Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large.

The sense of agency (SoA) is central to human experience. The comparator model, contrasting sensory prediction and action feedback, is influential but limited in explaining SoA. We investigated mechanisms beyond the comparator model, focusing on the processing of unpredictable stimuli, perimotor components of SoA, and their relation to schizotypy.

ERPs were recorded from 18 healthy participants engaged in button-pressing tasks while perceiving tones with varying causal relationships with their actions. We investigated the processing of non-causally related tones, contrasted this to causally related tones, and examined perimotor correlates of subjective expectancy and experience of agency.

We confirmed N100 attenuation for self-generated stimuli but found similar effects for expectancy-dependent processing of random tones. SoA also correlated with perimotor ERP components, modulated by schizotypy.

Thus, neural processes preceding actions contribute to the formation of SoA and are associated with schizotypy. Unpredictable events also undergo sensory attenuation, implying additional mechanisms contributing to SoA.

The debate over the independence of attention and consciousness is ongoing. Prior studies have established that invisible spatial cues can direct attention. However, our exploration extends beyond spatial dimensions to temporal information as a potent guide for attention. A intriguing question arises: Can unconscious temporal cues trigger attentional orienting? To investigate, we employed a modified reaction-time task in Experiments 1 and 2, using Gabor stimuli or human facial stimuli as temporal cues rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. We aimed to uncover temporal expectation effects (TE effects) without conscious awareness. Moreover, Experiments 3 and 4 probed the boundaries of this unconscious processing, assessing whether conscious temporal cues could modulate TE effects. Our results confirm that invisible temporal cues can induce TE effects, and these effects can be overridden by conscious temporal cues. This dissociation between temporal attention and consciousness provide a new perspective on our understanding of their relationship.

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Cognitive fatigue (CF) can lead to an increase in the latency of simple reaction time, although the processes involved in this delay are unknown. One potential explanation is that a longer time may be required for sensory processing of relevant stimuli. To investigate this possibility, the current study used a visual inspection time task to measure perceptual processing speed before and after a CF (math and memory) or non-fatiguing (documentary film) intervention. Subjective fatigue and simple reaction time significantly increased following the CF, but not the non-fatiguing intervention, confirming that CF was induced. Conversely, there was no effect of CF on inspection time task performance. It was therefore concluded that the speed of perceptual processing is not significantly impacted by CF, and thus is unlikely to underlie CF-related reaction time increases. Instead, increases in simple reaction time latency in CF may be due to delays in response preparation or initiation.

Intentional actions produce a temporal compression between the action and its outcome, known as intentional binding. However, Suzuki et al. (2019) recently showed that temporal compression can be observed without intentional actions. However, their results show a clear regression to the mean, which might have confounded the estimates of temporal intervals. To control these effects, we presented temporal intervals block-wise. Indeed, we found systematically greater compression for active than passive trials, in contrast to Suzuki et al. (2019). In our second experiment, our goal was to conceptually replicate the previous study. However, we were unable to reproduce their results and instead found more pronounced temporal compression in active trials compared to passive ones. In a subsequent attempt at a direct replication, we did not observe the same findings as the original study. Our findings reinforce the theory that intentions rather than causality cause temporal binding.

During the preparation of this work, the authors used ChatGPT in order to improve the readability of the paper. After using this tool/service, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the publication.

Mystical experience, non-dual awareness, selflessness, self-transcendent experience, and ego-dissolution have become increasingly prominent constructs in meditation and psychedelic research. However, these constructs and their measures tend to be highly overlapping, imprecise, and poorly integrated with similar pathological experiences. The present study seeks to clarify the common factors involved in the characteristics of these experiences using precise distinctions across an array of experience contexts (including meditation, psychedelics, and psychopathology). Participants (N = 386) completed an online survey about an experience that involved either a dissolution of self-boundaries or a loss of selfhood. Confirmatory factor analyses resulted in 16 experience characteristics, including multiple types of changes in sense of self, co-occurring phenomenology, and cognitive and affective responses. Qualitative thematic analysis provided rich descriptions of experience characteristics. Taken together, results lead to a more specific measurement model and descriptive account of experiences involving a loss of self or self-boundary.

Previous research indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected dreaming negatively. We compared 1132 dreams collected with prospective two-week dream diary during the pandemic to 166 dreams collected before the pandemic. We hypothesized that the pandemic would increase the number of threatening events, threats related to diseases, and the severity of threats. We also hypothesized that dreams that include direct references to the pandemic will include more threatening events, more disease-related threats, and more severe threats. In contradiction with our hypotheses, results showed no differences between pandemic and pre-pandemic samples in the number of threats, threats related to diseases, or severe threats. However, dreams with direct references to the pandemic had more threats, disease-related threats, and severe threats. Our results thus do not suggest a significant overall increase in nightmarish or threatening dream content during the pandemic but show a more profound effect on a minority of dreams.

While previous studies have highlighted the role of episodic future thinking in goal pursuit, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unexplored. Episodic future thinking may promote goal pursuit by shaping the feeling that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future – referred to as belief in future occurrence. We investigated whether goal self-concordance (Experiment 1) and other goal characteristics identified as influential in goal pursuit (Experiment 2) modulate belief in the future occurrence of goal-related events and predict the actual occurrence of these events. Results showed that goal self-concordance, engagement, and expectancy had an indirect effect on the actual occurrence of events, which was (partially) mediated by belief in future occurrence. The mediating role of belief supports the view that belief in future occurrence when imagining events conveys useful information, allowing us to make informed decisions and undertake adaptive actions in the process of goal pursuit.