Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

The rejection of research results is sometimes thought to be justified in cases of individuals embracing fringe ideas that depart significantly from prevailing orthodoxy, or in cases of individuals who lack appropriate expertise or credentials. The case of John Garcia exhibits both of these dimensions, and illustrates that such rejection can delay scientific advancements. Garcia's work decisively challenged what was the orthodoxy in psychology in the midcentury: behaviorism. Behaviorist learning theorists suffered from theory-entrenchment insofar as they failed to acknowledge Garcia's anomalous research findings that ran counter to their theoretical expectations. The case study also illustrates that theories on the margins can become embraced as a result of advancements in adjacent research fields. Studying how Garcia's work moved from fringe to mainstream results in lessons for the philosophy of science and epistemology more generally. Only when we see the mechanisms of exclusion at work can we understand how science and other knowledge production systems can inadvertently act counterproductively via gatekeeping practices that filter out unorthodox points of view.

The Lennard-Jones (LJ) fluid, named after mathematician-physicist-chemist Sir John Lennard-Jones (1894–1954), occupies a special place among fluids. It is an ideal entity, defined as the fluid whose particles interact according to the Lennard-Jones potential. This paper expounds the history of the LJ fluid to throw light on the tensions between theory and computational practice.

The paper argues for the following claims. Firstly, the computational approach—even prior to the computer—pragmatically aims at prediction, not truth. Secondly, computer simulation methods, especially “molecular dynamics” (MD), triggered a change in epistemology. Now, simulated model fluids became targets of investigation in their own right. The urge for prediction turned the LJ fluid into the most investigated fluid in engineering thermodynamics. Thirdly, MD took a huge upswing in the 1990s, due to exploratory options in simulation. We discuss how, under these conditions, predictive success might be fraught with problems of reproducibility.

Evidence-based policy has achieved great relevance in policy-making and social research. Nonetheless, over the past few years, several problematic aspects of this approach have been identified. This paper discusses whether, and to what extent, evidence of mechanisms could contribute to addressing certain difficulties faced by evidence-based policy. I argue that it could play a crucial role in the assessment of the efficacy of interventions, the extrapolation of interventions to target populations, and the identification of side effects. For analysing the potential contribution of evidence of mechanisms, the previous debate on the pluralist approach to evidence-based medicine is taken as reference.

The widely recognized 12 principles of green chemistry, introduced in 1998, have become a focal point for environmentally conscious chemists worldwide. These principles are regarded as a comprehensive summary of the achievements of green chemistry and a roadmap for future advancements in the field, aligning chemistry with sustainability goals. They have been hailed as groundbreaking in addressing pressing global challenges, including environmental and climate crises. However, a closer examination reveals a more nuanced perspective. Criticisms have emerged, asserting that these principles may stifle the creativity of emerging chemists and distort the history of green chemistry. Dissenting voices are growing, prompting scholars to reevaluate their effectiveness and relevance. It appears that the 12 principles provide an overarching narrative and a common language to practitioners of green chemistry but their success does not proceed from their ‘scientific’ qualities but should be rather understood in socio-historical terms. Analysing these principles provides insights into the mindset and collective identities of chemists, highlighting how underlying value-driven frameworks shape scientific discourse. It becomes evident that these frameworks can be co-opted and persist unquestioned for extended periods. The objective of this article is to demystify the 12 principles, stimulating dialogue on the necessity of self-reflection within scientific fields that heavily rely on value-laden sustainability-oriented terminology.

Broadly speaking, there are three views on whether Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is violated in the case of similar particles. According to the earliest view, PII is always violated (call this the no discernibility view); according to the more recent weak discernibility view, PII is at least valid in a weak sense. No and weak discernibility have been referred to as orthodoxy. Steven French has argued that although PII is violated, similar particles can still be regarded as individuals, or, alternatively, as non-individuals: French famously concluded therefore that metaphysics is underdetermined by physics. Call this thesis orthodox underdetermination. Most recently, some authors have turned against orthodoxy by arguing that PII is valid in more than a weak sense – call this the new discernibility view, also referred to as heterodoxy. Since heterodoxy is backed up by physical considerations, metaphysics now seems to be determined by physics: physics indicates that PII is valid. In this paper, I argue that with respect to entangled states, there are two ways to establish PII's validity, which yield two different ontological interpretations of entanglement. Therefore, a form of underdetermination returns within the heterodox framework. I argue that heterodox underdetermination deserves some attention, because the two ontological interpretations might yield different explanations of the violation of Bell inequalities.

We argue that the fundamental assertion underlying Mach's critique of Newton's first law is that inertial motion is not motion in the absence of causes; rather, it is motion whose cause lies in some homogeneous aspect of the environment. We distinguish this formal requirement (Mach's principle) from two hypotheses which Mach considers concerning the origin of inertia: that the distant stars play (1) a merely “collateral” or (2) a “fundamental” role in the causal determination of inertial motion.

In his later writings, Mach deliberately avoids referring to the concept of causation, and indeed, this has made the interpretation of Mach's principle a subject of widespread controversy. However, in his earlier writings, the substance of Mach's critique is less ambiguously expressed. Therefore, close attention is given to Mach's early writings and the evolution of his thought. Various accounts in the secondary literature on Mach's principle, in particular those of Norton and DiSalle, are assessed on this basis. We end with a defence of the Machian status and legitimacy of the early Einstein's research program.

The European tradition makes a sharp distinction between animism and science. On the basis of this distinction, either animism is reproved for failing to reach the heights of science, or science is reproved for failing to reach the heights of animism. In this essay, I draw on work in the history and philosophy and science, combined with a method from the sociology of scientific knowledge, to question the sharpness of this distinction. Along the way, I also take guidance from the research of North American Indigenous scholars. As it turns out, there is a rich, if largely overlooked, tradition of Aristotelian animism running through the history of modern European science, and this tradition sometimes resonates with Indigenous perspectives. By challenging the entrenched distinction between animism and science, I aim to help reconcile ongoing tensions between Indigenous and European scientific groups, and so strengthen prospects for their mutually beneficial cooperation.

This paper argues that the best interpretation of the human nature concept used in evolutionary social science (ESS) is as the human adaptive complex. This understanding of the concept enables us to make sense of the features of human nature that are described in that literature as symptomatic of traits which are part of human nature, rather than being constitutive of human nature itself. This enables this proposal to make better sense of how the human nature concept is used than other current proposals for how to understand that concept.

In 1956, John G. Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim proposed an approach to intertheoretical reduction as an alternative to that of Ernest Nagel. However, they neglected to provide a clear definition of its basic concept of systematization. After decades of languishing in the shadows, new interest in the KO approach is emerging. Nevertheless, there are still misunderstandings regarding this basic concept. The present paper elucidates this concept by returning to Oppenheim's hitherto little-noticed publications from the 1920s and 1930s, which Kemeny and Oppenheim obviously used as guidance in 1956. Reappraising Oppenheim's early writings delivers two significant payoffs: new clarity in understanding the concept of systematization as well as a more solid grasp of the structure of this approach as a distinctive combination of explanation and systematization.