A. David Redish, Henri Scott Chastain, Carlisle Ford Runge, Brian M. Sweis, Scott E. Allen, Antara Haldar
Current theories of decision making suggest that the neural circuits in mammalian brains (including humans) computationally combine representations of the past (memory), present (perception), and future (agentic goals) to take actions that achieve the needs of the agent. How information is represented within those neural circuits changes what computations are available to that system which changes how agents interact with their world to take those actions. We argue that the computational neuroscience of decision making provides a new microeconomic framework (neuroeconomics) that offers new opportunities to construct policies that interact with those decision-making systems to improve outcomes. After laying out the computational processes underlying decision making in mammalian brains, we present four applications of this logic with policy consequences: (1) contingency management as a treatment for addiction, (2) precommitment and the sensitivity to sunk costs, (3) media consequences for changes in housing prices after a disaster, and (4) how social interactions underlie the success (and failure) of microfinance institutions.
{"title":"Policy consequences of the new neuroeconomic framework","authors":"A. David Redish, Henri Scott Chastain, Carlisle Ford Runge, Brian M. Sweis, Scott E. Allen, Antara Haldar","doi":"arxiv-2409.07373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.07373","url":null,"abstract":"Current theories of decision making suggest that the neural circuits in\u0000mammalian brains (including humans) computationally combine representations of\u0000the past (memory), present (perception), and future (agentic goals) to take\u0000actions that achieve the needs of the agent. How information is represented\u0000within those neural circuits changes what computations are available to that\u0000system which changes how agents interact with their world to take those\u0000actions. We argue that the computational neuroscience of decision making\u0000provides a new microeconomic framework (neuroeconomics) that offers new\u0000opportunities to construct policies that interact with those decision-making\u0000systems to improve outcomes. After laying out the computational processes\u0000underlying decision making in mammalian brains, we present four applications of\u0000this logic with policy consequences: (1) contingency management as a treatment\u0000for addiction, (2) precommitment and the sensitivity to sunk costs, (3) media\u0000consequences for changes in housing prices after a disaster, and (4) how social\u0000interactions underlie the success (and failure) of microfinance institutions.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives to gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of information about peers' strategies and outcomes. When no peer information is available, competitive rewards can be associated with more evidence gathering than noncompetitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers know what or how their peers are doing, competitive rewards schemes are associated with less active evidence gathering than noncompetitive schemes. The nature of the feedback -- whether subjects receive information about peers' strategies, outcomes, or both -- also affects subjects' incentives to engage in evidence gathering. Specifically, only combined feedback about peers' strategies and performance -- from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between evidence gathering, riskiness, and success -- is associated with less evidence gathering when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar effect for noncompetitive rewards.
{"title":"Evidence gathering under competitive and noncompetitive rewards","authors":"Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin","doi":"arxiv-2409.06248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06248","url":null,"abstract":"Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives\u0000to gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a\u0000laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between\u0000incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of\u0000information about peers' strategies and outcomes. When no peer information is\u0000available, competitive rewards can be associated with more evidence gathering\u0000than noncompetitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers know what or how\u0000their peers are doing, competitive rewards schemes are associated with less\u0000active evidence gathering than noncompetitive schemes. The nature of the\u0000feedback -- whether subjects receive information about peers' strategies,\u0000outcomes, or both -- also affects subjects' incentives to engage in evidence\u0000gathering. Specifically, only combined feedback about peers' strategies and\u0000performance -- from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between\u0000evidence gathering, riskiness, and success -- is associated with less evidence\u0000gathering when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar\u0000effect for noncompetitive rewards.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the rapid expansion of Artificial Intelligence, there are expectations for a proportional expansion of economic activity due to increased productivity, and with it energy consumption and its associated environmental consequences like carbon dioxide emissions. Here, we combine data on economic activity, with early estimates of likely adoption of AI across occupations and industries, to estimate the increase in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions at the industry level and in aggregate for the US economy. At the industry level, energy use can increase between 0 and 12 PJ per year, while emissions increase between 47 tCO$_2$ and 272 ktCO$_2$. Aggregating across industries in the US economy, this totals an increase in energy consumption of 28 PJ per year, or around 0.03% of energy use per year in the US. We find this translates to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions of 896 ktCO$_2$ per year, or around 0.02% of the CO$_2$ emissions per year in the US.
