Pub Date : 2025-01-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027241308270
Ipek Ece Sener
Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid civilian victimization before peace talks by offering them a seat at the negotiation table.
{"title":"Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting","authors":"Ipek Ece Sener","doi":"10.1177/00220027241308270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241308270","url":null,"abstract":"Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid civilian victimization before peace talks by offering them a seat at the negotiation table.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-23DOI: 10.1177/00220027241309299
Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm
Why do states that simultaneously support rebel groups in each other’s intrastate conflicts enter negotiations to resolve such mutual interventions? This is an important question, as negotiations between interveners typically lead to negotiated settlements, which in turn tend to make their intrastate conflicts far less deadly. We argue that international crises make negotiations more likely. Crises raise the costs of intervention and often lead potential mediators to put pressure on states to negotiate. Using new monthly data on mutual interventions in Africa, the article shows that crises are indeed significantly associated with the likelihood that negotiations will occur. This finding is robust to using fixed effects and matching. The article contributes to the literature by investigating a widespread though little-studied type of conflict, as well as by studying the impact of state leaders’ crisis perception using a quantitative research design, which helps overcome a methodological limitation seen in previous studies.
{"title":"Crises and Negotiations in Mutual Interventions","authors":"Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm","doi":"10.1177/00220027241309299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241309299","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states that simultaneously support rebel groups in each other’s intrastate conflicts enter negotiations to resolve such mutual interventions? This is an important question, as negotiations between interveners typically lead to negotiated settlements, which in turn tend to make their intrastate conflicts far less deadly. We argue that international crises make negotiations more likely. Crises raise the costs of intervention and often lead potential mediators to put pressure on states to negotiate. Using new monthly data on mutual interventions in Africa, the article shows that crises are indeed significantly associated with the likelihood that negotiations will occur. This finding is robust to using fixed effects and matching. The article contributes to the literature by investigating a widespread though little-studied type of conflict, as well as by studying the impact of state leaders’ crisis perception using a quantitative research design, which helps overcome a methodological limitation seen in previous studies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-23DOI: 10.1177/00220027241309284
Juliana Tappe Ortiz
Who are the leaders who end civil wars through peace agreements? I theorize that the prior combat experience of a state leader is an important life experience with direct relevance for how leaders evaluate conflict outcomes. Combat experience increases sensitivity to human losses and gives the state leader a hawkish reputation, increasing internal support, boosting their risk-tolerance, and convincing the rebel leader to take the leader seriously. Using a nested research design, I show that civil wars are more likely to terminate in peace agreements when the leader in charge knows the battlefield. I supplement the quantitative analysis of all state leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015 with a qualitative pathway case of Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono. These findings expand upon insights on leaders’ attributes indicating that prior combat experience has different effects on potential conflict outcomes in intrastate than in international wars.
{"title":"Dovish Hawks: How Leaders’ Combat Experience Influences the End of Civil Conflicts in Peace Agreements","authors":"Juliana Tappe Ortiz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241309284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241309284","url":null,"abstract":"Who are the leaders who end civil wars through peace agreements? I theorize that the prior combat experience of a state leader is an important life experience with direct relevance for how leaders evaluate conflict outcomes. Combat experience increases sensitivity to human losses and gives the state leader a hawkish reputation, increasing internal support, boosting their risk-tolerance, and convincing the rebel leader to take the leader seriously. Using a nested research design, I show that civil wars are more likely to terminate in peace agreements when the leader in charge knows the battlefield. I supplement the quantitative analysis of all state leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015 with a qualitative pathway case of Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono. These findings expand upon insights on leaders’ attributes indicating that prior combat experience has different effects on potential conflict outcomes in intrastate than in international wars.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"279 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027241305076
Umut Yüksel
The making of international law through multilateral conventions and adjudication often leads to periods of legal uncertainty, times in which there are alternative rules and divergent views on how they ought to be applied to particular cases. I argue that legal uncertainty gives states opportunities and incentives to formulate excessive unilateral claims, thus making disputes more likely to arise. I illustrate my argument with a comprehensive analysis of maritime boundary disputes in the aftermath of the Second World War. In this period, the law regulating maritime boundary-making has been marked by varying degrees of uncertainty due to different rules and interpretations proffered by various multilateral and judicial lawmaking attempts. I find strong evidence that high legal uncertainty is associated with an increased probability of dispute onset. The analysis calls for an important rethinking of the impact of legalization on international affairs, both in maritime boundary-making and in other issues areas.
