Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267777
Haonan Dong
States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.
{"title":"The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations","authors":"Haonan Dong","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267777","url":null,"abstract":"States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267839
Nicholas J. Lotito, Renanah Miles Joyce
This article explores the phenomenon of high levels of public trust in the military across the Global South. We extend arguments from the US civil-military relations literature to a broader context and generate testable hypotheses to explain trust in the armed forces driven by the military’s performance and professionalism, and the public’s patriotism and partisanship. Using public opinion survey data from 73 countries between 1995 and 2017, we find broad but nuanced support for the hypotheses. Many determinants of public trust in the military, theorized in the US context, generalize globally: battlefield performance, resources, national pride, and right-wing partisanship all increase trust in the military, while coups and civil wars decrease it. By contrast, the effect of conscription is opposite to that in the United States, with national service providing a trust boost. The study highlights the implications of public trust for civil-military relations, political stability, and governance.
{"title":"In the Army We Trust: Public Confidence in Global South Militaries","authors":"Nicholas J. Lotito, Renanah Miles Joyce","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267839","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the phenomenon of high levels of public trust in the military across the Global South. We extend arguments from the US civil-military relations literature to a broader context and generate testable hypotheses to explain trust in the armed forces driven by the military’s performance and professionalism, and the public’s patriotism and partisanship. Using public opinion survey data from 73 countries between 1995 and 2017, we find broad but nuanced support for the hypotheses. Many determinants of public trust in the military, theorized in the US context, generalize globally: battlefield performance, resources, national pride, and right-wing partisanship all increase trust in the military, while coups and civil wars decrease it. By contrast, the effect of conscription is opposite to that in the United States, with national service providing a trust boost. The study highlights the implications of public trust for civil-military relations, political stability, and governance.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269980
Konstantin Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov
How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.
{"title":"Returning Veterans’ Attitudes Toward Democracy: Evidence From a Survey of Ukraine’s ATO Veterans","authors":"Konstantin Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269980","url":null,"abstract":"How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141980707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269952
Emily Myers
Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.
{"title":"Insurgent Conscription for Capacity and Control: State Violence and Coerced Recruitment in Civil War","authors":"Emily Myers","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269952","url":null,"abstract":"Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141974309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268533
Shelley X. Liu
Following regime change, how does wartime victimization shape political attitudes and participation in the long run? I argue that it increases post-war political vigilance: greater sensitivity to illiberal politics and poor governance, but with dampened effects on participation under authoritarianism due to greater fear of harm. I examine Protected Villages (PVs) in the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972–1979). PVs, a Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, was a large-scale and violent resettlement program that intensified politics’ role in civilian lives. I map PV-affected areas within pre-war and current-day administrative divisions, and estimate a difference-in-discontinuities regression to identify PVs’ long-run effects. PV-affected areas report greater sensitivity to the country’s illiberal politics and are more critical of poor government performance today. Contrary to existing literature however, I find no evidence of increased political participation and pro-social behavior in the long run, nor hardened support for the ruling party—whom these areas had once supported during war.
{"title":"From Politicization to Vigilance: The Post-war Legacies of Wartime Victimization","authors":"Shelley X. Liu","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268533","url":null,"abstract":"Following regime change, how does wartime victimization shape political attitudes and participation in the long run? I argue that it increases post-war political vigilance: greater sensitivity to illiberal politics and poor governance, but with dampened effects on participation under authoritarianism due to greater fear of harm. I examine Protected Villages (PVs) in the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972–1979). PVs, a Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, was a large-scale and violent resettlement program that intensified politics’ role in civilian lives. I map PV-affected areas within pre-war and current-day administrative divisions, and estimate a difference-in-discontinuities regression to identify PVs’ long-run effects. PV-affected areas report greater sensitivity to the country’s illiberal politics and are more critical of poor government performance today. Contrary to existing literature however, I find no evidence of increased political participation and pro-social behavior in the long run, nor hardened support for the ruling party—whom these areas had once supported during war.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141895464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267209
Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.
{"title":"From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections","authors":"Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267209","url":null,"abstract":"Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267216
Robert A. Pape, Keven G. Ruby, Kyle D. Larson, Kentaro Nakamura
Why do some individuals with military experience support the insurrection of January 6? With US military veterans playing a central role in the assault on the US Capitol, answering this question is of immediate scholarly and policy concern. To better understand the impact of military service, we conducted the first nationally representative survey of support for pro-Trump anti-democratic violence (“insurrectionist sentiments”) among US military veterans and a demographically matched sample of non-veterans. Our analysis finds veterans nearly twice as likely to hold high insurrectionist sentiments than non-veterans, and that military service increases support for restoring Trump to the presidency by force by 15 percent. Further, we find the effect veterancy is not fully explained by veterans being more likely to hold pro-Trump or conspiracy beliefs but is associated with negative military and post-service-related experiences. These findings are robust to significant unobserved confounding. We conclude with implications for future research on political violence and the role of the military in American democracy.
