Pub Date : 2025-11-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104843
Emma Halfmann , Christoph Kenntemich , Selma C. Rudert , Jan A. Häusser
Targets of ostracism are motivated to reconnect with others socially. One strategy to reconnect with others could be to adopt prevailing opinions in a group. Yet, as opinions held by groups are often perceived as more extreme than opinions held by individuals, targets of ostracism could over-adjust, resulting in opinion extremization. Here, we aim to investigate whether ostracism increases opinion extremization in a group context in targets of ostracism. In two studies, we used an Ostracism Online paradigm (pilot study, N = 144) and an essay task (preregistered main study, N = 286) to manipulate the inclusionary status (ostracism vs. neutral) before participants took part in a simulated group chat. The strength of opinion of the participants was measured pre- and post-discussion. Our prediction that the strength of opinion will show a greater increase post-discussion (vs. pre-discussion) in the ostracism condition (vs. neutral) (Hypothesis 1) was not confirmed. Also, there was no indirect effect via decreased need-fulfillment in the needs of the inclusionary cluster (Hypothesis 2).
{"title":"Ostracism and opinion extremization","authors":"Emma Halfmann , Christoph Kenntemich , Selma C. Rudert , Jan A. Häusser","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104843","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104843","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Targets of ostracism are motivated to reconnect with others socially. One strategy to reconnect with others could be to adopt prevailing opinions in a group. Yet, as opinions held by groups are often perceived as more extreme than opinions held by individuals, targets of ostracism could over-adjust, resulting in opinion extremization. Here, we aim to investigate whether ostracism increases opinion extremization in a group context in targets of ostracism. In two studies, we used an Ostracism Online paradigm (pilot study, <em>N</em> = 144) and an essay task (preregistered main study, <em>N</em> = 286) to manipulate the inclusionary status (ostracism vs. neutral) before participants took part in a simulated group chat. The strength of opinion of the participants was measured pre- and post-discussion. Our prediction that the strength of opinion will show a greater increase post-discussion (vs. pre-discussion) in the ostracism condition (vs. neutral) (<span><span>Hypothesis 1</span></span>) was not confirmed. Also, there was no indirect effect via decreased need-fulfillment in the needs of the inclusionary cluster (<span><span>Hypothesis 2</span></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104843"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145447554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-05DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104839
Chenxiao Zhao, Marret K. Noordewier, Michiel van Elk
Awe is typically elicited in response to perceptually vast stimuli and is often characterized by a reduced focus on the self and feeling small and insignificant. One key effect of awe is that it induces “self-transcendent experiences” (STEs), which involve two components: connectedness and self-loss. It is, however, not clear yet what determines whether the connectedness or self-loss component of STEs is most likely to occur in response to awe. Recently, awe has been classified into positive-awe and threatening-awe—depending on the type of elicitor, and we suggest that these different types of awe determine the relative strength of connectedness or self-loss. The current registered report presents two studies that investigated the effects of positive-awe and threatening-awe on connectedness and self-loss by inducing awe via (1) asking participants to recall and write about “positive-awe” or “threatening-awe” experiences (Experiment 1) and (2) presenting participants with a positive-awe or a threatening-awe inducing video (Experiment 2), with a neutral state as control condition in both experiments. We found that positive-awe resulted in stronger connectedness than threatening-awe, and both types of awe resulted in stronger connectedness compared to the neutral condition. In addition, we found that both types of awe resulted in stronger self-loss than the neutral condition. However, using a novel scale to distinguish between positive and negative self-loss, we did not find differences between positive-awe and threatening-awe on both positive and negative self-loss. The proposed studies lead to a better understanding of positive- and threatening-awe and their relation to self-transcendent experiences.
