Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103978
Aglaé Navarre , André Didierjean , Pauline Genin , Cyril Thomas
Decision-making research has shown that subtle environmental cues, such as numerical anchors or even a gesture, can shape behaviour without conscious awareness. The present study (N = 128) examined whether simple gestures, incidentally suggesting high versus low positions on a virtual vertical scale, could bias numerical estimates in a manner similar to the anchoring effect. Results revealed that high-value gestures led participants to give significantly higher estimates than low-value gestures. Strikingly, most participants reported no awareness of this influence. These findings are discussed within the framework of selective accessibility theory.
{"title":"Anchoring in motion: How gestures shape numerical estimates","authors":"Aglaé Navarre , André Didierjean , Pauline Genin , Cyril Thomas","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103978","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103978","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Decision-making research has shown that subtle environmental cues, such as numerical anchors or even a gesture, can shape behaviour without conscious awareness. The present study (N = 128) examined whether simple gestures, incidentally suggesting high versus low positions on a virtual vertical scale, could bias numerical estimates in a manner similar to the anchoring effect. Results revealed that high-value gestures led participants to give significantly higher estimates than low-value gestures. Strikingly, most participants reported no awareness of this influence. These findings are discussed within the framework of selective accessibility theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 103978"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145808340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-15DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103977
Andreas Krabbe , Pilleriin Sikka , Jussi Jylkkä
Psychedelic substances and meditation can elicit personally meaningful experiences that support well-being, yet their relative and combined contributions remain unclear. Meditation typically produces gradual improvements through sustained practice, whereas psychedelics may induce acute shifts. To examine these dynamics, we re-analysed data from two cross-sectional online surveys using multiple regression models. In Study 1 (N = 679), we assessed associations of cumulative psychedelic use and meditation practice with well-being, ill-being, and psychological flexibility. When examined separately, both practices were associated with greater well-being and flexibility. However, when considered jointly, the associations for psychedelics were reduced or became nonsignificant, whereas meditation remained consistently associated with the outcomes. Weak evidence also emerged for a potential synergy effect via an interaction between the two practices. In Study 2 (N = 137), we examined perceived well-being changes following a personally meaningful experience facilitated by psychedelics alone, meditation alone, or both combined. Participants in the combined and meditation groups reported significantly greater improvements compared with the psychedelic-only group, although all groups showed positive change on average. Together, these findings suggest that meditation may enhance the benefits of psychedelic experiences and that meditation practice can confound associations between psychedelic use and well-being. More broadly, they highlight the importance of considering both practices together when evaluating their contributions to mental health outcomes.
{"title":"The interplay of psychedelic use and meditation in shaping psychological well-being","authors":"Andreas Krabbe , Pilleriin Sikka , Jussi Jylkkä","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103977","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103977","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Psychedelic substances and meditation can elicit personally meaningful experiences that support well-being, yet their relative and combined contributions remain unclear. Meditation typically produces gradual improvements through sustained practice, whereas psychedelics may induce acute shifts. To examine these dynamics, we re-analysed data from two cross-sectional online surveys using multiple regression models. In Study 1 (N = 679), we assessed associations of cumulative psychedelic use and meditation practice with well-being, ill-being, and psychological flexibility. When examined separately, both practices were associated with greater well-being and flexibility. However, when considered jointly, the associations for psychedelics were reduced or became nonsignificant, whereas meditation remained consistently associated with the outcomes. Weak evidence also emerged for a potential synergy effect via an interaction between the two practices. In Study 2 (N = 137), we examined perceived well-being changes following a personally meaningful experience facilitated by psychedelics alone, meditation alone, or both combined. Participants in the combined and meditation groups reported significantly greater improvements compared with the psychedelic-only group, although all groups showed positive change on average. Together, these findings suggest that meditation may enhance the benefits of psychedelic experiences and that meditation practice can confound associations between psychedelic use and well-being. More broadly, they highlight the importance of considering both practices together when evaluating their contributions to mental health outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103977"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145769951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-15DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103976
Gull Zareen , Céline Souchay , Krystian Barzykowski , Chris J.A. Moulin
Spontaneous metacognitive experiences, such as déjà vu, are notoriously difficult to study under controlled laboratory conditions. Barzykowski and Moulin (2023) proposed that experimental procedures known to elicit involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) may also trigger a broader range of spontaneous cognitive phenomena, including déjà vu, tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs), jamais vu, error detection, and zoning out. In this study, 96 participants completed a low-demand vigilance task commonly used to elicit IAMs. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar whenever they experienced a spontaneous thought or metacognitive state, and subsequently categorized and rated each experience. IAMs were the most frequently reported, followed by déjà vu, with other metacognitive phenomena (jamais vu, TOTs, error detection, and zoning out) occurring less frequently. These findings demonstrate that when attentional demands are low, a diverse range of spontaneous experiences naturally emerges. We discuss both the theoretical relevance and methodological utility of this paradigm for capturing the phenomenology of spontaneous cognition in the lab, and highlight promising directions for future research.
