The aim of the current study was to investigate visual scan patterns for the self-face in infants with the ability to recognize themselves with a photograph. 24-month-old infants (N = 32) were presented with faces including the self-face in the upright or inverted orientation. We also measured infants’ ability to recognize oneself in a mirror and with a photograph. Results showed that only in trials with the self-face was pupil dilation greater in the upright orientation than in the inverted orientation, and that eye movements and pupil dilation were not associated with PSR tasks. Our findings suggest that the processing of the self-face was processed in a manner similar to that of others, with longer and more fixations on eyes and nose, but infants allocated more attentional resources to processing upright self-face. Self-face processing in infancy may be independent of the understanding of the self beyond the here and now.
{"title":"Self-face processing in relation to self-referential tasks in 24-month-old infants: A study through eye movements and pupillometry measures","authors":"Hiroshi Nitta , Yusuke Uto , Kengo Chaya , Kazuhide Hashiya","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103803","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103803","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The aim of the current study was to investigate visual scan patterns for the self-face in infants with the ability to recognize themselves with a photograph. 24-month-old infants (N = 32) were presented with faces including the self-face in the upright or inverted orientation. We also measured infants’ ability to recognize oneself in a mirror and with a photograph. Results showed that only in trials with the self-face was pupil dilation greater in the upright orientation than in the inverted orientation, and that eye movements and pupil dilation were not associated with PSR tasks. Our findings suggest that the processing of the self-face was processed in a manner similar to that of others, with longer and more fixations on eyes and nose, but infants allocated more attentional resources to processing upright self-face. Self-face processing in infancy may be independent of the understanding of the self beyond the here and now.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103803"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142903976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103801
Dylan Ludwig
Contrary to the leading theories of consciousness on offer, it is a fruitful working hypothesis that conscious experiences facilitate a variety of functional capacities that are distinct to particular psychological tasks, individuals, and species (i.e., functional pluralism). In this paper, I illustrate this novel methodological point by identifying some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) emotional processing. I first consolidate empirical evidence of the capacities and limitations of unconscious emotional processing, drawing on a) experimental paradigms that employ the tools of vision science (masking and suppression of emotionally relevant stimuli), and b) theoretical and clinical research on emotional disorder (Generalized Anxiety Disorder). After comparing the functional characteristics of unconscious and conscious emotional processes, I argue that conscious experiences facilitate a cluster of functions that are specific to emotion, including increased capacities for representing fine-grained evaluative information, inhibition, and flexible response.
{"title":"Functions of consciousness in emotional processing","authors":"Dylan Ludwig","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103801","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103801","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Contrary to the leading theories of consciousness on offer, it is a fruitful working hypothesis that conscious experiences facilitate a variety of functional capacities that are distinct to particular psychological tasks, individuals, and species (i.e., <em>functional pluralism</em>). In this paper, I illustrate this novel methodological point by identifying some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) emotional processing. I first consolidate empirical evidence of the capacities and limitations of unconscious emotional processing, drawing on a) experimental paradigms that employ the tools of vision science (masking and suppression of emotionally relevant stimuli), and b) theoretical and clinical research on emotional disorder (Generalized Anxiety Disorder). After comparing the functional characteristics of unconscious and conscious emotional processes, I argue that conscious experiences facilitate a cluster of functions that are specific to emotion, including increased capacities for representing fine-grained evaluative information, inhibition, and flexible response.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103801"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142830900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103802
Carrie M. Peters , Matthew W. Scott , Ryan Jin , Minghao Ma , Sarah N. Kraeutner , Nicola J. Hodges
Motor imagery (MI) is a cognitive process believed to rely on the representation developed through experience. The equivalence between MI and execution has been questioned and the relationship between experience types and MI is unclear. We tested how observational and physical practice of hand gesture sequences impacted visual and kinesthetic MI and transfer to the unpracticed effector. Three groups (n = 22/gp.); no-vision physical practice, observational practice and no-practice control, practiced and visually and kinesthetically imagined performing the sequences. MI was assessed using mental chronometry, a movement time (MT) congruency measure and subjective ratings. Physical practice improved kinesthetic MI ratings and observational practice improved visual MI ratings. Contrary to predictions, physical practice did not enhance timing congruency. Imagined MTs were longer in transfer after physical practice, suggesting MI was not based on the same representation. These data question ideas of equivalence, with poor temporal matching after no-vision physical practice.
