Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00165-7
Justin R. Wheelock, Nicole M. Long
Memory encoding and retrieval constitute neurally dissociable brain states and prior behavioral work suggests that these states may linger in time. Thus memory states may influence both the current experience and subsequent events; however, this account has not been directly tested. To test the hypothesis that memory judgments induce brain states that persist for several hundred milliseconds, we recorded scalp electroencephalography while participants completed a recognition task. We used an independently validated multivariate mnemonic state classifier to assess memory state engagement. We replicate previous behavioral findings, yet we find that memory states are modulated by response congruency. We find strong retrieval state engagement on incongruent trials, when the response switches between two consecutive trials. These findings indicate that cortical brain states are influenced by prior judgments and suggest that a non-mnemonic, internal attention state may be recruited in the face of changing demands in a dynamic environment. Using EEG recordings, this study shows that memory retrieval is influenced by prior judgments, suggesting that attentional effects may affect neural retrieval states.
{"title":"Prior memory responses modulate behavior and brain state engagement","authors":"Justin R. Wheelock, Nicole M. Long","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00165-7","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00165-7","url":null,"abstract":"Memory encoding and retrieval constitute neurally dissociable brain states and prior behavioral work suggests that these states may linger in time. Thus memory states may influence both the current experience and subsequent events; however, this account has not been directly tested. To test the hypothesis that memory judgments induce brain states that persist for several hundred milliseconds, we recorded scalp electroencephalography while participants completed a recognition task. We used an independently validated multivariate mnemonic state classifier to assess memory state engagement. We replicate previous behavioral findings, yet we find that memory states are modulated by response congruency. We find strong retrieval state engagement on incongruent trials, when the response switches between two consecutive trials. These findings indicate that cortical brain states are influenced by prior judgments and suggest that a non-mnemonic, internal attention state may be recruited in the face of changing demands in a dynamic environment. Using EEG recordings, this study shows that memory retrieval is influenced by prior judgments, suggesting that attentional effects may affect neural retrieval states.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00165-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00166-6
Säde Stenlund, Yingchi Guo, Jason Rights, Ryan Dwyer, Elizabeth Dunn
This study examines the emotional consequences of spending choices in everyday life across a diverse multinational sample. Based on a dataset of 200 participants across 7 countries who received $10,000 USD, we analyzed how happy they felt from different types of purchases made with that money. Participants derived high levels of happiness from some types of purchases that have been examined in past research (e.g., buying experiences), but also from other purchases (e.g., education) that have not been the focus of previous work. We found some evidence that the emotional benefits of spending choices varied depending on whether participants lived in higher vs. lower-income countries; specifically, we found differences in the benefits of spending on gifts, housing, debt, and time-saving services. Around the world, people who spent money in ways that made them happy experienced greater improvements in overall subjective well-being 3 and 6 months later. This study presents an analysis of reported happiness following spending decisions of an endowment of 10,000 USD. Participants in high vs low-income countries differed regarding what spending decisions contributed more to happiness.
{"title":"How spending decisions shape happiness in everyday life","authors":"Säde Stenlund, Yingchi Guo, Jason Rights, Ryan Dwyer, Elizabeth Dunn","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00166-6","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00166-6","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the emotional consequences of spending choices in everyday life across a diverse multinational sample. Based on a dataset of 200 participants across 7 countries who received $10,000 USD, we analyzed how happy they felt from different types of purchases made with that money. Participants derived high levels of happiness from some types of purchases that have been examined in past research (e.g., buying experiences), but also from other purchases (e.g., education) that have not been the focus of previous work. We found some evidence that the emotional benefits of spending choices varied depending on whether participants lived in higher vs. lower-income countries; specifically, we found differences in the benefits of spending on gifts, housing, debt, and time-saving services. Around the world, people who spent money in ways that made them happy experienced greater improvements in overall subjective well-being 3 and 6 months later. This study presents an analysis of reported happiness following spending decisions of an endowment of 10,000 USD. Participants in high vs low-income countries differed regarding what spending decisions contributed more to happiness.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00166-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00175-5
Hernán Anlló, Gil Salamander, Nichola Raihani, Stefano Palminteri, Uri Hertz
Individuals often rely on the advice of more experienced peers to minimise uncertainty and increase success likelihood. In most domains where knowledge is acquired through experience, advisers are themselves continuously learning. Here we examine the way advising behaviour changes throughout the learning process, and the way individual traits and costs and benefits of giving advice shape this behaviour. We ran a series of experiments implementing a decision task within a reinforcement learning framework, where participants could decide to share their choices as advice to others. Participants were overall likely to share their choices as advice, even on the first trial before learning. Tendency to share advice and advice quality increased as advisers learned about the value of choices, and moved from exploratory to exploitative behaviour. The introduction of consequences to advising resulted in a shift of the overall tendency to give advice, lowering it when advising implicated monetary loss, and increasing it when advising held reputational value. Individual differences in social anxiety levels were associated with lower tendency to share exploratory decisions. Our results show that advisers tend to share choices that are backed by their own experience, but that this relationship can be altered by advice-consequences and individual traits. In non-competitive settings, learners manifest a preference for broadcasting useful experience-based information to other learners, even when it comes at a social or economic cost.