{"title":"Watts and Bots: The Energy Implications of AI Adoption","authors":"Anthony Harding, Juan Moreno-Cruz","doi":"arxiv-2409.06626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06626","url":null,"abstract":"With the rapid expansion of Artificial Intelligence, there are expectations\u0000for a proportional expansion of economic activity due to increased\u0000productivity, and with it energy consumption and its associated environmental\u0000consequences like carbon dioxide emissions. Here, we combine data on economic\u0000activity, with early estimates of likely adoption of AI across occupations and\u0000industries, to estimate the increase in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions\u0000at the industry level and in aggregate for the US economy. At the industry\u0000level, energy use can increase between 0 and 12 PJ per year, while emissions\u0000increase between 47 tCO$_2$ and 272 ktCO$_2$. Aggregating across industries in\u0000the US economy, this totals an increase in energy consumption of 28 PJ per\u0000year, or around 0.03% of energy use per year in the US. We find this translates\u0000to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions of 896 ktCO$_2$ per year, or around\u00000.02% of the CO$_2$ emissions per year in the US.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate investment and earlier mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers' investments, while first movers learn to accommodate those responses.
{"title":"Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study","authors":"Arthur B. Nelson, Dmitry Ryvkin","doi":"arxiv-2409.06230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06230","url":null,"abstract":"We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions\u0000sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages.\u0000Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests\u0000of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect\u0000Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate\u0000investment and earlier mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly\u0000rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more\u0000sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence\u0000on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well.\u0000Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers\u0000and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later\u0000movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers' investments,\u0000while first movers learn to accommodate those responses.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates how the OECD's global minimum tax (GMT) affects multinational enterprises (MNEs) behavior and countries' corporate taxes. We consider both profit shifting and capital investment responses of the MNE in a formal model of tax competition between asymmetric countries. The GMT reduces the true tax rate differential and benefits the large country, while the revenue effect is generally ambiguous for the small country. In the short run where tax rates are fixed, due to tax deduction of the substance-based income exclusion (SBIE), a higher minimum rate exerts investment incentives but also incurs a larger revenue loss for the small country. We show that under high (low) profit shifting costs the former (latter) effect dominates so that the small country's revenue increases (decreases). In the long run where countries can adjust tax rates, the GMT reshapes the tax game and the competition pattern. In contrast to the existing literature, we reveal that the minimum rate binds the small country only if it is low. With the rise of the GMT rate, countries will undercut the minimum to boost real investments and collect top-up taxes. For small market-size asymmetry and intermediate profit shifting cost, the revenue loss from the elimination of profit shifting may dominate the revenue gain from taxing the true profits generated by substantive activities, so that even a marginal GMT reform may harm the small country. Otherwise, it can raise the small country's tax revenue.
{"title":"The Global Minimum Tax, Investment Incentives and Asymmetric Tax Competition","authors":"Xuyang Chen","doi":"arxiv-2409.05397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05397","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how the OECD's global minimum tax (GMT) affects\u0000multinational enterprises (MNEs) behavior and countries' corporate taxes. We\u0000consider both profit shifting and capital investment responses of the MNE in a\u0000formal model of tax competition between asymmetric countries. The GMT reduces\u0000the true tax rate differential and benefits the large country, while the\u0000revenue effect is generally ambiguous for the small country. In the short run\u0000where tax rates are fixed, due to tax deduction of the substance-based income\u0000exclusion (SBIE), a higher minimum rate exerts investment incentives but also\u0000incurs a larger revenue loss for the small country. We show that under high\u0000(low) profit shifting costs the former (latter) effect dominates so that the\u0000small country's revenue increases (decreases). In the long run where countries\u0000can adjust tax rates, the GMT reshapes the tax game and the competition\u0000pattern. In contrast to the existing literature, we reveal that the minimum\u0000rate binds the small country only if it is low. With the rise of the GMT rate,\u0000countries will undercut the minimum to boost real investments and collect\u0000top-up taxes. For small market-size asymmetry and intermediate profit shifting\u0000cost, the revenue loss from the elimination of profit shifting may dominate the\u0000revenue gain from taxing the true profits generated by substantive activities,\u0000so that even a marginal GMT reform may harm the small country. Otherwise, it\u0000can raise the small country's tax revenue.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from above, the derived system of equations constitutes a contraction mapping. As a result, fixed-point iterations are guaranteed to converge to the unique distribution of equilibrium transfers.
