Consciousness and Cognition最新文献

A serial reaction time task was used to test whether the representations of a probabilistic second-order sequence structure are (i) stored in an effector-dependent, effector-independent intrinsic or effector-independent visuospatial code and (ii) are inter-manually accessible. Participants were trained either with the dominant or non-dominant hand. Tests were performed with both hands in the practice sequence, a random sequence, and a mirror sequence. Learning did not differ significantly between left and right-hand practice, suggesting symmetric intermanual transfer from the dominant to the non-dominant hand and vice versa. In the posttest, RTs were shorter for the practice sequence than for the random sequence, and longest for the mirror sequence. Participants were unable to freely generate or recognize the practice sequence, indicating implicit knowledge of the probabilistic sequence structure. Because sequence-specific learning did not differ significantly between hands, we conclude that representations of the probabilistic sequence structure are stored in an effector-independent visuospatial code.

Mental rotation tasks are frequently used as standard measures of mental imagery. However, aphantasia research has brought such use into question. Here, we assessed a large group of individuals who lack visual imagery (aphantasia) on two mental rotation tasks: a three-dimensional block-shape, and a human manikin rotation task. In both tasks, those with aphantasia had slower, but more accurate responses than controls. Both groups demonstrated classic linear increases in response time and error-rate as functions of angular disparity. In the three-dimensional block-shape rotation task, a within-group speed-accuracy trade-off was found in controls, whereas faster individuals in the aphantasia group were also more accurate. Control participants generally favoured using object-based mental rotation strategies, whereas those with aphantasia favoured analytic strategies. These results suggest that visual imagery is not crucial for successful performance in classical mental rotation tasks, as alternative strategies can be effectively utilised in the absence of holistic mental representations.

To what degree human cognition is influenced by subliminal stimuli is a controversial empirical question. One striking example was reported by Linser and Goschke (2007): participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli when masked congruent primes were presented immediately before the action. Critically, however, unawareness of the masked primes was established by post hoc data selection. In our preregistered study we sought to explore these findings while adjusting prime visibility based on individual thresholds, so that each participant underwent both visible and non-visible conditions. In experiment 1, N = 39 participants engaged in a control judgement task: following the presentation of a semantic prime, they freely selected between two keys, which triggered the appearance of a colored circle. The color of the circles, however, was independent of the key-press. Subsequently, participants assessed their perceived control over the circle’s color, based on their key-presses, via a rating scale that ranged from 0 % (no control) to 100 % (complete control). Contrary to Linser and Goschke (2007)'s findings, this experiment demonstrated that predictive information influenced the experience of agency only when primes were consciously processed. In experiment 2, utilizing symbolic (arrow) primes, N = 35 participants had to rate their feeling of control over the effect-stimulus’ identity during a two-choice identification paradigm (i.e., they were instructed to press a key corresponding to a target stimulus; with a contingency between target and effect stimulus of 75 %/25 %). The results revealed no significant influence of subliminal priming on agency perceptions. In summary, this study implies that unconscious stimuli may not exert a substantial influence on the conscious experience of agency, underscoring the need for careful consideration of methodological aspects and experimental design's impact on observed phenomena.

Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with “aha” experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger “Aha!” emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.

The congruency judgments in action understanding helps individuals make timely adjustments to unexpected occurrence, and this process may be influenced by emotion. Previous research has showed contradictory effect of emotion on conflict processing, possibly due to the degree of relevance between emotion and task. However, to date, no study has systematically manipulated the relevance to explore how emotion affects congruency judgments in action understanding. We employed a cue-target paradigm and controlled the way emotional stimuli were presented on the target interface, setting up three experiments: emotion served as task-irrelevant distractor, task-irrelevant target and task-relevant target. The results showed that when emotion was irrelevant to the task, it impaired congruency judgements performance, regardless of a distractor or a target, while task-relevant emotion facilitated this process. These findings indicate that the impact of emotion on congruency judgements during action understanding depends on the degree of emotion-task relevance.

This study addresses the effects of blindness on trust. Using an auditory version of the multi-round Trust Game, we investigated the effect of reputation and reciprocity on trust decisions in early blind and sighted participants. During each round of the game, participants were endowed with a sum of money and had to decide how much they wanted to invest in their partners, who were manipulated as a function of their good or bad reputation and individualistic or cooperative behavior. The data showed that negative first impression about the partner (bad reputation and/or selfish behavior) impacted more blind participants than sighted ones. However, following repeated interactions with the partners, the overall mean investment aligned between the blind and sighted groups. We interpret these findings as suggesting that blindness may guide participants to a more cautionary behavior when dealing with partners with negative initial characteristics.

The sense of agency is the ability to recognize that we are the actors of our actions and their consequences.

We explored whether and how spatial cues may modulate the agency experience by manipulating the ecological validity of the experimental setup (real-space or computer-based setup) and the distance of the action-outcome (near or far).

We tested 58 healthy adults collecting explicit agency judgments and the perceived time interval between movements and outcomes (to quantify the intentional binding phenomenon, an implicit index of agency).

Participants show greater implicit agency for voluntary actions when there is a temporal and spatial action-outcome contingency. Conversely, participants reported similar explicit agency for outcomes appearing in the near and far space. Notably, these effects were independent of the ecological validity of the setting.

These results suggest that spatial proximity, realistic or illusory, is essential for feeling implicitly responsible for the consequences of our actions.

The neural underpinnings of selfhood encompass pre-reflective and reflective self-experience. The former refers to a basic, immediate experience of being a self, while the latter involves cognition and introspection. Although neural correlates of reflective self-experience have been studied, the pre-reflective remains underinvestigated.

This research aims to bridge this gap by comparatively investigating ERP correlates of reading first- vs. third-person pronouns – approximating pre-reflective self-experience – and self- vs. other-related adjectives – approximating reflective self-experience – in 30 healthy participants.

We found differential neural engagement between pre-reflective and reflective self-experience at 254–310 ms post-stimulus onset. Source estimation suggested that our sensor-level results could be plausibly explained by the involvement of cortical midline structures and default mode network in the general sense of self but selective recruitment of anterior cingulate and top-down dorsal attention network in the pre-reflective self. These findings offer a deeper understanding of the experiential self, especially pre-reflective, providing a foundation for investigating self-disorders.

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one’s actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.