Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

Visual masking and attentional selection play important roles in controlling information processing for perception. Using an experimental design combining metacontrast with attentional load, we investigated the time course of changes in event-related potentials under different attentional load and masking conditions. The behavioral results indicated significant effects of attentional load on masking functions (i.e., masking strength as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony between target and mask). The analyses of neural activities revealed significant effects of masking and attentional load on early components located over occipital and parieto-occipital scalp sites. There were also significant modulations in the late positivity range centered over centro-parietal electrodes. However, the nature of modulations in early and late components was different. These findings overall highlight the diverse nature of masking and attentional influences on visual processing, particularly suggesting that attentional load in the visual field may have distinct effects at different stages of perceptual processing.

Neuroimaging studies demonstrate that moral responsibility judgments activate the social cognition network, presumably reflecting mentalising processes. Conceptually, establishing an agent’s intention is a sub-process of responsibility judgment. However, the relationship between both processes on a neural level is poorly understood. To date, neural correlates of responsibility and intention judgments have not been compared directly. The present fMRI study compares neural activation elicited by third-party judgments of responsibility and intention in response to animated pictorial stimuli showing harm events. Our results show that the social cognition network, in particular Angular Gyrus (AG) and right Temporo-Parietal Junction (RTPJ), showed stronger activation during responsibility vs. intention evaluation. No greater activations for the reverse contrast were observed. Our imaging results are consistent with conceptualisations of intention attribution as a sub-process of responsibility judgment. However, they question whether the activation of the social cognition network, particularly AG/RTPJ, during responsibility judgment is limited to intention evaluation.

The ability to realize that you’re dreaming — lucid dreaming — has value for personal goals and for consciousness research. One route to lucid dreaming is to first undergo pre-sleep training with sensory cues and then receive those cues during REM sleep. This method, Targeted Lucidity Reactivation (TLR), does not demand extensive personal effort but generally requires concurrent polysomnography to guide cue delivery. Here we translated TLR from a laboratory procedure to a smartphone-based procedure without polysomnography. In a first experiment, participants reported increased lucid dreaming with TLR compared to during the prior week. In a second experiment, we showed increased lucidity with TLR compared to blinded control procedures on alternate nights. Cues during sleep were effective when they were the same sounds from pre-sleep training. Increased lucid dreaming can be ascribed to a strong link formed during training between the sounds and a mindset of carefully analyzing one’s current experience.

The truthiness effect (Newman et al., 2012) refers to the belief that any particular stimulus is truthful when it is accompanied by nonprobative information (e.g., a photograph). Accordingly, photo-accompanied statements are more likely to be judged as truthful compared to statements without a photo. In an online experiment (N = 98) with two assessment times, we aimed to replicate this effect and its persistence over time. Furthermore, we were interested in to what extent feedback on the actual veracity of statements would be affected by the presence of a photo. Participants rated the veracity of trivia statements either accompanied by a nonprobative photo or not. Feedback on veracity, with or without a nonprobative photo, was provided after some but not all veracity judgments. The truthiness effect could neither be replicated immediately nor after 48 h. Feedback facilitated discrimination between true and false statements − especially when accompanied by a photo. However, feedback also led to a bias towards responding “true”. Our findings suggest using photos in feedback on veracity.

Objective

The present study investigated whether autistic adults report different levels of mental imagery vividness than non-autistic adults, and, moreover, if autism is associated with aphantasia which is defined as a condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery.

Design and Methods

Clinically diagnosed and self-identifying autistic participants were compared with non-autistic participants in their mental imagery vividness (vision, sound, smell, taste, touch, bodily sensation and emotional feeling) and autistic traits using an online survey (N = 121).

Results

The autistic group scored significantly lower than the non-autistic group on imagery vividness (d = −0.44), in addition to having a higher proportion of participants scoring at cut-off for aphantasia. Moreover, a similar difference was observed for the emotional feel (η² = 0.11).

Conclusion

The vividness of visual and emotional mental imagery was on average lower for autistic individuals, with a higher proportion presenting at cut-off to be considered an aphantasic.

Some research suggests that moral behavior can be strongly influenced by trivial features of the environment of which we are completely unaware. Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have argued that these findings undermine our commonsense notions of agency and responsibility, both of which emphasize the role of practical reasoning and conscious deliberation in action. We present the results of four vignette-based studies (N=1,437) designed to investigate how people think about the metaphysical and moral implications of scientific findings that reveal our susceptibility to automaticity and situational influences. When presented with lightly fictionalized narratives about these findings, participants exhibit no tendency toward changing judgments of freedom and responsibility compared to control groups. This suggests that people seem unwilling to adopt skeptical attitudes about agency on the basis of these scientific findings.

Reporting discomfort when noise affects listening experience suggests that listeners may be aware, at least to some extent, of adverse environmental conditions and their impact on listening experience. This involves monitoring internal states (effort and confidence). Here we quantified continuous self-report indices that track one’s own internal states and investigated age-related differences in this ability. We instructed two groups of young and older adults to continuously report their confidence and effort while listening to stories in fluctuating noise. Using cross-correlation analyses between the time series of fluctuating noise and those of perceived effort or confidence, we showed that (1) participants modified their assessment of effort and confidence based on variations in the noise, with a 4 s lag; (2) there were no differences between the groups. These findings imply extending this method to other areas, expanding the definition of metacognition, and highlighting the value of this ability for older adults.