Abstract Why did the so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system emerge in East Asia after World War II instead of a multilateral alliance? Realists and constructivists offer various explanations, pointing to such factors as the United States' preference for bilateral alliances, the absence of a collective identity, and historical memories of Japanese imperialism. None of these explanations is satisfactory, however. Indeed, the historical record reveals that the United States sought a multilateral alliance in East Asia until the early 1960s. A theoretical model based on a social exchange network approach explains how a specific form of network can develop among potential allies. In East Asia, three U.S. allies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—contributed to the emergence and shape of the hub-and-spokes system, which came into being as an unintended consequence of their interactions. The preferences and behavior of these allies proved at least as consequential as those of the United States in shaping this system. The implications of this finding could be significant for alliance politics in contemporary East Asia.
{"title":"Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia","authors":"Y. Izumikawa","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00389","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why did the so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system emerge in East Asia after World War II instead of a multilateral alliance? Realists and constructivists offer various explanations, pointing to such factors as the United States' preference for bilateral alliances, the absence of a collective identity, and historical memories of Japanese imperialism. None of these explanations is satisfactory, however. Indeed, the historical record reveals that the United States sought a multilateral alliance in East Asia until the early 1960s. A theoretical model based on a social exchange network approach explains how a specific form of network can develop among potential allies. In East Asia, three U.S. allies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—contributed to the emergence and shape of the hub-and-spokes system, which came into being as an unintended consequence of their interactions. The preferences and behavior of these allies proved at least as consequential as those of the United States in shaping this system. The implications of this finding could be significant for alliance politics in contemporary East Asia.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"11 1","pages":"7-50"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75254831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scott D. Sagan, B. Valentino, C. Carpenter, Alexander H. Montgomery
Our 2015 survey experiment—reported in the 2017 International Security article “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”—asked a representative sample of Americans to choose between continuing a ground invasion of Iran that would kill an estimated 20,000 U.S. soldiers or launching a nuclear attack on an Iranian city that would kill an estimated 100,000 civilians.1 Fifty-six percent of the respondents preferred the nuclear strike. When a different set of subjects instead read that the air strike would use conventional weapons, but still kill 100,000 Iranians, 67 percent preferred it over the ground invasion. These andings led us to conclude that “when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the arst use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to noncombatant immunity is shallow.”2 By 2015, we had been researching American public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and the ethics of war for several years. Many of our previous andings about the U.S. public’s hawkish attitudes had been unsettling. Nevertheless, the levels of public support we found in this study for a strike that so clearly violated ethical and legal principles on the use of force were deeply troubling. We proposed, therefore, that future research on the nuclear taboo and the noncombatant immunity norm focus on interventions that might blunt
{"title":"Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power? A Debate","authors":"Scott D. Sagan, B. Valentino, C. Carpenter, Alexander H. Montgomery","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00393","url":null,"abstract":"Our 2015 survey experiment—reported in the 2017 International Security article “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”—asked a representative sample of Americans to choose between continuing a ground invasion of Iran that would kill an estimated 20,000 U.S. soldiers or launching a nuclear attack on an Iranian city that would kill an estimated 100,000 civilians.1 Fifty-six percent of the respondents preferred the nuclear strike. When a different set of subjects instead read that the air strike would use conventional weapons, but still kill 100,000 Iranians, 67 percent preferred it over the ground invasion. These andings led us to conclude that “when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the arst use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to noncombatant immunity is shallow.”2 By 2015, we had been researching American public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and the ethics of war for several years. Many of our previous andings about the U.S. public’s hawkish attitudes had been unsettling. Nevertheless, the levels of public support we found in this study for a strike that so clearly violated ethical and legal principles on the use of force were deeply troubling. We proposed, therefore, that future research on the nuclear taboo and the noncombatant immunity norm focus on interventions that might blunt","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"128 1","pages":"170-186"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88059161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.
