Pub Date : 2025-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103938
Maren Giersiepen , Nils Wendel Heinrich , Annika Österdiekhoff , Stefan Kopp , Nele Russwinkel , Simone Schütz-Bosbach , Jakob Kaiser
Sense of control (SoC) over our actions is crucial for regulating our behavior. SoC arises from low-level processes, such as immediate sensory feedback, and high-level processes, such as performance evaluation. Studies using simple action-effect tasks suggest that people rely more on low-level sensory than on high-level cues of control. Yet, it remains unclear how these cues interact to shape the SoC in complex, goal-directed environments that require continuous behavioral adaptation. To investigate this, 50 participants performed a challenging motor control task akin to a video game, steering a spaceship along a continuously changing path. Sensorimotor control was manipulated by varying task difficulty via input noise across experimental blocks. After each trial, participants received negative, neutral, or positive feedback, followed by rating of their SoC. Linear mixed model analyses revealed that both sensory and evaluative feedback influenced the SoC. SoC decreased with increasing task difficulty. Furthermore, independent of difficulty, negative feedback reduced the SoC whereas positive feedback enhanced it, with a stronger effect for negative feedback. Notably, the effects of task difficulty and negative feedback were influenced by participants’ depressive symptoms and their external locus of control, suggesting that generalized control beliefs modulate task-specific control experience. These findings indicate that SoC is informed by both low-level sensorimotor cues and high-level affective feedback, suggesting an integration of multiple types of information to assess control in dynamic task contexts where action-effect contingencies are extended over time. Crucially, these effects depend on trait-like control beliefs, highlighting the need to account for individual differences when investigating situated control experience.
{"title":"Am I in control? The dynamics of sensory information, performance feedback, and personality in shaping the sense of control","authors":"Maren Giersiepen , Nils Wendel Heinrich , Annika Österdiekhoff , Stefan Kopp , Nele Russwinkel , Simone Schütz-Bosbach , Jakob Kaiser","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103938","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103938","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sense of control (SoC) over our actions is crucial for regulating our behavior. SoC arises from low-level processes, such as immediate sensory feedback, and high-level processes, such as performance evaluation. Studies using simple action-effect tasks suggest that people rely more on low-level sensory than on high-level cues of control. Yet, it remains unclear how these cues interact to shape the SoC in complex, goal-directed environments that require continuous behavioral adaptation. To investigate this, 50 participants performed a challenging motor control task akin to a video game, steering a spaceship along a continuously changing path. Sensorimotor control was manipulated by varying task difficulty via input noise across experimental blocks. After each trial, participants received negative, neutral, or positive feedback, followed by rating of their SoC. Linear mixed model analyses revealed that both sensory and evaluative feedback influenced the SoC. SoC decreased with increasing task difficulty. Furthermore, independent of difficulty, negative feedback reduced the SoC whereas positive feedback enhanced it, with a stronger effect for negative feedback. Notably, the effects of task difficulty and negative feedback were influenced by participants’ depressive symptoms and their external locus of control, suggesting that generalized control beliefs modulate task-specific control experience. These findings indicate that SoC is informed by both low-level sensorimotor cues and high-level affective feedback, suggesting an integration of multiple types of information to assess control in dynamic task contexts where action-effect contingencies are extended over time. Crucially, these effects depend on trait-like control beliefs, highlighting the need to account for individual differences when investigating situated control experience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103938"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145253680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103935
Jona Förster , Giovanni Vardiero , Till Nierhaus , Felix Blankenburg
EEG studies have identified ERP components at various latencies as predictors of conscious somatosensory perception, but it remains largely unclear which factors are responsible for this variation. Here, for the first time we directly compare the event-related potential correlates of stimulus detection under tactile versus electrical peri-threshold stimulation using single-trial modelling and Bayesian model selection within and between groups, while controlling for task-relevance and post-perceptual processes with a visual-somatosensory matching task. We find evidence that the P50 component predicts conscious perception under tactile, but not electrical stimulation: while electrical stimulation evokes a P50 already for subliminal stimuli and activity in this time window is best explained by stimulus intensity, there is almost no subliminal P50 for tactile stimulation, and detection best explains the data. In contrast, the N80 and N140 components correlate with detection and detection probability in both stimulation groups. The P100 and the P300 were modulated by detection in the tactile group, and by detection probability in the electrical group. Our results indicate that cortical processing in somatosensory target detection partly depends on the type of stimulation used. We propose that electrical stimulation of afferent nerve fibers that do not give rise to conscious perception may mask the P50 modulation associated with conscious somatosensory detection, and might contribute to subliminal evoked cortical responses.
