Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105918
Michelle A. Hurst , Steven T. Piantadosi
Despite proportional information being ubiquitous, there is not a standard account of proportional reasoning. Part of the difficulty is that there are several apparent contradictions: in some contexts, proportion is easy and privileged, while in others it is difficult and ignored. One possibility is that although we see similarities across tasks requiring proportional reasoning, people approach them with different strategies. We test this hypothesis by implementing strategies computationally and quantitatively comparing them with Bayesian tools, using data from continuous (e.g., pie chart) and discrete (e.g., dots) stimuli and preschoolers, 2nd and 5th graders, and adults. Overall, people's comparisons of highly regular and continuous proportion are better fit by proportion strategy models, but comparisons of discrete proportion are better fit by a numerator comparison model. These systematic differences in strategies suggest that there is not a single, simple explanation for behavior in terms of success or failure, but rather a variety of possible strategies that may be chosen in different contexts.
{"title":"Continuous and discrete proportion elicit different cognitive strategies","authors":"Michelle A. Hurst , Steven T. Piantadosi","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105918","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105918","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite proportional information being ubiquitous, there is not a standard account of proportional reasoning. Part of the difficulty is that there are several apparent contradictions: in some contexts, proportion is easy and privileged, while in others it is difficult and ignored. One possibility is that although we see similarities across tasks requiring proportional reasoning, people approach them with different strategies. We test this hypothesis by implementing strategies computationally and quantitatively comparing them with Bayesian tools, using data from continuous (e.g., pie chart) and discrete (e.g., dots) stimuli and preschoolers, 2nd and 5th graders, and adults. Overall, people's comparisons of highly regular and continuous proportion are better fit by proportion strategy models, but comparisons of discrete proportion are better fit by a numerator comparison model. These systematic differences in strategies suggest that there is not a single, simple explanation for behavior in terms of success or failure, but rather a variety of possible strategies that may be chosen in different contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"252 ","pages":"Article 105918"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002772400204X/pdfft?md5=abfa3c614660be43f41398c0fad28dd7&pid=1-s2.0-S001002772400204X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141992715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is growing evidence that false memories can occur in working memory (WM) tasks with only a few semantically related words and seconds between study and test. Abadie and Camos (2019) proposed a new model to explain the formation of false memories by describing the role of articulatory rehearsal and attentional refreshing, the two main mechanisms for actively maintaining information in WM. However, this model has only been tested in recognition tasks. In the present study, we report four experiments testing the model in recall tasks in which the active maintenance of information in WM plays a more important role for retrieval. Short lists of semantically related items were held for a short retention interval filled with a concurrent task that either impaired or not the use of each of the WM maintenance mechanisms. Participants were asked to recall the items immediately after the concurrent task (immediate test) or later, at the end of a block of several trials (delayed test). In the immediate test, semantic errors were more frequent when WM maintenance was impaired. Specifically, rehearsal prevented the occurrence of semantic errors in the immediate test, while refreshing had no effect on their occurrence in this test, but increased semantic errors produced only in the delayed test. These results support Abadie and Camos (2019) model and go further by demonstrating the role of active information maintenance in WM in the emergence of false memories. The implications of these findings for understanding WM-LTM relationships are discussed.
