American Journal of Political Science最新文献

Higher education has massively expanded around the world, yet we know little about the political consequences of this expansion. Students generally have overly optimistic expectations about the returns to educational investment, and the effects of unmet expectations on graduates’ political behavior have been overlooked. I study this phenomenon in Chile with observational and experimental methods, using unique panel survey data collected from new graduates covering 72% of higher education enrollment. The survey tracks students before and after they enter the labor market and includes an experiment that induces variation in their expectations. The panel data reveals that 65% of students have unmet expectations, and both methods indicate that this induces a shift toward progovernment/proequality ideology. Overall, this study shows that the gap between aspirations and reality upon graduation can be an important driver of political attitudes.

Scholars have written extensively about hierarchical international order, on the one hand, and war on the other, but surprisingly little work systematically explores the connection between the two. This disconnect is all the more striking given that empirical studies have found a strong relationship between the two. We provide a generative computational network model that explains hierarchy and war as two elements of a larger recursive process: The threat of war drives the formation of hierarchy, which in turn shapes states' incentives for war. Grounded in canonical theories of hierarchy and war, the model explains an array of known regularities about hierarchical order and conflict. Surprisingly, we also find that many traditional results of the international relations literature—including institutional persistence, balancing behavior, and systemic self-regulation—emerge from the interplay between hierarchy and war.

When evaluating the impact of naming and shaming on public opinion regarding human rights, existing scholarship focuses on messages coming from ingroup or outgroup critics. Diaspora critics, increasingly vocal and visible in recent years, occupy an in-between identity. What, if any, is the impact of criticism coming from such critics? We address this question by fielding a pre-registered survey experiment in Israel, a country that routinely faces diasporic criticism. We find that exposure to criticism from both diaspora and foreign critics (but not from domestic critics) triggered a backlash response on the criticized issue (human rights) compared to a no-criticism condition. However, diaspora critics have a slight advantage over foreigners—their intentions for criticizing the state are perceived as more positive. Despite limited direct impact on public opinion, our findings suggest that the human rights regime could benefit from involving diasporic and domestic actors in their efforts.

How does the potential for socialization affect states' abilities to reassure each other and mitigate the security dilemma? Rationalist scholarship has identified numerous mechanisms by which states can credibly signal benign intentions. Yet it omits the possibility that states' interactions might endogenously shape their identities and domestic structures, and thus alter their basic preferences for or against cooperative outcomes. We present a formal model of the security dilemma that allows the sender's preferences to change endogenously as a function of the receiver's actions. The model yields several key results. First, the possibility of socialization generates incentives for benign actors to risk initiating cooperation, and even sustain cooperation in response to noncooperative signals in the hope of positively socializing the sender. However, conflict can still occur between mutually benign states through novel mechanisms not captured by standard models. These findings carry important implications for recent debates surrounding the US “engagement” strategy toward China.

Borders define states, yet little systematic evidence explains where they are drawn. Putting current challenges to state borders into perspective and breaking new methodological ground, this paper analyzes how ethnic geography and nationalism have shaped European borders since the 19^th century. We argue that nationalism creates pressures to redraw political borders along ethnic lines, ultimately making states more congruent with ethnic groups. We introduce a Probabilistic Spatial Partition Model to test this argument, modeling state territories as partitions of a planar spatial graph. Using new data on Europe's ethnic geography since 1855, we find that ethnic boundaries increase the conditional probability that two locations they separate are, or will become, divided by a state border. Secession is an important mechanism driving this result. Similar dynamics characterize border change in Asia but not in Africa and the Americas. Our results highlight the endogenous formation of nation-states in Europe and beyond.

Scholars increasingly recognize the plurality of leaders who exercise de facto authority in governing communities. But what limits different leaders’ power to organize distinct types of collective action beyond the law? We contend that leaders’ influence varies by activity, depending on the degree to which the activity matches the leaders’ geographic scope and field of expertise (“domain congruence”). Employing conjoint endorsement experiments in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, we test whether domain congruence predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with leader requests across different activities and examine the mechanisms that explain its importance. We find limits on leaders’ authority, that the concept of domain congruence helps predict the activities over which leaders have the greatest influence, and that leaders’ domain legitimacy may underpin the relationship between domain congruence and authority.

Formal models commonly characterize interstate bargaining as dichotomous, ending in either war or peace. But there are many forms of coercion—including supporting rebel groups, sanctions, and cyberattacks. How does the availability of intermediate policy options affect the incidence of war and peace? We present an analysis of crisis bargaining models with intermediate policy options that challenges conventional results about the relationship between private information and negotiation outcomes. In our “flexible-response” modeling framework, unlike in traditional crisis bargaining models, we find that greater private war payoffs may be associated with a lower probability of war or worse settlement values. When intermediate options are available, the relationship between the private efficacy of war and the private efficacy of these other options largely determines equilibrium outcomes. By utilizing the tools of mechanism design, we derive game-form–free results on how private information shapes international conflict, regardless of the precise negotiating protocol.

John Maynard Keynes is often seen as the quintessential thinker of the short run, calling on us to focus our intellectual and material resources on the present. This poses an intriguing puzzle in light of Keynes's own influential speculations about the future. I use this seeming tension as an opening into Keynes's politics of time, both as a crucial dimension of his political thought and a contribution to debates about political temporality and intertemporal choice. Keynes's insistence on radical uncertainty translated into a skepticism toward intertemporal calculus as not only morally objectionable but also at risk of undermining actual future possibilities. Instead of either myopic presentism or calculated futurity, Keynes advocated bold experimentation in the present to open up new possibilities for an uncertain future. This points to the need to grapple with how to align multiple overlapping time horizons while appreciating the performativity of competing conceptions of the future.

Extant research has established that displeasure with a Supreme Court ruling typically has negligible consequences for institutional support, largely because, as legitimacy theory's positivity bias explains, judicial decisions are invariably delivered with the accoutrements of legitimizing symbols. The Court's ruling in Dobbs, abrogating a federal constitutional right to abortion services, may challenge legitimacy theory because displeasure with the ruling seems so widespread and intense. This research aims to determine whether the ruling lessened the Court's legitimacy. The general conclusion is that Dobbs produced a sizeable dent in institutional support, perhaps to an unprecedented degree, in part because abortion attitudes for many are infused with moral content and in part owing to the Court's substantial tilt to the right since 2020. Indeed, the Court's legitimacy may be at greater risk today than at any time since Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1930s attack on the institution.

Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection-motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alternative empirical findings. These unelected elites hold similarly inaccurate perceptions about public opinion, though not in a single ideological direction. We find this elite population exhibits egocentrism bias, rather than partisan confirmation bias, as their perceptions about others' opinions systematically correspond to their own policy preferences. Thus, we document a remarkably consistent false consensus effect among unelected political elites, which holds across subsamples by party, occupation, professional relevance of party affiliation, and trust in party-aligned information sources.