{"title":"Spontaneous metacognitive experiences and involuntary memories in the laboratory","authors":"Gull Zareen , Céline Souchay , Krystian Barzykowski , Chris J.A. Moulin","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103976","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103976","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Spontaneous metacognitive experiences, such as déjà vu, are notoriously difficult to study under controlled laboratory conditions. <span><span>Barzykowski and Moulin (2023)</span></span> proposed that experimental procedures known to elicit involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) may also trigger a broader range of spontaneous cognitive phenomena, including déjà vu, tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs), jamais vu, error detection, and zoning out. In this study, 96 participants completed a low-demand vigilance task commonly used to elicit IAMs. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar whenever they experienced a spontaneous thought or metacognitive state, and subsequently categorized and rated each experience. IAMs were the most frequently reported, followed by déjà vu, with other metacognitive phenomena (jamais vu, TOTs, error detection, and zoning out) occurring less frequently. These findings demonstrate that when attentional demands are low, a diverse range of spontaneous experiences naturally emerges. We discuss both the theoretical relevance and methodological utility of this paradigm for capturing the phenomenology of spontaneous cognition in the lab, and highlight promising directions for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103976"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145769979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103975
Mingyuan Wang, Yunfei Guo
The successful execution of time-based prospective memory (TBPM) tasks demands self-initiation attentional resources. Mindfulness meditation can enhance attention, which may promote TBPM performance. This study investigates whether mindfulness meditation can facilitate TBPM via the improvement of attentional resources and whether such facilitation is modulated by time-monitoring conditions. The experiment, conducted with 95 participants, used a 2 (group: mindfulness meditation group, control group) × 2 (monitoring condition: limited, sufficient) between-subjects design. All 95 participants in this study were undergraduate students who volunteered. The results showed that, in the restricted condition, the TBPM accuracy of the mindfulness meditation group was better than that of the control group, indicating that mindfulness meditation indeed improves TBPM performance, but the facilitation of TBPM by mindfulness meditation is particularly susceptible to the influence of time-monitoring conditions.
{"title":"Mindfulness meditation can improve time-based prospective memory performance in restricted monitoring situation","authors":"Mingyuan Wang, Yunfei Guo","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103975","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103975","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The successful execution of time-based prospective memory (TBPM) tasks demands self-initiation attentional resources. Mindfulness meditation can enhance attention, which may promote TBPM performance. This study investigates whether mindfulness meditation can facilitate TBPM via the improvement of attentional resources and whether such facilitation is modulated by time-monitoring conditions. The experiment, conducted with 95 participants, used a 2 (group: mindfulness meditation group, control group) × 2 (monitoring condition: limited, sufficient) between-subjects design. All 95 participants in this study were undergraduate students who volunteered. The results showed that, in the restricted condition, the TBPM accuracy of the mindfulness meditation group was better than that of the control group, indicating that mindfulness meditation indeed improves TBPM performance, but the facilitation of TBPM by mindfulness meditation is particularly susceptible to the influence of time-monitoring conditions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103975"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145745666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-09DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103965
Manuela Kirberg , Jennifer Windt
Spontaneous thoughts and experiences, including mind wandering and dreaming, make up a significant proportion of our conscious mental lives. An influential proposal posits that dreaming and mind wandering exist on a continuum of spontaneous thought, in which dreaming is intensified compared to mind wandering. Yet the precise relationship between dreaming and mind wandering is only beginning to be investigated. Unusual features of dream experience, referred to as bizarreness, are at the heart of theoretical debates about the relationship between dreaming and waking experiences. Traditionally, bizarreness was considered as a distinctive and pervasive feature of dreaming that was absent in waking consciousness, whereas recently, it has been proposed as a dimension along which dreaming is an intensified form of waking mind wandering. Our study is the first to apply an in-depth bizarreness analysis to dreaming and mind wandering reports from the same group of participants within a naturalistic setting. Our results, based on 379 spontaneous reports, suggest that both dreaming and waking mind wandering, have unique bizarreness profiles, involving similarities as well as distinctive differences. Bizarreness is kaleidoscopic in that the comparison between dreaming and mind wandering changes with the precise rating and level of measure (bizarreness type, subtypes, contents) used. This means that dreams cannot, straightforwardly, be described as intensified compared to waking mind wandering on measures of bizarreness, and a more nuanced account, alongside more specific measures, is needed. We propose that our findings can inform and guide future work not just on bizarreness in dreams and mind wandering, but also more broadly on the relationship between conscious experiences in sleep and wakefulness.
