Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967
Salvatore G. Chiarella , Luca Simione , Monia D’Angiò , Chiara Saracini , Antonino Raffone , Enrico Di Pace
This study investigated whether second-order conditional (SOC) sequences can be learned through observation by combining rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) with a serial reaction time task (SRTT). Sixty participants observed either repeated SOC sequences or random sequences during RSVP, then completed explicit learning tasks and an SRTT. Explicit learning tasks showed no evidence of sequence knowledge. In the SRTT, groups did not differ in RTs, but the control group accumulated more errors in later blocks. Furthermore, RTs during the first two blocks predicted performance in recovery after interference in later blocks in the experimental group. This RT pattern was also reflected in the speed–accuracy trade-off as captured by inverse efficiency scores (IES) but only partially by the balanced integration scores (BIS). Finally, in the SRTT the experimental group reported higher awareness of sequence repetitiveness. These findings indicate that RSVP exposure may foster subtle and predominantly implicit learning of SOC sequences.
{"title":"Implicit observational learning of second-order conditional repeated sequences presented in rapid serial visual presentation","authors":"Salvatore G. Chiarella , Luca Simione , Monia D’Angiò , Chiara Saracini , Antonino Raffone , Enrico Di Pace","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigated whether second-order conditional (SOC) sequences can be learned through observation by combining rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) with a serial reaction time task (SRTT). Sixty participants observed either repeated SOC sequences or random sequences during RSVP, then completed explicit learning tasks and an SRTT. Explicit learning tasks showed no evidence of sequence knowledge. In the SRTT, groups did not differ in RTs, but the control group accumulated more errors in later blocks. Furthermore, RTs during the first two blocks predicted performance in recovery after interference in later blocks in the experimental group. This RT pattern was also reflected in the speed–accuracy trade-off as captured by inverse efficiency scores (IES) but only partially by the balanced integration scores (BIS). Finally, in the SRTT the experimental group reported higher awareness of sequence repetitiveness. These findings indicate that RSVP exposure may foster subtle and predominantly implicit learning of SOC sequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145670743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-25DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966
John H. Mace, Emily Chow
Studies have reported that the contents of everyday involuntary autobiographical memories may at times be influenced (primed) by the contents of ongoing preoccupations. However, these studies did not manipulate (nor simulate) preoccupations experimentally, and therefore causal connections between preoccupations and the priming of involuntary memories cannot be established with their findings. The goal of the current study was to establish a causal link between preoccupations and involuntary memory production. Participants in a repetitive thinking group thought about a single topic (food) repeatedly, after which they were engaged in an involuntary memory task (the vigilance task), which contained a handful of food related cues.
The performance of repetitive thinking participants on the vigilance task was compared to the performance of control participants, who in place of the repetitive thinking task, thought about various, different topics (e.g., think about setting goals; imagine sitting in a chair). The results showed that compared to the control group, the repetitive thinking group produced more food related involuntary memories, as well as more involuntary memories overall. The results support the idea that one’s preoccupations can influence involuntary remembering, and we argue preoccupations can be a priming source for everyday involuntary memories, among other potential sources.
{"title":"Preoccupation priming: How repetitive thinking can influence our involuntary memories","authors":"John H. Mace, Emily Chow","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Studies have reported that the contents of everyday involuntary autobiographical memories may at times be influenced (primed) by the contents of ongoing preoccupations. However, these studies did not manipulate (nor simulate) preoccupations experimentally, and therefore causal connections between preoccupations and the priming of involuntary memories cannot be established with their findings. The goal of the current study was to establish a causal link between preoccupations and involuntary memory production. Participants in a repetitive thinking group thought about a single topic (food) repeatedly, after which they were engaged in an involuntary memory task (the vigilance task), which contained a handful of food related cues.</div><div>The performance of repetitive thinking participants on the vigilance task was compared to the performance of control participants, who in place of the repetitive thinking task, thought about various, different topics (e.g., <em>think about setting goals</em>; <em>imagine sitting in a chair</em>). The results showed that compared to the control group, the repetitive thinking group produced more food related involuntary memories, as well as more involuntary memories overall. The results support the idea that one’s preoccupations can influence involuntary remembering, and we argue preoccupations can be a priming source for everyday involuntary memories, among other potential sources.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103966"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-17DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103964
Jochem G. Koopmans , Sushrut Thorat , Genevieve L. Quek , Marius V. Peelen
There is debate about how many items can be represented in visual consciousness at once. Evidence against the view that visual consciousness consists of many detailed items has come from a study using the partial-report paradigm. De Gardelle et al. (2009) showed that rotated letters shown in non-cued (i.e., unattended) parts of a briefly presented letter array are sometimes illusorily perceived as upright. Presumably, the expectation that letters are generally seen upright modulated a rotated letter’s visual representation towards an upright one. The present study elaborates on this finding by comparing reports of rotated letters to two kinds of controls: letters shown upright, and letters that were not shown in the preceding stimulus. Results showed that participants were able to discriminate non-cued letters from not-shown letters, providing evidence that such letters remained available for some time after stimulus offset. This was found for letters that were shown upright but also for letters shown inverted. Upright letters were reported as upright more often than not-shown letters were, showing that information about letter orientation was preserved. Inverted letters were also reported as upright but, importantly, not more so than not-shown letters were. This replicates the earlier finding that inverted letters can be reported as upright but shows that such errors might be attributable to non-perceptual stages of processing. Post-perceptual biases influencing reports of visual representations might present a new ground to distinguish between phenomenally conscious contents and reports thereof.
