Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027231177587
Ole Sevrin Nydal
How do rebel organizations capitalize on transit migration? While numerous studies have examined the role of refugees, this article explores a broader yet significant category of mobile populations in civil conflict. Focusing on Mali, I argue that transit migration increases rebel capacity based on three causal mechanisms: Obstacles in transit, camping banditry, and dynamic recruitment. Obstacles are an enabling mechanism by facilitating the intersection between rebels and migrants. As camping bandits, rebels move between violent extortion and systematic exploitation depending on levels of competition. Finally, I argue that rebels recruit transit migrants using dynamic strategies, including coercive incentives and short-term contracts in which social and ideological requirements are relaxed. Combining quantitative analysis with original interview data, I find significant support for the causal argument and preliminary evidence for my conceptual framework. The findings improve our understanding of rebel organizations and the role of mobile populations in civil conflict.
{"title":"Moving Through Conflict: Transit Migration and Rebel Capacity in Mali","authors":"Ole Sevrin Nydal","doi":"10.1177/00220027231177587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231177587","url":null,"abstract":"How do rebel organizations capitalize on transit migration? While numerous studies have examined the role of refugees, this article explores a broader yet significant category of mobile populations in civil conflict. Focusing on Mali, I argue that transit migration increases rebel capacity based on three causal mechanisms: Obstacles in transit, camping banditry, and dynamic recruitment. Obstacles are an enabling mechanism by facilitating the intersection between rebels and migrants. As camping bandits, rebels move between violent extortion and systematic exploitation depending on levels of competition. Finally, I argue that rebels recruit transit migrants using dynamic strategies, including coercive incentives and short-term contracts in which social and ideological requirements are relaxed. Combining quantitative analysis with original interview data, I find significant support for the causal argument and preliminary evidence for my conceptual framework. The findings improve our understanding of rebel organizations and the role of mobile populations in civil conflict.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41720090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1177/00220027231175071
Michael Jetter, Rafat Mahmood, David Stadelmann
This paper first introduces a theoretical formalization connecting a polity’s income level to terrorism. Our framework can accommodate different underlying assumptions about individual- and society-level grievances, yielding competing hypotheses. We then construct a panel database to study terrorism for 1527 subnational regions in 75 countries between 1970 and 2014. Results consistently imply an inverted U-shape that remains robust to incorporating a comprehensive set of region-level covariates, region- and time-fixed effects, as well as estimating an array of alternative specifications. The threat of terrorism systematically rises as low-income polities become richer, peaking at GDP/capita levels of ≈ US$12,800 (in constant 2005 PPP US$), but then falls consistently above that level. This pattern emerges for domestic and transnational terrorism alike. While peaks differ by perpetrator ideology, the inverted U shape also prevails across ideology-specific subsamples. In sum, alleviating poverty may first exacerbate terrorism, contrary to much of the proposed recipes advocated since 9/11.
{"title":"Income and Terrorism: Insights From Subnational Data","authors":"Michael Jetter, Rafat Mahmood, David Stadelmann","doi":"10.1177/00220027231175071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231175071","url":null,"abstract":"This paper first introduces a theoretical formalization connecting a polity’s income level to terrorism. Our framework can accommodate different underlying assumptions about individual- and society-level grievances, yielding competing hypotheses. We then construct a panel database to study terrorism for 1527 subnational regions in 75 countries between 1970 and 2014. Results consistently imply an inverted U-shape that remains robust to incorporating a comprehensive set of region-level covariates, region- and time-fixed effects, as well as estimating an array of alternative specifications. The threat of terrorism systematically rises as low-income polities become richer, peaking at GDP/capita levels of ≈ US$12,800 (in constant 2005 PPP US$), but then falls consistently above that level. This pattern emerges for domestic and transnational terrorism alike. While peaks differ by perpetrator ideology, the inverted U shape also prevails across ideology-specific subsamples. In sum, alleviating poverty may first exacerbate terrorism, contrary to much of the proposed recipes advocated since 9/11.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135335841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1177/00220027231176237
D. Krause
What explains the emergence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as parties in civil wars? This study provides the first large-N analysis of this question, studying a sample of states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 2003–2020, contributing to ongoing debates among peace and conflict scholars about jihadist rebels in civil war. Theoretically, it is argued that higher levels of state repression and states’ military capabilities should impact the preferences of local groups and increase the likelihood of a ‘transnationalization’. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increases in bureaucratic state capacity should reduce the risk of such transnationalization. A series of penalized logistic regressions yield support for the hypotheses regarding state repression and bureaucratic capacity, but not military state capacity. The findings point towards the importance of bureaucratic capacity building as well as the potentially adverse consequences of excessively repressive counterterrorism strategies.