{"title":"The kaleidoscope of bizarreness: The analysis of first-person-reports shows the relationship between dreaming and mind wandering to be complex","authors":"Manuela Kirberg , Jennifer Windt","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103965","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103965","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Spontaneous thoughts and experiences, including mind wandering and dreaming, make up a significant proportion of our conscious mental lives. An influential proposal posits that dreaming and mind wandering exist on a continuum of spontaneous thought, in which dreaming is intensified compared to mind wandering. Yet the precise relationship between dreaming and mind wandering is only beginning to be investigated. Unusual features of dream experience, referred to as bizarreness, are at the heart of theoretical debates about the relationship between dreaming and waking experiences. Traditionally, bizarreness was considered as a distinctive and pervasive feature of dreaming that was absent in waking consciousness, whereas recently, it has been proposed as a dimension along which dreaming is an intensified form of waking mind wandering. Our study is the first to apply an in-depth bizarreness analysis to dreaming and mind wandering reports from the same group of participants within a naturalistic setting. Our results, based on 379 spontaneous reports, suggest that both dreaming and waking mind wandering, have unique bizarreness profiles, involving similarities as well as distinctive differences. Bizarreness is kaleidoscopic in that the comparison between dreaming and mind wandering changes with the precise rating and level of measure (bizarreness type, subtypes, contents) used. This means that dreams cannot, straightforwardly, be described as intensified compared to waking mind wandering on measures of bizarreness, and a more nuanced account, alongside more specific measures, is needed. We propose that our findings can inform and guide future work not just on bizarreness in dreams and mind wandering, but also more broadly on the relationship between conscious experiences in sleep and wakefulness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103965"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145727175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hallucinations (HAs), the perceptual experiences that occur without external stimuli, are classically associated with psychiatric disorders, but also occur in the general population. Involuntary mental imagery (IMI), the spontaneous occurrence of visual or auditory mental content, shares several features with HAs. The continuum hypothesis suggests that these phenomena exist on a spectrum ranging from benign to clinically significant experiences. However, the precise boundaries of these phenomena remain under-explored. This pre-registered cross-sectional study focusing on the experiential continuum, involved 1,951 French-speaking adults who completed an online questionnaire assessing the frequency and characteristics of their HAs and IMI experiences. These experiences could include hearing music or voices, or seeing shadows. Participants rated ten phenomenologically-informed dimensions, including vividness, emotional valence, controllability, distress, agency, and perceived location. Associations were tested using Spearman correlations and Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction. IMIs were significantly more frequent than HAs and were rated as more vivid, emotionally positive, and self-generated. In contrast, HAs were associated with greater distress and external attribution. Moderate to strong correlations between HAs and IMIs on most dimensions support the hypothesis of a shared experiential continuum. However, the fact that confidence and agency cannot be fully separated from controllability raises questions about cognitive models of self-monitoring and metacognition. These findings provide empirical evidence for both convergence and divergence in the phenomenological profiles of HAs and IMIs. Refining these distinctions could enhance theoretical models of hallucinatory experiences and facilitate the early identification and prevention of distressing internal phenomena in individuals at risk.