{"title":"Evidence for the dependence of visual and kinesthetic motor imagery on isolated visual and motor practice","authors":"Carrie M. Peters , Matthew W. Scott , Ryan Jin , Minghao Ma , Sarah N. Kraeutner , Nicola J. Hodges","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103802","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103802","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Motor imagery (MI) is a cognitive process believed to rely on the representation developed through experience. The equivalence between MI and execution has been questioned and the relationship between experience types and MI is unclear. We tested how observational and physical practice of hand gesture sequences impacted visual and kinesthetic MI and transfer to the unpracticed effector. Three groups (n = 22/gp.); no-vision physical practice, observational practice and no-practice control, practiced and visually and kinesthetically imagined performing the sequences. MI was assessed using mental chronometry, a movement time (MT) congruency measure and subjective ratings. Physical practice improved kinesthetic MI ratings and observational practice improved visual MI ratings. Contrary to predictions, physical practice did not enhance timing congruency. Imagined MTs were longer in transfer after physical practice, suggesting MI was not based on the same representation. These data question ideas of equivalence, with poor temporal matching after no-vision physical practice.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103802"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142900260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103792
Keelan R. Gorman, Aimee Wrightson-Hester, Michael Landman, Warren Mansell
Research on consciousness typically presents stimuli and records the responses that follow, to infer the intervening processes. Yet, VR allows ecological validity by giving the user freedom to continuously control their sensory input across three spatial dimensions via head and eye movement. We designed a virtual world in which the angle of view relates to the information complexity of the sensory input. We assessed its acceptability and feasibility, and explored the first-person experience. Ten university students were immersed in two different novel environments, then a semi-structured interview, guided by first-person video footage of the VR experience, elicited participants’ reports. The methodology proved feasible, and a thematic analysis was consistent with Mansell’s (2024) control theory perspective, and to a lesser degree, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Workspace Theory (GWT). We conclude that novel virtual environments provide an accessible, dynamic and valid way to gather evidence regarding different theories of consciousness.
{"title":"How can virtual reality help to understand consciousness? A thematic analysis of students’ experiences in a novel virtual environment","authors":"Keelan R. Gorman, Aimee Wrightson-Hester, Michael Landman, Warren Mansell","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103792","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103792","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Research on consciousness typically presents stimuli and records the responses that follow, to infer the intervening processes. Yet, VR allows ecological validity by giving the user freedom to continuously control their sensory input across three spatial dimensions via head and eye movement. We designed a virtual world in which the angle of view relates to the information complexity of the sensory input. We assessed its acceptability and feasibility, and explored the first-person experience. Ten university students were immersed in two different novel environments, then a semi-structured interview, guided by first-person video footage of the VR experience, elicited participants’ reports. The methodology proved feasible, and a thematic analysis was consistent with <span><span>Mansell’s (2024)</span></span> control theory perspective, and to a lesser degree, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Workspace Theory (GWT). We conclude that novel virtual environments provide an accessible, dynamic and valid way to gather evidence regarding different theories of consciousness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103792"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142792831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-30DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103790
Paula Argueta , Julia Dominguez , Josie Zachman , Paul Worthington , Rajesh K. Kana
Aphantasia, a spectrum of inabilities creating and perceiving mental images, is becoming more of a focus in continued research to better understand functions of sensory perception and imagination. Current research on aphantasia is still in an era of exploration to find its underlying neural mechanisms, comorbidities and comparing levels of visual imagery to other cognitive functions. Through a systematic review, this article explores the most influential developments in aphantasia research. The search included 3 databases-PsycINFO, PubMed, and Web of Science. After a rigorous selection process, 52 studies are included in this review. The findings include new research themes across different studies such as relationships between aphantasia and diminished episodic and autobiographical memory, comorbidities including autism, attention, emotions, and neurobiological differences. By integrating diverse perspectives, this review aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes underlying mental imagery and offers implications for further development in aphantasia research.
