Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027231220021
Richard A.I. Johnson, Aaron P. Shreve
Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.
{"title":"Boys and Their Toys: Status Inconsistency in Non-democratic Regimes and the Import of Major Weapon Systems","authors":"Richard A.I. Johnson, Aaron P. Shreve","doi":"10.1177/00220027231220021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231220021","url":null,"abstract":"Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"97 S95","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138976779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-09DOI: 10.1177/00220027231219985
Feyaad Allie
How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion’s rituals are at odds with another (e.g., sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) help explain the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. These types of holidays can be used by riot entrepreneurs to incite violence or can independently raise an individual’s willingness to engage in violence. I provide support for this argument by analyzing data on Hindu-Muslim riots across 100 years. I investigate the mechanisms through additional analysis and examining historical and present-day cases of riots that occurred on holidays. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that elites use to incite religious violence.
{"title":"Sacred Time and Religious Violence: Evidence from Hindu-Muslim Riots in India","authors":"Feyaad Allie","doi":"10.1177/00220027231219985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231219985","url":null,"abstract":"How and when can religious times become focal points for communal violence? In the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, I argue that incompatible ritual holidays where one religion’s rituals are at odds with another (e.g., sacrificing cows or engaging in processions with idolatry) help explain the positive effect of sacred time on religious rioting. Holidays with incompatible rituals provide doctrinal differences that make riots more likely. These types of holidays can be used by riot entrepreneurs to incite violence or can independently raise an individual’s willingness to engage in violence. I provide support for this argument by analyzing data on Hindu-Muslim riots across 100 years. I investigate the mechanisms through additional analysis and examining historical and present-day cases of riots that occurred on holidays. By focusing on the content of religion, this paper demonstrates how particular religious holidays can provide the underlying conditions that elites use to incite religious violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138585207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oral submucous fibrosis (OSMF) is a chronic debilitating and a well-recognized potentially malignant condition of the oral cavity, sometimes involving oropharynx associated with trismus and burning sensation. Apart from medical management and counselling, local injection of hyaluronidase mixed with triamcinolone acetonide has been used at our centre for the last 20 years with satisfactory clinical results and without any significant side effects. The problem with the treatment was that the doses and duration of treatment has not been standardized. Therefore, in this study, authors aim to evaluate and compare the efficacy of Triamcinolone alone versus Triamcinolone acetonide plus Hyaluronidase at weekly interval and improvement in Clinical and Histopathological staging of disease after 6 weeks of treatment. This study was conducted in Department of Otorhinolaryngology & Head Neck Surgery, with a total sample of 80 participants divided into two Groups, group A received Inj. Triamcinolone acetonide and group B received Inj. Triamcinolone Acetonide and Hyaluronidase 1500 IU at weekly interval. Pre-treatment and post-treatment clinical and histopathological profile of the patients were recorded and analyzed using SPSS 16 software. According to pre-treatment status, the proportion of clinical grades I, II and III were found in proportion 12.5%, 18.8% and 15.0% respectively. No significant difference was found in proportion of various grades between the groups (p = 0.388). At post treatment, the grading was reduced with changed proportion of grades I, II and III cases as 33.8%, 41.3% and 7.5% respectively. There was no significant difference in proportion of various grades between the groups (p = 0.681). Further, the intragroup comparison showed significant improvement Pre to post in group A (p = 0.002), Group B (p < 0.001) and overall, as well (p < 0.001). The inj. Triamcinolone acetonide and Inj. Hyaluronidase showed a better improvement on post treatment histopathological grading although the difference between the two groups was not significant statistically.