{"title":"ERP responses reveal different neural mechanisms for perception of electrical and tactile stimuli","authors":"Jona Förster , Giovanni Vardiero , Till Nierhaus , Felix Blankenburg","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103935","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103935","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>EEG studies have identified ERP components at various latencies as predictors of conscious somatosensory perception, but it remains largely unclear which factors are responsible for this variation. Here, for the first time we directly compare the event-related potential correlates of stimulus detection under tactile versus electrical <em>peri</em>-threshold stimulation using single-trial modelling and Bayesian model selection within and between groups, while controlling for task-relevance and post-perceptual processes with a visual-somatosensory matching task. We find evidence that the P50 component predicts conscious perception under tactile, but not electrical stimulation: while electrical stimulation evokes a P50 already for subliminal stimuli and activity in this time window is best explained by stimulus intensity, there is almost no subliminal P50 for tactile stimulation, and detection best explains the data. In contrast, the N80 and N140 components correlate with detection and detection probability in both stimulation groups. The P100 and the P300 were modulated by detection in the tactile group, and by detection probability in the electrical group. Our results indicate that cortical processing in somatosensory target detection partly depends on the type of stimulation used. We propose that electrical stimulation of afferent nerve fibers that do not give rise to conscious perception may mask the P50 modulation associated with conscious somatosensory detection, and might contribute to subliminal evoked cortical responses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103935"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145187321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103937
Jan-Daniel Höhmann , Gerhard Jocham , Lina I. Skora
Habitual behaviour is commonly assumed to operate outside of conscious control, deliberation, or awareness, driven by stimulus–response (S-R) associations rather than goal-directed evaluation. Here, we investigate whether habitual instrumental behaviours can be triggered by stimuli that are prevented from entering subjective awareness with subliminal presentation. In a preregistered within-subjects study (N after exclusions = 75), we examined this question by employing a symmetrical outcome revaluation task. Participants underwent extensive instrumental training, forming strong S-R associations, before completing two testing stages: a conscious stage with fully visible stimuli, and an unconscious stage where stimuli were rendered subliminal via visual masking. In the conscious condition, participants exhibited habitual control, responding more accurately to habit-congruent (still-valuable, still-non-valuable) stimuli than to habit-incongruent (upvalued, devalued) stimuli, replicating prior findings. However, in the unconscious condition participants did not exhibit above-chance accuracy, and responses were not biased toward habitual actions, suggesting that subliminal stimuli were unable to elicit either habitual or goal-directed responses. These findings challenge the notion that habitual control of instrumental behaviour can function independently of stimulus awareness and suggest that conscious access to action-relevant cues may be necessary even for well-established S-R associations to guide behaviour.