{"title":"The influence of working memory mechanisms on false memories in immediate and delayed tests","authors":"Marlène Abadie , Christelle Guette , Amélie Troubat , Valérie Camos","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105901","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105901","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is growing evidence that false memories can occur in working memory (WM) tasks with only a few semantically related words and seconds between study and test. Abadie and Camos (2019) proposed a new model to explain the formation of false memories by describing the role of articulatory rehearsal and attentional refreshing, the two main mechanisms for actively maintaining information in WM. However, this model has only been tested in recognition tasks. In the present study, we report four experiments testing the model in recall tasks in which the active maintenance of information in WM plays a more important role for retrieval. Short lists of semantically related items were held for a short retention interval filled with a concurrent task that either impaired or not the use of each of the WM maintenance mechanisms. Participants were asked to recall the items immediately after the concurrent task (immediate test) or later, at the end of a block of several trials (delayed test). In the immediate test, semantic errors were more frequent when WM maintenance was impaired. Specifically, rehearsal prevented the occurrence of semantic errors in the immediate test, while refreshing had no effect on their occurrence in this test, but increased semantic errors produced only in the delayed test. These results support Abadie and Camos (2019) model and go further by demonstrating the role of active information maintenance in WM in the emergence of false memories. The implications of these findings for understanding WM-LTM relationships are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"252 ","pages":"Article 105901"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724001872/pdfft?md5=c15de62ac11c11ebacd31c18a40a0cbf&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724001872-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141990515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-15DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105915
Adam J.L. Harris, Shi-Hui Kau, Alice Liefgreen
A severity effect has previously been documented, whereby numerical translations of verbal probability expressions are higher for severe outcomes than for non-severe outcomes. Recent work has additionally shown the same effect in the opposite direction (translating numerical probabilities into words). Here, we aimed to test whether these effects lead to an escalation of subjective probabilities across a communication chain. In four ‘communication chain’ studies, participants at each communication stage either translated a verbal probability expression into a number, or a number into a verbal expression (where the probability to be translated was yoked to a previous participant). Across these four studies, we found a general Probability Escalation Effect, whereby subjective probabilities increased with subsequent communications for severe, non-severe and positive events. Having ruled out some alternative explanations, we propose that the most likely explanation is in terms of communications directing attention towards an event's occurrence. Probability estimates of focal outcomes increase across communication stages.
{"title":"Subjective Probability Increases Across Communication Chains: Introducing the Probability Escalation Effect.","authors":"Adam J.L. Harris, Shi-Hui Kau, Alice Liefgreen","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105915","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105915","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A severity effect has previously been documented, whereby numerical translations of verbal probability expressions are higher for severe outcomes than for non-severe outcomes. Recent work has additionally shown the same effect in the opposite direction (translating numerical probabilities into words). Here, we aimed to test whether these effects lead to an escalation of subjective probabilities across a communication chain. In four ‘communication chain’ studies, participants at each communication stage either translated a verbal probability expression into a number, or a number into a verbal expression (where the probability to be translated was yoked to a previous participant). Across these four studies, we found a general Probability Escalation Effect, whereby subjective probabilities increased with subsequent communications for severe, non-severe and positive events. Having ruled out some alternative explanations, we propose that the most likely explanation is in terms of communications directing attention towards an event's occurrence. Probability estimates of focal outcomes increase across communication stages.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"252 ","pages":"Article 105915"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724002014/pdfft?md5=cd55031d507f805ddf0b3ceaadc549c5&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724002014-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141990514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105917
Travis M. Seale-Carlisle
Erroneous eyewitness identification evidence is likely the leading cause of wrongful convictions. To minimize this error, scientists recommend collecting confidence. Research shows that eyewitness confidence and accuracy are strongly related when an eyewitness identifies someone from an initial and properly administered lineup. However, confidence is far less informative of accuracy when an eyewitness identifies no one and rejects the lineup instead. In this study, I aimed to improve the confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections in two ways. First, I aimed to find the lineup that yields the strongest confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections by comparing the standard, simultaneous procedure used by police worldwide to the novel “reveal” procedure designed by scientists to boost accuracy. Second, I aimed to find the best method for collecting confidence. To achieve this secondary aim, I made use of machine-learning techniques to compare confidence expressed in words to numeric confidence ratings. First, I find a significantly stronger confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections in the reveal than in the standard procedure regardless of the method used to collect confidence. Second, I find that confidence expressed in words captures unique diagnostic information about the likely accuracy of a lineup rejection separate from the diagnostic information captured by numeric confidence ratings. These results inform models of recognition memory and may improve the criminal-legal system by increasing the diagnostic value of a lineup rejection.