{"title":"Disentangling perceptual from non-perceptual expectation biases in short-term memory","authors":"Jochem G. Koopmans , Sushrut Thorat , Genevieve L. Quek , Marius V. Peelen","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103964","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103964","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There is debate about how many items can be represented in visual consciousness at once. Evidence against the view that visual consciousness consists of many detailed items has come from a study using the partial-report paradigm. <span><span>De Gardelle et al. (2009)</span></span> showed that rotated letters shown in non-cued (i.e., unattended) parts of a briefly presented letter array are sometimes illusorily perceived as upright. Presumably, the expectation that letters are generally seen upright modulated a rotated letter’s visual representation towards an upright one. The present study elaborates on this finding by comparing reports of rotated letters to two kinds of controls: letters shown upright, and letters that were not shown in the preceding stimulus. Results showed that participants were able to discriminate non-cued letters from not-shown letters, providing evidence that such letters remained available for some time after stimulus offset. This was found for letters that were shown upright but also for letters shown inverted. Upright letters were reported as upright more often than not-shown letters were, showing that information about letter orientation was preserved. Inverted letters were also reported as upright but, importantly, not more so than not-shown letters were. This replicates the earlier finding that inverted letters can be reported as upright but shows that such errors might be attributable to non-perceptual stages of processing. Post-perceptual biases influencing reports of visual representations might present a new ground to distinguish between phenomenally conscious contents and reports thereof.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103964"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145551499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-14DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103963
Jari K. Hietanen , Samuli Linnunsalo , Dennis Küster
Humans’ tendency to attribute mental states to robots positively correlates with the increasingly human-like appearance of the robots. As eyes have been suggested to be “the windows to the soul”, in the present study we investigated whether the presence or absence of facial features appearing as eyes in humanoid robots affects how perceivers attribute mental capacities of agency and experience to robots. We created images of highly realistic humanoid robots with full bodies and showed these robots either with the eyes or without the eyes. In Experiment 1, attribution of agency and experience was measured with self-evaluation questionnaires, whereas in Experiment 2, we used the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Results from both explicit and implicit measurements showed that humans attribute higher levels of agency and experience to humanoid robots with eyes (i.e. eyelike facial features) compared to robots without eyes. The results have great practical relevance to humanoid robot technology as the presence or absence of eyes in humanoid robots could have a fundamental effect on human-robot interaction.
