Pub Date : 2025-08-11DOI: 10.1177/00220027251359720
Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath
Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.
{"title":"Alliance Formation in Regional Space: Shifting the Battlefront Between Competing Hegemonial Powers","authors":"Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath","doi":"10.1177/00220027251359720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251359720","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"175 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027251362147
M. Patrick Hulme, Erik Gartzke, Alex Braithwaite, Lauren Gilbert
Students of international relations continue to debate the role of power as a cause of conflict. In particular, there exists no consensus about whether power parity or preponderance is more likely to trigger militarized disputes. Generally overlooked in this and related controversies is the question of where power is actually exercised. It is widely accepted that a state’s power declines with distance. This “loss-of-strength gradient” in turn must imply that the relative power of any combination of countries is not a constant, but rather varies spatially at different locations around the globe. Implementing this simple but as yet undocumented insight to the debate over the effects of relative power, we show that “proximate power”—i.e., power adjusted for the loss-of-strength imposed by distance—reveals a close relationship between parity and conflict onset. The finding conforms with the expectations of modern bargaining approaches to war, which emphasize the role uncertainty plays in precipitating military contests.
{"title":"Power, Parity, and Place: Why Forgetting the Loss-of-Strength Gradient Misses the Relative Power Relationship","authors":"M. Patrick Hulme, Erik Gartzke, Alex Braithwaite, Lauren Gilbert","doi":"10.1177/00220027251362147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251362147","url":null,"abstract":"Students of international relations continue to debate the role of power as a cause of conflict. In particular, there exists no consensus about whether power parity or preponderance is more likely to trigger militarized disputes. Generally overlooked in this and related controversies is the question of <jats:italic>where</jats:italic> power is actually exercised. It is widely accepted that a state’s power declines with distance. This “loss-of-strength gradient” in turn must imply that the relative power of any combination of countries is not a constant, but rather varies spatially at different locations around the globe. Implementing this simple but as yet undocumented insight to the debate over the effects of relative power, we show that “proximate power”—i.e., power adjusted for the loss-of-strength imposed by distance—reveals a close relationship between parity and conflict onset. The finding conforms with the expectations of modern bargaining approaches to war, which emphasize the role uncertainty plays in precipitating military contests.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144766173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027251362832
Christian Oswald
Conflict forecasting has seen two recent developments: a shift to predicting continuous variables and a debate about the value of structural and procedural variables. This paper contributes to these efforts and proposes the category of salience variables in the form of Google Trends and Wikipedia data. Internet searches can be precursors of conflict intensity as a result of for example an increase in protests, violent behavior, or public announcements. Data are readily and openly available, updated in real time, and provide global coverage which makes it ideal for near-real time forecasting. Prediction targets are the number of security-related incidents and battle-related, non-state, and civilian casualties. I demonstrate the value of salience variables using various out-of-sample windows and performance metrics on the country- and province-month level. I find evidence that salience variables have considerable predictive power, outperform other commonly used variables, and are thus a valuable addition to the conflict forecasting toolkit.
{"title":"I Still Haven’t Found what I’m Looking for: Predicting Security-Related Incidents and Conflict Fatalities with Google Trends and Wikipedia Data","authors":"Christian Oswald","doi":"10.1177/00220027251362832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251362832","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict forecasting has seen two recent developments: a shift to predicting continuous variables and a debate about the value of <jats:italic>structural</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>procedural</jats:italic> variables. This paper contributes to these efforts and proposes the category of <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables in the form of Google Trends and Wikipedia data. Internet searches can be precursors of conflict intensity as a result of for example an increase in protests, violent behavior, or public announcements. Data are readily and openly available, updated in real time, and provide global coverage which makes it ideal for near-real time forecasting. Prediction targets are the number of security-related incidents and battle-related, non-state, and civilian casualties. I demonstrate the value of <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables using various out-of-sample windows and performance metrics on the country- and province-month level. I find evidence that <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables have considerable predictive power, outperform other commonly used variables, and are thus a valuable addition to the conflict forecasting toolkit.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"285 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027251361656
Syeda ShahBano Ijaz
Does U.S. military assistance affect domestic patterns of political violence? Military aid can improve the recipient country’s military capacity, but also create an incentive for prolonging conflict to secure future assistance. This moral hazard can manifest by geographically displacing conflict away from military strongholds while demonstrating an aggregate country-wide decrease in levels of violence. I analyze U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and find that aid can decrease the aggregate level of political violence in the short run. However, this short-run decrease is accompanied by a displacement of violence away from military headquarters. The discontinuity created by the sudden withdrawal of U.S. military assistance after Pakistan’s nuclear program, followed by its resumption post-9/11, lends causal purchase to my results, as does the historical location of military headquarters that were established by colonizers and have persisted in post-independence Pakistan.