{"title":"Note on solving one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility","authors":"Esben Scrivers Andersen","doi":"arxiv-2409.05518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05518","url":null,"abstract":"We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in\u0000a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then\u0000show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from\u0000above, the derived system of equations constitutes a contraction mapping. As a\u0000result, fixed-point iterations are guaranteed to converge to the unique\u0000distribution of equilibrium transfers.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kris Wain, Mahesh Maiyani, Nikki M. Carroll, Rafael Meza, Robert T. Greenlee, Christine Neslund-Dudas, Michelle R. Odelberg, Caryn Oshiro, Debra P. Ritzwoller
Introduction: Lung cancer screening (LCS) increases early-stage cancer detection which may reduce cancer treatment costs. Little is known about how receipt of LCS affects healthcare costs in real-world clinical settings. Methods: This retrospective study analyzed utilization and cost data from the Population-based Research to Optimize the Screening Process Lung Consortium. We included individuals who met age and smoking LCS eligibility criteria and were engaged within four healthcare systems between February 5, 2015, and December 31, 2021. Generalized linear models estimated healthcare costs from the payer perspective during 12-months prior and 12-months post baseline LCS. We compared these costs to eligible individuals who did not receive LCS. Sensitivity analyses expanded our sample to age-eligible individuals with any smoking history noted in the electronic health record. Secondary analyses examined costs among a sample diagnosed with lung cancer. We reported mean predicted costs with average values for all other explanatory variables. Results: We identified 10,049 eligible individuals who received baseline LCS and 15,233 who did not receive baseline LCS. Receipt of baseline LCS was associated with additional costs of $3,698 compared to individuals not receiving LCS. Secondary analyses showed suggestive evidence that LCS prior to cancer diagnosis decreased healthcare costs compared to cancer diagnosed without screening. Conclusion: These findings suggest LCS increases healthcare costs in the year following screening. However, LCS also improves early-stage cancer detection and may reduce treatment costs following diagnosis. These results can inform future simulation models to guide LCS recommendations, and aid health policy decision makers on resource allocation.
{"title":"Patterns of Medical Care Cost by Service Type Associated with Lung Cancer Screening","authors":"Kris Wain, Mahesh Maiyani, Nikki M. Carroll, Rafael Meza, Robert T. Greenlee, Christine Neslund-Dudas, Michelle R. Odelberg, Caryn Oshiro, Debra P. Ritzwoller","doi":"arxiv-2409.06026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06026","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: Lung cancer screening (LCS) increases early-stage cancer\u0000detection which may reduce cancer treatment costs. Little is known about how\u0000receipt of LCS affects healthcare costs in real-world clinical settings. Methods: This retrospective study analyzed utilization and cost data from the\u0000Population-based Research to Optimize the Screening Process Lung Consortium. We\u0000included individuals who met age and smoking LCS eligibility criteria and were\u0000engaged within four healthcare systems between February 5, 2015, and December\u000031, 2021. Generalized linear models estimated healthcare costs from the payer\u0000perspective during 12-months prior and 12-months post baseline LCS. We compared\u0000these costs to eligible individuals who did not receive LCS. Sensitivity\u0000analyses expanded our sample to age-eligible individuals with any smoking\u0000history noted in the electronic health record. Secondary analyses examined\u0000costs among a sample diagnosed with lung cancer. We reported mean predicted\u0000costs with average values for all other explanatory variables. Results: We identified 10,049 eligible individuals who received baseline LCS\u0000and 15,233 who did not receive baseline LCS. Receipt of baseline LCS was\u0000associated with additional costs of $3,698 compared to individuals not\u0000receiving LCS. Secondary analyses showed suggestive evidence that LCS prior to\u0000cancer diagnosis decreased healthcare costs compared to cancer diagnosed\u0000without screening. Conclusion: These findings suggest LCS increases healthcare costs in the year\u0000following screening. However, LCS also improves early-stage cancer detection\u0000and may reduce treatment costs following diagnosis. These results can inform\u0000future simulation models to guide LCS recommendations, and aid health policy\u0000decision makers on resource allocation.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers participate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but not both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted total surplus, can strictly improve upon the laissez-faire outcome. We show that the optimal mechanism consists of three components: a public option, nonlinear subsidies, and laissez-faire consumption. We quantify the resulting distortions and relate them to the correlation between consumer demand and welfare weights. Our findings reveal that while private market access constrains the social planner's ability to redistribute, it also strengthens the rationale for non-market allocations.
