Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

A growing literature in philosophy of science focuses on the role of aesthetics in scientific practice, with the experiment recently recognized for its aesthetic value. However, the literature on aesthetics in experimentation grows out of case studies from the history of science, leaving open the question as to how contemporary scientists experience aesthetics in their experimental work. In this paper we offer the first qualitative, empirical analysis of aesthetic experiences regarding experimental practice, drawing from in-depth interviews with 215 scientists in four countries. We identify six categories of aesthetic experience we find in experimentation, their function, and new questions emerging from our study.

In a series of articles, Mauricio Suárez defends the neutrality of fictionalism with respect to the scientific realism-anti-realism debate. Suárez understands fictionalism from a strictly methodological point of view, linked to the practice of model building in the context of the philosophy of science. He moves away from the type of fictionalism analysed in other areas of philosophy such as metaphysics, the philosophy of language, aesthetics or the philosophy of mathematics. Following Vaihinger's position, he emphasizes the inferential role of fiction in scientific modelling and argues that scientific fictionalism is not incompatible with scientific realism, as is often believed. We argue against Suárez's position and reject the ubiquitous character assigned to fictions in scientific discourse, as well as the deflationary view of scientific realism defended by Suárez. We conclude that when the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical aspects at stake in the realism-antirealism debate are taken into account, the alleged compatibility between scientific realism and fictionalism starts to generate some tension.

The interpretability of ML models is important, but it is not clear what it amounts to. So far, most philosophers have discussed the lack of interpretability of black-box models such as neural networks, and methods such as explainable AI that aim to make these models more transparent. The goal of this paper is to clarify the nature of interpretability by focussing on the other end of the “interpretability spectrum”. The reasons why some models, linear models and decision trees, are highly interpretable will be examined, and also how more general models, MARS and GAM, retain some degree of interpretability. It is found that while there is heterogeneity in how we gain interpretability, what interpretability is in particular cases can be explicated in a clear manner.

I apply Dawid's Meta-Empirical Assessment (MEA) methodology to the theory of cosmological inflation. I argue that applying this methodology does not currently offer a compelling case for ascribing non-empirical confirmation to cosmological inflation. In particular, I argue that despite displaying strong instances of Unexpected Explanatory Coherence (UEA), it is premature to evaluate the theory on the basis of the No Alternatives Argument (NAA). More significantly though, I argue that the theory of cosmological inflation fails to sustain a convincing Meta-Inductive Argument (MIA) because the empirical evidence and theoretical successes that it seeks to draw meta-empirical support from do not warrant a meta-inductive inference to inflation. I conclude by assessing how future developments could pave the way towards crafting a more compelling case for the non-empirical confirmation of cosmological inflation.

Evidence-Based Medicine has little consideration for mechanisms and philosophers of science and medicine have recently made pleas to increase the place of mechanisms in the medical evidence hierarchy. However, in this debate the notions of mechanisms seem to be limited to ‘mechanistic processes’ and ‘complex-systems mechanisms,’ understood as ‘componential causal systems’. I believe that this will not do full justice to how mechanisms are used in biological, psychological and social sciences and, consequently, in a more biopsychosocial approach to medicine. Here, I propose, following (Kuorikoski, 2009), to pay more attention to ‘abstract forms of interaction’ mechanisms. The present work scrutinized review articles on depression and medically unexplained pain, which are considered to be of multifactorial pathogenesis, for their use of mechanisms. In review articles on these disorders there seemed to be a range of uses between more ‘abstract forms of interaction’ and ‘componential causal system’ mechanisms. I therefore propose to expand the notions of mechanisms considered in medicine to include that of more ‘abstract forms of interaction’ to better explain and manage biopsychosocial disorders.

No, but the paper argues that Bohr understood his correspondence principle, or at least an aspect of that principle expressed by the notion of rational generalization, as grounded in Hankel's principle of permanence, adapted to new historical and theoretical contexts. This is shown to illuminate some otherwise obscure aspects of Bohr's approach to quantum theory, as well as a seemingly strange criticism against this approach, due to Feyerabend and Bohm.