{"title":"Habitual control of instrumental behaviour requires conscious stimulus perception","authors":"Jan-Daniel Höhmann , Gerhard Jocham , Lina I. Skora","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103937","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103937","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Habitual behaviour is commonly assumed to operate outside of conscious control, deliberation, or awareness, driven by stimulus–response (S-R) associations rather than goal-directed evaluation. Here, we investigate whether habitual instrumental behaviours can be triggered by stimuli that are prevented from entering subjective awareness with subliminal presentation. In a preregistered within-subjects study (N after exclusions = 75), we examined this question by employing a symmetrical outcome revaluation task. Participants underwent extensive instrumental training, forming strong S-R associations, before completing two testing stages: a conscious stage with fully visible stimuli, and an unconscious stage where stimuli were rendered subliminal via visual masking. In the conscious condition, participants exhibited habitual control, responding more accurately to habit-congruent (still-valuable, still-non-valuable) stimuli than to habit-incongruent (upvalued, devalued) stimuli, replicating prior findings. However, in the unconscious condition participants did not exhibit above-chance accuracy, and responses were not biased toward habitual actions, suggesting that subliminal stimuli were unable to elicit either habitual or goal-directed responses. These findings challenge the notion that habitual control of instrumental behaviour can function independently of stimulus awareness and suggest that conscious access to action-relevant cues may be necessary even for well-established S-R associations to guide behaviour.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103937"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145245708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-23DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103936
Matthäus Rudolph , Carina G. Giesen , Klaus Rothermund
There is an ongoing debate about the role of top-down influences on episodic binding and retrieval processes. The Binding and Retrieval in Action Control (BRAC) framework postulates that both, binding and retrieval, are modulated by top-down processes, such as awareness and instructions (Frings et al., 2020). To test this assumption, we conducted a mega-analysis in which we reanalyzed data from four contingency learning experiments (total N = 859). Contingency awareness was assessed in all experiments. Furthermore, in two experiments, contingency awareness was experimentally manipulated by instructing participants about the existing contingencies. Results show that both binding and retrieval neither depend on nor are modulated by higher-order processes such as contingency knowledge or awareness of stimulus–response contingencies (measured and manipulated). In sum, our findings suggest that stimulus–response binding and retrieval is an automatic cognitive process that operates unconsciously and independently of top-down influences such as contingency knowledge and awareness.
{"title":"Stimulus-response binding and retrieval operates independently of contingency awareness: A mega-analysis","authors":"Matthäus Rudolph , Carina G. Giesen , Klaus Rothermund","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103936","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103936","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There is an ongoing debate about the role of top-down influences on episodic binding and retrieval processes. The Binding and Retrieval in Action Control (BRAC) framework postulates that both, binding and retrieval, are modulated by top-down processes, such as awareness and instructions (<span><span>Frings et al., 2020</span></span>). To test this assumption, we conducted a mega-analysis in which we reanalyzed data from four contingency learning experiments (total <em>N</em> = 859). Contingency awareness was assessed in all experiments. Furthermore, in two experiments, contingency awareness was experimentally manipulated by instructing participants about the existing contingencies. Results show that both binding and retrieval neither depend on nor are modulated by higher-order processes such as contingency knowledge or awareness of stimulus–response contingencies (measured and manipulated). In sum, our findings suggest that stimulus–response binding and retrieval is an automatic cognitive process that operates unconsciously and independently of top-down influences such as contingency knowledge and awareness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103936"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145118583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-18DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103922
Daniel Byrnes, Christopher A. Was
This study examined the underlying mechanisms of false memories observed in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Previous work indicates that greater working memory capacity (WMC) and inhibition are associated with lower susceptibility to such false memories. We hypothesized that this may be, due to the closely related construct of attention control. We examined if individual differences in attention control accounted for variance in susceptibility to false memories, above and beyond inhibition and WMC alone. Using a standard DRM procedure in an individual differences approach to examine how WMC, inhibition, and attention control contribute to false word recognition on the DRM task. Our results indicate that attention control accounts for unique variance in susceptibility to the false memories above and beyond that of WMC and inhibition, suggesting that attention control may be more directly related to the true underlying mechanisms behind false memories.