{"title":"Effects of awe on self-transcendence: A registered report study","authors":"Chenxiao Zhao, Marret K. Noordewier, Michiel van Elk","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104839","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104839","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Awe is typically elicited in response to perceptually vast stimuli and is often characterized by a reduced focus on the self and feeling small and insignificant. One key effect of awe is that it induces “self-transcendent experiences” (STEs), which involve two components: connectedness and self-loss. It is, however, not clear yet what determines whether the connectedness or self-loss component of STEs is most likely to occur in response to awe. Recently, awe has been classified into positive-awe and threatening-awe—depending on the type of elicitor, and we suggest that these different types of awe determine the relative strength of connectedness or self-loss. The current registered report presents two studies that investigated the effects of positive-awe and threatening-awe on connectedness and self-loss by inducing awe via (1) asking participants to recall and write about “positive-awe” or “threatening-awe” experiences (Experiment 1) and (2) presenting participants with a positive-awe or a threatening-awe inducing video (Experiment 2), with a neutral state as control condition in both experiments. We found that positive-awe resulted in stronger connectedness than threatening-awe, and both types of awe resulted in stronger connectedness compared to the neutral condition. In addition, we found that both types of awe resulted in stronger self-loss than the neutral condition. However, using a novel scale to distinguish between positive and negative self-loss, we did not find differences between positive-awe and threatening-awe on both positive and negative self-loss. The proposed studies lead to a better understanding of positive- and threatening-awe and their relation to self-transcendent experiences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104839"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145441955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104848
Blake Quinney , Elena Zubielevitch , Tyler G. Okimoto
Offering forgiveness can confer benefits to victims in terms of enhanced sense of self. In the present research, we argue that refusing to forgive may also promote psychological benefits. Across three studies, a recall design (N = 300), an experiment (N = 327), and its pre-registered replication (N = 296), we examined the potential psychological benefits of refusing forgiveness and offering forgiveness compared to inaction. We found that refusing forgiveness (vs. inaction) resulted in greater feelings of power (n.s. Study 1), greater value integrity, and mediated by these, refusing to forgive increased state self-esteem. We also found that offering forgiveness (vs. inaction) resulted in greater feelings of power (n.s. Studies 1 and 2), greater value integrity, and greater state self-esteem. These findings demonstrate that while offering and refusing to forgive may be opposing responses to transgressions, both actions can provide psychological benefits for victims. This research offers support to victims who wish to express their genuine feelings of unforgiveness because the act of refusing forgiveness can have psychological benefits.
{"title":"Refusing to forgive can have psychological benefits","authors":"Blake Quinney , Elena Zubielevitch , Tyler G. Okimoto","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104848","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104848","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Offering forgiveness can confer benefits to victims in terms of enhanced sense of self. In the present research, we argue that refusing to forgive may also promote psychological benefits. Across three studies, a recall design (<em>N</em> = 300), an experiment (<em>N</em> = 327), and its pre-registered replication (<em>N</em> = 296), we examined the potential psychological benefits of refusing forgiveness and offering forgiveness compared to inaction. We found that refusing forgiveness (vs. inaction) resulted in greater feelings of power (n.s. Study 1), greater value integrity, and mediated by these, refusing to forgive increased state self-esteem. We also found that offering forgiveness (vs. inaction) resulted in greater feelings of power (n.s. Studies 1 and 2), greater value integrity, and greater state self-esteem. These findings demonstrate that while offering and refusing to forgive may be opposing responses to transgressions, both actions can provide psychological benefits for victims. This research offers support to victims who wish to express their genuine feelings of unforgiveness because the act of refusing forgiveness can have psychological benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104848"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145441453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104845
Francisco Cruz, André Mata
In this research we explore why people have dualist beliefs about certain psychological phenomena (associating them with the soul or spirit rather than the brain), and the consequences of those beliefs for people's lay conceptions of what science can and cannot explain about how the mind works. We also explore whether dualist beliefs are intuitive and corrected upon reflection or rather held explicitly. We found that the first-person subjective experience (FPSE) of psychological phenomena predicts the extent to which individuals hold dualist beliefs about them (attributing those phenomena more to the soul/spirit and less to the brain). Our results further suggest that individuals are intuitive dualists, expressing different beliefs when making fast vs. slow judgments about the source of psychological phenomena that are associated with a strong FPSE (e.g., falling in love), with fast judgments leaning more towards the soul/spirit and slow judgments towards the brain. This dissociation is not observed for phenomena that do not elicit a FPSE (e.g., reading a map). Finally, this intuitive dualism has consequences for people's beliefs about science: Phenomena thought to be anchored on a material basis (i.e., the brain) are believed to be more explainable through science than those that are not (an effect supported by both correlational and experimental evidence).