{"title":"A Clinicopathological Study of OSMF to Evaluate the Response After Treatment with Intralesional Steroid Versus Intralesional Steroid Plus Hyaluronidase.","authors":"Gaurav Kumar Goldar, Hitendra Prakash Singh, Malti Kumari Maurya, Sunil Kumar, Manish Chandra, Abhishek Bahadur Singh, Veerendra Verma, Anupam Mishra","doi":"10.1007/s12070-023-03930-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12070-023-03930-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Oral submucous fibrosis (OSMF) is a chronic debilitating and a well-recognized potentially malignant condition of the oral cavity, sometimes involving oropharynx associated with trismus and burning sensation. Apart from medical management and counselling, local injection of hyaluronidase mixed with triamcinolone acetonide has been used at our centre for the last 20 years with satisfactory clinical results and without any significant side effects. The problem with the treatment was that the doses and duration of treatment has not been standardized. Therefore, in this study, authors aim to evaluate and compare the efficacy of Triamcinolone alone versus Triamcinolone acetonide plus Hyaluronidase at weekly interval and improvement in Clinical and Histopathological staging of disease after 6 weeks of treatment. This study was conducted in Department of Otorhinolaryngology & Head Neck Surgery, with a total sample of 80 participants divided into two Groups, group A received Inj. Triamcinolone acetonide and group B received Inj. Triamcinolone Acetonide and Hyaluronidase 1500 IU at weekly interval. Pre-treatment and post-treatment clinical and histopathological profile of the patients were recorded and analyzed using SPSS 16 software. According to pre-treatment status, the proportion of clinical grades I, II and III were found in proportion 12.5%, 18.8% and 15.0% respectively. No significant difference was found in proportion of various grades between the groups (p = 0.388). At post treatment, the grading was reduced with changed proportion of grades I, II and III cases as 33.8%, 41.3% and 7.5% respectively. There was no significant difference in proportion of various grades between the groups (p = 0.681). Further, the intragroup comparison showed significant improvement Pre to post in group A (p = 0.002), Group B (p < 0.001) and overall, as well (p < 0.001). The inj. Triamcinolone acetonide and Inj. Hyaluronidase showed a better improvement on post treatment histopathological grading although the difference between the two groups was not significant statistically.</p>","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"9 1","pages":"3057-3062"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10645688/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86903967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027231218633
Johan Brosché, Ralph Sundberg
Although conflict issues – the stated goals of actors engaged in conflict – hold a privileged position in many theoretical explanations of the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of civil war, global issue data are scarce beyond datasets that focus on specific thematic areas. This article aims to bring issues into the forefront of civil war scholarship by presenting the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset (CID). This global yearly dataset contains 14,832 conflict issues – divided, at the most disaggregated level, into 120 sub-categories – raised by armed non-state groups involved in intrastate armed conflict in 1989-2017. By bringing issues back in, the UCDP CID provides opportunities to reevaluate several central questions about the onset, duration, intensity, and resolution of civil war.
{"title":"What They Are Fighting For – Introducing the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset","authors":"Johan Brosché, Ralph Sundberg","doi":"10.1177/00220027231218633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231218633","url":null,"abstract":"Although conflict issues – the stated goals of actors engaged in conflict – hold a privileged position in many theoretical explanations of the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of civil war, global issue data are scarce beyond datasets that focus on specific thematic areas. This article aims to bring issues into the forefront of civil war scholarship by presenting the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset (CID). This global yearly dataset contains 14,832 conflict issues – divided, at the most disaggregated level, into 120 sub-categories – raised by armed non-state groups involved in intrastate armed conflict in 1989-2017. By bringing issues back in, the UCDP CID provides opportunities to reevaluate several central questions about the onset, duration, intensity, and resolution of civil war.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139234526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-22DOI: 10.1177/00220027231214748
B. Early, Timothy M. Peterson
Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.