{"title":"Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: The Role of Repression and State Capacity","authors":"D. Krause","doi":"10.1177/00220027231176237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231176237","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the emergence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as parties in civil wars? This study provides the first large-N analysis of this question, studying a sample of states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 2003–2020, contributing to ongoing debates among peace and conflict scholars about jihadist rebels in civil war. Theoretically, it is argued that higher levels of state repression and states’ military capabilities should impact the preferences of local groups and increase the likelihood of a ‘transnationalization’. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increases in bureaucratic state capacity should reduce the risk of such transnationalization. A series of penalized logistic regressions yield support for the hypotheses regarding state repression and bureaucratic capacity, but not military state capacity. The findings point towards the importance of bureaucratic capacity building as well as the potentially adverse consequences of excessively repressive counterterrorism strategies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47121169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027221104704
Douglas M. Gibler, Steven V. Miller
We use this article to introduce the Militarized Interstate Confrontation (MIC) dataset, 1816-2014—a new dataset for international conflict with a host of innovative features. The MIC data corrects thousands of errors in existing interstate conflict data and provides fatality ranges for all conflicts, with meaningful fatality estimates and no missing fatality values. Thus, the MIC data fixes missing data problems that have precluded researchers from analyzing escalation and related issues because of the lack of integrated conflict and war data. We also identify and distribute separate datasets for state-versus-citizen actions that are protest-dependent. These are attacks on shipping, fishing boats, and rebels, which were previously included in the data because the sovereign of those private citizens protested. We discuss our systematic search for new conflict cases and the 108 new conflicts we found, and we provide analyses and summaries that demonstrate the usefulness of our MIC data. Finally, we use our new data to create the first ever dataset of truly dyadic, directed dyad-year data, with highest actions and fatalities that vary appropriately within conflicts by both year and dyad. We believe these datasets will be useful for a host of studies but especially those interested in how conflicts evolve over time.
{"title":"The Militarized Interstate Confrontation Dataset, 1816-2014","authors":"Douglas M. Gibler, Steven V. Miller","doi":"10.1177/00220027221104704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221104704","url":null,"abstract":"We use this article to introduce the Militarized Interstate Confrontation (MIC) dataset, 1816-2014—a new dataset for international conflict with a host of innovative features. The MIC data corrects thousands of errors in existing interstate conflict data and provides fatality ranges for all conflicts, with meaningful fatality estimates and no missing fatality values. Thus, the MIC data fixes missing data problems that have precluded researchers from analyzing escalation and related issues because of the lack of integrated conflict and war data. We also identify and distribute separate datasets for state-versus-citizen actions that are protest-dependent. These are attacks on shipping, fishing boats, and rebels, which were previously included in the data because the sovereign of those private citizens protested. We discuss our systematic search for new conflict cases and the 108 new conflicts we found, and we provide analyses and summaries that demonstrate the usefulness of our MIC data. Finally, we use our new data to create the first ever dataset of truly dyadic, directed dyad-year data, with highest actions and fatalities that vary appropriately within conflicts by both year and dyad. We believe these datasets will be useful for a host of studies but especially those interested in how conflicts evolve over time.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48581059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027231170562
Scott Williamson
A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.
{"title":"Do Proxies Provide Plausible Deniability? Evidence From Experiments on Three Surveys","authors":"Scott Williamson","doi":"10.1177/00220027231170562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231170562","url":null,"abstract":"A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47286871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-23DOI: 10.1177/00220027231171310
TaeJun Seo, Yusaku Horiuchi
The “rally 'round the flag” effect—a short-term boost in a political leader’s popularity during an interstate political dispute—was first proposed by Mueller (1970) more than half a century ago. Ho...
{"title":"Natural Experiments of the Rally 'Round the Flag Effects Using Worldwide Surveys","authors":"TaeJun Seo, Yusaku Horiuchi","doi":"10.1177/00220027231171310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231171310","url":null,"abstract":"The “rally 'round the flag” effect—a short-term boost in a political leader’s popularity during an interstate political dispute—was first proposed by Mueller (1970) more than half a century ago. Ho...","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50165345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-21DOI: 10.1177/00220027231167840
Jordan Becker, S. Kreps, Paul Poast, Rochelle Terman
Does “shaming” work in NATO? More precisely, does publicly using negative language criticizing allies’ defense spending improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower spending? We evaluate the effectiveness of public shaming language; specifically, whether it increases allies’ defense spending or whether other considerations like external threat, domestic budgets, economic growth, or unemployment rates are better predictors of contributions. Using an original dataset of presidential statements and NATO defense spending data disaggregated across the four categories tracked by the alliance, we conclude that negative language toward allies’ spending is at best ineffective and may even adversely affect burden-sharing in the long run. These findings have important implications for the political economy of alliances and both theories and policies on the use of rhetorical pressure to elicit compliance in asymmetric power relationships.