{"title":"Love is in the soul, math is in the brain: Dualist intuitions and belief in psychological science","authors":"Francisco Cruz, André Mata","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104845","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104845","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this research we explore why people have dualist beliefs about certain psychological phenomena (associating them with the soul or spirit rather than the brain), and the consequences of those beliefs for people's lay conceptions of what science can and cannot explain about how the mind works. We also explore whether dualist beliefs are intuitive and corrected upon reflection or rather held explicitly. We found that the first-person subjective experience (FPSE) of psychological phenomena predicts the extent to which individuals hold dualist beliefs about them (attributing those phenomena more to the soul/spirit and less to the brain). Our results further suggest that individuals are intuitive dualists, expressing different beliefs when making fast vs. slow judgments about the source of psychological phenomena that are associated with a strong FPSE (e.g., falling in love), with fast judgments leaning more towards the soul/spirit and slow judgments towards the brain. This dissociation is not observed for phenomena that do not elicit a FPSE (e.g., reading a map). Finally, this intuitive dualism has consequences for people's beliefs about science: Phenomena thought to be anchored on a material basis (i.e., the brain) are believed to be more explainable through science than those that are not (an effect supported by both correlational and experimental evidence).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104845"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145404726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104840
Michael W. White, Rebecca Ponce de Leon
The arts are widely recognized for their profound psychological and social benefits. Although historically viewed as a uniquely human pursuit, art is increasingly created with artificial intelligence (AI). In the current work, we explore whether AI-generated art evokes the same emotional reactions and inspires the same interpersonal benefits as human-created art. Integrating appraisal theories of emotion and philosophical accounts of the arts, we propose that art believed to be AI-generated elicits less awe than human-created art, which in turn diminishes empathy. Across five preregistered studies (N = 1598), we find consistent support for these relationships across multiple artistic media (visual and literary) and participant samples (art museum patrons, online participants, and community members). Although art is often an effective conduit for fostering empathy, our findings reveal that AI-generated art may lack the capacity to inspire awe in the same way as human-created art, diminishing its ability to cultivate empathy. This work reveals that responses to art are shaped by beliefs about its creator, raising important questions about the emotional and social consequences of AI's growing role in creative domains.
{"title":"Less “awe”-some art: How AI diminishes the empathic power of the arts","authors":"Michael W. White, Rebecca Ponce de Leon","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104840","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104840","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The arts are widely recognized for their profound psychological and social benefits. Although historically viewed as a uniquely human pursuit, art is increasingly created with artificial intelligence (AI). In the current work, we explore whether AI-generated art evokes the same emotional reactions and inspires the same interpersonal benefits as human-created art. Integrating appraisal theories of emotion and philosophical accounts of the arts, we propose that art believed to be AI-generated elicits less awe than human-created art, which in turn diminishes empathy. Across five preregistered studies (<em>N</em> = 1598), we find consistent support for these relationships across multiple artistic media (visual and literary) and participant samples (art museum patrons, online participants, and community members). Although art is often an effective conduit for fostering empathy, our findings reveal that AI-generated art may lack the capacity to inspire awe in the same way as human-created art, diminishing its ability to cultivate empathy. This work reveals that responses to art are shaped by beliefs about its creator, raising important questions about the emotional and social consequences of AI's growing role in creative domains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104840"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145404725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104844
Rajen A. Anderson , Benjamin C. Ruisch , Maryam Kouchaki
Major contemporary religions tend to emphasize self-control and moral purity in their believers. Such belief systems may have implications for moral judgments and social predictions. One topic that has received attention—with mixed results—is the relative punitiveness of religious believers. In the present research, we examine whether religiosity predicts punitive attitudes and propose a novel mechanism: slippery slope thinking, in which small changes are predicted to have potentially disastrous consequences. In eight samples across three nations and religious traditions, we find that greater religiosity is associated with greater slippery slope thinking. This association is related to psychological tendencies to believe in karma and moralize matters of self-control. Furthermore, we find that slippery slope thinking helps explain why more religious people are more punitive, especially for relatively minor transgressions. This research provides insight into the psychology of religious beliefs and provides a cognitive mechanism (slippery slope thinking) linking religiosity and punishment.