{"title":"Comparing the characteristics of hallucinations and mental imagery: a large cross-sectional study in the general population","authors":"Guillaume Pepin , Hélène Lœvenbruck , Alan Chauvin , Camille Jacquet , Jean-Baptiste Eichenlaub , Catherine Bortolon","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103974","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103974","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Hallucinations (HAs), the perceptual experiences that occur without external stimuli, are classically associated with psychiatric disorders, but also occur in the general population. Involuntary mental imagery (IMI), the spontaneous occurrence of visual or auditory mental content, shares several features with HAs. The continuum hypothesis suggests that these phenomena exist on a spectrum ranging from benign to clinically significant experiences. However, the precise boundaries of these phenomena remain under-explored. This pre-registered cross-sectional study focusing on the experiential continuum, involved 1,951 French-speaking adults who completed an online questionnaire assessing the frequency and characteristics of their HAs and IMI experiences. These experiences could include hearing music or voices, or seeing shadows. Participants rated ten phenomenologically-informed dimensions, including vividness, emotional valence, controllability, distress, agency, and perceived location. Associations were tested using Spearman correlations and Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction. IMIs were significantly more frequent than HAs and were rated as more vivid, emotionally positive, and self-generated. In contrast, HAs were associated with greater distress and external attribution. Moderate to strong correlations between HAs and IMIs on most dimensions support the hypothesis of a shared experiential continuum. However, the fact that confidence and agency cannot be fully separated from controllability raises questions about cognitive models of self-monitoring and metacognition. These findings provide empirical evidence for both convergence and divergence in the phenomenological profiles of HAs and IMIs. Refining these distinctions could enhance theoretical models of hallucinatory experiences and facilitate the early identification and prevention of distressing internal phenomena in individuals at risk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103974"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145693549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-05DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103961
Matthias Forstmann , Pascal Burgmer
We developed and validated the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS), a 24-item measure assessing lay beliefs about eight distinct philosophical positions on the mind–body relationship. Given the limitations of existing measures and the theoretical diversity of mind–body positions, our goal was to develop a comprehensive yet practical scale that could capture the full range of philosophical stances without reducing them to overly simplified dimensions. Across four studies with 1074 participants, we established the NOMS’s psychometric properties and nomological network. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we identified an eight-factor structure representing belief in substance dualism, interactionism, panpsychism, idealism, reductive physicalism, non-reductive physicalism, mystical monism, and neutral monism. Participants most strongly endorsed interactionism, non-reductive physicalism, and mystical monism, while showing the least support for idealism. The scale demonstrated good model fit and strong evidence of measurement invariance across samples. Convergent validity was established through correlations with existing mind–body belief measures. Construct validity was supported by theoretically consistent relationships with religiosity, free will beliefs, cognitive style, personality traits, and afterlife beliefs. The NOMS represents an extension of previous measures of mind–body relations, capturing the multifaceted nature of these beliefs while maintaining sufficient brevity for practical research applications.
{"title":"The nature of mind scale (NOMS): Validation of an eight-dimensional scale assessing beliefs about the relationship between mind and matter","authors":"Matthias Forstmann , Pascal Burgmer","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103961","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103961","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We developed and validated the Nature of Mind Scale (NOMS), a 24-item measure assessing lay beliefs about eight distinct philosophical positions on the mind–body relationship. Given the limitations of existing measures and the theoretical diversity of mind–body positions, our goal was to develop a comprehensive yet practical scale that could capture the full range of philosophical stances without reducing them to overly simplified dimensions. Across four studies with 1074 participants, we established the NOMS’s psychometric properties and nomological network. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we identified an eight-factor structure representing belief in substance dualism, interactionism, panpsychism, idealism, reductive physicalism, non-reductive physicalism, mystical monism, and neutral monism. Participants most strongly endorsed interactionism, non-reductive physicalism, and mystical monism, while showing the least support for idealism. The scale demonstrated good model fit and strong evidence of measurement invariance across samples. Convergent validity was established through correlations with existing mind–body belief measures. Construct validity was supported by theoretically consistent relationships with religiosity, free will beliefs, cognitive style, personality traits, and afterlife beliefs. The NOMS represents an extension of previous measures of mind–body relations, capturing the multifaceted nature of these beliefs while maintaining sufficient brevity for practical research applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103961"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145693625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967
Salvatore G. Chiarella , Luca Simione , Monia D’Angiò , Chiara Saracini , Antonino Raffone , Enrico Di Pace
This study investigated whether second-order conditional (SOC) sequences can be learned through observation by combining rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) with a serial reaction time task (SRTT). Sixty participants observed either repeated SOC sequences or random sequences during RSVP, then completed explicit learning tasks and an SRTT. Explicit learning tasks showed no evidence of sequence knowledge. In the SRTT, groups did not differ in RTs, but the control group accumulated more errors in later blocks. Furthermore, RTs during the first two blocks predicted performance in recovery after interference in later blocks in the experimental group. This RT pattern was also reflected in the speed–accuracy trade-off as captured by inverse efficiency scores (IES) but only partially by the balanced integration scores (BIS). Finally, in the SRTT the experimental group reported higher awareness of sequence repetitiveness. These findings indicate that RSVP exposure may foster subtle and predominantly implicit learning of SOC sequences.
