Pub Date : 2024-05-09DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00094-5
Anthony S. Gabay, Andrea Pisauro, Kathryn C. O’Nell, Matthew A. J. Apps
There is an ever-increasing understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying how we process others’ behaviours during social interactions. However, little is known about how people decide when to leave an interaction. Are these decisions shaped by alternatives in the environment – the opportunity-costs of connecting to other people? Here, participants chose when to leave partners who treated them with varying degrees of fairness, and connect to others, in social environments with different opportunity-costs. Across four studies we find people leave partners more quickly when opportunity-costs are high, both the average fairness of people in the environment and the effort required to connect to another partner. People’s leaving times were accounted for by a fairness-adapted evidence accumulation model, and modulated by depression and loneliness scores. These findings demonstrate the computational processes underlying decisions to leave, and highlight atypical social time allocations as a marker of poor mental health. Across four experiments, participants chose to spend more time with partners who made fair offers; likewise, a poor social environment and low opportunity-costs led participants to stay with partners.
{"title":"Social environment-based opportunity costs dictate when people leave social interactions","authors":"Anthony S. Gabay, Andrea Pisauro, Kathryn C. O’Nell, Matthew A. J. Apps","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00094-5","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00094-5","url":null,"abstract":"There is an ever-increasing understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying how we process others’ behaviours during social interactions. However, little is known about how people decide when to leave an interaction. Are these decisions shaped by alternatives in the environment – the opportunity-costs of connecting to other people? Here, participants chose when to leave partners who treated them with varying degrees of fairness, and connect to others, in social environments with different opportunity-costs. Across four studies we find people leave partners more quickly when opportunity-costs are high, both the average fairness of people in the environment and the effort required to connect to another partner. People’s leaving times were accounted for by a fairness-adapted evidence accumulation model, and modulated by depression and loneliness scores. These findings demonstrate the computational processes underlying decisions to leave, and highlight atypical social time allocations as a marker of poor mental health. Across four experiments, participants chose to spend more time with partners who made fair offers; likewise, a poor social environment and low opportunity-costs led participants to stay with partners.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00094-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140895328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-06DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00089-2
Laura G. E. Smith, Emma F. Thomas, Ana-Maria Bliuc, Craig McGarty
The term polarization is used to describe both the division of a society into opposing groups (political polarization), and a social psychological phenomenon (group polarization) whereby people adopt more extreme positions after discussion. We explain how group polarization underpins the political polarization phenomenon: Social interaction, for example through social media, enables groups to form in such a way that their beliefs about what should be done to change the world—and how this differs from the stance of other groups—become integrated as aspects of a new, shared social identity. This provides a basis for mobilization to collective action. Group polarization, a result of social interaction, can underpin political polarization—the division of society into groups. While intergroup conflict and hostility are possible outcomes of polarization, polarization as a mobilizing force for collective action can benefit marginalized groups.
{"title":"Polarization is the psychological foundation of collective engagement","authors":"Laura G. E. Smith, Emma F. Thomas, Ana-Maria Bliuc, Craig McGarty","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00089-2","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00089-2","url":null,"abstract":"The term polarization is used to describe both the division of a society into opposing groups (political polarization), and a social psychological phenomenon (group polarization) whereby people adopt more extreme positions after discussion. We explain how group polarization underpins the political polarization phenomenon: Social interaction, for example through social media, enables groups to form in such a way that their beliefs about what should be done to change the world—and how this differs from the stance of other groups—become integrated as aspects of a new, shared social identity. This provides a basis for mobilization to collective action. Group polarization, a result of social interaction, can underpin political polarization—the division of society into groups. While intergroup conflict and hostility are possible outcomes of polarization, polarization as a mobilizing force for collective action can benefit marginalized groups.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00089-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140845003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-06DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00088-3
Timothy W. Broom, Siddhant Iyer, Andrea L. Courtney, Meghan L. Meyer
The word zeitgeist refers to common perceptions shared in a given culture. Meanwhile, a defining feature of loneliness is feeling that one’s views are not shared with others. Does loneliness correspond with deviating from the zeitgeist? Across two independent brain imaging datasets, lonely participants’ neural representations of well-known celebrities strayed from group-consensus neural representations in the medial prefrontal cortex—a region that encodes and retrieves social knowledge (Studies 1 A/1B: N = 40 each). Because communication fosters social connection by creating shared reality, we next asked whether lonelier participants’ communication about well-known celebrities also deviates from the zeitgeist. Indeed, when a strong group consensus exists, lonelier individuals use idiosyncratic language to describe well-known celebrities (Study 2: N = 923). Collectively, results support lonely individuals’ feeling that their views are not shared. This suggests loneliness may not only reflect impoverished relationships with specific individuals, but also feelings of disconnection from prevalently shared views of contemporary culture. Written descriptions and neural activity indicate that lonelier individuals’ semantic and neural representations of contemporary cultural figures depart more from the group-consensus when compared to less lonely individuals.