{"title":"The impact of eyes on attributions of agency and experience in humanoid robots","authors":"Jari K. Hietanen , Samuli Linnunsalo , Dennis Küster","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103963","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103963","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Humans’ tendency to attribute mental states to robots positively correlates with the increasingly human-like appearance of the robots. As eyes have been suggested to be “the windows to the soul”, in the present study we investigated whether the presence or absence of facial features appearing as eyes in humanoid robots affects how perceivers attribute mental capacities of agency and experience to robots. We created images of highly realistic humanoid robots with full bodies and showed these robots either with the eyes or without the eyes. In Experiment 1, attribution of agency and experience was measured with self-evaluation questionnaires, whereas in Experiment 2, we used the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Results from both explicit and implicit measurements showed that humans attribute higher levels of agency and experience to humanoid robots with eyes (i.e. eyelike facial features) compared to robots without eyes. The results have great practical relevance to humanoid robot technology as the presence or absence of eyes in humanoid robots could have a fundamental effect on human-robot interaction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103963"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145529161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-12DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103962
Anh H. Le, Thomas Burke, Andrew P. Bayliss
A “sense of agency” is the feeling that one is the cause of events in the world. The presence of others has been shown to create a diffusion of responsibility and thus reduce individuals’ explicit ratings of control. This notion has recently been conceptualised as “interfered agency”. The current study investigated both explicit and implicit measures of agency in an interfered agency paradigm. In two online experiments, we showed that when being induced to feel that they were working with an artificial virtual agent who could potentially act in a shared task, participants felt less control i.e., explicit measure. We also found greater temporal binding (an implicit measure) implying a stronger sense of agency; that is, the opposite pattern of results compared with the explicit measure. Across the two experiments conducted online, we demonstrated that these effects were due to the implied ability for the partner to act and not an effect of social presence per se. We propose that explicit measures of agency reflect the conscious attribution of responsibility, while implicit measures reflect the strength of the representation of the causal links between action and effect. These data reinforce recent theoretical developments in our understanding of the sense of agency and social agency when working with an artificial partner.
{"title":"Working with an Online Artificial Partner Enhances Implicit and Reduces Explicit Sense of Agency","authors":"Anh H. Le, Thomas Burke, Andrew P. Bayliss","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103962","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A “sense of agency” is the feeling that one is the cause of events in the world. The presence of others has been shown to create a diffusion of responsibility and thus reduce individuals’ explicit ratings of control. This notion has recently been conceptualised as “interfered agency”. The current study investigated both explicit and implicit measures of agency in an <em>interfered agency paradigm</em>. In two online experiments, we showed that when being induced to feel that they were working with an artificial virtual agent who could potentially act in a shared task, participants felt less control i.e., explicit measure. We also found greater temporal binding (an implicit measure) implying a stronger sense of agency; that is, the opposite pattern of results compared with the explicit measure. Across the two experiments conducted online, we demonstrated that these effects were due to the implied ability for the partner to act and not an effect of social presence per se. We propose that explicit measures of agency reflect the conscious attribution of responsibility, while implicit measures reflect the strength of the representation of the causal links between action and effect. These data reinforce recent theoretical developments in our understanding of the sense of agency and social agency when working with an artificial partner.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103962"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145514991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-10DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103959
Kyle Napierkowski, Emily Cook
Dreams offer insight into how individual differences shape conscious experience in the absence of external input or task demands. This study examines whether synesthesia is linked to distinct patterns in dream content, suggesting underlying differences in cognitive architecture. Leveraging the statistical power of large-scale, naturalistic data, we analyzed 2,337 dream reports from Reddit, comparing 1,169 reports from self-identified synesthetes with 1,168 matched controls. Semantic embedding models and logistic regression achieved modest classification performance, indicating group-level differences in language use. Topic modeling revealed four themes—digital, interpersonal regret, diverse worlds, and violent conflict—that were significantly more prevalent in synesthete dreams. These results suggest that trait-level cognitive organization, as expressed in synesthetic perception, extends across states of consciousness and shapes the thematic content of dreams. The findings support theoretical accounts of dreaming as continuous with waking cognition and demonstrate how stable neurocognitive traits manifest in unstructured, self-generated thought.
{"title":"Synesthesia is associated with distinctive patterns in dream content","authors":"Kyle Napierkowski, Emily Cook","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103959","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103959","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dreams offer insight into how individual differences shape conscious experience in the absence of external input or task demands. This study examines whether synesthesia is linked to distinct patterns in dream content, suggesting underlying differences in cognitive architecture. Leveraging the statistical power of large-scale, naturalistic data, we analyzed 2,337 dream reports from Reddit, comparing 1,169 reports from self-identified synesthetes with 1,168 matched controls. Semantic embedding models and logistic regression achieved modest classification performance, indicating group-level differences in language use. Topic modeling revealed four themes—digital, interpersonal regret, diverse worlds, and violent conflict—that were significantly more prevalent in synesthete dreams. These results suggest that trait-level cognitive organization, as expressed in synesthetic perception, extends across states of consciousness and shapes the thematic content of dreams. The findings support theoretical accounts of dreaming as continuous with waking cognition and demonstrate how stable neurocognitive traits manifest in unstructured, self-generated thought.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103959"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145497308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The human brain constructs a boundary between self and world by distinguishing self-generated sensory events from external ones. For events that are self-initiated, the brain attenuates its response, what is known as the sensory suppression effect. This effect is regarded as a proxy of the sense of agency, i.e., our feeling of being subjective agents controlling our actions and ensuing events in the world. In deep meditative states, where the self-world boundary blurs, phenomenological reports indicate a reduced or absent sense of agency, accompanied by neural oscillatory changes. However, definitive neural markers of agency have not been identified in these states. In our preregistered study, we engaged 46 experienced meditators in a button-pressing task during Magnetoencephalography (MEG) monitoring to assess how meditation-induced self-boundary dissolution affects sensory suppression. Participants’ self-reports indicated partial attainment of deep meditative states during the task. At the overall group level, dissolution states did not significantly modulate sensory suppression. However, individual variations showed a positive correlation between the depth of meditation and sensory suppression magnitude. This suggests that variation in the induced states might have obscured group-level effects. Our findings highlight the complex interplay between meditation depth, agency suspension, intention awareness, and sensory suppression.