{"title":"Implicit observational learning of second-order conditional repeated sequences presented in rapid serial visual presentation","authors":"Salvatore G. Chiarella , Luca Simione , Monia D’Angiò , Chiara Saracini , Antonino Raffone , Enrico Di Pace","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigated whether second-order conditional (SOC) sequences can be learned through observation by combining rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) with a serial reaction time task (SRTT). Sixty participants observed either repeated SOC sequences or random sequences during RSVP, then completed explicit learning tasks and an SRTT. Explicit learning tasks showed no evidence of sequence knowledge. In the SRTT, groups did not differ in RTs, but the control group accumulated more errors in later blocks. Furthermore, RTs during the first two blocks predicted performance in recovery after interference in later blocks in the experimental group. This RT pattern was also reflected in the speed–accuracy trade-off as captured by inverse efficiency scores (IES) but only partially by the balanced integration scores (BIS). Finally, in the SRTT the experimental group reported higher awareness of sequence repetitiveness. These findings indicate that RSVP exposure may foster subtle and predominantly implicit learning of SOC sequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145670743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-25DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966
John H. Mace, Emily Chow
Studies have reported that the contents of everyday involuntary autobiographical memories may at times be influenced (primed) by the contents of ongoing preoccupations. However, these studies did not manipulate (nor simulate) preoccupations experimentally, and therefore causal connections between preoccupations and the priming of involuntary memories cannot be established with their findings. The goal of the current study was to establish a causal link between preoccupations and involuntary memory production. Participants in a repetitive thinking group thought about a single topic (food) repeatedly, after which they were engaged in an involuntary memory task (the vigilance task), which contained a handful of food related cues.
The performance of repetitive thinking participants on the vigilance task was compared to the performance of control participants, who in place of the repetitive thinking task, thought about various, different topics (e.g., think about setting goals; imagine sitting in a chair). The results showed that compared to the control group, the repetitive thinking group produced more food related involuntary memories, as well as more involuntary memories overall. The results support the idea that one’s preoccupations can influence involuntary remembering, and we argue preoccupations can be a priming source for everyday involuntary memories, among other potential sources.
{"title":"Preoccupation priming: How repetitive thinking can influence our involuntary memories","authors":"John H. Mace, Emily Chow","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2025.103966","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Studies have reported that the contents of everyday involuntary autobiographical memories may at times be influenced (primed) by the contents of ongoing preoccupations. However, these studies did not manipulate (nor simulate) preoccupations experimentally, and therefore causal connections between preoccupations and the priming of involuntary memories cannot be established with their findings. The goal of the current study was to establish a causal link between preoccupations and involuntary memory production. Participants in a repetitive thinking group thought about a single topic (food) repeatedly, after which they were engaged in an involuntary memory task (the vigilance task), which contained a handful of food related cues.</div><div>The performance of repetitive thinking participants on the vigilance task was compared to the performance of control participants, who in place of the repetitive thinking task, thought about various, different topics (e.g., <em>think about setting goals</em>; <em>imagine sitting in a chair</em>). The results showed that compared to the control group, the repetitive thinking group produced more food related involuntary memories, as well as more involuntary memories overall. The results support the idea that one’s preoccupations can influence involuntary remembering, and we argue preoccupations can be a priming source for everyday involuntary memories, among other potential sources.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":"137 ","pages":"Article 103966"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-17DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103964
Jochem G. Koopmans , Sushrut Thorat , Genevieve L. Quek , Marius V. Peelen
There is debate about how many items can be represented in visual consciousness at once. Evidence against the view that visual consciousness consists of many detailed items has come from a study using the partial-report paradigm. De Gardelle et al. (2009) showed that rotated letters shown in non-cued (i.e., unattended) parts of a briefly presented letter array are sometimes illusorily perceived as upright. Presumably, the expectation that letters are generally seen upright modulated a rotated letter’s visual representation towards an upright one. The present study elaborates on this finding by comparing reports of rotated letters to two kinds of controls: letters shown upright, and letters that were not shown in the preceding stimulus. Results showed that participants were able to discriminate non-cued letters from not-shown letters, providing evidence that such letters remained available for some time after stimulus offset. This was found for letters that were shown upright but also for letters shown inverted. Upright letters were reported as upright more often than not-shown letters were, showing that information about letter orientation was preserved. Inverted letters were also reported as upright but, importantly, not more so than not-shown letters were. This replicates the earlier finding that inverted letters can be reported as upright but shows that such errors might be attributable to non-perceptual stages of processing. Post-perceptual biases influencing reports of visual representations might present a new ground to distinguish between phenomenally conscious contents and reports thereof.
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