{"title":"The Law Behind Dispute Onset: How Legal Uncertainty Drives Maritime Boundary Disputes","authors":"Umut Yüksel","doi":"10.1177/00220027241305076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241305076","url":null,"abstract":"The making of international law through multilateral conventions and adjudication often leads to periods of legal uncertainty, times in which there are alternative rules and divergent views on how they ought to be applied to particular cases. I argue that legal uncertainty gives states opportunities and incentives to formulate excessive unilateral claims, thus making disputes more likely to arise. I illustrate my argument with a comprehensive analysis of maritime boundary disputes in the aftermath of the Second World War. In this period, the law regulating maritime boundary-making has been marked by varying degrees of uncertainty due to different rules and interpretations proffered by various multilateral and judicial lawmaking attempts. I find strong evidence that high legal uncertainty is associated with an increased probability of dispute onset. The analysis calls for an important rethinking of the impact of legalization on international affairs, both in maritime boundary-making and in other issues areas.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"135 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142789877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-04DOI: 10.1177/00220027241298890
Ursula Daxecker, Annekatrin Deglow, Hanne Fjelde
This study presents new theory and evidence on the repertoire of electoral intimidation, suggesting that threats can be used to deter rival party supporters from voting but also to mobilize citizens to vote for a particular party. We expect these strategies to unfold in the same electoral context, but differ in targeting and incidence; while threats to demobilize are concentrated in closely contested areas and occur more frequently overall, threats to mobilize target fewer voters and are centered in parties’ own strongholds. Recognizing the difficulty of surveying citizens about sensitive experiences, we combine qualitative material from local news with evidence from a list experiment embedded in an original survey conducted after the 2019 elections in the Indian state of West Bengal. Our empirical findings corroborate our expectations: areas without overt violence may nevertheless be highly coercive, underlining the importance of studying the full repertoire of electoral violence.
{"title":"Voter Intimidation as a Tool of Mobilization or Demobilization? Evidence from West Bengal, India","authors":"Ursula Daxecker, Annekatrin Deglow, Hanne Fjelde","doi":"10.1177/00220027241298890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241298890","url":null,"abstract":"This study presents new theory and evidence on the repertoire of electoral intimidation, suggesting that threats can be used to deter rival party supporters from voting but also to mobilize citizens to vote for a particular party. We expect these strategies to unfold in the same electoral context, but differ in targeting and incidence; while threats to demobilize are concentrated in closely contested areas and occur more frequently overall, threats to mobilize target fewer voters and are centered in parties’ own strongholds. Recognizing the difficulty of surveying citizens about sensitive experiences, we combine qualitative material from local news with evidence from a list experiment embedded in an original survey conducted after the 2019 elections in the Indian state of West Bengal. Our empirical findings corroborate our expectations: areas without overt violence may nevertheless be highly coercive, underlining the importance of studying the full repertoire of electoral violence.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"215 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142776389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-02DOI: 10.1177/00220027241304703
Berker Kavasoglu
Why are some autocratic regimes more prone to mass uprisings than others? This article argues that autocratic leaders can mitigate opposition mobilization by strategically appointing opposition leaders to cabinet positions. Drawing on yearly data from autocracies between 1966 and 2020, the article exploits temporal variations in the composition of cabinets and the onset of mass uprisings within autocratic regimes. The findings demonstrate that appointing opposition elites to cabinet positions significantly decreases the likelihood of anti-regime mass uprisings. The results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation strategies addressing endogeneity concerns. By demonstrating why some autocracies with organized opposition avoid uprisings while others face repeated challenges, this study offers novel insights into how opposition cooptation stabilizes autocratic regimes.