{"title":"Loneliness corresponds with neural representations and language use that deviate from shared cultural perceptions","authors":"Timothy W. Broom, Siddhant Iyer, Andrea L. Courtney, Meghan L. Meyer","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00088-3","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00088-3","url":null,"abstract":"The word zeitgeist refers to common perceptions shared in a given culture. Meanwhile, a defining feature of loneliness is feeling that one’s views are not shared with others. Does loneliness correspond with deviating from the zeitgeist? Across two independent brain imaging datasets, lonely participants’ neural representations of well-known celebrities strayed from group-consensus neural representations in the medial prefrontal cortex—a region that encodes and retrieves social knowledge (Studies 1 A/1B: N = 40 each). Because communication fosters social connection by creating shared reality, we next asked whether lonelier participants’ communication about well-known celebrities also deviates from the zeitgeist. Indeed, when a strong group consensus exists, lonelier individuals use idiosyncratic language to describe well-known celebrities (Study 2: N = 923). Collectively, results support lonely individuals’ feeling that their views are not shared. This suggests loneliness may not only reflect impoverished relationships with specific individuals, but also feelings of disconnection from prevalently shared views of contemporary culture. Written descriptions and neural activity indicate that lonelier individuals’ semantic and neural representations of contemporary cultural figures depart more from the group-consensus when compared to less lonely individuals.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00088-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140845011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-06DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00087-4
Austin van Loon, Amir Goldberg, Sameer B. Srivastava
Dehumanization of others has been attributed to institutional processes that spread dehumanizing norms and narratives, as well as to individuals’ denial of mind to others. We propose that blatant dehumanization also arises when people actively contemplate others’ minds. We introduce the construct of imagined otherness—perceiving that a prototypical member of a social group construes an important facet of the social world in ways that diverge from the way most humans understand it—and argue that such attributions catalyze blatant dehumanization beyond the effects of general perceived difference and group identification. Measuring perceived schematic difference relative to the concept of America, we examine how this measure relates to the tendency of U.S. Republicans and Democrats to blatantly dehumanize members of the other political party. We report the results of two pre-registered studies—one correlational (N = 771) and one experimental (N = 398)—that together lend support for our theory. We discuss implications of these findings for research on social boundaries, political polarization, and the measurement of meaning. Perceiving outgroup members as holding different schematic understandings of the concept of America as compared to most other people is associated with greater dehumanization of outgroup members
{"title":"Imagined otherness fuels blatant dehumanization of outgroups","authors":"Austin van Loon, Amir Goldberg, Sameer B. Srivastava","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00087-4","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00087-4","url":null,"abstract":"Dehumanization of others has been attributed to institutional processes that spread dehumanizing norms and narratives, as well as to individuals’ denial of mind to others. We propose that blatant dehumanization also arises when people actively contemplate others’ minds. We introduce the construct of imagined otherness—perceiving that a prototypical member of a social group construes an important facet of the social world in ways that diverge from the way most humans understand it—and argue that such attributions catalyze blatant dehumanization beyond the effects of general perceived difference and group identification. Measuring perceived schematic difference relative to the concept of America, we examine how this measure relates to the tendency of U.S. Republicans and Democrats to blatantly dehumanize members of the other political party. We report the results of two pre-registered studies—one correlational (N = 771) and one experimental (N = 398)—that together lend support for our theory. We discuss implications of these findings for research on social boundaries, political polarization, and the measurement of meaning. Perceiving outgroup members as holding different schematic understandings of the concept of America as compared to most other people is associated with greater dehumanization of outgroup members","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00087-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140842592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-30DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00090-9
Arielle Baskin-Sommers, Alex Williams, Callie Benson-Williams, Sonia Ruiz, Jordyn R. Ricard, Jorge Camacho
The footprint of the legal system in the United States is expansive. Applying psychological and neuroscience research to understand or predict individual criminal behavior is problematic. Nonetheless, psychology and neuroscience can contribute substantially to the betterment of the criminal legal system and the outcomes it produces. We argue that scientific findings should be applied to the legal system through systemwide policy changes. Specifically, we discuss how science can shape policies around pollution in prisons, the use of solitary confinement, and the law’s conceptualization of insanity. Policies informed by psychology and neuroscience have the potential to affect meaningful—and much-needed—legal change. This Perspective calls for a reform of the criminal justice system in the US. Psychological and neuroscientific research should inform regulations around pollution and toxins, policies for solitary confinement, and the framework for the admissibility of legal insanity defense.