{"title":"Slippery slope thinking links religiosity to punishment","authors":"Rajen A. Anderson , Benjamin C. Ruisch , Maryam Kouchaki","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104844","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104844","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Major contemporary religions tend to emphasize self-control and moral purity in their believers. Such belief systems may have implications for moral judgments and social predictions. One topic that has received attention—with mixed results—is the relative punitiveness of religious believers. In the present research, we examine whether religiosity predicts punitive attitudes and propose a novel mechanism: slippery slope thinking, in which small changes are predicted to have potentially disastrous consequences. In eight samples across three nations and religious traditions, we find that greater religiosity is associated with greater slippery slope thinking. This association is related to psychological tendencies to believe in karma and moralize matters of self-control. Furthermore, we find that slippery slope thinking helps explain why more religious people are more punitive, especially for relatively minor transgressions. This research provides insight into the psychology of religious beliefs and provides a cognitive mechanism (slippery slope thinking) linking religiosity and punishment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104844"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104841
Samantha N. Smith , Sophia L. Pink , Erika L. Kirgios , Edward H. Chang , Katherine L. Milkman
People naturally seek group memberships that support their need for belonging and desire to interact with like-minded others (e.g., those with similar affiliations, such as political parties, preferred sports teams, or academic disciplines). However, we theorize and show that people may be more willing to forgo such homophily in the face of competition. We propose this pattern arises because of the belief that having a distinctive identity will yield two strategic advantages: (1) it will render a person's ideas and contributions more unique, improving their performance relative to the group; and (2) it will leave evaluators with no clear comparison standard, allowing the person in question to stand out from their group. Across four pre-registered studies (N = 3200), including a correlational field study of full-time workers and three experiments involving both real and hypothetical group choices, we show that competition increases people's willingness to opt into groups without like-minded others (e.g., becoming the only Democrat among Republicans) and find evidence consistent with our two proposed mechanisms. This research sheds new light on when and why competitive environments systematically shape our strategic thinking and affiliative choices.
{"title":"Which group should I join? Competition drives group selection away from like-minded others","authors":"Samantha N. Smith , Sophia L. Pink , Erika L. Kirgios , Edward H. Chang , Katherine L. Milkman","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104841","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104841","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People naturally seek group memberships that support their need for belonging and desire to interact with like-minded others (e.g., those with similar affiliations, such as political parties, preferred sports teams, or academic disciplines). However, we theorize and show that people may be more willing to forgo such homophily in the face of competition. We propose this pattern arises because of the belief that having a distinctive identity will yield two strategic advantages: (1) it will render a person's ideas and contributions more unique, improving their performance relative to the group; and (2) it will leave evaluators with no clear comparison standard, allowing the person in question to stand out from their group. Across four pre-registered studies (<em>N</em> = 3200), including a correlational field study of full-time workers and three experiments involving both real and hypothetical group choices, we show that competition increases people's willingness to opt into groups without like-minded others (e.g., becoming the only Democrat among Republicans) and find evidence consistent with our two proposed mechanisms. This research sheds new light on when and why competitive environments systematically shape our strategic thinking and affiliative choices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104841"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145396695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104833
Zi Ye , Feiteng Long , Roujia Feng , Yi Zhang , Wilco W. van Dijk
Literature on person perception suggests the primacy of morality over sociability in interactions. While theories of emotion highlight the importance of adhering to socially acceptable display rules, a contentious debate surrounds whether individuals prioritize moral or sociable communication of emotions. We investigated how people perceive and react to others who falsely communicate empathic versus truthfully communicate unempathic emotions related to others' (mis)fortunes. Through three preregistered studies, we examined participants' perceptions (sociability and morality) and behavioral reactions (in a Dictator Game) by employing various paradigms (vignette and retrospective recall) and situations (e.g., promotion and lottery). Consistently across our studies, we found that participants perceived targets who truthfully communicated unempathic emotions as higher on morality and lower on sociability compared to those who falsely communicated empathic emotions. Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 revealed that participants formed more favorable impressions of, and were more willing to interact with, the target who falsely communicated empathic emotions, as opposed to those who truthfully communicated unempathic emotions. This preference was explained by perceived morality and sociability attributed to the targets. Building on these findings, we propose two follow-up studies aimed at replicating our results and extending them to a laboratory setting – a Gamble Game where participants will directly encounter an actual (mis)fortune, and a Dictator Game with an allegedly real interaction partner. Our expected findings indicate that falsely communicating empathic emotions is favored over truthfully communicating unempathic emotions, suggesting the primacy of sociability over morality in the context of communicating emotions related to others' (mis)fortunes.