{"title":"The Power of Cabinet Appointments in Autocracies: Elite Cooptation and Anti-Regime Mass Uprisings","authors":"Berker Kavasoglu","doi":"10.1177/00220027241304703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241304703","url":null,"abstract":"Why are some autocratic regimes more prone to mass uprisings than others? This article argues that autocratic leaders can mitigate opposition mobilization by strategically appointing opposition leaders to cabinet positions. Drawing on yearly data from autocracies between 1966 and 2020, the article exploits temporal variations in the composition of cabinets and the onset of mass uprisings within autocratic regimes. The findings demonstrate that appointing opposition elites to cabinet positions significantly decreases the likelihood of anti-regime mass uprisings. The results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation strategies addressing endogeneity concerns. By demonstrating why some autocracies with organized opposition avoid uprisings while others face repeated challenges, this study offers novel insights into how opposition cooptation stabilizes autocratic regimes.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142760311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-30DOI: 10.1177/00220027241303150
Kris De Jaegher
This paper presents a game-theoretic model where dissidents with heterogeneous abilities and motivations contribute to collective action. A regime demotivates dissidents by preemptively increasing their costs of contributing, using a budget that can be spread across them in any way desired. The regime’s optimal targeting strategy is shown to depend on the (technological) degree of complementarity between dissidents’ contributions. For low complementarity, it is optimal to equalize all dissidents’ strengths (where strength depends both on motivation and ability; tall-poppies strategy). For intermediate complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the most able dissidents (key-player strategy). For high complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the least-motivated dissidents (weakest-link strategy). The range of intermediate complementarities for which the key-player strategy is optimal is larger, the larger heterogeneity in abilities. The paper finds indication for the use of these strategies in concrete examples of preemptive repression.
{"title":"Whom to Repress: Tall Poppies, Key Players, and Weakest Links","authors":"Kris De Jaegher","doi":"10.1177/00220027241303150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241303150","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a game-theoretic model where dissidents with heterogeneous abilities and motivations contribute to collective action. A regime demotivates dissidents by preemptively increasing their costs of contributing, using a budget that can be spread across them in any way desired. The regime’s optimal targeting strategy is shown to depend on the (technological) degree of complementarity between dissidents’ contributions. For low complementarity, it is optimal to equalize all dissidents’ strengths (where strength depends both on motivation and ability; tall-poppies strategy). For intermediate complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the most able dissidents (key-player strategy). For high complementarity, it is optimal to focus all repression on the least-motivated dissidents (weakest-link strategy). The range of intermediate complementarities for which the key-player strategy is optimal is larger, the larger heterogeneity in abilities. The paper finds indication for the use of these strategies in concrete examples of preemptive repression.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142756105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027241297641
Ruixing Cao
Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument.
{"title":"Personalist Regime and Rebel Sponsorship in Civil Conflicts","authors":"Ruixing Cao","doi":"10.1177/00220027241297641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241297641","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"252 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027241299815
Alejandro Corvalan
There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.
{"title":"Does Local Representation Reduce Self-Determination Conflict?","authors":"Alejandro Corvalan","doi":"10.1177/00220027241299815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241299815","url":null,"abstract":"There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027241297692
Oliver Pamp, Andreas Mehltretter, Paul Binder, Paul W. Thurner
There is a scarcity of systematic data regarding the military equipment of rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts. This empirical gap has impeded the rigorous evaluation of (formal) theories concerning militarized interactions between governments and rebel groups. To address this deficiency, we have developed the Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD). This dataset provides detailed information on the military arsenals of 270 groups over the period from 1989 to 2020, categorizing 15 different types of small arms, light weapons, explosives, and major weapons. In this article, we introduce RAD, compare it with existing datasets, elucidate the data collection process, present an initial overview of the information contained in it, and apply the data to examine civilian suffering in civil wars. Although this dataset is merely an initial step that can be expanded as additional public information becomes available, RAD offers the first organized compilation of data on the armament levels of rebels.
{"title":"Introducing the Rebels’ Armament Dataset (RAD): Empirical Evidence on Rebel Military Capabilities","authors":"Oliver Pamp, Andreas Mehltretter, Paul Binder, Paul W. Thurner","doi":"10.1177/00220027241297692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241297692","url":null,"abstract":"There is a scarcity of systematic data regarding the military equipment of rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts. This empirical gap has impeded the rigorous evaluation of (formal) theories concerning militarized interactions between governments and rebel groups. To address this deficiency, we have developed the Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD). This dataset provides detailed information on the military arsenals of 270 groups over the period from 1989 to 2020, categorizing 15 different types of small arms, light weapons, explosives, and major weapons. In this article, we introduce RAD, compare it with existing datasets, elucidate the data collection process, present an initial overview of the information contained in it, and apply the data to examine civilian suffering in civil wars. Although this dataset is merely an initial step that can be expanded as additional public information becomes available, RAD offers the first organized compilation of data on the armament levels of rebels.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142594766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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