{"title":"Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy","authors":"Michael McFaul","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00390","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"194 1","pages":"95-139"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77645433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ketian Zhang’s article is an important contribution to the literature on Chinese foreign policy and coercive diplomacy. Her research design, however, is not best suited to demonstrate the key andings of her study: China is a cautious bully; it employs coercion only infrequently; and as it grows stronger, it uses military coercion less often.1 For reasons discussed below, it is premature to conclude that China’s “decisions about when to pursue coercion and which tools to use cannot be explained by focusing on material capabilities” (p. 119). First, Zhang’s decision to develop “a theory of coercion . . . in response to national security threats” means that every instance of coercion discussed in the article is a result of China’s failed deterrence against a challenge from another state (p. 119). Zhang mentions but does not analyze cases of proactive coercion; therefore, her andings about Chinese coercion apply only to China’s reactions to what Beijing considers to be provocations. A bully can get what it wants by using brute force or proactive coercion, but Zhang chooses to exclude these aspects from her analysis—for example, China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea (pp. 133–134). If, without provocation, China were to occupy disputed maritime features or to threaten a military attack to expel other disputants, Zhang’s operationalization would exclude this action from her analysis because it would be considered brute force or proactive coercion. Second, Zhang argues that “China has not used brute force in any of its territorial disputes in the South China Sea” since the 1990s, but I disagree with her use of the term “brute force” (p. 134). Indeed, China has refrained from using military violence since the 1990s in the South China Sea, whereas it fought against South Vietnam in 1974 and against Vietnam in 1988. Nevertheless, I argue that China has continued to use brute force, because scholars who study the use of coercion should distinguish brute force
{"title":"Correspondence: Is China a Cautious Bully?","authors":"Tongfi Kim, Andrew Taffer, Ketian Zhang","doi":"10.1162/isec_c_00386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00386","url":null,"abstract":"Ketian Zhang’s article is an important contribution to the literature on Chinese foreign policy and coercive diplomacy. Her research design, however, is not best suited to demonstrate the key andings of her study: China is a cautious bully; it employs coercion only infrequently; and as it grows stronger, it uses military coercion less often.1 For reasons discussed below, it is premature to conclude that China’s “decisions about when to pursue coercion and which tools to use cannot be explained by focusing on material capabilities” (p. 119). First, Zhang’s decision to develop “a theory of coercion . . . in response to national security threats” means that every instance of coercion discussed in the article is a result of China’s failed deterrence against a challenge from another state (p. 119). Zhang mentions but does not analyze cases of proactive coercion; therefore, her andings about Chinese coercion apply only to China’s reactions to what Beijing considers to be provocations. A bully can get what it wants by using brute force or proactive coercion, but Zhang chooses to exclude these aspects from her analysis—for example, China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea (pp. 133–134). If, without provocation, China were to occupy disputed maritime features or to threaten a military attack to expel other disputants, Zhang’s operationalization would exclude this action from her analysis because it would be considered brute force or proactive coercion. Second, Zhang argues that “China has not used brute force in any of its territorial disputes in the South China Sea” since the 1990s, but I disagree with her use of the term “brute force” (p. 134). Indeed, China has refrained from using military violence since the 1990s in the South China Sea, whereas it fought against South Vietnam in 1974 and against Vietnam in 1988. Nevertheless, I argue that China has continued to use brute force, because scholars who study the use of coercion should distinguish brute force","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"187-193"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91271637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David M. Allison, Stephen Herzog, B. Green, A. Long
Brendan Green and Austin Long make a signiacant contribution with their theoretical framework for peacetime signaling of clandestine military capabilities.1 Examining U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during the Cold War, they argue that choices to disclose capabilities depend on uniqueness (replaceability) and anticipated countermeasures (pp. 59–60). Green and Long cannot fully account for many historical cases, however, because they overlook decisionmaker concerns about the spread of technology. A modiaed framework combining their theory with fears of technological diffusion offers greater predictive power by explaining the broader dilemma of revealing military innovations during both war and peace. States conceal military capabilities to avoid two threats: nulliacation and duplication.2 Green and Long’s variables of uniqueness and countermeasures focus on the former while failing to address the latter. Green and Long argue that if the risk of countermeasures is low or if replacement capabilities exist, signaling becomes attractive for “improved general deterrence, adversary resource diversion, and diplomatic concessions or strategic adjustments” (p. 56). Duplication is a fundamentally different concern. Disclosures may provide an adversary with insights to improve their own capabilities. The fear of nulliacation identiaed by Green and Long does not preclude concerns about technological diffusion (pp. 51–52). Correspondence: Clandestine Capabilities