{"title":"Individual differences in false memories in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott Paradigm: An attention control account","authors":"Daniel Byrnes, Christopher A. Was","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103922","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103922","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examined the underlying mechanisms of false memories observed in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Previous work indicates that greater working memory capacity (WMC) and inhibition are associated with lower susceptibility to such false memories. We hypothesized that this may be, due to the closely related construct of attention control. We examined if individual differences in attention control accounted for variance in susceptibility to false memories, above and beyond inhibition and WMC alone. Using a standard DRM procedure in an individual differences approach to examine how WMC, inhibition, and attention control contribute to false word recognition on the DRM task. Our results indicate that attention control accounts for unique variance in susceptibility to the false memories above and beyond that of WMC and inhibition, suggesting that attention control may be more directly related to the true underlying mechanisms behind false memories.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103922"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145092935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-16DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103934
Paweł Motyka , David J. Schwartzman , Anil K. Seth , Keisuke Suzuki
According to sensorimotor accounts of perceptual experience, the subjective sense that an object is real builds up as one learns how sensory inputs depend on bodily movements. Using virtual reality (VR), we manipulated the complexity of spatial dependencies governing interactions with unfamiliar 3D objects to assess whether they would show differential access to visual awareness during a continuous flash suppression paradigm (CFS). In specially-designed sensorimotor mastery tasks, participants had to manually control objects rotating in congruent, opposite, novel (orthogonal), or random directions in response to their actions. These tasks alternated with a continuous flash suppression task, in which participants first indicated stimulus detection as quickly as possible and subsequently identified its shape, evaluating the access of stationary objects to visual awareness. We hypothesised that objects governed by lawful (learnable) dependencies would overcome suppression faster than randomly moving objects (for which there is no world-related statistical structure to learn). While sensorimotor control performance decreased with condition difficulty, the pre-registered analysis yielded no differences in breakthrough times across conditions. We discuss methodological factors, stemming from the dual-task CFS design, which potentially account for these null findings and which warrant further study. Overall, our findings are consistent with prior evidence for the negligible role of spatial congruence (compared to contingency) between actions and their visual consequences in shaping perceptual experience under interocular suppression paradigms.
{"title":"Investigating the role of sensorimotor spatial dependencies in shaping conscious access to virtual 3D objects","authors":"Paweł Motyka , David J. Schwartzman , Anil K. Seth , Keisuke Suzuki","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103934","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103934","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>According to sensorimotor accounts of perceptual experience, the subjective sense that an object is real builds up as one learns how sensory inputs depend on bodily movements. Using virtual reality (VR), we manipulated the complexity of spatial dependencies governing interactions with unfamiliar 3D objects to assess whether they would show differential access to visual awareness during a continuous flash suppression paradigm (CFS). In specially-designed sensorimotor mastery tasks, participants had to manually control objects rotating in congruent, opposite, novel (orthogonal), or random directions in response to their actions. These tasks alternated with a continuous flash suppression task, in which participants first indicated stimulus detection as quickly as possible and subsequently identified its shape, evaluating the access of stationary objects to visual awareness. We hypothesised that objects governed by lawful (learnable) dependencies would overcome suppression faster than randomly moving objects (for which there is no world-related statistical structure to learn). While sensorimotor control performance decreased with condition difficulty, the pre-registered analysis yielded no differences in breakthrough times across conditions. We discuss methodological factors, stemming from the dual-task CFS design, which potentially account for these null findings and which warrant further study. Overall, our findings are consistent with prior evidence for the negligible role of spatial congruence (compared to contingency) between actions and their visual consequences in shaping perceptual experience under interocular suppression paradigms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103934"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145082427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-05DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103933
Meng Zou , Yongchun Wang , Zhengqi Tang , Ya Li , Yonghui Wang
Flexibly inhibiting inappropriate responses based on current goals and past experiences is crucial. The dual-mechanism of control (DMC) model proposes that cognitive control involves proactive (expectation-driven) and reactive (stimulus-driven, such as reward history) control. However, how these mechanisms interact during inhibitory control remains unclear. We explored this interaction using cued and non-cued Go/NoGo tasks through two experiments, employing different reward training paradigms: value-driven attentional capture (VDAC, Experiment 1) and monetary incentive delay task (MIDT, Experiment 2). The results showed that reward history interacted with action expectation only when established via the MIDT (Experiment 2), with previously rewarded NoGo target showing lower commission errors under the unexpected condition. In contrast, reward history from the VDAC paradigm (Experiment 1) influenced inhibition independently of action expectation. Across both experiments, reward history generally facilitated response inhibition. These findings suggest that the relationship between proactive and reactive control is flexible, particularly when reactive control is dependent on the nature of prior reward learning. This study provides new insights into how humans weigh current goals with past experiences to guide adaptive behavior in dynamic environments.