幻像症是一种创造和感知心理图像的一系列障碍，它正成为持续研究的焦点，以更好地理解感官知觉和想象的功能。目前对失视症的研究仍处于探索其潜在的神经机制、合并症以及视觉意象与其他认知功能水平比较的时代。本文通过系统回顾，探讨了幻像研究中最具影响力的进展。搜索包括3个数据库：psycinfo、PubMed和Web of Science。经过严格的筛选过程，本综述纳入了52项研究。这些发现包括不同研究的新研究主题，如缺失症与情景记忆和自传式记忆减少之间的关系，包括自闭症在内的合并症，注意力，情绪和神经生物学差异。通过对不同视角的整合，本综述旨在加深对心理意象认知过程的理解，并为幻影症研究的进一步发展提供启示。
{"title":"“The Giant Black Elephant with white Tusks stood in a field of Green Grass”: Cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying aphantasia","authors":"Paula Argueta , Julia Dominguez , Josie Zachman , Paul Worthington , Rajesh K. Kana","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103790","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103790","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Aphantasia, a spectrum of inabilities creating and perceiving mental images, is becoming more of a focus in continued research to better understand functions of sensory perception and imagination. Current research on aphantasia is still in an era of exploration to find its underlying neural mechanisms, comorbidities and comparing levels of visual imagery to other cognitive functions. Through a systematic review, this article explores the most influential developments in aphantasia research. The search included 3 databases-<em>PsycINFO, PubMed, and Web of Science.</em> After a rigorous selection process, 52 studies are included in this review. The findings include new research themes across different studies such as relationships between aphantasia and diminished episodic and autobiographical memory, comorbidities including autism, attention, emotions, and neurobiological differences. By integrating diverse perspectives, this review aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes underlying mental imagery and offers implications for further development in aphantasia research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103790"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142747028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-28DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103793
Julian Gutzeit , Lynn Huestegge
Experiencing a sense of agency (SoA), the feeling of being in control over one’s actions and their outcomes, typically requires intentional and voluntary actions. Prior research has compared the association of voluntary versus completely involuntary actions with the SoA. Here, we leveraged unique characteristics of oculomotor actions to partially manipulate the degree of action voluntariness. Participants performed either highly automatized prosaccades or highly controlled (voluntary) anti-saccades, triggering a gaze-contingent visual action effect. We assessed explicit SoA ratings and temporal action and effect binding as an implicit SoA measure. Anti-saccades were associated with stronger action binding compared to prosaccades, demonstrating a robust association between higher action voluntariness and a stronger implicit sense of action agency. We conclude that our manipulation of action voluntariness may have impacted the implicit phenomenological feeling of bodily agency, but it did not affect the SoA over effect outcomes or explicit agency perception.
{"title":"The impact of the degree of action voluntariness on sense of agency in saccades","authors":"Julian Gutzeit , Lynn Huestegge","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103793","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103793","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Experiencing a sense of agency (SoA), the feeling of being in control over one’s actions and their outcomes, typically requires intentional and voluntary actions. Prior research has compared the association of voluntary versus <em>completely</em> involuntary actions with the SoA. Here, we leveraged unique characteristics of oculomotor actions to <em>partially</em> manipulate the degree of action voluntariness. Participants performed either highly automatized prosaccades or highly controlled (voluntary) anti-saccades, triggering a gaze-contingent visual action effect. We assessed explicit SoA ratings and temporal action and effect binding as an implicit SoA measure. Anti-saccades were associated with stronger action binding compared to prosaccades, demonstrating a robust association between higher action voluntariness and a stronger implicit sense of action agency. We conclude that our manipulation of action voluntariness may have impacted the implicit phenomenological feeling of bodily agency, but it did not affect the SoA over effect outcomes or explicit agency perception.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 103793"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142747159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103783
Hilla Jacobson , Zohar Ongil , Daniel Algom , Marius Usher
A fundamental question in the domain of affect and conscious perception is whether the former can impact the latter. Traditionally, perception and affect were conceived as largely independent. Against this backdrop, it was recently argued that the affective valence of a stimulus can modulate the perceptual experience of its sensory features. An alternative hypothesis is that perceptual experiences have a valenced aspect over and above their sensory aspects, with these two aspects interacting and comprising integral perceptual dimensions. To test this, we carried out two experiments deploying Wendell Garner’s speeded classification paradigm to decide whether visual brightness and affective valence are separable or integral dimensions. We found Garner interference, documenting that brightness and valence are integral dimensions. We did not observe effects of congruity – responses to bright positive stimuli were not faster than to bright negative stimuli — providing no support for affect induced changes in the perception of brightness.
{"title":"Valence in perception: Are affective valence and visual brightness integral dimensions in visual experience?","authors":"Hilla Jacobson , Zohar Ongil , Daniel Algom , Marius Usher","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103783","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103783","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A fundamental question in the domain of affect and conscious perception is whether the former can impact the latter. Traditionally, perception and affect were conceived as largely independent. Against this backdrop, it was recently argued that the affective valence of a stimulus can modulate the perceptual experience of its sensory features. An alternative hypothesis is that perceptual experiences have a valenced aspect over and above their sensory aspects, with these two aspects interacting and comprising integral perceptual dimensions. To test this, we carried out two experiments deploying Wendell Garner’s speeded classification paradigm to decide whether visual brightness and affective valence are <em>separable</em> or <em>integral</em> dimensions.<!--> <!-->We found Garner interference, documenting that brightness and valence are integral dimensions. We did not observe effects of congruity – responses to bright positive stimuli were not faster than to bright negative stimuli — providing no support for affect induced changes in the perception of brightness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"126 ","pages":"Article 103783"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142632367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774
Benjamin Kozuch
Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory’s own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex’s role in consciousness.