{"title":"Correspondence: Clandestine Capabilities and Technological Diffusion Risks","authors":"David M. Allison, Stephen Herzog, B. Green, A. Long","doi":"10.1162/isec_c_00396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00396","url":null,"abstract":"Brendan Green and Austin Long make a signiacant contribution with their theoretical framework for peacetime signaling of clandestine military capabilities.1 Examining U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during the Cold War, they argue that choices to disclose capabilities depend on uniqueness (replaceability) and anticipated countermeasures (pp. 59–60). Green and Long cannot fully account for many historical cases, however, because they overlook decisionmaker concerns about the spread of technology. A modiaed framework combining their theory with fears of technological diffusion offers greater predictive power by explaining the broader dilemma of revealing military innovations during both war and peace. States conceal military capabilities to avoid two threats: nulliacation and duplication.2 Green and Long’s variables of uniqueness and countermeasures focus on the former while failing to address the latter. Green and Long argue that if the risk of countermeasures is low or if replacement capabilities exist, signaling becomes attractive for “improved general deterrence, adversary resource diversion, and diplomatic concessions or strategic adjustments” (p. 56). Duplication is a fundamentally different concern. Disclosures may provide an adversary with insights to improve their own capabilities. The fear of nulliacation identiaed by Green and Long does not preclude concerns about technological diffusion (pp. 51–52). Correspondence: Clandestine Capabilities","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"194-198"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79587693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have expressed interest in radiological weapons; a number have actively pursued them; and three tested them on multiple occasions before ultimately deciding not to deploy the weapons. Why is so little known about these false starts, especially outside the United States? Are such weapons more difficult to manufacture than depicted by science-fiction authors and military pundits? Are radiological weapons a thing of the past, or do they remain an attractive option for some countries? A comparative analysis of the previously underexplored cases of radiological weapons programs in the United States and the Soviet Union illuminates the drivers and limitations of weapons innovation in one specific nuclear sector. An examination of the rise and demise of radiological weapons programs in both countries also points to circumstances in the future that might prompt renewed interest on the part of some states in radiological weapons and proposes steps that might be undertaken to reduce the possibility of their production, deployment, and use.
{"title":"Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons","authors":"Samuel Meyer, S. Bidgood, W. Potter","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00391","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have expressed interest in radiological weapons; a number have actively pursued them; and three tested them on multiple occasions before ultimately deciding not to deploy the weapons. Why is so little known about these false starts, especially outside the United States? Are such weapons more difficult to manufacture than depicted by science-fiction authors and military pundits? Are radiological weapons a thing of the past, or do they remain an attractive option for some countries? A comparative analysis of the previously underexplored cases of radiological weapons programs in the United States and the Soviet Union illuminates the drivers and limitations of weapons innovation in one specific nuclear sector. An examination of the rise and demise of radiological weapons programs in both countries also points to circumstances in the future that might prompt renewed interest on the part of some states in radiological weapons and proposes steps that might be undertaken to reduce the possibility of their production, deployment, and use.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"27 1","pages":"51-94"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82556200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Military operations lie at the center of international relations theory and practice. Although security studies scholars have used campaign analysis to study military operations for decades, the method has not been formally defined or standardized, and there is little methodological guidance available for scholars interested in conducting or evaluating it. Campaign analysis is a method involving the use of a model and techniques for managing uncertainty to answer questions about military operations. The method comprises six steps: (1) question selection, (2) scenario development, (3) model construction, (4) value assignment, (5) sensitivity analysis, and (6) interpretation and presentation of results. The models that scholars develop to direct analysis are significant intellectual contributions in their own right, and can be adapted by other scholars and practitioners to guide additional analyses. Careful model construction can clarify, but does not obviate, the uncertainty of conflict. To manage uncertainty in parameter values, scholars can use the “input distribution approach” to propagate uncertainty in inputs through to a model's output. Replications and extensions of Wu Riqiang's 2020 analysis of Chinese nuclear survivability and Barry Posen's 1991 analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's prospects against the Warsaw Pact illustrate the six steps of campaign analysis, the value of transparent models and the input distribution approach, and the potential of campaign analysis to contribute to policy and theory.
