Pub Date : 2024-10-04DOI: 10.1177/00220027241289843
Chandan Kumar Jha, Ishita Tripathi
The existing literature on terrorism focuses on the “rally-around-the-flag-effect” – a relatively short-term phenomenon. The non-immediate effects of terrorist attacks on trust in institutions, however, remain largely unexplored. Arguing that maintaining law and order and upholding peace is considered the responsibility of the political and legal institutions in democracies, we theorize the “accountability effect” suggesting that terrorist activities indicate institutional failures in preventing casualties, undermining residents’ trust in these institutions. Using over 350,000 individual-level observations from the European Social Survey, we find evidence of the accountability effect showing that exposure to terrorist activities undermines self-reported trust in various national and international institutions, including the parliament, legal institutions, the police, politicians, political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Whereas this negative relationship does not weaken with additional terrorist attacks, strong governance and high trust in institutions mitigate these adverse effects. Lastly, terrorist attacks do not affect trust among people.
关于恐怖主义的现有文献侧重于 "围旗效应"--一种相对短期的现象。然而，恐怖袭击对机构信任的非直接影响在很大程度上仍未得到探讨。在民主国家，维持法律秩序和维护和平被认为是政治和法律机构的责任，因此我们提出了 "问责效应 "的理论，认为恐怖活动表明机构在防止人员伤亡方面存在失误，从而削弱了居民对这些机构的信任。我们利用欧洲社会调查（European Social Survey）中超过 35 万个个人层面的观察结果，找到了问责效应的证据，表明恐怖活动会削弱人们对各种国家和国际机构的自报信任，包括议会、法律机构、警察、政治家、政党、欧洲议会和联合国。虽然这种负面关系不会随着更多的恐怖袭击而减弱，但强有力的治理和对机构的高度信任会减轻这些不利影响。最后，恐怖袭击不会影响人们之间的信任。
{"title":"Terrorist Attacks and Trust in Institutions: Micro Evidence From Europe","authors":"Chandan Kumar Jha, Ishita Tripathi","doi":"10.1177/00220027241289843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241289843","url":null,"abstract":"The existing literature on terrorism focuses on the “rally-around-the-flag-effect” – a relatively short-term phenomenon. The non-immediate effects of terrorist attacks on trust in institutions, however, remain largely unexplored. Arguing that maintaining law and order and upholding peace is considered the responsibility of the political and legal institutions in democracies, we theorize the “accountability effect” suggesting that terrorist activities indicate institutional failures in preventing casualties, undermining residents’ trust in these institutions. Using over 350,000 individual-level observations from the European Social Survey, we find evidence of the accountability effect showing that exposure to terrorist activities undermines self-reported trust in various national and international institutions, including the parliament, legal institutions, the police, politicians, political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Whereas this negative relationship does not weaken with additional terrorist attacks, strong governance and high trust in institutions mitigate these adverse effects. Lastly, terrorist attacks do not affect trust among people.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027241283824
Andrew J. Coe, Peter Schram, Heesun Yoo
Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence.
{"title":"Terrorism Works, for its Supporters","authors":"Andrew J. Coe, Peter Schram, Heesun Yoo","doi":"10.1177/00220027241283824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241283824","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268586
Don Casler
When and why do foreign policy officials believe that it is important to fight for credibility? Conventional wisdom suggests that policymakers tend to care uniformly about how others perceive them. Yet this logic overlooks substantial variation in how officials prioritize credibility when weighing policy options. I argue that organizational identity affects the dimensions of credibility that policymakers value and their preferences on the use of force. Diplomats see the world from a reputational perspective, whereas military officials do so through the lens of military capabilities. During crises, diplomats match their advice to reputational considerations, while military officials attend to available capabilities. I examine these propositions via an original, vignette-based elite experiment involving over 250 U.S. national security officials and analysis of historical elite survey data. The findings demonstrate that where you sit shapes when you want to fight for credibility.
{"title":"Credibility, Organizational Politics, and Crisis Decision Making","authors":"Don Casler","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268586","url":null,"abstract":"When and why do foreign policy officials believe that it is important to fight for credibility? Conventional wisdom suggests that policymakers tend to care uniformly about how others perceive them. Yet this logic overlooks substantial variation in how officials prioritize credibility when weighing policy options. I argue that organizational identity affects the dimensions of credibility that policymakers value and their preferences on the use of force. Diplomats see the world from a reputational perspective, whereas military officials do so through the lens of military capabilities. During crises, diplomats match their advice to reputational considerations, while military officials attend to available capabilities. I examine these propositions via an original, vignette-based elite experiment involving over 250 U.S. national security officials and analysis of historical elite survey data. The findings demonstrate that where you sit shapes when you want to fight for credibility.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269897
José M. Reis, Marcel Garz
International courts lack traditional enforcement mechanisms. Scholars theorize that compliance with human rights rulings is therefore often driven by domestic processes, including political mobilization and parliamentary agenda setting. A necessary condition underlying these processes is attention to the rulings which is in part expected to be mediated by media attention. However, these conditions have not been explicitly addressed by the existing compliance literature. In this paper, we assess the impact of media attention to rulings by the European Court of the Human Rights on the likelihood of their implementation, using a novel dataset of case-specific news coverage. Exploiting exogenous variation in media attention caused by competing newsworthy events, we find that the probability of compliance increases, the more coverage a ruling receives. Our findings indicate that domestic news media play a key role for compliance with international courts.