{"title":"Experience and advice consequences shape information sharing strategies","authors":"Hernán Anlló, Gil Salamander, Nichola Raihani, Stefano Palminteri, Uri Hertz","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00175-5","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00175-5","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals often rely on the advice of more experienced peers to minimise uncertainty and increase success likelihood. In most domains where knowledge is acquired through experience, advisers are themselves continuously learning. Here we examine the way advising behaviour changes throughout the learning process, and the way individual traits and costs and benefits of giving advice shape this behaviour. We ran a series of experiments implementing a decision task within a reinforcement learning framework, where participants could decide to share their choices as advice to others. Participants were overall likely to share their choices as advice, even on the first trial before learning. Tendency to share advice and advice quality increased as advisers learned about the value of choices, and moved from exploratory to exploitative behaviour. The introduction of consequences to advising resulted in a shift of the overall tendency to give advice, lowering it when advising implicated monetary loss, and increasing it when advising held reputational value. Individual differences in social anxiety levels were associated with lower tendency to share exploratory decisions. Our results show that advisers tend to share choices that are backed by their own experience, but that this relationship can be altered by advice-consequences and individual traits. In non-competitive settings, learners manifest a preference for broadcasting useful experience-based information to other learners, even when it comes at a social or economic cost.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00175-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00168-4
Samia C. Akhter-Khan, Sakshi Ghai, Rosie Mayston
Beginning to conduct psychological research in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is daunting. In this reflexive commentary, the authors raise three critical questions that researchers should ask themselves before conducting research in LMICs. Beginning to conduct psychological research in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is daunting. Where do you start? In this reflexive commentary, we raise three critical questions that researchers should ask themselves before conducting research in LMICs.
{"title":"Considerations for conducting psychological research in lower- and middle-income countries","authors":"Samia C. Akhter-Khan, Sakshi Ghai, Rosie Mayston","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00168-4","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00168-4","url":null,"abstract":"Beginning to conduct psychological research in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is daunting. In this reflexive commentary, the authors raise three critical questions that researchers should ask themselves before conducting research in LMICs. Beginning to conduct psychological research in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is daunting. Where do you start? In this reflexive commentary, we raise three critical questions that researchers should ask themselves before conducting research in LMICs.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00168-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00170-w
Valentin Guigon, Marie Claire Villeval, Jean-Claude Dreher
How do we assess the veracity of ambiguous news, and does metacognition guide our decisions to seek further information? In a controlled experiment, participants evaluated the veracity of ambiguous news and decided whether to seek extra information. Confidence in their veracity judgments did not predict accuracy, showing limited metacognitive ability when facing ambiguous news. Despite this, confidence in one’s judgment was the primary driver of the demand for additional information about the news. Lower confidence predicted a stronger desire for extra information, regardless of the veracity judgment. Two key news characteristics led individuals to confidently misinterpret both true and fake news. News imprecision and news tendency to polarize opinions increased the likelihood of misjudgment, highlighting individuals’ vulnerability to ambiguity. Structural equation modeling revealed that the demand for disambiguating information, driven by uncalibrated metacognition, became increasingly ineffective as individuals are drawn in by the ambiguity of the news. Our results underscore the importance of metacognitive abilities in mediating the relationship between assessing ambiguous information and the decision to seek or avoid more information. Judging ambiguous news stories, participants’ confidence determines whether they are willing to pay to receive or avoid extra information.