{"title":"The Case for Campaign Analysis: A Method for Studying Military Operations","authors":"Rachel Tecott, Andrew Halterman","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00408","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Military operations lie at the center of international relations theory and practice. Although security studies scholars have used campaign analysis to study military operations for decades, the method has not been formally defined or standardized, and there is little methodological guidance available for scholars interested in conducting or evaluating it. Campaign analysis is a method involving the use of a model and techniques for managing uncertainty to answer questions about military operations. The method comprises six steps: (1) question selection, (2) scenario development, (3) model construction, (4) value assignment, (5) sensitivity analysis, and (6) interpretation and presentation of results. The models that scholars develop to direct analysis are significant intellectual contributions in their own right, and can be adapted by other scholars and practitioners to guide additional analyses. Careful model construction can clarify, but does not obviate, the uncertainty of conflict. To manage uncertainty in parameter values, scholars can use the “input distribution approach” to propagate uncertainty in inputs through to a model's output. Replications and extensions of Wu Riqiang's 2020 analysis of Chinese nuclear survivability and Barry Posen's 1991 analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's prospects against the Warsaw Pact illustrate the six steps of campaign analysis, the value of transparent models and the input distribution approach, and the potential of campaign analysis to contribute to policy and theory.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"44-83"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79651211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate with and support declining powers. What explains the rising state's choice of policy? When do rising states support or prey on declining great powers, and why do such strategies vary across time and space? The answer depends on the rising state's broader strategic calculations. All things being equal, a rising state will generally support a declining power when the latter can be used to offset threats from other great powers that can harm the rising state's security. Conversely, when using a declining state to offset such challenges is not a plausible option, the rising state is likely to pursue a predation strategy. The level of assertiveness of support or predation, meanwhile, depends on the declining power's military posture: the stronger the declining state is militarily, the less assertive the rising state tends to be. A review of the strategies adopted by two relatively rising powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward a declining Great Britain after 1945, and of a rising United States vis-à-vis a declining Soviet Union in the late Cold War, illustrates how this argument outperforms explanations that focus instead on the importance of economic interdependence and ideology.