{"title":"Transatlantic Shakedown: Presidential Shaming and NATO Burden Sharing","authors":"Jordan Becker, S. Kreps, Paul Poast, Rochelle Terman","doi":"10.1177/00220027231167840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231167840","url":null,"abstract":"Does “shaming” work in NATO? More precisely, does publicly using negative language criticizing allies’ defense spending improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower spending? We evaluate the effectiveness of public shaming language; specifically, whether it increases allies’ defense spending or whether other considerations like external threat, domestic budgets, economic growth, or unemployment rates are better predictors of contributions. Using an original dataset of presidential statements and NATO defense spending data disaggregated across the four categories tracked by the alliance, we conclude that negative language toward allies’ spending is at best ineffective and may even adversely affect burden-sharing in the long run. These findings have important implications for the political economy of alliances and both theories and policies on the use of rhetorical pressure to elicit compliance in asymmetric power relationships.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43973186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027231170569
A. Ibáñez, A. Arjona, Julián Arteaga, J. Cárdenas, P. Justino
A growing literature has documented widespread variation in the extent to which insurgents provide public goods, collect taxes, and regulate civilian conduct. This paper offers what is, to our knowledge, the first study of the long-term economic legacies of rebel governance. This effect is theoretically unclear. Rebel governance may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate resources. However, rebel rule may be too unstable to maintain such incentives. We explore empirically the effect of rebel rule on households’ economic resilience using a longitudinal dataset for Colombia. Results show a positive relation between wartime rebel rule and the ability of households to cope with weather shocks in the post-war period. Households in regions where armed groups were present but exercised limited or no intervention fare worse. This effect is associated with infrastructure improvement led by armed groups, their intervention in dispute adjudication, and their close interactions with local populations.
{"title":"The Long-Term Economic Legacies of Rebel Rule in Civil War: Micro Evidence From Colombia","authors":"A. Ibáñez, A. Arjona, Julián Arteaga, J. Cárdenas, P. Justino","doi":"10.1177/00220027231170569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231170569","url":null,"abstract":"A growing literature has documented widespread variation in the extent to which insurgents provide public goods, collect taxes, and regulate civilian conduct. This paper offers what is, to our knowledge, the first study of the long-term economic legacies of rebel governance. This effect is theoretically unclear. Rebel governance may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate resources. However, rebel rule may be too unstable to maintain such incentives. We explore empirically the effect of rebel rule on households’ economic resilience using a longitudinal dataset for Colombia. Results show a positive relation between wartime rebel rule and the ability of households to cope with weather shocks in the post-war period. Households in regions where armed groups were present but exercised limited or no intervention fare worse. This effect is associated with infrastructure improvement led by armed groups, their intervention in dispute adjudication, and their close interactions with local populations.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48541180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027231166345
J Andres Gannon, E. Gartzke, J. Lindsay, P. Schram
Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the “gray zone” between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to “little green men”—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggression in response to a credible escalation threat. We develop a model that formalizes both scenarios and identifies distinct empirical patterns across the two cases. We use the model’s findings to empirically analyze Russian gray zone activity since the 1990s, finding that Russian activity appears, in part, to be restrained by NATO’s deterrent threat. Our model also shows that developing gray zone conflict capabilities can lead to more peace but could also backfire and provoke a challenger to escalate to war.
{"title":"The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War","authors":"J Andres Gannon, E. Gartzke, J. Lindsay, P. Schram","doi":"10.1177/00220027231166345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231166345","url":null,"abstract":"Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the “gray zone” between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to “little green men”—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggression in response to a credible escalation threat. We develop a model that formalizes both scenarios and identifies distinct empirical patterns across the two cases. We use the model’s findings to empirically analyze Russian gray zone activity since the 1990s, finding that Russian activity appears, in part, to be restrained by NATO’s deterrent threat. Our model also shows that developing gray zone conflict capabilities can lead to more peace but could also backfire and provoke a challenger to escalate to war.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42188981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027231169260
Dan P. Silverman, Benjamin Acosta, Reyko Huang
What determines the outcomes of civil wars? Existing literature highlights numerous factors at the systemic, state, and organizational levels of analysis. Yet there is little research on the attributes of rebel leaders in shaping war outcomes despite ample theories of their importance in steering their organizations. This article focuses on rebel leaders’ age as one key driver of their behavior. Applying insights from developmental psychology to the context of armed rebellion, we argue that young rebel leaders are the most likely to suffer military defeats, middle-aged leaders to win military victories, and elderly ones to reach negotiated settlements. We use a mixed-methods strategy to substantiate our claims, combining case studies of George Washington and Yasser Arafat with new data from the Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) database. Our findings help advance the study of non-state violent leaders in world politics while illuminating neglected sources of risk and opportunity for peace practitioners.
{"title":"Rebel Leader Age and the Outcomes of Civil Wars","authors":"Dan P. Silverman, Benjamin Acosta, Reyko Huang","doi":"10.1177/00220027231169260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231169260","url":null,"abstract":"What determines the outcomes of civil wars? Existing literature highlights numerous factors at the systemic, state, and organizational levels of analysis. Yet there is little research on the attributes of rebel leaders in shaping war outcomes despite ample theories of their importance in steering their organizations. This article focuses on rebel leaders’ age as one key driver of their behavior. Applying insights from developmental psychology to the context of armed rebellion, we argue that young rebel leaders are the most likely to suffer military defeats, middle-aged leaders to win military victories, and elderly ones to reach negotiated settlements. We use a mixed-methods strategy to substantiate our claims, combining case studies of George Washington and Yasser Arafat with new data from the Rebel Organization Leaders (ROLE) database. Our findings help advance the study of non-state violent leaders in world politics while illuminating neglected sources of risk and opportunity for peace practitioners.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43043882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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