{"title":"Moral Hazard or State Capacity? U.S. Military Assistance and Political Violence in Pakistan","authors":"Syeda ShahBano Ijaz","doi":"10.1177/00220027251361656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251361656","url":null,"abstract":"Does U.S. military assistance affect domestic patterns of political violence? Military aid can improve the recipient country’s military capacity, but also create an incentive for prolonging conflict to secure future assistance. This moral hazard can manifest by geographically displacing conflict away from military strongholds while demonstrating an aggregate country-wide decrease in levels of violence. I analyze U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and find that aid can decrease the aggregate level of political violence in the short run. However, this short-run decrease is accompanied by a displacement of violence away from military headquarters. The discontinuity created by the sudden withdrawal of U.S. military assistance after Pakistan’s nuclear program, followed by its resumption post-9/11, lends causal purchase to my results, as does the historical location of military headquarters that were established by colonizers and have persisted in post-independence Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"214 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144715294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027251359626
Todd Sandler, Justin George
The main purpose of this retrospective of the economic theory of alliances is to characterize three basic paradigms: purely public deterrence, spatial connectivity, and joint products. For each model, allies’ military expenditure (ME) responds differently to the aggregate ME of the other allies, known as defense spillins, thereby resulting in diverse burden sharing, allocative implications, membership composition, and institutional recommendations. The underlying theoretical models determine reduced-form equations for allies’ interdependent defense demands. We examine how changes in strategic doctrines, weapons technology, enemy threats, and membership composition affected NATO burden sharing and its allocative efficiency over time. Generally, changes that increase the share of excludable defense benefits possess a better prognosis for burden sharing and allocative efficiency. Principles and insights from the economic theory of alliances are related to defense demands at the operational level and for non-NATO alliances.
{"title":"Economic Theory of Alliances: Sixty Years Later","authors":"Todd Sandler, Justin George","doi":"10.1177/00220027251359626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251359626","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this retrospective of the economic theory of alliances is to characterize three basic paradigms: purely public deterrence, spatial connectivity, and joint products. For each model, allies’ military expenditure (ME) responds differently to the aggregate ME of the other allies, known as defense spillins, thereby resulting in diverse burden sharing, allocative implications, membership composition, and institutional recommendations. The underlying theoretical models determine reduced-form equations for allies’ interdependent defense demands. We examine how changes in strategic doctrines, weapons technology, enemy threats, and membership composition affected NATO burden sharing and its allocative efficiency over time. Generally, changes that increase the share of excludable defense benefits possess a better prognosis for burden sharing and allocative efficiency. Principles and insights from the economic theory of alliances are related to defense demands at the operational level and for non-NATO alliances.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144629814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027251355747
Miriam J. Anderson, Brian R. Urlacher, Liam Swiss
The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda has achieved global prominence. Yet, women’s participation in peace negotiations remains rare, and little is known about which factors facilitate their inclusion. Quantitative scholarship has been hampered by incomplete data, drawing almost exclusively from prominent negotiations where agreements were reached. To address this shortcoming, we introduce a novel dataset comprising 267 dyadic negotiations between 1975 and 2020. We find two distinct pathways to women’s representation. First, representation in government and rebel negotiating delegations is linked to higher rates of women’s participation in rebel group leadership, higher levels of feminist mobilization, and the presence of a WPS National Action Plan. Second, representation in civil society delegations correlates to international mediation and higher levels of women’s representation in parliament. These findings suggest that the norm of women’s inclusion continues to face barriers that can be overcome by a particular combination of actors and domestic commitments.
