Journal of Financial Economics最新文献

The average total compensation of directors in U.S.-listed companies was $342,030 in 2020, 5.06 times the median household income. Directors set their own pay, giving rise to potential self-dealing. We argue and document that in the presence of self-dealing, external mechanisms such as legal standards act as effective means of governance. Following a landmark Delaware court ruling that subjected director pay to a more stringent legal standard, Delaware-incorporated firms reduced director compensation relative to non-Delaware firms and experienced positive and non-transient stock price reactions. Our results indicate that proper governance of director compensation enhances firm value.

We study aggregate lapsation risk in the life insurance sector. We construct two lapsation risk factors that explain a large fraction of the common variation in lapse rates of the 30 largest life insurance companies. The first is a cyclical factor that is positively correlated with credit spreads and unemployment, while the second factor is a trend factor that correlates with the level of interest rates. Using a novel policy-level database from a large life insurer, we examine the heterogeneity in risk factor exposures based on policy and policyholder characteristics. Young policyholders with higher health risk in low-income areas are more likely to lapse their policies during economic downturns. We explore the implications for hedging and valuation of life insurance contracts. Ignoring aggregate lapsation risk results in mispricing of life insurance policies. The calibrated model points to overpricing on average. In the cross-section, young, low-income, and high-health risk households face higher effective mark-ups than the old, high-income, and healthy.

Comparing coverage of the same corporate financial news by the conservative Wall Street Journal and the liberal New York Times, we find strong evidence of political polarization in their reporting on both the intensive and extensive margins of coverage. We show that this politics-induced disagreement in corporate financial news leads to an increase in abnormal trading volume for the most politically extreme firms. Our results highlight a new source of investor disagreement, arising out of polarized reporting of corporate financial news, that generates trade among investors.

Economic theory suggests that production complementarity is an important driver of sectoral co-movements and business cycle fluctuations. We operationalize this concept using a measure of production complementarity proximity (COMPL) between any two companies. We show firms from different industries but are closely aligned in COMPL exhibit strong co-movement in their operating, investing, and financing activities, as well as quarterly earnings revisions and monthly returns. We further document a lead-lag effect in their returns, such that a long-short strategy based on recent COMPL peer returns yields a monthly 6-factor alpha of 122 basis points. This inter-industry momentum spillover effect is not explained by other network-based mechanisms, such as shared analyst coverage. We conclude information transmission takes place along complementarity networks, but stock prices do not update instantaneously.

We characterize the structure and origins of missingness for 159 cross-sectional return predictors and study missing value handling for portfolios constructed using machine learning. Simply imputing with cross-sectional means performs well compared to rigorous expectation-maximization methods. This stems from three facts about predictor data: (1) missingness occurs in large blocks organized by time, (2) cross-sectional correlations are small, and (3) missingness tends to occur in blocks organized by the underlying data source. As a result, observed data provide little information about missing data. Sophisticated imputations introduce estimation noise that can lead to underperformance if machine learning is not carefully applied.

This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. For identification, we use a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mixed-gender elections in the US House of Representatives. The effect grows over a female representative's tenure and concentrates in female representatives who are on powerful congressional committees. Changes in the pool of and behavior by government contractors cannot explain the result. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting is not associated with economic costs.

We show that firm valuations fell after a key expense became more visible in financial statements. FAS 123-R required firms to deduct option compensation costs from earnings, instead of disclosing them in footnotes. Firms that granted high option pay experienced earnings reductions, while fundamentals remained unchanged. These firms were more likely to miss earnings forecasts, and they experienced recommendation downgrades and valuation declines. Our findings suggest that market participants exhibited limited attention to option costs before FAS 123-R. As we reuse the FAS 123-R natural experiment, we show how one can address confounding channels by integrating reduced-form and structural estimation.

We develop and test a model in which swap spreads are determined by end users' demand for and constrained intermediaries' supply of long-term interest rate swaps. Swap spreads reflect compensation both for using scarce intermediary capital and for bearing convergence risk—i.e., the risk spreads will widen due to a future demand-and-supply imbalance. We show that a proxy for the intermediated quantity of swaps—dealers' net position in Treasuries—flipped sign during the Global Financial Crisis when swap spreads turned negative and that this variable predicts the excess returns on swap spread trades. Exploiting our model's sign restrictions, we identify shifts in demand and supply and find that both contribute significantly to the volatility of swap spreads.

We study the horizon dimension of cross-sectional return predictability using a model where characteristics contain both persistent and transitory components. We test the implications of this model for the average returns of popular characteristic-based trading strategies at short versus long horizons after portfolio formation. Our evidence supports the claim that the relative compensation for persistent and transitory components varies across characteristics, in both magnitude and sign. Benchmark factor models cannot explain the returns of portfolios sorted on characteristics where either the persistent or transitory component is dominant. Finally, we discuss implications for the long-term discount rates of firms.

We study the stock market performance of firms with Jewish board members during the “Dreyfus Affair” in 19th century France. In a context of widespread latent antisemitism, initial accusations made against the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus led to short-lived abnormal negative returns for Jewish-connected firms. However, investors betting on these firms earned higher returns during the period corresponding to Dreyfus' rehabilitation, starting with the publication of the famous op-ed J'Accuse! in 1898. Our conceptual framework illustrates how diminishing antisemitic biases among investors might plausibly explain these effects. Our paper provides novel insights on how antisemitism can increase and decrease over short periods of time at the highest socio-economic levels in response to certain events, which in turn can affect firm value in financial markets.