Pub Date : 2024-02-19DOI: 10.1177/00220027241232964
Miriam Barnum, Christopher J. Fariss, Jonathan N. Markowitz, Gaea Morales
Military spending data measure key international relations concepts such as balancing, arms races, the distribution of power, and the severity of military burdens. Unfortunately, missing values and measurement error threaten the validity of existing findings. Addressing this challenge, we introduce the Global Military Spending Dataset (GMSD). GMSD collates new and existing expenditure variables from a comprehensive collection of sources, expands data coverage, and employs a latent variable model to estimate missing values and quantify measurement error. We validate the data and present new findings. First, correlations between economic surplus and military spending are currently higher than at any point in the last two-hundred years. Second, updating DiGiuseppe and Poast’s (2018) analysis, we find larger substantive effects. Specifically, we find that the (negative) effect of a democratic ally on military spending is three times larger, and the (positive) effect of an increase in GDP is five times larger than previously estimated.
{"title":"Measuring Arms: Introducing the Global Military Spending Dataset","authors":"Miriam Barnum, Christopher J. Fariss, Jonathan N. Markowitz, Gaea Morales","doi":"10.1177/00220027241232964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241232964","url":null,"abstract":"Military spending data measure key international relations concepts such as balancing, arms races, the distribution of power, and the severity of military burdens. Unfortunately, missing values and measurement error threaten the validity of existing findings. Addressing this challenge, we introduce the Global Military Spending Dataset (GMSD). GMSD collates new and existing expenditure variables from a comprehensive collection of sources, expands data coverage, and employs a latent variable model to estimate missing values and quantify measurement error. We validate the data and present new findings. First, correlations between economic surplus and military spending are currently higher than at any point in the last two-hundred years. Second, updating DiGiuseppe and Poast’s (2018) analysis, we find larger substantive effects. Specifically, we find that the (negative) effect of a democratic ally on military spending is three times larger, and the (positive) effect of an increase in GDP is five times larger than previously estimated.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2023-03-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027231159830
Sara Hellmüller, Xiang-Yun Rosalind Tan, Corinne Bara
UN peace missions are constantly evolving. Yet, we lack a detailed understanding of the shifting types and objectives of peace missions beyond broad categorizations that distinguish for instance between observer, traditional, multidimensional, and peace enforcement missions. To address this gap, we present the UN Peace Mission Mandates (UNPMM) dataset. With global coverage, 30 years of data between 1991 and 2020, a broad scope that includes peacekeeping and political missions, and information on 41 mandate tasks, the UNPMM represents one of the most detailed and up-to-date datasets on UN peace mission mandates. We use it to highlight how mission types, objectives, and specific tasks have changed since the end of the Cold War, and to analyze what factors influence the kind of missions the UN is willing to authorize. The descriptive statistics and empirical analysis reaffirm the need for a greater disaggregation of data on UN peace missions and their mandates.
{"title":"What is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset.","authors":"Sara Hellmüller, Xiang-Yun Rosalind Tan, Corinne Bara","doi":"10.1177/00220027231159830","DOIUrl":"10.1177/00220027231159830","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>UN peace missions are constantly evolving. Yet, we lack a detailed understanding of the shifting types and objectives of peace missions beyond broad categorizations that distinguish for instance between observer, traditional, multidimensional, and peace enforcement missions. To address this gap, we present the UN Peace Mission Mandates (UNPMM) dataset. With global coverage, 30 years of data between 1991 and 2020, a broad scope that includes peacekeeping and political missions, and information on 41 mandate tasks, the UNPMM represents one of the most detailed and up-to-date datasets on UN peace mission mandates. We use it to highlight how mission types, objectives, and specific tasks have changed since the end of the Cold War, and to analyze what factors influence the kind of missions the UN is willing to authorize. The descriptive statistics and empirical analysis reaffirm the need for a greater disaggregation of data on UN peace missions and their mandates.</p>","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10663125/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47757261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-25DOI: 10.1177/00220027231224022
G. Kiyani, Jeffrey Pickering, Mohsin Raza, Clayton Webb
Civil-military relations and terrorism are both extensively studied subjects. Their relationship has, however, yet to be examined. We maintain that public conflict between the civilian and the military leadership in a country and declining civil control over the armed forces may often precipitate a rise in domestic terror events. Civil-military conflict and reduced civilian control can lead to agency slack by the armed forces and ineffective counterterror policies. These phenomena are also associated with policies that exclude groups in society and generate grievances, leading some to turn to terror. In zero inflated negative binomial analyses of domestic terror events and two distinct indicators of civil-military tension, we find support for our contention. Terror incidents increase both when civil-military conflict rises and when civilian control decreases. Our results add to understanding of both the domestic consequences of civil-military tension and the types of influences that impact domestic terror.