{"title":"Action without agent, but with awareness? meditation and the modulation of agency induced sensory suppression","authors":"Yoav Schweitzer , Aviva Berkovich-Ohana , Yair Dor-Ziderman , Ohad Nave , Stephen Fulder , Fynn-Mathis Trautwein","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103960","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103960","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The human brain constructs a boundary between self and world by distinguishing self-generated sensory events from external ones. For events that are self-initiated, the brain attenuates its response, what is known as the sensory suppression effect. This effect is regarded as a proxy of the sense of agency, i.e., our feeling of being subjective agents controlling our actions and ensuing events in the world. In deep meditative states, where the self-world boundary blurs, phenomenological reports indicate a reduced or absent sense of agency, accompanied by neural oscillatory changes. However, definitive neural markers of agency have not been identified in these states. In our preregistered study, we engaged 46 experienced meditators in a button-pressing task during Magnetoencephalography (MEG) monitoring to assess how meditation-induced self-boundary dissolution affects sensory suppression. Participants’ self-reports indicated partial attainment of deep meditative states during the task. At the overall group level, dissolution states did not significantly modulate sensory suppression. However, individual variations showed a positive correlation between the depth of meditation and sensory suppression magnitude. This suggests that variation in the induced states might have obscured group-level effects. Our findings highlight the complex interplay between meditation depth, agency suspension, intention awareness, and sensory suppression.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103960"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145475709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hypnotic suggestions can modulate unintentional emotional processing. However, the specific contributions of hypnotic induction and suggestion — two central components of the hypnotic procedure — remain unclear. The present study aims to disentangle the effects of hypnotic induction and emotional numbing suggestion on the modulation of attentional bias in two experiments. In Experiment 1, high suggestible individuals (N = 34) performed an online emotional Stroop task in a two-by-two within-subject experimental design in which we crossed hypnotic induction and suggestion. Results show that both the emotional numbing suggestion — whether delivered within or outside the hypnotic context — and the relaxation-based hypnotic induction led to equivalent modulation of attentional bias. Experiment 2 tested the potential confounding effects of demand characteristics and of session repetition on the modulation of attentional bias in low suggestible individuals (N = 38). Results from this second experiment show no significant modulation of attentional bias across the four experimental sessions in this group. Our findings suggest that relaxation-based hypnotic induction and emotional numbing suggestion contribute to the modulation of attentional bias in high suggestible individuals. The results are discussed in line with socio-cognitive perspectives of the hypnotic induction, acting as a relaxation suggestion supporting emotional numbing effects.