{"title":"Improving the diagnostic value of lineup rejections","authors":"Travis M. Seale-Carlisle","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105917","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105917","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Erroneous eyewitness identification evidence is likely the leading cause of wrongful convictions. To minimize this error, scientists recommend collecting confidence. Research shows that eyewitness confidence and accuracy are strongly related when an eyewitness identifies someone from an initial and properly administered lineup. However, confidence is far less informative of accuracy when an eyewitness identifies no one and rejects the lineup instead. In this study, I aimed to improve the confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections in two ways. First, I aimed to find the lineup that yields the strongest confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections by comparing the standard, simultaneous procedure used by police worldwide to the novel “reveal” procedure designed by scientists to boost accuracy. Second, I aimed to find the best method for collecting confidence. To achieve this secondary aim, I made use of machine-learning techniques to compare confidence expressed in words to numeric confidence ratings. First, I find a significantly stronger confidence-accuracy relationship for lineup rejections in the reveal than in the standard procedure regardless of the method used to collect confidence. Second, I find that confidence expressed in words captures unique diagnostic information about the likely accuracy of a lineup rejection separate from the diagnostic information captured by numeric confidence ratings. These results inform models of recognition memory and may improve the criminal-legal system by increasing the diagnostic value of a lineup rejection.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"252 ","pages":"Article 105917"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724002038/pdfft?md5=20ba466c73103ea7697bc07e302f13e9&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724002038-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141989168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105911
Karl Halvor Teigen , Marie Juanchich
Predictions and estimates are sometimes qualified as certain. This epistemic marker occupies a privileged position at the top of scales of verbal probability expressions, reflecting probabilities close to 1. But such statements have rarely been compared to plain, unqualified statements in which certainty is not mentioned. We examined in nine studies (N = 2784) whether statements explicitly claimed to be certain are perceived as (1) more (or less) credible, (2) more (or less) precise, and (3) more (or less) strongly based upon evidence, compared to plain, unmarked declarative statements. We find, in apparent contrast with assumptions made by the standard scales, that “certain” are often judged to be less trustworthy, less reliable, and held with lower confidence than unmarked statements. Plain, declarative statements are further assumed to be more precise, while certainty implies that more extreme outcomes are possible. When it is certain that Henry made four errors, it is clear he did not commit less than four, but he might have committed five errors or more. Thus certainty can indicate lower bounds of an interval whose upper bounds are not defined, and certainty statements are consequently more ambiguous than estimates that do not mention certainty. At least-interpretations of certainty affect the interpretation of options in risky choice problems, where “200 lives will be saved” was deemed by a majority to mean exactly 200, while “it is certain that 200 will be saved”, could mean 200–600 lives. We also find that credibility is affected by type of certainty, with impersonal certainty (“it is certain”) perceived to be more accurate and persuasive than personal certainty (“I am certain”), especially in predictions of future events. Moreover, mentions of certainty can reveal that that a speaker's estimate is based on subjective judgments and guesswork rather than upon objective evidence. These findings have implications for communication. Estimates can appear more consensual when claims of certainty are omitted. To convey certainty it may be better not to mention that one is certain.
{"title":"Do claims about certainty make estimates less certain?","authors":"Karl Halvor Teigen , Marie Juanchich","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105911","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105911","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Predictions and estimates are sometimes qualified as <em>certain.</em> This epistemic marker occupies a privileged position at the top of scales of verbal probability expressions, reflecting probabilities close to 1. But such statements have rarely been compared to plain, unqualified statements in which certainty is not mentioned. We examined in nine studies (<em>N</em> = 2784) whether statements explicitly claimed to be certain are perceived as (1) more (or less) credible, (2) more (or less) precise, and (3) more (or less) strongly based upon evidence, compared to plain, unmarked declarative statements. We find, in apparent contrast with assumptions made by the standard scales, that “certain” are often judged to be less trustworthy, less reliable, and held with lower confidence than unmarked statements. Plain, declarative statements are further assumed to be more precise, while certainty implies that more extreme outcomes are possible. When it is certain that Henry made four errors, it is clear he did not commit less than four, but he might have committed five errors or more. Thus certainty can indicate lower bounds of an interval whose upper bounds are not defined, and certainty statements are consequently more ambiguous than estimates that do not mention certainty. At least-interpretations of certainty affect the interpretation of options in risky choice problems, where “200 lives will be saved” was deemed by a majority to mean exactly 200, while “it is certain that 200 will be saved”, could mean 200–600 lives. We also find that credibility is affected by type of certainty, with impersonal certainty (“it is certain”) perceived to be more accurate and persuasive than personal certainty (“I am certain”), especially in predictions of future events. Moreover, mentions of certainty can reveal that that a speaker's estimate is based on subjective judgments and guesswork rather than upon objective evidence. These findings have implications for communication. Estimates can appear more consensual when claims of certainty are omitted. To convey certainty it may be better not to mention that one is certain.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"252 ","pages":"Article 105911"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-10DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105916