{"title":"Shrinking the footprint of the criminal legal system through policies informed by psychology and neuroscience","authors":"Arielle Baskin-Sommers, Alex Williams, Callie Benson-Williams, Sonia Ruiz, Jordyn R. Ricard, Jorge Camacho","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00090-9","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00090-9","url":null,"abstract":"The footprint of the legal system in the United States is expansive. Applying psychological and neuroscience research to understand or predict individual criminal behavior is problematic. Nonetheless, psychology and neuroscience can contribute substantially to the betterment of the criminal legal system and the outcomes it produces. We argue that scientific findings should be applied to the legal system through systemwide policy changes. Specifically, we discuss how science can shape policies around pollution in prisons, the use of solitary confinement, and the law’s conceptualization of insanity. Policies informed by psychology and neuroscience have the potential to affect meaningful—and much-needed—legal change. This Perspective calls for a reform of the criminal justice system in the US. Psychological and neuroscientific research should inform regulations around pollution and toxins, policies for solitary confinement, and the framework for the admissibility of legal insanity defense.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00090-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140817295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-29DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00069-6
Rodela Mostafa, Nicolas Andrew McNair, Winston Tan, Cosette Saunders, Ben Colagiuri, Kirsten Barnes
Witnessing another’s pain can heighten pain in the observer. However, research has focused on the observer’s intrapersonal experience. Here, a social transmission-chain explored the spread of socially-acquired nocebo hyperalgesia. Dyads of genuine participants were randomised to ‘Generations’ (G1–G3). G1-Demonstrators, observed by G2-Observers, experienced high/low thermal pain contingent on supposed activity/inactivity of a sham-treatment. G2 became Demonstrators, witnessed by G3-Observers. They experienced fixed low-temperature stimuli irrespective of sham-treatment ‘activity’. G3 then Demonstrated for G4-Observers (a confederate), also experiencing low-temperature stimuli only. Pain ratings, electrodermal activity, and facial action units were measured. G1’s treatment-related pain propagated throughout the chain. G2 and G3 participants showed heightened subjective and physiological response to sham-treatment, despite equivalent stimulus temperatures, and G3 never witnessing the initial pain-event. Dyadic interpersonal physiological synchrony (electrodermal activity) and psychological synchrony (Observer’s ability to predict the Demonstrator’s pain), predicted subsequent socially-acquired pain. Implications relate to the interpersonal spread of maladaptive pain experiences. Nocebo hyperalgesia can be socially transmitted through a chain of observers. Differences in interpersonal physiological and psychological synchrony predicted subsequent socially-acquired pain.
