting over the decade after the move. We find that the program led to a small decline in fertility for women and a two-percentage-point increase in formal employment but did not affect school attendance. The relocation program did not result in transformative improvements in the lives of its beneficiaries, likely because of its minimum income requirements and the lack of strong spatial inequality in Uruguay.

Many claimants of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) retain legal representation to help with the approval process. The Social Security Administration imposes strict rules on representative compensation. Representatives are only paid if claimants are awarded disability, and they are paid the lesser of 25 percent of the claimant’s past due benefits or a pre-specified maximum fee ($7,200 since 2022). Because past due benefits are a function of the number of months claimants wait to be awarded, representatives face incentives to delay case resolution until past due benefits push the representative fees past the fee ceiling. We use difference-in-differences to evaluate how these incentives impact SSDI claimant wait times. After the fee ceiling increased in 2002, average wait times increased by 0.85 months among claimants for whom the fee threshold is more binding, implying a 2.6–5.6 month increase for claimants with representatives. This indicates that the structure of representative compensation does matter for case outcomes, and highlights the importance of interactions with auxiliary agents so common in modern social programs.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization sparked the most profound transformation of the landscape of abortion access in 50 years. We provide the first estimates of the effects of near-total abortion bans on fertility using a pre-registered synthetic difference-in-differences design applied to newly released provisional natality data for the first half of 2023. The results indicate that states with abortion bans experienced an average increase in births of 2.3 percent relative to if no bans had been enforced.

Blind adoption of opinions put forward by political parties and influential figures can sometimes be harmful. Focusing on cases where the partisan gap on policy support has not yet arisen, we investigate whether its formation can be prevented by encouraging prior active engagement with non-partisan information. To address this question, we recruited N=851 Republicans for a study about net neutrality, an issue largely unfamiliar to the electorate, which refers to equal treatment of all internet traffic. In a pre-registered experiment, we randomly changed the order in which the following two types of information were provided: (i) partisan, underscoring Republicans’ opposition and Democrats’ support, and (ii) non-partisan, where the participants evaluated factual arguments about the pros and cons of the policy. Despite holding total information constant, we find that those who saw the non-partisan block first donated 46% more to a charity advocating for net neutrality (p=0.001). The treatment effect persisted in an obfuscated follow-up study, conducted several weeks after the intervention. However, we do not find an effect on donations when repeating the main study with a sample of Democrats.