Lettie Wareing , Lisa P.Y. Lin , Megan Rose Readman , Trevor J. Crawford , Matthew R. Longo , Sally A. Linkenauger
Despite our wealth of experience with our bodies, our perceptions of our body size are far from veridical. For example, when estimating the relative proportions of their body part lengths, using the hand as a metric, individuals tend to exhibit systematic distortions which vary across body parts. Whilst extensive research with healthy populations has focused on perceptions of body part length, less is known about perceptions of the width of individual body parts and the various components comprising these representations. Across four experiments, representations of the relative proportions of body part width were investigated for both the self and other, and when using both the hand, or a hand-sized stick as the metric. Overall, we found distortions in the perceived width of body parts; however, different patterns of distortions were observed across all experiments. Moreover, the variability across experiments appears not to be moderated by the type of metric used or individuals' posture at the time of estimation. Consequently, findings suggest that, unlike perceptions of body part length, assessed using an identical methodology, our representations of the width of the body parts measured in this task are not fixed and vary across individuals and context. We propose that, as stored width representations of these parts are not necessarily required for navigating our environments, these may not be maintained by our perceptual systems, and thus variable task performance reflects the engagement of idiosyncratic guessing strategies.
{"title":"Representations of the relative proportions of body part width","authors":"Lettie Wareing , Lisa P.Y. Lin , Megan Rose Readman , Trevor J. Crawford , Matthew R. Longo , Sally A. Linkenauger","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105916","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105916","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite our wealth of experience with our bodies, our perceptions of our body size are far from veridical. For example, when estimating the relative proportions of their body part lengths, using the hand as a metric, individuals tend to exhibit systematic distortions which vary across body parts. Whilst extensive research with healthy populations has focused on perceptions of body part length, less is known about perceptions of the width of individual body parts and the various components comprising these representations. Across four experiments, representations of the relative proportions of body part width were investigated for both the self and other, and when using both the hand, or a hand-sized stick as the metric. Overall, we found distortions in the perceived width of body parts; however, different patterns of distortions were observed across all experiments. Moreover, the variability across experiments appears not to be moderated by the type of metric used or individuals' posture at the time of estimation. Consequently, findings suggest that, unlike perceptions of body part length, assessed using an identical methodology, our representations of the width of the body parts measured in this task are not fixed and vary across individuals and context. We propose that, as stored width representations of these parts are not necessarily required for navigating our environments, these may not be maintained by our perceptual systems, and thus variable task performance reflects the engagement of idiosyncratic guessing strategies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"Article 105916"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724002026/pdfft?md5=b8a00c798333407aaff1553351eec07c&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724002026-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141917863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105865
Judy Sein Kim , Clara Colombatto , M.J. Crockett
We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as conveying accurate information about what happened (‘informational goals’) and swaying audiences' impressions about their moral characters (‘reputational goals'). Here, we ask to what extent audiences’ detection of narrators' reputational goals guide or prevent them from making moral character judgments intended by narrators. Across two pre-registered experiments, audiences read narratives written by real narrators about their own moral actions. Each narrator was incentivized to write about the same action twice while trying to appear like a morally good or bad person (positive and negative reputational goals). Audiences detected narrators' reputational goals with high accuracy and made judgments about moral character that aligned with narrators' goals. However, audiences were more suspicious toward positive than negative reputational goals, requiring more evidence of high informational goals. These results demonstrate how audiences' inferences of reputational goals can both support and hinder narrators: accurate goal recognition increases the chance that audiences will make judgments intended by narrators, but inferred positive reputational goals can lead to doubts about accuracy. More generally, this provides a novel approach to studying how moral information about people is transmitted through naturalistic narratives.
