Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

Recent studies have emphasized the association between action and perceptual awareness, suggesting that action-related information can contribute to perceptual awareness. Given that the Level of Processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that the emergence of awareness depends on the level of stimulus processing, the current study examines whether action impacts perceptual awareness across different processing levels. In Experiment 1, participants identified target stimuli’s color (low-level task) or category (high-level task) via mouse clicks, followed by visual awareness ratings. Experiment 2 replicated the tasks using hand-grip dynamometers. Results from Experiment 1 support the LoP theory, showing a more gradual emergence of awareness for low-level features and a more dichotomous emergence for high-level features. In Experiment 2, higher reported visual awareness ratings were observed at greater physical effort, regardless of task type. These results suggest that action-related information influences reported awareness of stimuli in the same way at low- and high-level stimulus processing.

For a long time, clinical knowledge and first-person reports have pointed to individual differences in the dynamics of spontaneous thoughts, in particular in the extreme case of psychiatric conditions (e.g. racing thoughts in Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder, ADHD; rumination in depression). We used a novel procedure to investigate this individual variability by combining verbal fluency tasks and introspective reports of thought content. Our goal was twofold. First, we tested the hypothesis that a greater segmentation of the stream of thoughts would be associated with trait inattention, in line with subjective reports of ADHD patients. Second, we tested whether the segmentation of the stream of thoughts increased with an increased tendency for exploratory behavior, following recent theoretical claims on the mechanisms underpinning the generation of spontaneous thoughts. Our results support both hypotheses, shedding light on the factors contributing to the individual variability in the dynamics of the stream of thought.

Cognitive scientists differentiate the “minimal self” – subjective experiences of agency and ownership in our sensorimotor interactions with the world – from declarative beliefs about the self that are sustained over time. However, it remains an open question how individual sensory experiences of agency are integrated into the belief of being an agent. We administered a sensorimotor task to measure subjects’ (n = 195) propensity to classify stimuli as self-caused and metacognitive monitoring of such judgements, and we compared these behavioral metrics to declarative beliefs about their agency. Subjects who were less sensitive to control cues also reported more negative agency beliefs, though positive beliefs were not clearly correlated with any sensorimotor measure. Importantly, this relationship between first-order sensitivity and declarative beliefs essentially disappears when controlling for metacognitive sensitivity. Results suggest agency beliefs are not related directly to the propensity to make positive agency judgements but are connected through introspective access.

The recent “Conscious Turing Machine” (CTM) proposal offered by Manuel and Lenore Blum aims to define and explore consciousness, contribute to the solution of the hard problem, and demonstrate the value of theoretical computer science with respect to the study of consciousness. Surprisingly, given the ambitiousness and novelty of the proposal (and the prominence of its creators), CTM has received relatively little attention. We here seek to remedy this by offering an exhaustive evaluation of CTM. Our evaluation considers the explanatory power of CTM in three different domains of interdisciplinary consciousness studies: the philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and computation. Based on our evaluation in each of the target domains, at present, any claim that CTM constitutes progress is premature. Nevertheless, the model has potential, and we highlight several possible avenues of future research which proponents of the model may pursue in its development.

The question of whether free will exists or not has intrigued philosophers for centuries. About 40 years ago, cognitive neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet have joined the discussion by demonstrating that an ERP component, the readiness potential (RP), precedes the reported time of decision to act by a few hundred milliseconds. Libet et al. (1983) argued that our brains unconsciously prepare the movement before we experience any conscious intention, which led some free will skeptics (e.g., Ebert & Wegner, 2011) to argue that free will does not exist. While Libet’s interpretation of his findings initiated an intense philosophical debate, alternative interpretations have been put forward more recently (Bode et al., 2014, Brass et al., 2019, Schurger et al., 2012, Schurger et al., 2021). Integration to bound models (ITB) of Libet-style experiments suggest that we accumulate information until an intention threshold is reached, which triggers our experience of intention and execution of voluntary behaviors. The RP, from this perspective reflects the decision process itself rather than the consequence of an unconscious decision. To determine if the ITB model better predicts behavioral patterns in Libet-style experiments, we added a whether-component to the classical Libet task (the Veto Libet task) and compared the behavioral measures in the Veto Libet task with the Classical Libet task. We hypothesized that the signal accumulation in the Veto Libet task would be less steep than in the Classical Libet task, resulting in longer wait times and earlier self-reported intentions to act (i.e., the W). The result in general supported our hypotheses. In addition, these behavioral differences between the Classical Libet task and the Veto Libet task established valuable behavioral correlates for future investigations into the vetoing phenomenon. Finally, this study was also the first application of the Libet task in an online setting, and the behavioral parameters were highly comparable to the previous offline studies, further supporting the possibility of using the online platform to study arbitrary decision-making.