根据目前的目标和过去的经验,灵活地抑制不适当的反应是至关重要的。双重控制机制(dual-mechanism of control, DMC)模型认为认知控制包括主动控制(期望驱动)和反应控制(刺激驱动,如奖励历史)。然而,这些机制如何在抑制控制中相互作用仍不清楚。我们通过两个不同的奖励训练范式:价值驱动的注意捕获(实验1)和货币激励延迟任务(实验2),通过线索和非线索的Go/NoGo任务来探索这种相互作用。结果表明,奖励历史仅在通过MIDT建立时才与行动期望相互作用(实验2),先前奖励的NoGo目标在意外条件下表现出较低的任务误差。相反,来自VDAC范式的奖励历史(实验1)对抑制的影响独立于行动期望。在这两个实验中,奖励历史通常会促进反应抑制。这些发现表明,主动控制和反应性控制之间的关系是灵活的,特别是当反应性控制依赖于先前奖励学习的性质时。这项研究为人类如何权衡当前目标和过去经验以指导动态环境中的适应性行为提供了新的见解。
{"title":"When action expectation meets reward history: The interaction of proactive and reactive control during inhibitory control","authors":"Meng Zou , Yongchun Wang , Zhengqi Tang , Ya Li , Yonghui Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103933","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103933","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Flexibly inhibiting inappropriate responses based on current goals and past experiences is crucial. The dual-mechanism of control (DMC) model proposes that cognitive control involves proactive (expectation-driven) and reactive (stimulus-driven, such as reward history) control. However, how these mechanisms interact during inhibitory control remains unclear. We explored this interaction using cued and non-cued Go/NoGo tasks through two experiments, employing different reward training paradigms: value-driven attentional capture (VDAC, Experiment 1) and monetary incentive delay task (MIDT, Experiment 2). The results showed that reward history interacted with action expectation only when established via the MIDT (Experiment 2), with previously rewarded NoGo target showing lower commission errors under the unexpected condition. In contrast, reward history from the VDAC paradigm (Experiment 1) influenced inhibition independently of action expectation. Across both experiments, reward history generally facilitated response inhibition. These findings suggest that the relationship between proactive and reactive control is flexible, particularly when reactive control is dependent on the nature of prior reward learning. This study provides new insights into how humans weigh current goals with past experiences to guide adaptive behavior in dynamic environments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103933"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144997309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-02DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103924
Andy Mckilliam , Manuela Kirberg
Until recently, mental imagery has largely been regarded as an exclusively conscious phenomenon. However, recent empirical results suggest that mental imagery can also occur unconsciously. People who report having no experiences of mental imagery often perform similar to controls on behavioural tasks thought to require imagery. A surprising number of them also display significant levels of imagery-based priming, and recent neural decoding studies have shown that imagery-related information is being processed in their visual cortex. However, investigating unconscious imagery empirically is not straightforward. One challenge is to establish that imagery is genuinely unconscious as opposed to merely going unreported due to response biases. Another is to clarify how imagistic and indirect perceptual processing needs to be to qualify as imagery. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evidence for unconscious imagery, argue that it is not as compelling as it initially appears, and outline a strategy for advancing research on this question.