{"title":"Goal inference in moral narratives","authors":"Judy Sein Kim , Clara Colombatto , M.J. Crockett","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105865","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105865","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as conveying accurate information about what happened (‘informational goals’) and swaying audiences' impressions about their moral characters (‘reputational goals'). Here, we ask to what extent audiences’ detection of narrators' reputational goals guide or prevent them from making moral character judgments intended by narrators. Across two pre-registered experiments, audiences read narratives written by real narrators about their own moral actions. Each narrator was incentivized to write about the same action twice while trying to appear like a morally good or bad person (positive and negative reputational goals). Audiences detected narrators' reputational goals with high accuracy and made judgments about moral character that aligned with narrators' goals. However, audiences were more suspicious toward positive than negative reputational goals, requiring more evidence of high informational goals. These results demonstrate how audiences' inferences of reputational goals can both support and hinder narrators: accurate goal recognition increases the chance that audiences will make judgments intended by narrators, but inferred positive reputational goals can lead to doubts about accuracy. More generally, this provides a novel approach to studying how moral information about people is transmitted through naturalistic narratives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"Article 105865"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141914281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105903
Zhiqing Deng , Jie Gao , Toni Li , Yan Chen , BoYu Gao , Fang Fang , Jody C. Culham , Juan Chen
For convenience and experimental control, cognitive science has relied largely on images as stimuli rather than the real, tangible objects encountered in the real world. Recent evidence suggests that the cognitive processing of images may differ from real objects, especially in the processing of spatial locations and actions, thought to be mediated by the dorsal visual stream. Perceptual and semantic processing in the ventral visual stream, however, has been assumed to be largely unaffected by the realism of objects. Several studies have found that one key difference accounting for differences between real objects and images is actability; however, less research has investigated another potential difference – the three-dimensional nature of real objects as conveyed by cues like binocular disparity. To investigate the extent to which perception is affected by the realism of a stimulus, we compared viewpoint adaptation when stimuli (a face or a kettle) were 2D (flat images without binocular disparity) vs. 3D (i.e., real, tangible objects or stereoscopic images with binocular disparity). For both faces and kettles, adaptation to 3D stimuli induced stronger viewpoint aftereffects than adaptation to 2D images when the adapting orientation was rightward. A computational model suggested that the difference in aftereffects could be explained by broader viewpoint tuning for 3D compared to 2D stimuli. Overall, our finding narrowed the gap between understanding the neural processing of visual images and real-world objects by suggesting that compared to 2D images, real and simulated 3D objects evoke more broadly tuned neural representations, which may result in stronger viewpoint invariance.
{"title":"Viewpoint adaptation revealed potential representational differences between 2D images and 3D objects","authors":"Zhiqing Deng , Jie Gao , Toni Li , Yan Chen , BoYu Gao , Fang Fang , Jody C. Culham , Juan Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105903","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105903","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>For convenience and experimental control, cognitive science has relied largely on images as stimuli rather than the real, tangible objects encountered in the real world. Recent evidence suggests that the cognitive processing of images may differ from real objects, especially in the processing of spatial locations and actions, thought to be mediated by the dorsal visual stream. Perceptual and semantic processing in the ventral visual stream, however, has been assumed to be largely unaffected by the realism of objects. Several studies have found that one key difference accounting for differences between real objects and images is actability; however, less research has investigated another potential difference – the three-dimensional nature of real objects as conveyed by cues like binocular disparity. To investigate the extent to which perception is affected by the realism of a stimulus, we compared viewpoint adaptation when stimuli (a face or a kettle) were 2D (flat images without binocular disparity) vs. 3D (i.e., real, tangible objects or stereoscopic images with binocular disparity). For both faces and kettles, adaptation to 3D stimuli induced stronger viewpoint aftereffects than adaptation to 2D images when the adapting orientation was rightward. A computational model suggested that the difference in aftereffects could be explained by broader viewpoint tuning for 3D compared to 2D stimuli. Overall, our finding narrowed the gap between understanding the neural processing of visual images and real-world objects by suggesting that compared to 2D images, real and simulated 3D objects evoke more broadly tuned neural representations, which may result in stronger viewpoint invariance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"Article 105903"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724001896/pdfft?md5=fb7c903ff335e2e6e1d2792eba7e6a04&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724001896-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141914282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-07DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105912
Nayoung Kwon , Patrick Sturt
Korean grammar encodes relative social hierarchies among interlocutors in various ways. This study utilized honorific subject-verb agreement in Korean to investigate how social hierarchies are processed during sentence comprehension. The experimental results showed that honorific violations elicited processing difficulties. The use of an honorific verb with an unhonorifiable subject resulted in lower naturalness ratings, longer reading times, and elicited a P600, similar to effects observed with number, person, and gender agreement in Spanish or English. These findings suggest that social hierarchies have become integrated into grammar, constraining how native Korean speakers process sentences. However, the agreement between honorific subjects and verbs seems asymmetrical; the mismatch effect was smaller or absent when an honorifiable subject was not accompanied by an honorific verb, suggesting that while an honorific verb requires an honorifiable subject, the reverse is not necessarily true. The results indicate that the -si agreement in Korean is a form of morpho-syntactic agreement, despite its asymmetrical nature.