{"title":"Interpersonal physiological and psychological synchrony predict the social transmission of nocebo hyperalgesia between individuals","authors":"Rodela Mostafa, Nicolas Andrew McNair, Winston Tan, Cosette Saunders, Ben Colagiuri, Kirsten Barnes","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00069-6","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00069-6","url":null,"abstract":"Witnessing another’s pain can heighten pain in the observer. However, research has focused on the observer’s intrapersonal experience. Here, a social transmission-chain explored the spread of socially-acquired nocebo hyperalgesia. Dyads of genuine participants were randomised to ‘Generations’ (G1–G3). G1-Demonstrators, observed by G2-Observers, experienced high/low thermal pain contingent on supposed activity/inactivity of a sham-treatment. G2 became Demonstrators, witnessed by G3-Observers. They experienced fixed low-temperature stimuli irrespective of sham-treatment ‘activity’. G3 then Demonstrated for G4-Observers (a confederate), also experiencing low-temperature stimuli only. Pain ratings, electrodermal activity, and facial action units were measured. G1’s treatment-related pain propagated throughout the chain. G2 and G3 participants showed heightened subjective and physiological response to sham-treatment, despite equivalent stimulus temperatures, and G3 never witnessing the initial pain-event. Dyadic interpersonal physiological synchrony (electrodermal activity) and psychological synchrony (Observer’s ability to predict the Demonstrator’s pain), predicted subsequent socially-acquired pain. Implications relate to the interpersonal spread of maladaptive pain experiences. Nocebo hyperalgesia can be socially transmitted through a chain of observers. Differences in interpersonal physiological and psychological synchrony predicted subsequent socially-acquired pain.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00069-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-24DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00081-w
Ole Jensen
The role of alpha oscillations (8–13 Hz) in cognition is intensively investigated. While intracranial animal recordings demonstrate that alpha oscillations are associated with decreased neuronal excitability, it is been questioned whether alpha oscillations are under direct control from frontoparietal areas to suppress visual distractors. We here point to a revised mechanism in which alpha oscillations are controlled by an indirect mechanism governed by the load of goal-relevant information – a view compatible with perceptual load theory. We will outline how this framework can be further tested and discuss the consequences for network dynamics and resource allocation in the working brain. This Perspective argues for a revised mechanism for the functional role of alpha oscillations. While alpha oscillations reflect inhibition, they are controlled by an indirect mechanism governed by the load of goal-relevant information.
{"title":"Distractor inhibition by alpha oscillations is controlled by an indirect mechanism governed by goal-relevant information","authors":"Ole Jensen","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00081-w","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00081-w","url":null,"abstract":"The role of alpha oscillations (8–13 Hz) in cognition is intensively investigated. While intracranial animal recordings demonstrate that alpha oscillations are associated with decreased neuronal excitability, it is been questioned whether alpha oscillations are under direct control from frontoparietal areas to suppress visual distractors. We here point to a revised mechanism in which alpha oscillations are controlled by an indirect mechanism governed by the load of goal-relevant information – a view compatible with perceptual load theory. We will outline how this framework can be further tested and discuss the consequences for network dynamics and resource allocation in the working brain. This Perspective argues for a revised mechanism for the functional role of alpha oscillations. While alpha oscillations reflect inhibition, they are controlled by an indirect mechanism governed by the load of goal-relevant information.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00081-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140639698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-24DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00083-8
Alexandra G. Mitchell, Jesper Fischer Ehmsen, Małgorzata Basińska, Arthur S. Courtin, Rebecca A. Böhme, Camila Sardeto Deolindo, Micah G. Allen, Kristian Sandberg, Francesca Fardo
Paradoxical Heat Sensation (PHS) is the remarkable feeling of warmth or heat pain while the skin is cooling. Despite its initial documentation over 100 years ago, a unified explanation for this perplexing experience remains elusive. Here we apply contrast enhancement principles, known for their instrumental role in understanding visual illusions, to the domain of thermosensation. Contrast enhancement describes the amplification of two contrasting visual features, such as the enhanced perception of an edge between a light and dark bar. In thermosensation, this encompasses an enhancement of the difference between sequential warming and cooling of the skin, and is defined as the normalised difference between successive temporal warm and cold temperatures. Remarkably, thermal contrast predicts the occurrence of PHS. Our findings reveal compelling evidence supporting the role of thermal contrast in the generation of PHS, shedding light on its underlying mechanism and offering a framework for broader encoding principles in thermosensation and pain. Applying contrast enhancement principles, established within the visual and auditory domain, to thermosensation, reveals that larger temporal contrasts increase the probability of experiencing thermal nociceptive illusions.
