Journal of Experimental Social Psychology最新文献

Predictions are often inaccurate. Still, the direction of prediction errors may vary. Contrary to research on the intention-behavior gap, where people fail to live up to their ambitions, a study on “moral forecasting” found that people behaved more honestly than they predicted. In this registered report, we present two close replication attempts and one conceptual replication attempt of this moral forecasting error across two experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 1839), we recruited a general population sample from the same country as the original study (Canada) to an online experiment. We successfully replicated the moral forecasting error using a math-based cheating task from the original study: Predicted cheating was much higher in a moral forecasting condition than actual cheating in a moral action condition (d = 0.69). In Experiment 2 (N = 1381) we replicated the forecasting error again, using the same task in a general population sample from the U.S. (d = 0.72). However, we were unable to conceptually replicate the effect using a different dishonesty measure, the “mind game”, in Experiment 1 (φ = 0.03). We also could not reduce the forecasting error through a debiasing intervention in Experiment 2 (d = 0.01). Across both experiments, participants predicted that others would cheat much more than they would themselves. In this registered report, we conclude that the moral forecasting error is robust for the original cheating task. We also show that it can generalize contextually (from a lab to an online setting), but not to a different task. Future research may show exactly when predictions about one's own honesty are pessimistic rather than optimistic.

Marginalized groups may face systemic discrimination for generations until concrete advancements in society finally ensure fairer treatment for their members. Although fairness advancements may benefit these groups in the present and future, they do not change the past; they cannot undo the discrimination already experienced by previous generations. However, five studies (N = 1672) suggest that fairness advancements that benefit a marginalized group may change how its members perceive their own prior experiences with discrimination, leading them to see these experiences as having been fairer compared to when there are no such advancements. We find evidence of this revisionism of unfair past experiences in different historically marginalized groups (women and immigrants) and cultural contexts (U.S., U.K., and China). Critically, fairness revisionism arises even when fairness advancements have no objective impact on individuals themselves, as long as there are benefits for current and future members of their social group. Fairness revisionism does not arise, however, in response to gains for marginalized groups to which one does not belong, nor when individuals assess fairness in other groups' past experiences from an outsider's perspective. Overall, this phenomenon may be a double-edged sword: it may provide peace of mind for those treated unfairly by assuaging the memory of adverse experiences, but may also make discrimination issues in society seem less pressing based on the perspective of victims themselves.

Perceivers' ability to use multiple sources of information when forming impressions—including top-down, perceiver-level features, and bottom-up, target-level features—is a hallmark of social cognition. We investigate this primary foundation by examining the role of perceiver-level and target-level variation in perceived racial prototypicality in the U.S. In Study 1 (200 unique faces; 2608 raters), we quantified contributions of perceiver- and target-level effects to perceived racial prototypicality. Perceiver- and target-level contributions varied across racial category (Asian, Black, Latine, Middle Eastern, and Multiracial), with Multiracial and Middle Eastern prototypicality being more perceiver-driven. Although several appearance features (e.g., perceived ambiguity, skin tone) related to perceived prototypicality, there were distinctions in how perceivers used them (e.g., some people strongly used skin tone to infer Black prototypicality, while others used this less or not at all). A second study (N = 511) experimentally manipulated race essentialist beliefs. While there was no impact on perceived racial prototypicality, regardless of the category (Asian, Black, Latine, Middle Eastern, Multiracial, and Native American), Middle Eastern, Multiracial, and Native American prototypicality were generally more perceiver-driven than other categories, converging with Study 1. Further, perceivers' social dominance orientation, but not several other individual differences, were associated with less use of each of these categories. Taken together, findings suggest perceived racial prototypicality may originate less from stable individual differences like attitudes and instead reflects both i) differences in perceptions of target features and ii) differences in how people use particular target features in making racial prototypicality judgments.

We studied mental representations of social categories in the context of political groups nested within national identities. Extending previous works derived from the Ingroup Projection Model, which had investigated category representations based on prototypical attributes, we examined category representations based on prototypical exemplars, focusing on group leaders. We hypothesized that the mental representation of the superordinate, national, category is more strongly associated with the mental representation of ingroup political leaders than outgroup political leaders. We tested our hypothesis in three preregistered experiments, looking at two different national-political contexts and using diverse methods. In Studies 1 (N = 145) and 2 (N = 103), both conducted in Israel, we found that participants explicitly associated the national category with leaders of their own political camp more than with leaders of the rival political camp. In Study 2, we further found that participants were more likely to falsely remember that ingroup relative to outgroup political leaders were paired with the national category (versus their political wing). In Study 3 (N = 381), conducted in the USA, we found using an implicit measure of association (ST-IAT) that Democrats and Republicans sorted stimuli, representing political leaders, faster when the national category (represented by American symbols) was paired with the ingroup rather than the outgroup category. Implications for theoretical accounts of ingroup projection, as well as for the understanding of political polarization and intergroup leadership, are discussed.

In diversifying societies, people are inevitably exposed to an increasing number of outgroups. As impressions of outgroups are more negative than those of ingroups, this may overall lead to more negative social attitudes and behaviors. In six preregistered experiments (N_total = 1832) using a minimal group paradigm, we investigated whether the mere number of groups influences the perceived trustworthiness of ingroups, outgroups, and the total population. Our results consistently show that higher diversity does not decrease overall population trustworthiness, despite a larger number of outgroups. This is because of a stronger intergroup bias such that ingroups receive an additional boost in trustworthiness judgments when there are more outgroups. Our experiments show that these effects are not due to objective or perceived group sizes or greater attitude differences toward the group-defining attributes. Instead, people seem to perceive members of their ingroup as more similar to themselves if there is a higher number of outgroups and high similarity is related to high perceived trustworthiness.