{"title":"When social hierarchy matters grammatically: Investigation of the processing of honorifics in Korean","authors":"Nayoung Kwon , Patrick Sturt","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105912","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105912","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Korean grammar encodes relative social hierarchies among interlocutors in various ways. This study utilized honorific subject-verb agreement in Korean to investigate how social hierarchies are processed during sentence comprehension. The experimental results showed that honorific violations elicited processing difficulties. The use of an honorific verb with an unhonorifiable subject resulted in lower naturalness ratings, longer reading times, and elicited a P600, similar to effects observed with number, person, and gender agreement in Spanish or English. These findings suggest that social hierarchies have become integrated into grammar, constraining how native Korean speakers process sentences. However, the agreement between honorific subjects and verbs seems asymmetrical; the mismatch effect was smaller or absent when an honorifiable subject was not accompanied by an honorific verb, suggesting that while an honorific verb requires an honorifiable subject, the reverse is not necessarily true. The results indicate that the -<em>si</em> agreement in Korean is a form of morpho-syntactic agreement, despite its asymmetrical nature.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"Article 105912"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141908018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vowelless words are exceptionally typologically rare, though they are found in some languages, such as Tashlhiyt (e.g., fkt ‘give it’). The current study tests whether lexicons containing tri-segmental (CCC) vowelless words are more difficult to acquire than lexicons not containing vowelless words by adult English speakers from brief auditory exposure. The role of acoustic-phonetic form on learning these typologically rare word forms is also explored: In Experiment 1, participants were trained on words produced in either only Clear speech or Casual speech productions of words; Experiment 2 trained participants on lexical items produced in both speech styles. Listeners were able to learn both vowelless and voweled lexicons equally well when speaking style was consistent for participants, but learning was lower for vowelless lexicons when training consisted of variable acoustic-phonetic forms. In both experiments, responses to a post-training wordlikeness ratings task containing novel items revealed that exposure to a vowelless lexicon leads participants to accept new vowelless words as acceptable lexical forms. These results demonstrate that one of the typologically rarest types of lexical forms - words without vowels - can be rapidly acquired by naive adult listeners. Yet, acoustic-phonetic variation modulates learning.
{"title":"Learning a language with vowelless words","authors":"Georgia Zellou , Santiago Barreda , Mohamed Lahrouchi , Rajka Smiljanić","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105909","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105909","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Vowelless words are exceptionally typologically rare, though they are found in some languages, such as Tashlhiyt (e.g., <em>fkt</em> ‘give it’). The current study tests whether lexicons containing tri-segmental (CCC) vowelless words are more difficult to acquire than lexicons not containing vowelless words by adult English speakers from brief auditory exposure. The role of acoustic-phonetic form on learning these typologically rare word forms is also explored: In Experiment 1, participants were trained on words produced in either only Clear speech or Casual speech productions of words; Experiment 2 trained participants on lexical items produced in both speech styles. Listeners were able to learn both vowelless and voweled lexicons equally well when speaking style was consistent for participants, but learning was lower for vowelless lexicons when training consisted of variable acoustic-phonetic forms. In both experiments, responses to a post-training wordlikeness ratings task containing novel items revealed that exposure to a vowelless lexicon leads participants to accept new vowelless words as acceptable lexical forms. These results demonstrate that one of the typologically rarest types of lexical forms - words without vowels - can be rapidly acquired by naive adult listeners. Yet, acoustic-phonetic variation modulates learning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"251 ","pages":"Article 105909"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724001951/pdfft?md5=dc90163f816062321398142477c0a602&pid=1-s2.0-S0010027724001951-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141903274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}