{"title":"The Enforcement of U.S. Economic Sanctions and Global De-risking Behavior","authors":"B. Early, Timothy M. Peterson","doi":"10.1177/00220027231214748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231214748","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139248851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-21DOI: 10.1177/00220027231211792
J. Braithwaite, K. Cunningham
Why do governments make concessions to some rebels but not others? We argue that the origins of rebel groups influence the bargaining process, and the government’s willingness to make concessions in particular. Rebel groups inherit different resource endowments – community ties and military expertise – from pre-existing “parent” organizations. These resource endowments are visible to the government, and they provide critical information about the likely durability of the rebellion. We expect that rebel group origins facilitating these endowments are associated with the state offering concessions earlier in the conflict. Employing original data on rebel group origins, as well as information on government concessions during post-Cold War African conflicts, we find general support for our expectations, although not all types of parent organizations are equally beneficial to rebel groups when it comes to extracting concessions from the state.
{"title":"Backgrounds With Benefits? Rebel Group Origins and Concessions During Civil Wars in Africa","authors":"J. Braithwaite, K. Cunningham","doi":"10.1177/00220027231211792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231211792","url":null,"abstract":"Why do governments make concessions to some rebels but not others? We argue that the origins of rebel groups influence the bargaining process, and the government’s willingness to make concessions in particular. Rebel groups inherit different resource endowments – community ties and military expertise – from pre-existing “parent” organizations. These resource endowments are visible to the government, and they provide critical information about the likely durability of the rebellion. We expect that rebel group origins facilitating these endowments are associated with the state offering concessions earlier in the conflict. Employing original data on rebel group origins, as well as information on government concessions during post-Cold War African conflicts, we find general support for our expectations, although not all types of parent organizations are equally beneficial to rebel groups when it comes to extracting concessions from the state.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"40 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139252639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027231214716
Jonathan A. Chu, Carrie A. Lee
Does public support for armed humanitarian intervention depend on the race and religion of those it seeks to save? Social identity theory predicts that people prefer helping strangers with whom they share an identity, but norms of paternalism and cosmopolitanism could moderate such favoritism. We test these propositions via survey experiments administered to a nationally representative sample of Americans that randomized the racial and religious characteristics of foreigners in a hypothetical civil war. The data reveal that Americans, especially Christians, prefer to intervene on behalf of Christians over Muslims. Ingroup affinity rather than outgroup Islamophobia explains this effect. Meanwhile, Americans exhibit less consistent prejudice along racial lines. Finally, while scholars find paternalist norms affect attitudes toward economic assistance, we find no similar effect for military intervention. Cosmopolitan Americans, however, express less identity-based bias. We conclude that people act on their basic socio-psychological instincts, but norms could attenuate these biases.
{"title":"Race, Religion, and American Support for Humanitarian Intervention","authors":"Jonathan A. Chu, Carrie A. Lee","doi":"10.1177/00220027231214716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231214716","url":null,"abstract":"Does public support for armed humanitarian intervention depend on the race and religion of those it seeks to save? Social identity theory predicts that people prefer helping strangers with whom they share an identity, but norms of paternalism and cosmopolitanism could moderate such favoritism. We test these propositions via survey experiments administered to a nationally representative sample of Americans that randomized the racial and religious characteristics of foreigners in a hypothetical civil war. The data reveal that Americans, especially Christians, prefer to intervene on behalf of Christians over Muslims. Ingroup affinity rather than outgroup Islamophobia explains this effect. Meanwhile, Americans exhibit less consistent prejudice along racial lines. Finally, while scholars find paternalist norms affect attitudes toward economic assistance, we find no similar effect for military intervention. Cosmopolitan Americans, however, express less identity-based bias. We conclude that people act on their basic socio-psychological instincts, but norms could attenuate these biases.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134956880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/00220027231211530
Patrick Hunnicutt, Kou Gbaintor-Johnson
What explains protest mobilization in areas of limited statehood, where the government struggles to make and enforce rules? We adapt existing theory to explain protest mobilization through a comparative perspective, beginning with the proposition that informal political elites who mediate citizens’ interactions with the government in areas of limited statehood represent a crucial but understudied source of political opportunity. We specifically argue that informal political elites who are effective intermediaries between citizens and the state moderate the relationship between grievances and protest at the individual-level. Six months of fieldwork in Liberia substantiates this claim. Leveraging an original, high-frequency household panel dataset, we demonstrate how informal political elites called “community chairpeople” moderate the otherwise positive association between public service shortages and protest. Qualitative data collected through focus groups and interviews provide further evidence of how informal political elites shape protest mobilization in settings where the state is weak.