{"title":"Registered Report Stage I: Prioritizing sociability over morality: Preferring false empathic over truthful unempathic emotion communication","authors":"Zi Ye , Feiteng Long , Roujia Feng , Yi Zhang , Wilco W. van Dijk","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104833","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104833","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Literature on person perception suggests the primacy of morality over sociability in interactions. While theories of emotion highlight the importance of adhering to socially acceptable display rules, a contentious debate surrounds whether individuals prioritize moral or sociable communication of emotions. We investigated how people perceive and react to others who falsely communicate empathic versus truthfully communicate unempathic emotions related to others' (mis)fortunes. Through three preregistered studies, we examined participants' perceptions (sociability and morality) and behavioral reactions (in a Dictator Game) by employing various paradigms (vignette and retrospective recall) and situations (e.g., promotion and lottery). Consistently across our studies, we found that participants perceived targets who truthfully communicated unempathic emotions as higher on morality and lower on sociability compared to those who falsely communicated empathic emotions. Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 revealed that participants formed more favorable impressions of, and were more willing to interact with, the target who falsely communicated empathic emotions, as opposed to those who truthfully communicated unempathic emotions. This preference was explained by perceived morality and sociability attributed to the targets. Building on these findings, we propose two follow-up studies aimed at replicating our results and extending them to a laboratory setting – a Gamble Game where participants will directly encounter an actual (mis)fortune, and a Dictator Game with an allegedly real interaction partner. Our expected findings indicate that falsely communicating empathic emotions is favored over truthfully communicating unempathic emotions, suggesting the primacy of sociability over morality in the context of communicating emotions related to others' (mis)fortunes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104833"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145332207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-14DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104835
Oliver Genschow , John Protzko , Senne Braem
Scientists debate how the public would react when anti-free will messages are communicated in the media. Taking part in this debate, social psychologists test whether letting participants read texts that argue against the plausibility of free will reduces their beliefs related to free will. However, this research leaves open whether merely reading such a text actually changes free will beliefs over and beyond a single experimental session in the lab. To fill this gap, in three experiments we investigated whether merely reading a short text claiming that free will does not exist, influences beliefs related to free will over time. Two experiments demonstrate that reading an anti-free will text (as compared to a control text) reduces participants' beliefs related to free will when measured on the same day (Experiment 1 and 2), the next day (Experiment 1 and 2) as well as one week later (Experiment 2). Critically, when controlling for potential demand effects by making sure that participants do not associate the assessment of free will beliefs with the first session in which beliefs were manipulated (Experiment 3), results no longer showed an effect of reading the anti-free will text over time. Theoretical and ethical implications of these findings are discussed.
{"title":"Does reading an anti-free will text affect beliefs related to free will over time? — A registered report","authors":"Oliver Genschow , John Protzko , Senne Braem","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104835","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104835","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Scientists debate how the public would react when anti-free will messages are communicated in the media. Taking part in this debate, social psychologists test whether letting participants read texts that argue against the plausibility of free will reduces their beliefs related to free will. However, this research leaves open whether merely reading such a text actually changes free will beliefs over and beyond a single experimental session in the lab. To fill this gap, in three experiments we investigated whether merely reading a short text claiming that free will does not exist, influences beliefs related to free will over time. Two experiments demonstrate that reading an anti-free will text (as compared to a control text) reduces participants' beliefs related to free will when measured on the same day (Experiment 1 and 2), the next day (Experiment 1 and 2) as well as one week later (Experiment 2). Critically, when controlling for potential demand effects by making sure that participants do not associate the assessment of free will beliefs with the first session in which beliefs were manipulated (Experiment 3), results no longer showed an effect of reading the anti-free will text over time. Theoretical and ethical implications of these findings are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 104835"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145311733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104838
Mei Chen , Ruqian Zhang , Yangzhuo Li , Jieqiong Liu , Xianchun Li
Third-party punishment (TPP) and third-party compensation (TPC) are two basic forms of intervention for maintaining fairness. We investigated whether third parties base their intervention on unfair outcomes, intentions, or both through four experiments using economic games and a single-paper meta-analysis. Participants were presented with monetary allocation scenarios designed to reflect different intention-outcome integrations, and then made punishment or compensation decisions. We found that when allocators had no control over the outcome (Experiment 1), TPC was driven solely by outcome fairness. When allocators had partial control (Experiments 2a and 2b), both intention and outcome had main effects on TPC without interaction. Furthermore, when receivers believed the allocator's intention was unfair (Experiment 3), the interaction of intention and outcome significantly affected TPC: intention played a significant role only when the outcome was unfair. The influence of intention and outcome on TPC was driven by third-party moral anger towards the allocators and compassion towards the receivers. In contrast, TPP was consistently shaped by the interaction between intention and outcome across all experiments, regardless of the allocator's control and the receiver's belief. Unfair outcome intensified the intention effect on punishment compared to fair outcome. This effect was driven by third-party compassion. These findings suggest that while third parties consistently integrate both intention and outcome in punishment, their focus on either factor in compensation is influenced by the allocator's control and the receiver's belief. This deepens our understanding of how and why third-party observers engage in third-party intervention.
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