{"title":"Aphantasia and the unconscious imagery hypothesis","authors":"Andy Mckilliam , Manuela Kirberg","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103924","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103924","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Until recently, mental imagery has largely been regarded as an exclusively conscious phenomenon. However, recent empirical results suggest that mental imagery can also occur unconsciously. People who report having no experiences of mental imagery often perform similar to controls on behavioural tasks thought to require imagery. A surprising number of them also display significant levels of imagery-based priming, and recent neural decoding studies have shown that imagery-related information is being processed in their visual cortex. However, investigating unconscious imagery empirically is not straightforward. One challenge is to establish that imagery is genuinely unconscious as opposed to merely going unreported due to response biases. Another is to clarify how imagistic and indirect perceptual processing needs to be to qualify as imagery. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evidence for unconscious imagery, argue that it is not as compelling as it initially appears, and outline a strategy for advancing research on this question.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 103924"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144926513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-01Epub Date: 2025-08-09DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920
Heng Li, Yu Cao
According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, individuals represent abstract concepts, such as time, through more concrete experiences, such as the sensorimotor system. For example, left and right spatial orientations can be projected onto temporal concepts of past and future in mental models, which is consistent with various writing systems across cultures. Although evidence indicates that manual and visual experiences can influence lateral mental timelines, it remains unclear whether passive whole-body motion can exert similar effects. In this study, we explored this hypothesized effect among Chinese sighted and blind participants. Participants responded to verbal stimuli corresponding to past and future events while being displaced leftward and rightward on a motion platform. The results demonstrated an expedited categorization of future-related words during rightward motion compared to leftward motion. However, no analogous effects were observed for the categorization of past-related stimuli. This partial metaphor-congruency effect cannot be explained by linguistic conventions, as there are no explicit lateral metaphors for time in Mandarin Chinese. Therefore, a more plausible explanation relates to the malleability of future event representations, which can be more easily shaped by motion experiences compared to past event representations. Together, these findings highlight the significant role of bodily movements in influencing temporal thought.
{"title":"Moving through time: The influence of body motion on temporal concepts of future in Chinese sighted and blind people.","authors":"Heng Li, Yu Cao","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103920","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, individuals represent abstract concepts, such as time, through more concrete experiences, such as the sensorimotor system. For example, left and right spatial orientations can be projected onto temporal concepts of past and future in mental models, which is consistent with various writing systems across cultures. Although evidence indicates that manual and visual experiences can influence lateral mental timelines, it remains unclear whether passive whole-body motion can exert similar effects. In this study, we explored this hypothesized effect among Chinese sighted and blind participants. Participants responded to verbal stimuli corresponding to past and future events while being displaced leftward and rightward on a motion platform. The results demonstrated an expedited categorization of future-related words during rightward motion compared to leftward motion. However, no analogous effects were observed for the categorization of past-related stimuli. This partial metaphor-congruency effect cannot be explained by linguistic conventions, as there are no explicit lateral metaphors for time in Mandarin Chinese. Therefore, a more plausible explanation relates to the malleability of future event representations, which can be more easily shaped by motion experiences compared to past event representations. Together, these findings highlight the significant role of bodily movements in influencing temporal thought.</p>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"134 ","pages":"103920"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144818159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103923
Frank Calio , Lena Nadarevic , Jochen Musch
The finding that repeating a statement typically increases its perceived validity is referred to as the truth effect. Research on individual differences in the magnitude of the effect and its correlates is scarce and has yielded rather mixed results. However, any search for replicable relations between the truth effect and other cognitive or personality variables is bound to fail if the truth effect cannot be measured reliably at the individual level and if the effect is not a stable phenomenon. We conducted two experiments investigating the split-half reliability and test–retest stability of the truth effect. To operationalize the magnitude of the effect, Experiment 1 used the between-items criterion and Experiment 2 used the within-items criterion of the truth effect (Dechêne et al., 2010). In both experiments, the truth effect’s test–retest stability was found to be very low, probably due to a highly insufficient reliability of the measures that were used. While there may be meaningful and stable individual differences in the truth effect, our findings raise concerns about the usefulness of established indices and standard measures of the truth effect for personality and individual difference research.
重复陈述通常会增加其感知有效性的发现被称为真相效应。对影响程度的个体差异及其相关因素的研究很少,并且得出了相当复杂的结果。然而,如果真相效应不能在个人层面上可靠地测量,如果真相效应不是一个稳定的现象,那么任何寻找真相效应与其他认知或人格变量之间可复制关系的研究都注定会失败。我们进行了两个实验来研究真相效应的劈半信度和重测稳定性。为了对效果的大小进行操作,实验1使用了项目间标准,实验2使用了真值效应的项目内标准(Dechêne et al., 2010)。在这两个实验中,发现真相效应的测试-重测稳定性非常低,可能是由于所使用的测量方法的可靠性非常不足。虽然真实效应中可能存在有意义和稳定的个体差异,但我们的研究结果引起了人们对真实效应的既定指数和标准测量在人格和个体差异研究中的有用性的关注。
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