{"title":"Institutionalized but Under Implemented: Factors Affecting Women’s Inclusion in Peace Negotiations Between 1975 and 2020","authors":"Miriam J. Anderson, Brian R. Urlacher, Liam Swiss","doi":"10.1177/00220027251355747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251355747","url":null,"abstract":"The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda has achieved global prominence. Yet, women’s participation in peace negotiations remains rare, and little is known about which factors facilitate their inclusion. Quantitative scholarship has been hampered by incomplete data, drawing almost exclusively from prominent negotiations where agreements were reached. To address this shortcoming, we introduce a novel dataset comprising 267 dyadic negotiations between 1975 and 2020. We find two distinct pathways to women’s representation. First, representation in government and rebel negotiating delegations is linked to higher rates of women’s participation in rebel group leadership, higher levels of feminist mobilization, and the presence of a WPS National Action Plan. Second, representation in civil society delegations correlates to international mediation and higher levels of women’s representation in parliament. These findings suggest that the norm of women’s inclusion continues to face barriers that can be overcome by a particular combination of actors and domestic commitments.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144640045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-03DOI: 10.1177/00220027251353078
Dawn Brancati
Early studies of the effects of COVID-19 lockdowns on nonstate actor violence presented competing hypotheses and yielded mixed results. Economic arguments primarily claimed that lockdowns would increase violence and implied that their effects would last after lockdowns were lifted. Conversely, logistical arguments claimed that lockdowns would decrease violence and that their effects would endure only as long as lockdowns were in place. Using new, more precise, and comprehensive data and measures, this study directly compares these competing arguments globally. The study finds that both economic and logistical factors affected violence and that violence was lower overall in the short and long term. Logistical factors potentially outweighed economic ones due to the inability of nonstate actors to capitalize fully on the negative economic effects of lockdowns when population movements were disrupted. The study also disaggregates the economic effects of lockdowns, finding the strongest support for state capacity-based arguments.
{"title":"The Long Shadow of COVID-19 Lockdowns on Nonstate Actor Violence","authors":"Dawn Brancati","doi":"10.1177/00220027251353078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251353078","url":null,"abstract":"Early studies of the effects of COVID-19 lockdowns on nonstate actor violence presented competing hypotheses and yielded mixed results. Economic arguments primarily claimed that lockdowns would increase violence and implied that their effects would last after lockdowns were lifted. Conversely, logistical arguments claimed that lockdowns would decrease violence and that their effects would endure only as long as lockdowns were in place. Using new, more precise, and comprehensive data and measures, this study directly compares these competing arguments globally. The study finds that both economic and logistical factors affected violence and that violence was lower overall in the short and long term. Logistical factors potentially outweighed economic ones due to the inability of nonstate actors to capitalize fully on the negative economic effects of lockdowns when population movements were disrupted. The study also disaggregates the economic effects of lockdowns, finding the strongest support for state capacity-based arguments.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144565720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-03DOI: 10.1177/00220027251356643
Vinh Pham, Linjia Jiang, Yoshio Kamijo
Fairness perceptions can significantly impact the instigation and resolution of conflicts. To examine how fairness norms shape agreements, we conduct an experiment, where participants first select a preferred rule between equal division, equal gain, and proportional division. When paired with another sharing the same norm, participants decide whether to adhere to the projected division or negotiate a different outcome. Experimental results reveal that participants renege on the agreement more frequently when allocations are perceived as unfair to the self: high contributors in equal division and low contributors in proportional division. Furthermore, attachment to the initial norm is sturdiest for strict equality and weakest for proportionality. Equal gain, coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution, is the most favored at both preselection and negotiation outcomes. We discuss several applications of our findings in resolving international conflicts.