Addressing the existential threat posed by climate change requires urgent actions, both on an individual level and on a policy level. In the present research, we applied an emotion-based persuasion appeal model to climate change mitigation to test the effect of climate mitigation appeals formulated with different levels of threat (high vs. low) and appealing to different types of climate change solutions (individual vs. policy) in eliciting psychological reactance, motivating support for climate change mitigation, and influencing willingness to discuss the issue with others. Through an online between-subjects experiment, we found that appealing to individuals (as opposed to policy) increased individuals' perceived threat to freedom, and psychological reactance. Our threat manipulation increased levels of fear, but the interaction between level of threat and type of appeal was not statistically significant on any of our dependent variables. Results are discussed in light of the active debate regarding the effectiveness of fear appeals in the climate change communication context.

Across eight studies (and two additional supplemental studies), we investigate possible bidirectional causal links between dehumanization and exploitation (total N = 5923). Participants were less opposed to the exploitation of mechanistically dehumanized workers – i.e., workers perceived to lack traits central to human nature like emotionality and warmth – than other workers (Studies 1–5). The effects of mechanistic dehumanization on exploitation judgments were statistically explained by perceptions that mechanistically dehumanized workers are more capable of enduring experiences that typically elicit suffering and hardship (Studies 2–4). We also found evidence against several other possible explanations for the effects of mechanistic dehumanization on exploitation judgments (i.e., competence, dependability, likeability; Studies 2–4). In addition, we found consistent evidence for the reverse causal pathway: Workers who are exploited – relative to workers who are not exploited – are more likely to be attributed qualities indicative of mechanistic dehumanization (Studies 6–8; Supplemental Studies 1–2). The effects across studies were invariant to job type, the perceived race/ethnicity and gender of the target worker, and the specific case of exploitation. In addition, the relationships between dehumanization and exploitation judgments were specific to the mechanistic form of dehumanization and not the animalistic form – i.e., perceiving others as lacking traits that distinguish humans from animals like self-control, rationality, civility. These bidirectional causal relations between mechanistic dehumanization and exploitation have the potential to create a vicious cycle of suffering and unfair treatment for certain workers.

How strongly do higher investment premiums tempt people to invest in unethical assets, such as harmful ‘sin stocks’? We present two experimental studies (N_total = 1260) examining baseline willingness to invest in ‘sin stocks’ (without a premium), changes in investments as premiums increase, and how individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations and dark personality traits impact baseline and changes to investments. We compare results to hypothetical models of sensitivity to higher returns: a) full resilience (to moral decay), where people increase investment in regular but not sin stocks with increasing premiums, b) partial resilience, where increasing premiums increases investment more slowly for sin than regular stocks, c) sin deduction: a flat baseline penalty for sin versus regular stocks resulting in similar sensitivity to increasing premiums, and d) decay, where investment differences in sin versus regular stocks reduce as premiums increase. On average, responses aligned best with the partial resilience model. Individual differences in morally-relevant traits moderated effects: most notably, people with higher deontological inclinations and lower dark traits showed greater resilience. However, 21–33% of participants exhibited full resilience, refusing to invest more in sin stocks even as premiums increased, which was more common in people with higher deontological inclinations and lower dark traits. These findings suggest that decisions to invest in sin stocks reflect the sensitivity to the sinfulness of the stock, which remains strong even after unethical investments are made more attractive. We conclude that increasing the economic reward of unethical investments does not crowd out moral concerns.

This research investigates the link between scientific identity and STEMM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics, and Medicine)-related outcomes as a function of identity certainty. Across a pilot study and three additional studies, participants' scientific identity was first measured using different procedures. Then, the certainty with which that identity was held was either measured (pilot study and Studies 1 & 2) or manipulated (Study 3). Both subjective outcomes (e.g., interest and career decisions in the pilot study and Study 2) and objective consequences (e.g., performance in Studies 1 and 3) served as dependent variables. As expected, results showed that participants' scientific identity was more strongly associated with STEMM-relevant outcomes as certainty in that identity increased. Beyond predicting when and for whom scientific identity is more likely to guide career decisions and performance, this research showed that reliance on identity certainty (a metacognitive assessment) is more likely to occur as the extent of thinking is increased. By inducing elaboration after certainty was already manipulated (Study 3), this research distinguishes between forming a metacognitive judgment of certainty and subsequently using that already existing certainty.

People rely on a number of methods to avoid information that would compel them to change their beliefs or behaviors. However, it remains unclear whether people use visual inattention as a method of information avoidance. In three eye-tracking experiments, we test the hypothesis that people avoid visual information by strategically suppressing and facilitating visual attention depending on where desired and avoided information is likely to appear. Introducing a novel search task, we independently manipulate the probability of where desired and avoided information appear on the screen. Study 1 show that participants learn statistical regularities in information location and utilize this to gradually suppress attention to undesired information. Study 2 and 3 show that participants can simultaneously reduce and increase visual attention to areas where avoided and desired information are most likely to appear. The findings point to suppression of attention as a mechanism behind information avoidance through visual inattention and that reducing the predictability of where information appears could be a fruitful avenue for reducing it.