{"title":"Media Attention and Compliance With the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"José M. Reis, Marcel Garz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269897","url":null,"abstract":"International courts lack traditional enforcement mechanisms. Scholars theorize that compliance with human rights rulings is therefore often driven by domestic processes, including political mobilization and parliamentary agenda setting. A necessary condition underlying these processes is attention to the rulings which is in part expected to be mediated by media attention. However, these conditions have not been explicitly addressed by the existing compliance literature. In this paper, we assess the impact of media attention to rulings by the European Court of the Human Rights on the likelihood of their implementation, using a novel dataset of case-specific news coverage. Exploiting exogenous variation in media attention caused by competing newsworthy events, we find that the probability of compliance increases, the more coverage a ruling receives. Our findings indicate that domestic news media play a key role for compliance with international courts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267777
Haonan Dong
States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.
{"title":"The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations","authors":"Haonan Dong","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267777","url":null,"abstract":"States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267839
Nicholas J. Lotito, Renanah Miles Joyce
This article explores the phenomenon of high levels of public trust in the military across the Global South. We extend arguments from the US civil-military relations literature to a broader context and generate testable hypotheses to explain trust in the armed forces driven by the military’s performance and professionalism, and the public’s patriotism and partisanship. Using public opinion survey data from 73 countries between 1995 and 2017, we find broad but nuanced support for the hypotheses. Many determinants of public trust in the military, theorized in the US context, generalize globally: battlefield performance, resources, national pride, and right-wing partisanship all increase trust in the military, while coups and civil wars decrease it. By contrast, the effect of conscription is opposite to that in the United States, with national service providing a trust boost. The study highlights the implications of public trust for civil-military relations, political stability, and governance.
{"title":"In the Army We Trust: Public Confidence in Global South Militaries","authors":"Nicholas J. Lotito, Renanah Miles Joyce","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267839","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the phenomenon of high levels of public trust in the military across the Global South. We extend arguments from the US civil-military relations literature to a broader context and generate testable hypotheses to explain trust in the armed forces driven by the military’s performance and professionalism, and the public’s patriotism and partisanship. Using public opinion survey data from 73 countries between 1995 and 2017, we find broad but nuanced support for the hypotheses. Many determinants of public trust in the military, theorized in the US context, generalize globally: battlefield performance, resources, national pride, and right-wing partisanship all increase trust in the military, while coups and civil wars decrease it. By contrast, the effect of conscription is opposite to that in the United States, with national service providing a trust boost. The study highlights the implications of public trust for civil-military relations, political stability, and governance.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141986211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269980
Konstantin Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov
How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.
{"title":"Returning Veterans’ Attitudes Toward Democracy: Evidence From a Survey of Ukraine’s ATO Veterans","authors":"Konstantin Ash, Miroslav Shapovalov","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269980","url":null,"abstract":"How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141980707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027241269952
Emily Myers
Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.
{"title":"Insurgent Conscription for Capacity and Control: State Violence and Coerced Recruitment in Civil War","authors":"Emily Myers","doi":"10.1177/00220027241269952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269952","url":null,"abstract":"Though previous research has recognized that armed groups do not always recruit fighters on a voluntary basis, varieties and determinants of insurgent forced recruitment are still poorly understood. What drives armed groups to employ certain methods of coercive recruitment? This article conceptualizes and studies a particular form of coerced recruitment—insurgent conscription—whereby rebel groups rely on their administrative capacity to compel civilians to fight. Building on scholarship that highlights the impact of state violence on rebel recruitment, I theorize that state violence incentivizes armed groups to employ insurgent conscription. Leveraging a novel, cross-national dataset of insurgent conscription in state-rebel dyads between 1946 and 2008, I find that state targeting of an armed group’s civilian support base increases the likelihood of insurgent conscription. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between state violence and insurgent recruitment, rebel-civilian relationships, and the transformation of institutions and networks in civil wars.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141974309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268533
Shelley X. Liu
Following regime change, how does wartime victimization shape political attitudes and participation in the long run? I argue that it increases post-war political vigilance: greater sensitivity to illiberal politics and poor governance, but with dampened effects on participation under authoritarianism due to greater fear of harm. I examine Protected Villages (PVs) in the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972–1979). PVs, a Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, was a large-scale and violent resettlement program that intensified politics’ role in civilian lives. I map PV-affected areas within pre-war and current-day administrative divisions, and estimate a difference-in-discontinuities regression to identify PVs’ long-run effects. PV-affected areas report greater sensitivity to the country’s illiberal politics and are more critical of poor government performance today. Contrary to existing literature however, I find no evidence of increased political participation and pro-social behavior in the long run, nor hardened support for the ruling party—whom these areas had once supported during war.
{"title":"From Politicization to Vigilance: The Post-war Legacies of Wartime Victimization","authors":"Shelley X. Liu","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268533","url":null,"abstract":"Following regime change, how does wartime victimization shape political attitudes and participation in the long run? I argue that it increases post-war political vigilance: greater sensitivity to illiberal politics and poor governance, but with dampened effects on participation under authoritarianism due to greater fear of harm. I examine Protected Villages (PVs) in the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972–1979). PVs, a Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, was a large-scale and violent resettlement program that intensified politics’ role in civilian lives. I map PV-affected areas within pre-war and current-day administrative divisions, and estimate a difference-in-discontinuities regression to identify PVs’ long-run effects. PV-affected areas report greater sensitivity to the country’s illiberal politics and are more critical of poor government performance today. Contrary to existing literature however, I find no evidence of increased political participation and pro-social behavior in the long run, nor hardened support for the ruling party—whom these areas had once supported during war.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141895464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267209
Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.
{"title":"From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections","authors":"Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed","doi":"10.1177/00220027241267209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241267209","url":null,"abstract":"Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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