{"title":"Optimal In-Kind Redistribution","authors":"Zi Yang Kang, Mitchell Watt","doi":"arxiv-2409.06112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06112","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers\u0000participate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but\u0000not both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted\u0000total surplus, can strictly improve upon the laissez-faire outcome. We show\u0000that the optimal mechanism consists of three components: a public option,\u0000nonlinear subsidies, and laissez-faire consumption. We quantify the resulting\u0000distortions and relate them to the correlation between consumer demand and\u0000welfare weights. Our findings reveal that while private market access\u0000constrains the social planner's ability to redistribute, it also strengthens\u0000the rationale for non-market allocations.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the impact of offline store expansion by Lianjia, China's leading real estate brokerage, within the framework of platform-mediated consolidation. By analyzing micro-level transactions of second-hand houses from Lianjia in ten major Chinese cities from 2016 to 2022, this research investigates how the transaction patterns of traditional brokerages, characterized by the strategic clustering of offline stores, transition towards platform-mediated consolidation, thereby facilitating the development of an extensive franchise network. Utilizing a regression discontinuity design (RDD), this study quantifies the optimal influence radius of offline stores (410 meters) on housing transactions. this study empirically estimates the effects of real estate brokerage's offline store expansion and platform-mediated consolidation on transaction properties. The results indicate that this strategy significantly boosts revenues and attracts more people to housing tours. Additionally, the results suggest that neither the platform-mediated strategy nor offline expansion affects the transaction period, but offline store expansion can reduce the price gap between sellers and buyers. Furthermore, this study introduces a measure of network effect, revealing that Lianjia's offline stores exhibit a local clustering pattern with moderate network strength. The analysis of platform-mediated consolidation indicates a significantly positive effect on network strength. This study provides valuable insights into the synergy between offline store expansion and online platform development, elucidating future trajectories in the evolving real estate brokerage market and analogous sectors.
{"title":"Platform-Mediated Consolidation and Offline Store Expansion: Evidence from Real Estate Brokerages in Major Chinese Cities","authors":"Guoying Deng, Xuyuan Zhang","doi":"arxiv-2409.04326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.04326","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of offline store expansion by Lianjia, China's\u0000leading real estate brokerage, within the framework of platform-mediated\u0000consolidation. By analyzing micro-level transactions of second-hand houses from\u0000Lianjia in ten major Chinese cities from 2016 to 2022, this research\u0000investigates how the transaction patterns of traditional brokerages,\u0000characterized by the strategic clustering of offline stores, transition towards\u0000platform-mediated consolidation, thereby facilitating the development of an\u0000extensive franchise network. Utilizing a regression discontinuity design (RDD),\u0000this study quantifies the optimal influence radius of offline stores (410\u0000meters) on housing transactions. this study empirically estimates the effects\u0000of real estate brokerage's offline store expansion and platform-mediated\u0000consolidation on transaction properties. The results indicate that this\u0000strategy significantly boosts revenues and attracts more people to housing\u0000tours. Additionally, the results suggest that neither the platform-mediated\u0000strategy nor offline expansion affects the transaction period, but offline\u0000store expansion can reduce the price gap between sellers and buyers.\u0000Furthermore, this study introduces a measure of network effect, revealing that\u0000Lianjia's offline stores exhibit a local clustering pattern with moderate\u0000network strength. The analysis of platform-mediated consolidation indicates a\u0000significantly positive effect on network strength. This study provides valuable\u0000insights into the synergy between offline store expansion and online platform\u0000development, elucidating future trajectories in the evolving real estate\u0000brokerage market and analogous sectors.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142192970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This document replicates the main results from Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006 in R. The original results were obtained in TSP back in 2006. The idea here is to be explicit regarding the conceptual approach to regression in R. For most of the replication I used base R without external libraries except when it was absolutely necessary. The findings are consistent with the original article and reveal that the replication effort is minimal, without the need to contact the authors for clarifications or incur into data transformations or filtering not mentioned in the article.
本文用 R 语言复制了 Santos Silva 和 Tenreyro（2006 年）的主要结果。在大部分复制过程中，我使用了基本 R 语言，没有使用外部库，除非有绝对必要。研究结果与原始文章一致，并且表明复制工作非常简单，无需联系作者进行澄清，也无需进行文章中未提及的数据转换或过滤。
{"title":"Replicating The Log of Gravity","authors":"Mauricio Vargas Sepúlveda","doi":"arxiv-2409.09066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.09066","url":null,"abstract":"This document replicates the main results from Santos Silva and Tenreyro\u0000(2006 in R. The original results were obtained in TSP back in 2006. The idea\u0000here is to be explicit regarding the conceptual approach to regression in R.\u0000For most of the replication I used base R without external libraries except\u0000when it was absolutely necessary. The findings are consistent with the original\u0000article and reveal that the replication effort is minimal, without the need to\u0000contact the authors for clarifications or incur into data transformations or\u0000filtering not mentioned in the article.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"9 27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142259582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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