{"title":"Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness","authors":"Benjamin Kozuch","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory’s own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex’s role in consciousness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"126 ","pages":"Article 103774"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142569217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103787
Peng Wang , XT (XiaoTian) Wang
Although life is lived forward, it can only be understood backward. From the perspective of life-history theory, we propose that mortality reminders may induce backward thinking from the endpoint of life and regulate intertemporal choice between smaller-and-sooner (SS) and large-and-later rewards (LL), thereby helping individuals with time management. Experiment 1 compared the effects of mortality (endpoint) imagination with the imagination of being at age 70 and found that only mortality imagination significantly reduced delay discounting, the extent to which a delayed reward is discounted. In Experiment 2, mortality reminders companied by retrospective episodic mental time travel significantly reduced delay discounting compared to prospective episodic processing. However, the effect disappeared when the end-of-life reminder was replaced with an old-age (70 years) reminder. Highlighting the inevitability of death, coupled with retrospective episodic thinking, promoted future-oriented preferences, suggesting that end-of-life meditation is likely to induce retrospective mental time travels.
{"title":"How mortality awareness regulates intertemporal Choice: A joint effect of endpoint reminder and retrospective episodic thinking","authors":"Peng Wang , XT (XiaoTian) Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103787","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103787","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although life is lived forward, it can only be understood backward. From the perspective of life-history theory, we propose that mortality reminders may induce backward thinking from the endpoint of life and regulate intertemporal choice between smaller-and-sooner (SS) and large-and-later rewards (LL), thereby helping individuals with time management. Experiment 1 compared the effects of mortality (endpoint) imagination with the imagination of being at age 70 and found that only mortality imagination significantly reduced delay discounting, the extent to which a delayed reward is discounted. In Experiment 2, mortality reminders companied by retrospective episodic mental time travel significantly reduced delay discounting compared to prospective episodic processing. However, the effect disappeared when the end-of-life reminder was replaced with an old-age (70 years) reminder. Highlighting the inevitability of death, coupled with retrospective episodic thinking, promoted future-oriented preferences, suggesting that end-of-life meditation is likely to induce retrospective mental time travels.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"126 ","pages":"Article 103787"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142660932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103785
Elisabetta Colombari , Henry Railo
Research has revealed two major event-related potential (ERP) markers of visual awareness: the earlier Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN, around 150–250 ms after stimulus onset), and the following Late Positivity (LP, around 300–500 ms after stimulus onset). Understanding the neural sources that give rise to VAN and LP is important in order to understand what kind of neural processes underlie conscious visual perception. Although the ERPs afford high temporal resolution, their spatial resolution is limited because multiple separate neural sources sum up at the scalp level. In the present study, we sought to characterize the locations and time-courses of independent neural sources underlying the ERP correlates of visual awareness by means of Independent Component Analysis (ICA). ICA allows identifying and localizing the temporal dynamics of different neural sources that contribute to the ERP correlates of conscious perception. The present results show that the cortical sources of VAN are localized to posterior areas including occipital and temporal cortex, while LP reflects a combination of multiple sources distributed among frontal, parietal and occipito-temporal cortex. Our findings suggest that conscious vision correlates with dynamically changing neural sources, developing in part in “accumulative fashion”: consciousness-related activity initially arises in few early sources and, subsequently, additional sources are engaged as a function of time.
The results further suggest that even early latency neural sources that correlate with conscious perception may also associate with action-related processes.
{"title":"Multiple independent components contribute to event-related potential correlates of conscious vision","authors":"Elisabetta Colombari , Henry Railo","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103785","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103785","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Research has revealed two major event-related potential (ERP) markers of visual awareness: the earlier Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN, around 150–250 ms after stimulus onset), and the following Late Positivity (LP, around 300–500 ms after stimulus onset). Understanding the neural sources that give rise to VAN and LP is important in order to understand what kind of neural processes underlie conscious visual perception. Although the ERPs afford high temporal resolution, their spatial resolution is limited because multiple separate neural sources sum up at the scalp level. In the present study, we sought to characterize the locations and time-courses of independent neural sources underlying the ERP correlates of visual awareness by means of Independent Component Analysis (ICA). ICA allows identifying and localizing the temporal dynamics of different neural sources that contribute to the ERP correlates of conscious perception. The present results show that the cortical sources of VAN are localized to posterior areas including occipital and temporal cortex, while LP reflects a combination of multiple sources distributed among frontal, parietal and occipito-temporal cortex. Our findings suggest that conscious vision correlates with dynamically changing neural sources, developing in part in “accumulative fashion”: consciousness-related activity initially arises in few early sources and, subsequently, additional sources are engaged as a function of time.</div><div>The results further suggest that even early latency neural sources that correlate with conscious perception may also associate with action-related processes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"126 ","pages":"Article 103785"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142632366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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