{"title":"Metacognition biases information seeking in assessing ambiguous news","authors":"Valentin Guigon, Marie Claire Villeval, Jean-Claude Dreher","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00170-w","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00170-w","url":null,"abstract":"How do we assess the veracity of ambiguous news, and does metacognition guide our decisions to seek further information? In a controlled experiment, participants evaluated the veracity of ambiguous news and decided whether to seek extra information. Confidence in their veracity judgments did not predict accuracy, showing limited metacognitive ability when facing ambiguous news. Despite this, confidence in one’s judgment was the primary driver of the demand for additional information about the news. Lower confidence predicted a stronger desire for extra information, regardless of the veracity judgment. Two key news characteristics led individuals to confidently misinterpret both true and fake news. News imprecision and news tendency to polarize opinions increased the likelihood of misjudgment, highlighting individuals’ vulnerability to ambiguity. Structural equation modeling revealed that the demand for disambiguating information, driven by uncalibrated metacognition, became increasingly ineffective as individuals are drawn in by the ambiguity of the news. Our results underscore the importance of metacognitive abilities in mediating the relationship between assessing ambiguous information and the decision to seek or avoid more information. Judging ambiguous news stories, participants’ confidence determines whether they are willing to pay to receive or avoid extra information.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00170-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00173-7
Paul M. Bays
In our everyday experience, the sizes and weights of objects we encounter are strongly correlated. When objects are lifted, visual information about size can be combined with haptic feedback about weight, and a naive application of Bayes’ rule predicts that the perceived weight of larger objects should be exaggerated and smaller objects underestimated. Instead, it is the smaller of two objects of equal weight that is perceived as heavier, a phenomenon termed the Size-Weight Illusion (SWI). Here we provide a normative explanation of the SWI based on principles of efficient coding, which dictate that stimulus properties should be encoded with a fidelity that depends on how frequently those properties are encountered in the environment. We show that the precision with which human observers estimate object weight varies as a function of both mass and volume in a manner consistent with the estimated joint distribution of those properties among everyday objects. We further show that participants’ seemingly “anti-Bayesian” biases (the SWI) are quantitatively predicted by Bayesian estimation when taking into account the gradient of discriminability induced by efficient encoding. The related Material-Weight Illusion (MWI) can also be accounted for on these principles, with surface material providing a visual cue that changes expectations about object density. The efficient coding model is further compatible with a wide range of previous observations, including the adaptability of weight illusions and properties of “non-illusory” objects. The framework is general and predicts perceptual biases and variability in any sensory properties that are correlated in the natural environment. Weight illusions reflect the efficient coding of everyday experiences with objects. Bayesian models that account for the resulting differences in discriminability predict the size-weight and material-weight illusions.
{"title":"Weight illusions explained by efficient coding based on correlated natural statistics","authors":"Paul M. Bays","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00173-7","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00173-7","url":null,"abstract":"In our everyday experience, the sizes and weights of objects we encounter are strongly correlated. When objects are lifted, visual information about size can be combined with haptic feedback about weight, and a naive application of Bayes’ rule predicts that the perceived weight of larger objects should be exaggerated and smaller objects underestimated. Instead, it is the smaller of two objects of equal weight that is perceived as heavier, a phenomenon termed the Size-Weight Illusion (SWI). Here we provide a normative explanation of the SWI based on principles of efficient coding, which dictate that stimulus properties should be encoded with a fidelity that depends on how frequently those properties are encountered in the environment. We show that the precision with which human observers estimate object weight varies as a function of both mass and volume in a manner consistent with the estimated joint distribution of those properties among everyday objects. We further show that participants’ seemingly “anti-Bayesian” biases (the SWI) are quantitatively predicted by Bayesian estimation when taking into account the gradient of discriminability induced by efficient encoding. The related Material-Weight Illusion (MWI) can also be accounted for on these principles, with surface material providing a visual cue that changes expectations about object density. The efficient coding model is further compatible with a wide range of previous observations, including the adaptability of weight illusions and properties of “non-illusory” objects. The framework is general and predicts perceptual biases and variability in any sensory properties that are correlated in the natural environment. Weight illusions reflect the efficient coding of everyday experiences with objects. Bayesian models that account for the resulting differences in discriminability predict the size-weight and material-weight illusions.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00173-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142866958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-18DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00172-8
Didrika S. van de Wouw, Ryan T. McKay, Nicholas Furl
Considerable research has shown that people make biased decisions in “optimal stopping problems”, where options are encountered sequentially, and there is no opportunity to recall rejected options or to know upcoming options in advance (e.g. when flat hunting or choosing a spouse). Here, we used computational modelling to identify the mechanisms that best explain decision bias in the context of an especially realistic version of this problem: the full-information problem. We eliminated a number of factors as potential instigators of bias. Then, we examined sequence length and payoff scheme: two manipulations where an optimality model recommends adjusting the sampling rate. Here, participants were more reluctant to increase their sampling rates when it was optimal to do so, leading to increased undersampling bias. Our comparison of several computational models of bias demonstrates that many participants maintain these relatively low sampling rates because of suboptimally pessimistic expectations about the quality of future options (i.e. a mis-specified prior distribution). These results support a new theory about how humans solve full information problems. Understanding the causes of decision error could enhance how we conduct real world sequential searches for options, for example how online shopping or dating applications present options to users. Decisions frequently involve sequential searches through options until the right moment to stop and make a decision has been reached. This study shows that participants’ searches stop too early because of misguided expectations of future options.