{"title":"Modulation of attentional bias by hypnosis: Disentangling the effect of induction and suggestion","authors":"Jeremy Brunel , Stéphanie Mathey , Mathieu Landry , Sandrine Delord","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103948","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103948","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Hypnotic suggestions can modulate unintentional emotional processing. However, the specific contributions of hypnotic induction and suggestion — two central components of the hypnotic procedure — remain unclear. The present study aims to disentangle the effects of hypnotic induction and emotional numbing suggestion on the modulation of attentional bias in two experiments. In Experiment 1, high suggestible individuals (N = 34) performed an online emotional Stroop task in a two-by-two within-subject experimental design in which we crossed hypnotic induction and suggestion. Results show that both the emotional numbing suggestion — whether delivered within or outside the hypnotic context — and the relaxation-based hypnotic induction led to equivalent modulation of attentional bias. Experiment 2 tested the potential confounding effects of demand characteristics and of session repetition on the modulation of attentional bias in low suggestible individuals (N = 38). Results from this second experiment show no significant modulation of attentional bias across the four experimental sessions in this group. Our findings suggest that relaxation-based hypnotic induction and emotional numbing suggestion contribute to the modulation of attentional bias in high suggestible individuals. The results are discussed in line with socio-cognitive perspectives of the hypnotic induction, acting as a relaxation suggestion supporting emotional numbing effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 103948"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145395017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103947
Moo-Rung Loo, Shih-kuen Cheng
Dream lucidity, the ability to recognize and reflect on one’s dream state, has been linked to heightened memory monitoring. Although individuals with high trait lucidity often rate imagined and perceived events as similarly vivid, they nonetheless perform better in distinguishing memory sources. This study examined whether this advantage reflects greater subjective specificity, the retrieval of more distinct representational details, supported by recollection. Forty-one participants completed a source memory task involving object names that were either imagined or paired with images. During a later recognition test with EEG recording, participants judged each item’s prior occurrence and its source. Trait lucidity was assessed via a multi-day self-report inventory and lucid dream frequency. Participants with higher trait lucidity tended to show greater source memory accuracy, especially for externally perceived items. Event-related potential (ERP) and time–frequency analyses indicated stronger left parietal old/new effects for imagined items, and greater frontal gamma-band power for perceived items. Both effects were positively correlated with trait lucidity (p < 0.05) and source accuracy (p < 0.05). Theta-band activity also predicted source accuracy for both item types. These findings may suggest that high-lucidity individuals engage recollection and familiarity processes to enhance subjective specificity, leading to more precise discrimination between imagined and perceived experiences.
{"title":"The roles of recollection and familiarity in the positive association between dream lucidity and reality monitoring: Evidence from ERPs and EEG","authors":"Moo-Rung Loo, Shih-kuen Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103947","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103947","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dream lucidity, the ability to recognize and reflect on one’s dream state, has been linked to heightened memory monitoring. Although individuals with high trait lucidity often rate imagined and perceived events as similarly vivid, they nonetheless perform better in distinguishing memory sources. This study examined whether this advantage reflects greater subjective specificity, the retrieval of more distinct representational details, supported by recollection. Forty-one participants completed a source memory task involving object names that were either imagined or paired with images. During a later recognition test with EEG recording, participants judged each item’s prior occurrence and its source. Trait lucidity was assessed via a multi-day self-report inventory and lucid dream frequency. Participants with higher trait lucidity tended to show greater source memory accuracy, especially for externally perceived items. Event-related potential (ERP) and time–frequency analyses indicated stronger left parietal old/new effects for imagined items, and greater frontal gamma-band power for perceived items. Both effects were positively correlated with trait lucidity (p < 0.05) and source accuracy (p < 0.05). Theta-band activity also predicted source accuracy for both item types. These findings may suggest that high-lucidity individuals engage recollection and familiarity processes to enhance subjective specificity, leading to more precise discrimination between imagined and perceived experiences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 103947"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145410440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103957
Hong He , Binqian Leng , Jinghong Shi , Xinyue Zhang , Ting Li , Xuemin Zhang
Previous research has reported inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and tendencies for future-oriented mind wandering. To address this, the present study incorporated self-relevant elements into probes to further specify self-relevant, future-oriented (self-future) mind wandering, aiming to clarify its relationship with WMC and explore the functional connectivity mediating this association. Ninety-four participants completed the sustained attention to response task (SART) with thought probes, the operation span (OSPAN) task, and the reading span (RSPAN) task. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) data were also collected. The findings demonstrated a significant positive association between WMC and self-future mind wandering. Additionally, functional connectivity between the left lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and the left lateral premotor cortex (LPMC) was positively associated with both WMC and self-future mind wandering. Further analyses revealed that LPFC–LPMC connectivity statistically mediated the relationship between WMC and self-future mind wandering. Conversely, self-future mind wandering also mediated the association between WMC and LPFC–LPMC connectivity. These findings are consistent with the context regulation hypothesis and provide insight into the underlying mechanisms. Specifically, LPFC-LPMC connectivity may link to the integration of motor sequence predictions and anticipated speech and nonverbal communication, whereas the reverse mediation suggests that self-future mind wandering may contribute to shaping neural connectivity associated with executive control.
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