{"title":"When Fairness is Unfair: Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations","authors":"Vinh Pham, Linjia Jiang, Yoshio Kamijo","doi":"10.1177/00220027251356643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251356643","url":null,"abstract":"Fairness perceptions can significantly impact the instigation and resolution of conflicts. To examine how fairness norms shape agreements, we conduct an experiment, where participants first select a preferred rule between equal division, equal gain, and proportional division. When paired with another sharing the same norm, participants decide whether to adhere to the projected division or negotiate a different outcome. Experimental results reveal that participants renege on the agreement more frequently when allocations are perceived as unfair to the self: high contributors in equal division and low contributors in proportional division. Furthermore, attachment to the initial norm is sturdiest for strict equality and weakest for proportionality. Equal gain, coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution, is the most favored at both preselection and negotiation outcomes. We discuss several applications of our findings in resolving international conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144566514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-06-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251353717
Sarah Lockwood, Philip Martin
Do elected representatives become more authoritarian when violence against politicians is made salient? Many states are beset by politician-directed violence, but we know little about the consequences of such violence for democratic politics. In this paper we use a pre-registered survey experiment to investigate whether raising the salience of violence against politicians influences authoritarian attitudes among local councillors in South Africa. We find that councillors prompted to think about politician-directed violence are significantly more likely to adopt authoritarian attitudes. We also find strong heterogeneous treatment effects by political party, with the strongest effects among opposition party members. Unlike members of the nationally dominant African National Congress (ANC), opposition councillors appear to interpret politician-directed violence as a signal of systemic corruption, leading them to prioritize re-establishing order. Our findings have important implications for understanding the effects of violence on political elites and the determinants of authoritarianism.
{"title":"Living in Fear? Political Violence and Authoritarian Attitudes Among Politicians in South Africa","authors":"Sarah Lockwood, Philip Martin","doi":"10.1177/00220027251353717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251353717","url":null,"abstract":"Do elected representatives become more authoritarian when violence against politicians is made salient? Many states are beset by politician-directed violence, but we know little about the consequences of such violence for democratic politics. In this paper we use a pre-registered survey experiment to investigate whether raising the salience of violence against politicians influences authoritarian attitudes among local councillors in South Africa. We find that councillors prompted to think about politician-directed violence are significantly more likely to adopt authoritarian attitudes. We also find strong heterogeneous treatment effects by political party, with the strongest effects among opposition party members. Unlike members of the nationally dominant African National Congress (ANC), opposition councillors appear to interpret politician-directed violence as a signal of systemic corruption, leading them to prioritize re-establishing order. Our findings have important implications for understanding the effects of violence on political elites and the determinants of authoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-06-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251355757
Jacque Gao, Marton Szabo
This article develops a new theory of how a strong target regime can (partially) deter a sender from imposing sanctions over major issues. We develop a formal theoretic framework to show that, following a sender’s sanction threat, a strong target regime can signal its strength by deliberately weakening itself through always sharing power with a domestic opposition, while a weak target regime mixes between sharing and not sharing power with the opposition. The strategy offers the sender a better assessment of a target’s strength, enabling it to adjust its sanction policy accordingly and avoid the costs of a potentially ineffective sanction over a strong target regime. As a result, a strong target regime will be sanctioned with a lower probability than a weak one.
{"title":"Signaling Strength Through Power Sharing","authors":"Jacque Gao, Marton Szabo","doi":"10.1177/00220027251355757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251355757","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a new theory of how a strong target regime can (partially) deter a sender from imposing sanctions over major issues. We develop a formal theoretic framework to show that, following a sender’s sanction threat, a strong target regime can signal its strength by deliberately weakening itself through always sharing power with a domestic opposition, while a weak target regime mixes between sharing and not sharing power with the opposition. The strategy offers the sender a better assessment of a target’s strength, enabling it to adjust its sanction policy accordingly and avoid the costs of a potentially ineffective sanction over a strong target regime. As a result, a strong target regime will be sanctioned with a lower probability than a weak one.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144513254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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