{"title":"Thermal contrast enhancement predicts paradoxical heat sensation","authors":"Alexandra G. Mitchell, Jesper Fischer Ehmsen, Małgorzata Basińska, Arthur S. Courtin, Rebecca A. Böhme, Camila Sardeto Deolindo, Micah G. Allen, Kristian Sandberg, Francesca Fardo","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00083-8","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00083-8","url":null,"abstract":"Paradoxical Heat Sensation (PHS) is the remarkable feeling of warmth or heat pain while the skin is cooling. Despite its initial documentation over 100 years ago, a unified explanation for this perplexing experience remains elusive. Here we apply contrast enhancement principles, known for their instrumental role in understanding visual illusions, to the domain of thermosensation. Contrast enhancement describes the amplification of two contrasting visual features, such as the enhanced perception of an edge between a light and dark bar. In thermosensation, this encompasses an enhancement of the difference between sequential warming and cooling of the skin, and is defined as the normalised difference between successive temporal warm and cold temperatures. Remarkably, thermal contrast predicts the occurrence of PHS. Our findings reveal compelling evidence supporting the role of thermal contrast in the generation of PHS, shedding light on its underlying mechanism and offering a framework for broader encoding principles in thermosensation and pain. Applying contrast enhancement principles, established within the visual and auditory domain, to thermosensation, reveals that larger temporal contrasts increase the probability of experiencing thermal nociceptive illusions.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00083-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140648267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-23DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00075-8
Lara B. Aknin, Gillian M. Sandstrom
Social relationships provide one of the most reliable paths to happiness, but relationships can fade for various reasons. While it does not take much to reinitiate contact, here we find that people are surprisingly reluctant to do so. Specifically, most people reported losing touch with an old friend yet expressed little interest in reaching out (Studies 1-2, Ns = 401 and 199). Moreover, fewer than one third of participants sent a message to an old friend, even when they wanted to, thought the friend would be appreciative, had the friend’s contact information, and were given time to draft and send a message (Studies 3-4, Ns = 453 and 604). One reason for this reluctance may be that old friends feel like strangers. Supporting this possibility, participants were no more willing to reach out to an old friend than they were to talk to a stranger (Study 5, N = 288), and were less willing to contact old friends who felt more like strangers (Study 6, N = 319). Therefore, in Study 7 (N = 194), we adapted an intervention shown to ease anxieties about talking to strangers and found that it increased the number of people who reached out to an old friend by two-thirds. Individuals seldom reach out to old friends with whom they have lost touch. Interventions focused on changing attitudes were ineffective, but practicing reaching out to current friends first successfully encouraged people to reach out to old friends.
{"title":"People are surprisingly hesitant to reach out to old friends","authors":"Lara B. Aknin, Gillian M. Sandstrom","doi":"10.1038/s44271-024-00075-8","DOIUrl":"10.1038/s44271-024-00075-8","url":null,"abstract":"Social relationships provide one of the most reliable paths to happiness, but relationships can fade for various reasons. While it does not take much to reinitiate contact, here we find that people are surprisingly reluctant to do so. Specifically, most people reported losing touch with an old friend yet expressed little interest in reaching out (Studies 1-2, Ns = 401 and 199). Moreover, fewer than one third of participants sent a message to an old friend, even when they wanted to, thought the friend would be appreciative, had the friend’s contact information, and were given time to draft and send a message (Studies 3-4, Ns = 453 and 604). One reason for this reluctance may be that old friends feel like strangers. Supporting this possibility, participants were no more willing to reach out to an old friend than they were to talk to a stranger (Study 5, N = 288), and were less willing to contact old friends who felt more like strangers (Study 6, N = 319). Therefore, in Study 7 (N = 194), we adapted an intervention shown to ease anxieties about talking to strangers and found that it increased the number of people who reached out to an old friend by two-thirds. Individuals seldom reach out to old friends with whom they have lost touch. Interventions focused on changing attitudes were ineffective, but practicing reaching out to current friends first successfully encouraged people to reach out to old friends.","PeriodicalId":501698,"journal":{"name":"Communications Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00075-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140633868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}