The rise of powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) provides a compelling opportunity to investigate the consequences of anthropomorphism, particularly regarding how their exposure may influence the way individuals view themselves (self-perception) and other people (other-perception). Using a mind perception framework, we examined attributions of agency (the ability to do) and experience (the ability to feel). Participants evaluated their agentic and experiential capabilities and the extent to which these features are uniquely human before and after exposure to LLM responses. Post-exposure, participants increased evaluations of their agentic and experiential qualities while decreasing their perception that agency and experience are considered to be uniquely human. These results indicate that anthropomorphizing LLMs impacts attributions of mind for humans in fundamentally divergent ways: enhancing the perception of one’s own mind while reducing its uniqueness for others. These results open up a range of future questions regarding how anthropomorphism can affect mind perception toward humans.

The cognitive neural mechanisms by which sleep deprivation affects cognitive flexibility are poorly understood. Therefore, the study investigated the neuroelectrophysiological basis of the effect of 24 h sleep deprivation on cognitive flexibility in adolescents. 72 participants (36 females, mean age ± SD=20.46 ± 2.385 years old) participated in the study and were randomly assigned to the sleep deprivation group and control group. They were instructed to complete a task switch paradigm, during which participants’ behavioral and electroencephalographic data were recorded. Behaviorally, there were significant between-group differences in accuracy. The results of event-related potential showed that the P2, N2 and P3 components had significant group effects or interaction effects. At the time–frequency level, there were statistically significant differences between the delta and theta bands. These results suggested that 24 h sleep deprivation affected problem-solving effectiveness rather than efficiency, mainly because it systematically impaired cognitive processing associated with cognitive flexibility.

Participants completed two sessions of an auditory attention task and intermittently responded to thought probes asking about their level of mind-wandering. After the first session one group received 200 mg of caffeinated chewing gum (n = 61) and another group received regular (placebo) chewing gum (n = 66). The gum was chewed for 20-minutes and then disposed of before beginning the second session. Participants who received caffeine showed a performance benefit as well as reported being more on task and fewer instances of spontaneous mind-wandering compared to those in the placebo group. Participants who received caffeine also reported greater positive affect and arousal, as well as less feelings of boredom, sleepiness, and mental effort required to stay on task compared to those who received placebo. These results suggest that caffeine may benefit attentional engagement as well as performance during a sustained attention task.

There are no studies that have experimentally tested how temporal integration/segregation of sensory inputs might be linked to the emergence of dissociative experiences and alterations of emotional functioning. Thirty-six participants completed 3 sensory integration tasks. Psychometric thresholds were estimated as indexes of temporal integration/segregation processes. We collected self-report measures of pre-task trait levels of dissociation, as well as pre- post-task changes in both dissociation and emotionality. An independent sample of 21 subjects completed a control experiment administering the Attention Network Test. Results showed: (i) a significant increase of dissociative experiences after the completion of sensory integration tasks, but not after the ANT task; (ii) that subjective thresholds predicted the emergence of dissociative states; (iii) temporal integration efforts affected positive emotionality, which was explained by the extent of task-dependent dissociative states. The present findings reveal that dissociation could be understood in terms of an imbalance between “hyper-segregation” and “hyper-integration” processes.

The study aimed to investigate the effects of an embodied mindfulness treatment on chronometric mental rotation. Forty-four women and 47 men participated and were randomly divided into two groups: a mindfulness induction group and a control group. They completed two sets of 150 mental rotation tasks with cube figures each. Subjective cognitive effort (measured after each block), reaction time, and accuracy were analyzed using linear mixed models with the factors of time, mindfulness, angular disparity, and gender. The significant finding was a three-way interaction between pre-post testing, mindfulness, and gender for reaction times. This interaction suggests that women might benefit more from the mindfulness induction, while men may benefit more from the control condition. The analysis of subjective cognitive effort indicates that women and men perceive the same cognitive effort when solving cube-figure tasks.