{"title":"Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers","authors":"Joshua R. Shifrinson","doi":"10.1162/ISEC_A_00384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_A_00384","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate with and support declining powers. What explains the rising state's choice of policy? When do rising states support or prey on declining great powers, and why do such strategies vary across time and space? The answer depends on the rising state's broader strategic calculations. All things being equal, a rising state will generally support a declining power when the latter can be used to offset threats from other great powers that can harm the rising state's security. Conversely, when using a declining state to offset such challenges is not a plausible option, the rising state is likely to pursue a predation strategy. The level of assertiveness of support or predation, meanwhile, depends on the declining power's military posture: the stronger the declining state is militarily, the less assertive the rising state tends to be. A review of the strategies adopted by two relatively rising powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward a declining Great Britain after 1945, and of a rising United States vis-à-vis a declining Soviet Union in the late Cold War, illustrates how this argument outperforms explanations that focus instead on the importance of economic interdependence and ideology.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"8 1","pages":"126 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77203905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On November 19, 1977, the world watched in disbelief as Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat visited Jerusalem. In one dramatic stroke, Sadat met with Israel's leaders, promised “no more war,” and offered Israel de facto recognition. Recently declassified archival sources provide new insight into why Sadat suddenly made all these concessions and why he chose to initiate conciliation through such a bold move. The historical evidence supports a prospect-theoretic explanation of Sadat's risk acceptance. Sadat never accepted Egypt's loss of the Sinai Peninsula but, unable to recover it either militarily or diplomatically (through U.S. mediation), he became willing to accept greater risks to recoup Egypt's territorial losses. As Sadat grew frustrated with the efforts of Jimmy Carter's administration to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, he sought to accelerate the peace process by abandoning multilateral diplomacy in favor of direct negotiations with Israel. He understood, however, that bilateral talks would fail given Israel's deep suspicion and mistrust of its Arab neighbors. By empathetically responding to its fears and security concerns, Sadat reasoned that he could reassure Israel of Egypt's benign intentions and remove, as he often said, the “psychological barriers” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such an approach might help Israel feel secure enough so that its leaders would trade land for peace.
{"title":"Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem: Bold Gestures and Risk Acceptance in the Search for Peace","authors":"Shahin Berenji","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00381","url":null,"abstract":"On November 19, 1977, the world watched in disbelief as Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat visited Jerusalem. In one dramatic stroke, Sadat met with Israel's leaders, promised “no more war,” and offered Israel de facto recognition. Recently declassified archival sources provide new insight into why Sadat suddenly made all these concessions and why he chose to initiate conciliation through such a bold move. The historical evidence supports a prospect-theoretic explanation of Sadat's risk acceptance. Sadat never accepted Egypt's loss of the Sinai Peninsula but, unable to recover it either militarily or diplomatically (through U.S. mediation), he became willing to accept greater risks to recoup Egypt's territorial losses. As Sadat grew frustrated with the efforts of Jimmy Carter's administration to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, he sought to accelerate the peace process by abandoning multilateral diplomacy in favor of direct negotiations with Israel. He understood, however, that bilateral talks would fail given Israel's deep suspicion and mistrust of its Arab neighbors. By empathetically responding to its fears and security concerns, Sadat reasoned that he could reassure Israel of Egypt's benign intentions and remove, as he often said, the “psychological barriers” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such an approach might help Israel feel secure enough so that its leaders would trade land for peace.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"127-163"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74894591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each additional revelation made it less likely that the country would be rewarded, while continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership struggled to resolve this dilemma, as elites pursued competing policies and subordinates did not consistently obey Saddam Hussein's orders. These difficulties reflected principal-agent problems that were aggravated by the leadership's initial attempts to deny and cover up Iraq's WMD capabilities. Together, the cheater's dilemma and principal-agent problems explain a range of puzzling Iraqi behaviors that came across as calculated ambiguity to the outside world. These findings offer insights into the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMD, and the extent to which they are willing and able to disclose information about past programs and their past efforts to conceal this information from the outside world.
{"title":"Cheater's Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War","authors":"Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00382","url":null,"abstract":"Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each additional revelation made it less likely that the country would be rewarded, while continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership struggled to resolve this dilemma, as elites pursued competing policies and subordinates did not consistently obey Saddam Hussein's orders. These difficulties reflected principal-agent problems that were aggravated by the leadership's initial attempts to deny and cover up Iraq's WMD capabilities. Together, the cheater's dilemma and principal-agent problems explain a range of puzzling Iraqi behaviors that came across as calculated ambiguity to the outside world. These findings offer insights into the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMD, and the extent to which they are willing and able to disclose information about past programs and their past efforts to conceal this information from the outside world.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"75 1","pages":"51-89"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74135901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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