{"title":"Biased expectations about future choice options predict sequential economic decisions","authors":"Didrika S. van de Wouw, Ryan T. McKay, Nicholas Furl","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00172-8","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00172-8","url":null,"abstract":"Considerable research has shown that people make biased decisions in “optimal stopping problems”, where options are encountered sequentially, and there is no opportunity to recall rejected options or to know upcoming options in advance (e.g. when flat hunting or choosing a spouse). Here, we used computational modelling to identify the mechanisms that best explain decision bias in the context of an especially realistic version of this problem: the full-information problem. We eliminated a number of factors as potential instigators of bias. Then, we examined sequence length and payoff scheme: two manipulations where an optimality model recommends adjusting the sampling rate. Here, participants were more reluctant to increase their sampling rates when it was optimal to do so, leading to increased undersampling bias. Our comparison of several computational models of bias demonstrates that many participants maintain these relatively low sampling rates because of suboptimally pessimistic expectations about the quality of future options (i.e. a mis-specified prior distribution). These results support a new theory about how humans solve full information problems. Understanding the causes of decision error could enhance how we conduct real world sequential searches for options, for example how online shopping or dating applications present options to users. Decisions frequently involve sequential searches through options until the right moment to stop and make a decision has been reached. This study shows that participants’ searches stop too early because of misguided expectations of future options.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00172-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142857438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-17DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00163-9
Santiago Castiello, Joan Danielle K. Ongchoco, Benjamin van Buren, Brian J. Scholl, Philip R. Corlett
Paranoia (believing others intend harm) and excess teleological thinking (ascribing too much purpose) are non-consensual beliefs about agents. Human vision rapidly detects agents and their intentions. Might paranoia and teleology have roots in visual perception? Using displays that evoke the impression that one disc (‘wolf’) is chasing another (‘sheep’), we find that paranoia and teleology involve perceiving chasing when there is none (studies 1 and 2) — errors we characterize as social hallucinations. When asked to identify the wolf or the sheep (studies 3, 4a, and 4b), we find high-paranoia participants struggled to identify sheep, while high-teleology participants were impaired at identifying wolves — both despite high-confidence. Both types of errors correlated with hallucinatory percepts in the real world. Although paranoia and teleology both involve excess perception of agency, the current results collectively suggest a perceptual distinction between the two, perhaps with clinical import. When asked to judge if a chase was present in a visual display of moving discs, people with higher paranoia and teleological thinking were more likely to perceive a chase in its absence. They were also worse at detecting the chaser and the chased, yet highly confident when there was no chase.