{"title":"Understanding the Impact of Military Service on Support for Insurrection in the United States","authors":"Robert A. Pape, Keven G. Ruby, Kyle D. Larson, Kentaro Nakamura","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267216","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some individuals with military experience support the insurrection of January 6? With US military veterans playing a central role in the assault on the US Capitol, answering this question is of immediate scholarly and policy concern. To better understand the impact of military service, we conducted the first nationally representative survey of support for pro-Trump anti-democratic violence (“insurrectionist sentiments”) among US military veterans and a demographically matched sample of non-veterans. Our analysis finds veterans nearly twice as likely to hold high insurrectionist sentiments than non-veterans, and that military service increases support for restoring Trump to the presidency by force by 15 percent. Further, we find the effect veterancy is not fully explained by veterans being more likely to hold pro-Trump or conspiracy beliefs but is associated with negative military and post-service-related experiences. These findings are robust to significant unobserved confounding. We conclude with implications for future research on political violence and the role of the military in American democracy.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-22DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267191
Vincenzo Bove, Jessica Di Salvatore, Leandro Elia
We investigate the impact of UN peacekeeping on voluntary returns and negative attitudes towards displaced persons. We posit that peacekeeping missions can have beneficial effects by improving security and alleviating the socio-economic burden imposed by new arrivals on receiving communities. Focusing on the critical case of South Sudan, we combine information on peacekeepers' subnational deployment with high frequency survey data. Our findings suggest that the presence of peacekeepers is more likely to attract individuals seeking to return home, compared to those relocating for other reasons. In addition, peacekeepers positively influence the perceptions of receiving communities regarding the impact of IDPs and refugees on economic opportunities, security conditions, and social cohesion.
{"title":"What it Takes to Return: UN Peacekeeping and the Safe Return of Displaced People","authors":"Vincenzo Bove, Jessica Di Salvatore, Leandro Elia","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267191","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of UN peacekeeping on voluntary returns and negative attitudes towards displaced persons. We posit that peacekeeping missions can have beneficial effects by improving security and alleviating the socio-economic burden imposed by new arrivals on receiving communities. Focusing on the critical case of South Sudan, we combine information on peacekeepers' subnational deployment with high frequency survey data. Our findings suggest that the presence of peacekeepers is more likely to attract individuals seeking to return home, compared to those relocating for other reasons. In addition, peacekeepers positively influence the perceptions of receiving communities regarding the impact of IDPs and refugees on economic opportunities, security conditions, and social cohesion.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141755272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.1177/00220027241261660
Ji Yeon Hong, Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, Christopher Paik
How can one increase openness towards conflict refugees in states that have experienced conflict? While highlighting shared war experience may reduce hostility toward refugees by enabling people to better understand the plight of refugees, it may also foment higher levels of out-group antipathy due to heightened feelings of threat. To answer this question, we leverage the context of South Korea, a country that technically remains at war with North Korea for more than 70 years and yet attracts asylum seekers as an advanced economy. This provides a hard case to shift residents' refugee acceptance, as challenges associated with accepting refugees are amplified with ongoing threat concerns. Employing an original survey, we find that when the parallels between the human costs of the Korean War and current conflicts are underscored, refugee acceptance increases, particularly among those whose families were displaced by the war. Moreover, this strategy is more effective than perspective-taking exercises.
{"title":"Can a Sense of Shared War Experience Increase Refugee Acceptance?","authors":"Ji Yeon Hong, Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, Christopher Paik","doi":"10.1177/00220027241261660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241261660","url":null,"abstract":"How can one increase openness towards conflict refugees in states that have experienced conflict? While highlighting shared war experience may reduce hostility toward refugees by enabling people to better understand the plight of refugees, it may also foment higher levels of out-group antipathy due to heightened feelings of threat. To answer this question, we leverage the context of South Korea, a country that technically remains at war with North Korea for more than 70 years and yet attracts asylum seekers as an advanced economy. This provides a hard case to shift residents' refugee acceptance, as challenges associated with accepting refugees are amplified with ongoing threat concerns. Employing an original survey, we find that when the parallels between the human costs of the Korean War and current conflicts are underscored, refugee acceptance increases, particularly among those whose families were displaced by the war. Moreover, this strategy is more effective than perspective-taking exercises.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141736855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027241253532
Juan F. Tellez, Laia Balcells
Millions of people around the world are internally displaced. And yet – compared to other forms of wartime victimization – scholars know relatively little about the long-run consequences of displacement for victims. This gap in the literature is problematic since displacement is distinct from other forms of victimization, and because IDPs face unique challenges in post-conflict transitions. This study contributes to the literature on the effects of displacement in three ways. First, the study brings to bear a unique sample of households in Colombia that is largely homogeneous along key confounders – mostly poor, rural, and conflict-afflicted – yet varies in their exposure to displacement. Next, the study draws on a rich set of covariates and outcomes to provide plausible estimates on the long-run effects of internal displacement. The study finds that a decade or more after displacement, victims experience substantial negative welfare deficits yet exhibit higher levels of social cohesion than their counterparts. Finally, combining a prediction framework with key stakeholder interviews, the study explores variation in outcomes among victims, particularly why some can return home and seek reparations while others are not. The results reveal a wide assortment of consequences resulting from displacement and should help inform policy-making bearing on support for internally displaced people.
{"title":"Social Cohesion, Economic Security, and Forced displacement in the Long-run: Evidence From Rural Colombia","authors":"Juan F. Tellez, Laia Balcells","doi":"10.1177/00220027241253532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241253532","url":null,"abstract":"Millions of people around the world are internally displaced. And yet – compared to other forms of wartime victimization – scholars know relatively little about the long-run consequences of displacement for victims. This gap in the literature is problematic since displacement is distinct from other forms of victimization, and because IDPs face unique challenges in post-conflict transitions. This study contributes to the literature on the effects of displacement in three ways. First, the study brings to bear a unique sample of households in Colombia that is largely homogeneous along key confounders – mostly poor, rural, and conflict-afflicted – yet varies in their exposure to displacement. Next, the study draws on a rich set of covariates and outcomes to provide plausible estimates on the long-run effects of internal displacement. The study finds that a decade or more after displacement, victims experience substantial negative welfare deficits yet exhibit higher levels of social cohesion than their counterparts. Finally, combining a prediction framework with key stakeholder interviews, the study explores variation in outcomes among victims, particularly why some can return home and seek reparations while others are not. The results reveal a wide assortment of consequences resulting from displacement and should help inform policy-making bearing on support for internally displaced people.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141177195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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