In this research we explore why people have dualist beliefs about certain psychological phenomena (associating them with the soul or spirit rather than the brain), and the consequences of those beliefs for people's lay conceptions of what science can and cannot explain about how the mind works. We also explore whether dualist beliefs are intuitive and corrected upon reflection or rather held explicitly. We found that the first-person subjective experience (FPSE) of psychological phenomena predicts the extent to which individuals hold dualist beliefs about them (attributing those phenomena more to the soul/spirit and less to the brain). Our results further suggest that individuals are intuitive dualists, expressing different beliefs when making fast vs. slow judgments about the source of psychological phenomena that are associated with a strong FPSE (e.g., falling in love), with fast judgments leaning more towards the soul/spirit and slow judgments towards the brain. This dissociation is not observed for phenomena that do not elicit a FPSE (e.g., reading a map). Finally, this intuitive dualism has consequences for people's beliefs about science: Phenomena thought to be anchored on a material basis (i.e., the brain) are believed to be more explainable through science than those that are not (an effect supported by both correlational and experimental evidence).
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