{"title":"Paranoid and teleological thinking give rise to distinct social hallucinations in vision","authors":"Santiago Castiello, Joan Danielle K. Ongchoco, Benjamin van Buren, Brian J. Scholl, Philip R. Corlett","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00163-9","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00163-9","url":null,"abstract":"Paranoia (believing others intend harm) and excess teleological thinking (ascribing too much purpose) are non-consensual beliefs about agents. Human vision rapidly detects agents and their intentions. Might paranoia and teleology have roots in visual perception? Using displays that evoke the impression that one disc (‘wolf’) is chasing another (‘sheep’), we find that paranoia and teleology involve perceiving chasing when there is none (studies 1 and 2) — errors we characterize as social hallucinations. When asked to identify the wolf or the sheep (studies 3, 4a, and 4b), we find high-paranoia participants struggled to identify sheep, while high-teleology participants were impaired at identifying wolves — both despite high-confidence. Both types of errors correlated with hallucinatory percepts in the real world. Although paranoia and teleology both involve excess perception of agency, the current results collectively suggest a perceptual distinction between the two, perhaps with clinical import. When asked to judge if a chase was present in a visual display of moving discs, people with higher paranoia and teleological thinking were more likely to perceive a chase in its absence. They were also worse at detecting the chaser and the chased, yet highly confident when there was no chase.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00163-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142826483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-16DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00176-4
Carolin Konrad, Lina Neuhoff, Dirk Adolph, Stephan Goerigk, Jane S. Herbert, Julie Jagusch-Poirier, Sarah Weigelt, Sabine Seehagen, Silvia Schneider
Associative learning is a key feature of adaptive behaviour and mental health, enabling individuals to adjust their actions in anticipation of future events. Comprehensive documentation of this essential component of human cognitive development throughout different developmental periods is needed. Here, we investigated age-related changes in associative learning in key developmental stages, including infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. We employed a classical delay eyeblink conditioning paradigm that consisted of two sessions with a total of 48 paired trials. Our initial hypothesis was that performance in associative learning would increase linearly with age. However, our findings suggest that performance peaks during the primary school years: Children in this age-group exhibited superior performance compared to all other age-groups and displayed the most consistent and least variable learning. Adults and adolescents exhibited faster association learning than infants. An additional learning session supported learning in infants and adolescents indicating that during these developmental stages, consolidation processes are vital for learning. A comprehensive account of the development of associative learning may inform theories on aetiology and treatment options in clinical psychology and neurosciences. Learning associations via eyeblink conditioning was strongest in children ages 7 to 8 in comparison to infants, adolescents, and adults. A second learning session supported learning in infants and adolescents.
{"title":"Associative learning via eyeblink conditioning differs by age from infancy to adulthood","authors":"Carolin Konrad, Lina Neuhoff, Dirk Adolph, Stephan Goerigk, Jane S. Herbert, Julie Jagusch-Poirier, Sarah Weigelt, Sabine Seehagen, Silvia Schneider","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00176-4","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00176-4","url":null,"abstract":"Associative learning is a key feature of adaptive behaviour and mental health, enabling individuals to adjust their actions in anticipation of future events. Comprehensive documentation of this essential component of human cognitive development throughout different developmental periods is needed. Here, we investigated age-related changes in associative learning in key developmental stages, including infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. We employed a classical delay eyeblink conditioning paradigm that consisted of two sessions with a total of 48 paired trials. Our initial hypothesis was that performance in associative learning would increase linearly with age. However, our findings suggest that performance peaks during the primary school years: Children in this age-group exhibited superior performance compared to all other age-groups and displayed the most consistent and least variable learning. Adults and adolescents exhibited faster association learning than infants. An additional learning session supported learning in infants and adolescents indicating that during these developmental stages, consolidation processes are vital for learning. A comprehensive account of the development of associative learning may inform theories on aetiology and treatment options in clinical psychology and neurosciences. Learning associations via eyeblink conditioning was strongest in children ages 7 to 8 in comparison to infants, adolescents, and adults. A second learning session supported learning in infants and adolescents.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00176-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142826500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-04DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00160-y
Noam Markovitch, Anat Perry, Tali Kleiman
Research in psychology has long underscored the significance of contextual influence on social cognition processes and behavior. However, the exploration of sexual interactions as a unique context affecting these processes has largely been neglected by previous research, despite their prominent role in our daily lives and potentially consequential outcomes. We outline the relevance of various basic social cognition processes to sexual interactions and propose a line of research integrating theoretical insights and methodologies from social cognition research with those from sex and relationship research. We elaborate on theoretical and applied contributions to both fields. Applying social cognition theories, concepts, and methodologies to the context of sexual interactions can lead to a better understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of sexual interactions. Likewise, considering the context of sexual interactions can better inform knowledge of the domain specificity of social cognition.
{"title":"Psychologists should study basic social cognition processes within the context of sexual interactions","authors":"Noam Markovitch, Anat Perry, Tali Kleiman","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00160-y","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00160-y","url":null,"abstract":"Research in psychology has long underscored the significance of contextual influence on social cognition processes and behavior. However, the exploration of sexual interactions as a unique context affecting these processes has largely been neglected by previous research, despite their prominent role in our daily lives and potentially consequential outcomes. We outline the relevance of various basic social cognition processes to sexual interactions and propose a line of research integrating theoretical insights and methodologies from social cognition research with those from sex and relationship research. We elaborate on theoretical and applied contributions to both fields. Applying social cognition theories, concepts, and methodologies to the context of sexual interactions can lead to a better understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of sexual interactions. Likewise, considering the context of sexual interactions can better inform knowledge of the domain specificity of social cognition.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00160-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142762937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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