{"title":"The Missing Link: Informal Political Elites and Protest in Areas of Limited Statehood","authors":"Patrick Hunnicutt, Kou Gbaintor-Johnson","doi":"10.1177/00220027231211530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231211530","url":null,"abstract":"What explains protest mobilization in areas of limited statehood, where the government struggles to make and enforce rules? We adapt existing theory to explain protest mobilization through a comparative perspective, beginning with the proposition that informal political elites who mediate citizens’ interactions with the government in areas of limited statehood represent a crucial but understudied source of political opportunity. We specifically argue that informal political elites who are effective intermediaries between citizens and the state moderate the relationship between grievances and protest at the individual-level. Six months of fieldwork in Liberia substantiates this claim. Leveraging an original, high-frequency household panel dataset, we demonstrate how informal political elites called “community chairpeople” moderate the otherwise positive association between public service shortages and protest. Qualitative data collected through focus groups and interviews provide further evidence of how informal political elites shape protest mobilization in settings where the state is weak.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"18 13","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027231211801
Patrick Hunnicutt
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to post-conflict countries is difficult. After conflict ends, governments struggle to perfectly enforce the institutions which otherwise shield investors from political instability. Reflecting this governance problem, this article presents a new explanation linking United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations to subnational allocations of FDI in post-conflict countries. I specifically argue that deployments of UN peacekeeping police credibly signal to foreign firms where future political instability is least likely to disrupt their operations. Data from Liberia’s extractive sector support my argument. Increasing the local deployment of UN police encourages foreign firms to establish new natural resource concessions, particularly in areas where the government’s capacity to uphold the rule of law is weak.
{"title":"International Peacekeeping Encourages Foreign Direct Investment: Subnational Evidence From Liberia’s Extractive Sector","authors":"Patrick Hunnicutt","doi":"10.1177/00220027231211801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231211801","url":null,"abstract":"Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to post-conflict countries is difficult. After conflict ends, governments struggle to perfectly enforce the institutions which otherwise shield investors from political instability. Reflecting this governance problem, this article presents a new explanation linking United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations to subnational allocations of FDI in post-conflict countries. I specifically argue that deployments of UN peacekeeping police credibly signal to foreign firms where future political instability is least likely to disrupt their operations. Data from Liberia’s extractive sector support my argument. Increasing the local deployment of UN police encourages foreign firms to establish new natural resource concessions, particularly in areas where the government’s capacity to uphold the rule of law is weak.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"13 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135972917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027231206775
Edward Goldring, Austin S. Matthews
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they provide dictators in navigating outsider threats. Second, dictators benefit from purging elites who helped them seize power; the demonstrable willingness of these elites to overthrow an incumbent threatens the dictator and his ability to consolidate power. We find support for our argument from original quantitative data on 289 elites in 32 autocratic ruling institutions between 1948 and 2000. Our findings have important implications for the study of the large proportion of autocracies born of regime change coups, particularly topics on survival and state violence.
{"title":"Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge?","authors":"Edward Goldring, Austin S. Matthews","doi":"10.1177/00220027231206775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231206775","url":null,"abstract":"Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they provide dictators in navigating outsider threats. Second, dictators benefit from purging elites who helped them seize power; the demonstrable willingness of these elites to overthrow an incumbent threatens the dictator and his ability to consolidate power. We find support for our argument from original quantitative data on 289 elites in 32 autocratic ruling institutions between 1948 and 2000. Our findings have important implications for the study of the large proportion of autocracies born of regime change coups, particularly topics on survival and state violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"414 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135327671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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