{"title":"Civil-Military Relations and Domestic Terrorism","authors":"G. Kiyani, Jeffrey Pickering, Mohsin Raza, Clayton Webb","doi":"10.1177/00220027231224022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231224022","url":null,"abstract":"Civil-military relations and terrorism are both extensively studied subjects. Their relationship has, however, yet to be examined. We maintain that public conflict between the civilian and the military leadership in a country and declining civil control over the armed forces may often precipitate a rise in domestic terror events. Civil-military conflict and reduced civilian control can lead to agency slack by the armed forces and ineffective counterterror policies. These phenomena are also associated with policies that exclude groups in society and generate grievances, leading some to turn to terror. In zero inflated negative binomial analyses of domestic terror events and two distinct indicators of civil-military tension, we find support for our contention. Terror incidents increase both when civil-military conflict rises and when civilian control decreases. Our results add to understanding of both the domestic consequences of civil-military tension and the types of influences that impact domestic terror.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139158688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-21DOI: 10.1177/00220027231222004
Mirko Reul, Ravi Bhavnani
“Loyalty trials” are common to a range of conflict settings, with consequences that range from harassment to imprisonment, torture, or death. Yet, they have received little if any attention as a general phenomenon in studies of state repression, civil war, or rebel governance, which focus on particular behaviors that authorities use to put people on trial, such as dissent, defection, and resistance. Using a computational model and data on the German Democratic Republic and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, we focus on the dynamics of “loyalty trials” held to identify enemy collaborators—the interaction between expectations, perceptions, and behavior. We use our framework to explore the conditions under which trials result in widespread defection, as in the German Democratic Republic, or in conformity as illustrated by our study of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The polarizing nature of loyalty trials and the propensity to over- or under-identify threats to political order have notable implications for democratic and non-democratic societies alike.
{"title":"How Loyalty Trials Shape Allegiance to Political Order","authors":"Mirko Reul, Ravi Bhavnani","doi":"10.1177/00220027231222004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231222004","url":null,"abstract":"“Loyalty trials” are common to a range of conflict settings, with consequences that range from harassment to imprisonment, torture, or death. Yet, they have received little if any attention as a general phenomenon in studies of state repression, civil war, or rebel governance, which focus on particular behaviors that authorities use to put people on trial, such as dissent, defection, and resistance. Using a computational model and data on the German Democratic Republic and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, we focus on the dynamics of “loyalty trials” held to identify enemy collaborators—the interaction between expectations, perceptions, and behavior. We use our framework to explore the conditions under which trials result in widespread defection, as in the German Democratic Republic, or in conformity as illustrated by our study of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The polarizing nature of loyalty trials and the propensity to over- or under-identify threats to political order have notable implications for democratic and non-democratic societies alike.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138953546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027231221536
Thomas Hegghammer, Neil Ketchley
How should we measure terrorism? Political scientists typically use executed attacks as the dependent variable and test covariates to identify factors that produce terrorism. But attacks are an imperfect measure of terrorist activity because of ‘plot attrition’ — the tendency for plots to derail due to police intervention or other factors. We examine whether the exclusion of foiled plots from event datasets constitutes a measurement problem in terrorism studies. Building on recent advances in plot data collection, we study the correlation between plots and attacks and conduct an original analysis of jihadism in Europe. Our results suggest common research designs predicting terrorism can produce different results depending on whether incidents are operationalized as plots or attacks. Adjusting for state security capability does not solve the problem. Despite its limitations, plot data is a more complete measure of terrorist activity that should be incorporated, when available, in quantitative studies of terrorism.
{"title":"Plots, Attacks, and the Measurement of Terrorism","authors":"Thomas Hegghammer, Neil Ketchley","doi":"10.1177/00220027231221536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231221536","url":null,"abstract":"How should we measure terrorism? Political scientists typically use executed attacks as the dependent variable and test covariates to identify factors that produce terrorism. But attacks are an imperfect measure of terrorist activity because of ‘plot attrition’ — the tendency for plots to derail due to police intervention or other factors. We examine whether the exclusion of foiled plots from event datasets constitutes a measurement problem in terrorism studies. Building on recent advances in plot data collection, we study the correlation between plots and attacks and conduct an original analysis of jihadism in Europe. Our results suggest common research designs predicting terrorism can produce different results depending on whether incidents are operationalized as plots or attacks. Adjusting for state security capability does not solve the problem. Despite its limitations, plot data is a more complete measure of terrorist activity that should be incorporated, when available, in quantitative studies of terrorism.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138956925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027231220006
Stephen Bagwell, Matthew Rains, Meridith LaVelle
Why do states and their agents abuse citizens? Traditional explanations focus on contentious politics, the presence of institutions, and international pressures. Despite this, accounts dissecting the state and its agents in this context of abuse remain largely theoretic in nature. This article offers a breakthrough for within-the-state accounts of human rights abuses by focusing on state leaders and their relationship to broader government institutions and function. We posit that personalist leaders have fundamentally different relationship with institutions that foster human rights respect, arguing that leaders relying on their own merits and qualities are less likely to either activate or manipulate institutions of accountability for human rights abuses. Using data from 1991 to 2019, we show that the presence of leaders legitimizing themselves within personalist framing can worsen human rights conditions.
{"title":"Of One’s Own Making: Leadership Legitimation Strategy and Human Rights","authors":"Stephen Bagwell, Matthew Rains, Meridith LaVelle","doi":"10.1177/00220027231220006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231220006","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states and their agents abuse citizens? Traditional explanations focus on contentious politics, the presence of institutions, and international pressures. Despite this, accounts dissecting the state and its agents in this context of abuse remain largely theoretic in nature. This article offers a breakthrough for within-the-state accounts of human rights abuses by focusing on state leaders and their relationship to broader government institutions and function. We posit that personalist leaders have fundamentally different relationship with institutions that foster human rights respect, arguing that leaders relying on their own merits and qualities are less likely to either activate or manipulate institutions of accountability for human rights abuses. Using data from 1991 to 2019, we show that the presence of leaders legitimizing themselves within personalist framing can worsen human rights conditions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138995716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027231220021
Richard A.I. Johnson, Aaron P. Shreve
Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.
{"title":"Boys and Their Toys: Status Inconsistency in Non-democratic Regimes and the Import of Major Weapon Systems","authors":"Richard A.I. Johnson, Aaron P. Shreve","doi":"10.1177/00220027231220021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231220021","url":null,"abstract":"Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138976779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-09DOI: 10.1177/00220027231219985
Feyaad Allie
How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion’s rituals are at odds with another (e.g., sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) help explain the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. These types of holidays can be used by riot entrepreneurs to incite violence or can independently raise an individual’s willingness to engage in violence. I provide support for this argument by analyzing data on Hindu-Muslim riots across 100 years. I investigate the mechanisms through additional analysis and examining historical and present-day cases of riots that occurred on holidays. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that elites use to incite religious violence.
{"title":"Sacred Time and Religious Violence: Evidence from Hindu-Muslim Riots in India","authors":"Feyaad Allie","doi":"10.1177/00220027231219985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231219985","url":null,"abstract":"How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion’s rituals are at odds with another (e.g., sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) help explain the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. These types of holidays can be used by riot entrepreneurs to incite violence or can independently raise an individual’s willingness to engage in violence. I provide support for this argument by analyzing data on Hindu-Muslim riots across 100 years. I investigate the mechanisms through additional analysis and examining historical and present-day cases of riots that occurred on holidays. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that elites use to incite religious violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138585207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027231218633
Johan Brosché, Ralph Sundberg
Although conflict issues – the stated goals of actors engaged in conflict – hold a privileged position in many theoretical explanations of the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of civil war, global issue data are scarce beyond datasets that focus on specific thematic areas. This article aims to bring issues into the forefront of civil war scholarship by presenting the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset (CID). This global yearly dataset contains 14,832 conflict issues – divided, at the most disaggregated level, into 120 sub-categories – raised by armed non-state groups involved in intrastate armed conflict in 1989-2017. By bringing issues back in, the UCDP CID provides opportunities to reevaluate several central questions about the onset, duration, intensity, and resolution of civil war.
{"title":"What They Are Fighting For – Introducing the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset","authors":"Johan Brosché, Ralph Sundberg","doi":"10.1177/00220027231218633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231218633","url":null,"abstract":"Although conflict issues – the stated goals of actors engaged in conflict – hold a privileged position in many theoretical explanations of the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of civil war, global issue data are scarce beyond datasets that focus on specific thematic areas. This article aims to bring issues into the forefront of civil war scholarship by presenting the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset (CID). This global yearly dataset contains 14,832 conflict issues – divided, at the most disaggregated level, into 120 sub-categories – raised by armed non-state groups involved in intrastate armed conflict in 1989-2017. By bringing issues back in, the UCDP CID provides opportunities to reevaluate several central questions about the onset, duration, intensity, and resolution of civil war.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139234526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-22DOI: 10.1177/00220027231214748
B. Early, Timothy M. Peterson
Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.
{"title":"The Enforcement of U.S. Economic Sanctions and Global De-risking Behavior","authors":"B. Early, Timothy M. Peterson","doi":"10.1177/00220027231214748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231214748","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139248851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：